B. C. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) ON 13-2-1