M. RAVJI v. STATE — 1991 DIGILAW 243 (GUJ)

A. P. RAVANI, S. D. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THE dealer a dissolved partnership firm requested the Tribunal to make reference to this Court. The questions referred to are reproduced hereinafter. The relevant assessment period is as follows:1 April 1 L95 6/03/19572/04/195 7/10/19573/10/195 7/11/19584 November 12 195 8/02/1959the dealer was a registered partnership firm and was carrying on business of reselling oil. It was registered under the appropriate provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 The firm was dissolved on 22/02/1959 Before it was dissolved a search was made on the business premises of the firm and its books of accounts and other material were seized. For the aforesaid period assessment was made by the Sales Tax Officer. He passed four different orders and directed the assessee to pay Rs. 1 24 686. 18 ps. over and above the amount of Rs. 4 0 697. 57 ps. paid by it along with the returns. The aforesaid orders were passed by the Sales Tax Officer on 18/05/1967 Against the aforesaid assessment orders the dealer filed four different appeals before the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. It was contended in the appeals that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jullunder Vegetables Syndicate reported in 17 S. T. C. page 325 a dissolved firm cannot be assessed. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax followed the aforesaid decision and by his order dated 29/11/1967 set aside the order of assessment passed by the Sales Tax Officer. ( 2 ) THEREAFTER the things remained quiet upto 20/03/1976 on which date the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax issued a notice to the dealer stating that the matters were being taken up in suo motu revision. It appears that this action was taken on account of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Murarilal Mahavir Prasad and Ors. v. B. R. Vad and Other reported in 37 S. T. C. page 77. In that decision the Supreme Court held that under the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 a dissolved firm could be assessed or reassessed in respect of its turnover upto the date of its dissolution. In view of this decision the aforesaid notice was issued. v. B. R. Vad and Other reported in 37 S. T. C. page 77. In that decision the Supreme Court held that under the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 a dissolved firm could be assessed or reassessed in respect of its turnover upto the date of its dissolution. In view of this decision the aforesaid notice was issued. ( 3 ) IN response to the notice the dealer appeared before the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and raised several contentions on facts as well as on law points. The Deputy Commissioner however negatived all the contentions raised by the dealer and held as per his order dated 27/11/1980 that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax is not in accordance with law and the matters were remained to the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax for deciding the same on merits. It may be noted that the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax has disposed of the appeals only on the ground that a dissolved firm could not be assessed. He had not passed order on merits. ( 4 ) AGAINST the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax the dealer preferred four different revision applications before the Tribunal. It was inter alia contended before the Tribunal that the exercise of revisional power under Section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 was after a lapse of considerable time and after such an inordinate delay if the powers are exercised the same cannot be said to be reasonable exercise of power. Therefore the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax should be set aside. The Tribunal rejected all the contentions raised by the dealer by its judgment and order dated 12/11/1982 The dealer thereafter applied for making reference of certain questions to this Court. The Tribunal drew the statements of the case and referred the following questions to this Court for its opinion. Our answers to the questions are indicated in the column opposite to each question:question Answer 1 Whether on the facts and in the In negative in favour of the assessee circumstances of the case the Tribunal and against the revenue. was right in holding that the exercise of powers under Section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 as per orders passed on 27-11-80 by which appeal orders dated 29-11-67 are set aside is legal and valid? was right in holding that the exercise of powers under Section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 as per orders passed on 27-11-80 by which appeal orders dated 29-11-67 are set aside is legal and valid? 2 Whether on the facts and in the In affirmative in favour of the Revenue circumstances of the case the Tribunal and against the assessee. is right in holding that exercise of suo motu revision power by the Deputy Commissioner does not trench upon the power of rectification of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 ? 3 Whether on the facts and in the In negative in favour of the assessee circumstances of the case the Tribunal and against the Revenue. is right in holding that the requirement of the exercise of the power of suo motu revision within a reasonable time as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Others (A. P. R. 1969 S. C. 1297) would not be applicable to the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 4 Whether on the facts and in the In negative. in favour of the assessee circumstances of the case the Tribunal and against the Revenue. was right in holding that the power of suo motu revision cannot be said to be unreasonably exercised in the case of the applicant ? ( 5 ) WHETHER on the facts and in the In view of the answer to questions circumstances of the case the suo Nos. 1 and 4 this question does not motu revision orders passed without survive. Hence not answered. making all the expartners of the dissolved firm parties to the proceedings of revision are legal and valid ?5 As indicated hereinabove the assessment period covered by the orders passed by the S. T. O. which culminated into revision by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax is of the years 1956 to 1959 To be precise the period starts from 1-4-56 to 22-2-59. This period is divided into four different periods. This period is divided into four different periods. It is an admitted position that the firm was dissolved on 22/02/195 9/05/1956 the Sales Tax Officer passed assessment orders on the basis of the record produced and which was seized by the officers of the Sales Tax Department on 19/12/1958 Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jullunder Vegetables Syndicate reported in 17 S. T. C. page 326 the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax allowed the appeals solely on the ground that a dissolved firm could not be assessed. Thereafter the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case of Murarilal Mahavir Prasad and Ors. v. B. R. Vad and Other reported in 37 S. T. C. page 77 some time in September 1975. However the decision appears to have been reported in January or February 1976. It also appears that the Department came to know about the view taken by the Supreme Court that having regard to the scheme of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 and Bombay Sales Tax Act 1959 a dissolved firm can be assessed or reassessed to tax in respect of its predissolution turnover. In the case of Murarilal Mahavir Prasad (supra) the Supreme Court also considered its earlier decision in the case of Jullunder Vegetables Syndicate (supra) and explained and distinguished the same. In view of this judgment of the Supreme Court the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax issued notice on 20/03/1976 and sought to exercise his suo motu power and take all the four matters in revision. Thus after a period of eight years and four months the suo moto revision power was exercised by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. ( 6 ) THE controversy before the Tribunal was as to whether the Tribunal should have followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd. v. H. B. Munshi Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tar Bombay reported in 21 S. T. C. 333 or the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Ors. reported in AIR 1969 SC page 1297. reported in AIR 1969 SC page 1297. It was contended before the Tribunal as well as before this Court that in the case of Swastik Oil Mills (supra) the Supreme Court has in terms held that no period of limitation can be read into the statute as regards the suo motu exercise of powers because the statute has not provided any such limitation. While in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) the Supreme Court has in terms held that the revisional powers must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and nature of the order which is being revised. It is true that the Supreme Court has made these observations while considering the provisions of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. But it should not be forgotten that in Section 211 of the Bombay I and Revenue Code no period of limitation has been prescribed. The Supreme Court was aware of this fact. As a matter of fact this fact has been noted by the Supreme Court. Even so the Supreme Court observed to the following effect. ". . . it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised". The applicability of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be restricted to the cases falling under the provisions of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. If there is similar provision in any other statute and the question of exercise of revisional power arises then the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) would be applicable. It has got to be recognised that under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts in the country. It is not open to the lower courts to bye pass the judgments of the superior forum and that too of the Supreme Court by saying that the law declared by the Supreme Court pertains to some other statute. Such a distinction is without any meaning whatsoever. It is not open to the lower courts to bye pass the judgments of the superior forum and that too of the Supreme Court by saying that the law declared by the Supreme Court pertains to some other statute. Such a distinction is without any meaning whatsoever. In our opinion it was not open to the Tribunal to say that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) was not relevant simply because it was not under the Sales Tax Act. ( 7 ) THEREFORE the question arises as to what is the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Swastik Oil Mills (supra ). In that case the dealer was assessed to sales tax on its turnover for the periods from April 1 194 8/03/1950 and from 1/04/1950 to 31/03/1951 The assessment was made on the basis of the returns submitted by it. In the returns submitted by the assessee it claimed exemption from tax in respect of the turnover representing the despatches or transfers of goods from its head office Bombay to various depots or branches in other states. It had also claimed exemption in respect of sales which were alleged to have taken place in the course of interstate trade after 26/01/1950 The Sales Tax Officer rejected both the aforesaid claims. The assessee prefer red appeal before the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax who partly accepted the aforesaid claims as per his order dated 29/10/1956 As a consequence of the order passed by the appellate authority the tax liability of the assessee company was reduced. Hence direction was given that the amount of tax paid be refunded to it. The assessee filed revision in respect of the claim which was rejected by the appellate authority. During the pendency of the revisions application on 7/01/1963 a notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Bombay in exercise of this power under Section 32 of Bombay Sales Tax 1953 By this notice the company was intimated that the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax proposed to suo motu revise the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax in appeal. It was proposed that the deduction in respect of the entire goods despatched to branches in other states outside Maharashtra was not proper inasmuch as certain provisions of the Act were overlooked by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. On receipt of this notice the Company had prefer red writ petition in the High Court of Bombay challenging the legality and validity of the notice on various grounds including the ground regarding limitation. The Bombay High Court rejected the petition. The matter was carried before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court one of the contentions raised was that it should be held that the proceedings sought to be initiated were barred by time because the limitation of reasonable time within which the revisional powers are to be exercised must be implied in the statute itself. The Supreme Court refused to read such limitation and observed as follows:". . . WHEN a revisional power is to be exercised we think that the only limitations to which thai power is subject are those indicated by this Court in K. M. Cheria Abdulla and Co. s case. These limitations are that the revising authority should not trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Acts or by the Rules to other authorities and should not ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers. [emphasis supplied. ] from the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court it is clear that there are two limitations or constraints on the exercise of revisional powers. They are as follows: (i) The revisional authority should not exercise the powers which are reserved by the Act or by the Rules to any other authority that is to say the revisional authority should not encroach upon the powers of any other authority. (II) That the revisional authority should not ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of power. In the case of Swastik Oil Mills (supra) in the context of the facts of the case the Supreme Court held that when the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax sought to exercise his revisional powers under Section 11-A of the Act he was not transgressing any of the limits indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Kerala v. K. M. Cheria Abdulla and Co. reported in (1965) 16 S. T. C. page 875. reported in (1965) 16 S. T. C. page 875. ( 8 ) THE decision of Swastik Oil Mills case (supra) was rendered by Supreme Court on 29/11/1967 Thereafter in the year 1969 the Supreme Court decided the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra ). By necessary implication the Supreme Court has explained the inherent limitations on the exercise of powers by revisional authority. When the Supreme Court held that it was plain that the power (revisional power under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code) must be exercised within reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was being revised it was reiterating the well settled principle of law that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably. The duty to act judicially would necessitate the compliance with the rules of natural justice. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. This is so stated by the Supreme Court in the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 . It is also a settled principle of law entrenched in our jurisprudence that a power conferred upon any statutory authority should be exercised genuinely. Genuine exercise of powers takes within its sweep the concept of reasonableness. ( 9 ) WHILE considering the reasonableness of otherwise of the exercise of power time element enters into it. If the time gap is such that the exercise of power can be said to be unreasonable and therefore not genuine then the element of time becomes relevant. In this context reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mansaram v. S. P. Pathak reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1239. In that case a tenant was sought to be evicted after a period of about 22 years on the alleged ground that his initial entry in the premises was unauthorised. The question arose in the context of the provisions of C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order (1949) and the Supreme Court observed as follows:". . . . The question arose in the context of the provisions of C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order (1949) and the Supreme Court observed as follows:". . . . POWER is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector therefore comes across information that there is a contravention he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant". Thereafter the Supreme Court has referred its earlier decision in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) and has indicated that this is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. ( 10 ) IN view of the aforesaid legal position what is stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Raghav Natha can be summarised as follows: (I) All the statutory authorities are required to exercise powers reasonably. (II) Reasonable exercise of powers presupposes that the authority on which the power is conferred shall act in just fair and reasonable manner. Once an authority is required to act in just fair and reasonable manner and not arbitrarily the principles of natural justice come into play. (III) Powers conferred on any statutory authority can be exercised genuinely and for the purpose for which it is conferred. To determine as to whether the power conferred and exercised is genuine or not one has to take into consideration the time element. If the power is exercised after inordinate delay in a given case it may be said that it is not genuine exercise of power. This would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. (IV) While deciding as to whether it is genuine exercise of power or not the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised are required to be taken into consideration. This would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. (IV) While deciding as to whether it is genuine exercise of power or not the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised are required to be taken into consideration. (V) In substance length of the reasonable time is to be determined by taking into consideration the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised. ( 11 ) APPLYING the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case one has to keep in mind the scheme of the Act and the purpose for which the powers are conferred upon the authority. After examining the scheme of the Act and after noticing the purpose for which the power is conferred the question needs to be examined by keeping in mind the facts of each case and the nature of the order. Is the exercise of power in consonance with the object of the Act and does it serve the purpose for which the same is conferred ? In the instant case the power of suo motu revision is conferred to see that tax imposed is properly collected and wherever there is concealment and tax is escaped the same is disclosed and brought within the taxation net. After examining this question one has to consider the nature of the order under revision and consequences of the order that may be fixed in revision. Are the consequences such which are normally contemplated by the working of the Act ? Are the consequences such that there is likelihood of conflict of interest between a private individual and the interest of the society ? These are some of the considerations which should be taken into consideration while determining the nature of the order and while examining the facts of each case. In short all the relevant aspects of the facts of the case that of the order under revision should be taken into consideration. Therefore one may say that length of time would depend upon the facts of each case. ( 12 ) IT may be noted that in taxing statutes each year is separate entity. Ordinarily the assessment is to be made by the taxing officers in relation to each accounting year. Therefore one may say that length of time would depend upon the facts of each case. ( 12 ) IT may be noted that in taxing statutes each year is separate entity. Ordinarily the assessment is to be made by the taxing officers in relation to each accounting year. Businessmen as well as the Revenue do not consider that the respective rights and obligations of the parties remain open for an indefinite time. This is the reason why in almost all tax laws detailed provisions for assessment is made and assessment is ordinarily for each separate year. It is common knowledge that very often at the end of financial year the rates of tax also may change. The trading community and the people engaged in the world of commerce and trade manage and arrange their affairs by taking into consideration the provisions of tax laws prevailing at that time. They also arrange their affairs by taking recourse to and by understanding the orders that may be passed in each assessment year by the appropriate officers. Having regard to the normal course of business and the conduct of the administration it should ordinarily be held that once assessment is over in respect of a particular year the same would not be reopened except as provided under the Act. ( 13 ) THE Act provides for the reopening of assessment in certain cases only. There is no provision for reopening of the assessment on the ground of mistake of law common to both. It may be that mistake of law may be a ground for suo motu revision. But then the same should be subject to the inherent limitation for the purpose for which the power is conferred. The power is conferred for the purpose of collecting revenue and to see that there is no concealment and evasion of tax and the dealer has not escaped the assessment. In short it is conferred with a view to prevent evasion to tax and also to see that unlawful orders are corrected by the revisional authority. But this could be done within reasonable time only. The time element enters into consideration from the aspect of reasonableness. No power can be exercised in an unreasonable manner. Hence the importance of time factor. But this could be done within reasonable time only. The time element enters into consideration from the aspect of reasonableness. No power can be exercised in an unreasonable manner. Hence the importance of time factor. Therefore ordinarily in tax laws when the assessment is over and the parties have arranged and adjusted their affairs in accordance with the orders passed by the appropriate authority the parties should be free to proceed further pursuant to the orders so passed. If any action is permitted to be taken under the Act the same can be taken in accordance with law. Where no time limit for such action is provided the question of reasonable time comes into play without which the exercise of power may be exposed to arbitrariness. ( 14 ) IF one examines the scheme of the Act even if there is concealment and the dealer has escaped the assessment such cases should be taken into consideration by the appropriate tax authorities within a period of eight years from the year in question. Applying this yardstick in this case the period can be stretched maximum upto the year 1975 However one may take the starting point from 29/11/1967 the date of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. Even so the period of limitation of eight years would expire some time in November 1975. It may be noted that this could be done in case where there is concealment and thereby the payment of tax is evaded. ( 15 ) IN the instant case there is no such question. Everyone believed the position of law as declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Jullunder Vegetables Syndicate to be the correct law. Thereafter the Supreme Court in the case of Murarilal Mahavir Prasad explained its earlier decision and indicated the correct position of law as far as the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 and Bombay Sales Tax Act 1959 are concerned. On this ground it cannot be said that the assessment which have become final before about eight years be reopened. At this stage the nature of the order under revision and the consequences of the order become relevant. The order under revision is final. The appellate authority had finally decided the cases. On this ground it cannot be said that the assessment which have become final before about eight years be reopened. At this stage the nature of the order under revision and the consequences of the order become relevant. The order under revision is final. The appellate authority had finally decided the cases. Ordinarily after this order one would believe that his liability under the sales tax law is finallly decided unless the matter is carried further within prescribed time limit. ( 16 ) REOPENING of the case after eight years would create immense hardship to the parties. In case of a dissolved firm one would not know where the partner would be. Different partners might have started their separate business. Some of them might have migrated to other town or country. Some of them might have died. Many situations can be visualised. On the other hand if such a situation is permitted on the part of the assessee and if the assessee could invoke the powers of High Courts or any other appropriate authority and seek reopening of the assessment on the ground of mistake of law after such an inordinate delay there would be havoc as far as the public revenue is concerned. Budgets would be upset. Estimates of revenue income made will be of no use. Estimates of expenditure also would become useless. All the estimates of income and expenditure will have to be made provisional and subject to decision of final court. This would make the working of the Government and other instrumentalities of State impossible. Again this may have chain reactions. On account of reopening of the cases other private disputes also may arise. This may lend to multiplicity of litigation and in ones own life time no one would be certain about anything. ( 17 ) THEREFORE ordinarily in cases of tax laws where assessment unit is one year and it is separate and distinct ordinarily parties would arrange their business and other affairs as per the orders in assessment proceedings. Therefore unless fraud or collusion is shown the cases should not be permitted to be reopened because the consequences would be to upset everything already settled. This subject to the rider that a dealer or anyone who has taken the advantage of his own wrong he cannot be permitted to retain the gains of illgotten fruits reaped by him. Therefore unless fraud or collusion is shown the cases should not be permitted to be reopened because the consequences would be to upset everything already settled. This subject to the rider that a dealer or anyone who has taken the advantage of his own wrong he cannot be permitted to retain the gains of illgotten fruits reaped by him. In cases where there may be fraud or a systematic well planned design to defraud the revenue and thereby the society at large is made to suffer the loss the power may be exercised even after a period of two three or four years or even after more years because in such cases the consequences would be to disgorge the illgotten fruits reaped by a person who has committed fraud upon the society. That is the reason why in the case of Patel Raghav Natha ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 ) the Supreme Court has said that the reasonableness of the length of time would depend upon the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised. In the instant case having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the consequences which are likely to follow we are of the opinion that it was not reasonable on the part of the Deputy Commissioner to invoke the powers under Section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the Revenue has drawn our attention to a decision of Single Judge Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Minish v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 26 (1) G. L. R. page 202. Relying on this decision it was submitted that this Court should hold that constraint as regards time should not be read at all while considering the exercise of power by revisional authority under Section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. It is difficult to agree with this proposition. Even in the case of Minish (supra) all that the Court has done is to apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) and in the case of Swastik Oil Mills (supra ). It is difficult to agree with this proposition. Even in the case of Minish (supra) all that the Court has done is to apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) and in the case of Swastik Oil Mills (supra ). After examining the scheme of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 the Court has inter alia observed that in exercise of power under Section 34 of the U. L. C. Act the Government seeks to fulfil its obligation towards society. The State E or the Government is not an interested party to take excess land from the individual. The interest of the Government is to see that the objects of the Act namely prevention of concentration of urban land in few hands and prevention of speculation and profiteering in the land be achieved so that the land is equitably distributed to all. The Government cannot be absolved from its obligation towards society because some officers of the Government are negligent and/or indolent and do not take action in time. In view of this position the Court further observed that the principles underlying the provisions of Section 10 of the Limitation Act also may be invoked. Section 10 of the Limitation Act grants a total exemption from the bar of limitation in regard to the suits mentioned therein. The reason behind the section is that an express trust ought not to suffer by the misfeasance of non feasance of a trustee. On the same reasoning it was observed that on account of the negligence or complecent behavior of a Government Officer the society should not be made to suffer. The land which otherwise would have vested in the Government as per the provisions of the U. L. C. Act should not be allowed to be used by an individual on account of technical pleas of limitation. Thus it would be clear that in the facts of the case and having regard to the nature of the order to be revised the court held that the exercise of revisional power under Section 34 of the Act after a period of about two years could not be said to be unreasonable. We are in perfect agreement with the principles laid down and with what is stated in the case of Minish (supra ). We are in perfect agreement with the principles laid down and with what is stated in the case of Minish (supra ). But as far as the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised in the instant case is concerned the period of little over eight years cannot be said to be reasonable for the reasons indicated hereinabove. In view of this position the decision rendered by one of us (A. P. Ravani J.) in the case of Minish (supra) is of no help to the revenue. ( 19 ) THE learned Counsel for the revenue submitted that in the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1953 the revenue had no right to file appeal or revision against the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and therefore the revisional power should be permitted to be exercised without placing any limitation as regards time. The contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in such a situation one has to ask a question Had the legislature intended to confer such right of appeal or revision on the revenue how much time would have been prescribed for filing appeal or revision. It would not be more than sixty days or ninety days or at the most six months. But in any case it could not be little over eight years. Even so as indicated hereinabove the length of reasonable time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. We have indicated certain facts which should be taken into consideration while determining the length of time. We have indicated certain facts which should be taken into consideration while determining the length of time. We have also indicated other relevant factors. Therefore simply because the revenue had no light to file appeal or revision against the order of Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax the revenue does not get an unlimited power to invoke the revisional jurisdiction after an inordinate delay. ( 20 ) IT was contended that the revisional authority while exercising suo motu powers trenches upon the powers conferred on other officers /authorities exercising power under the Act and the Rules. It is pointed out that exercise of such revisional power would amount to rectification or reassessment. The powers of rectification and reassessment cannot be exercised by the revisional authority. It is pointed out that exercise of such revisional power would amount to rectification or reassessment. The powers of rectification and reassessment cannot be exercised by the revisional authority. Therefore it is submitted that this is nothing but trenching upon the powers of an officer/authority who could exercise the power of rectification and reassessment. The argument takes within its sweep and assumption that at the time when the revisional powers are invoked the proceedings of rectification and/or reassessment are pending. Unless it is shown that the proceedings of rectification and/or reassessment are pending it cannot be said that the revisional authority is trenching upon powers which are conferred upon other authority/officer. The power of rectification stands on different footing. While making rectification it may be that the Assistant Commissioner may also pass same or similar type of order. But when the revisional authority exercises its power it does not exercise the powers of the Assistant Commissioner. While describing the limitation on the powers of the revisional authority what the Supreme Court said in the case of Swastik Oil Mills (supra) is required to be understood in proper context. The Supreme Court has not said that this revisional authority shall not exercise the powers conferred upon the appellate authority or the power of rectification. What is meant by this limitation is that at that particular stage appeal or rectification proceedings should not be pending. If at the stage of invoking the revisional powers in the same proceedings appeal is pending and the revisional authority seeks to exercise its suo motu power it may amount to trenching upon the powers of appellate authority. Similarly in a case where rectification proceedings are pending in the same proceedings the revisional authority may not be free to exercise its revisional powers conferred upon it. Only in such a situation the exercise of revisional power may amount to trenching upon the powers of appellate authority and or the authority exercising the powers of rectification. Where no such proceedings are pending before the appellate authority or before the authority exercising powers of rectification the exercise of powers by the revisional authority would not amount to trenching upon the powers of appellate authority or that of rectification authority. Where no such proceedings are pending before the appellate authority or before the authority exercising powers of rectification the exercise of powers by the revisional authority would not amount to trenching upon the powers of appellate authority or that of rectification authority. If such limitations constraints are to be read on the powers of the revisional authority as contended by the learned Counsel for the assessee then the power of the revisional authority would become illusory. No such limitation as is sought to be canvassed by the learned Counsel for the assessee can be read on this power. . ( 21 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove the reference is answered as indicated in para 4 of the judgment. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. (NSS) Reference answered. .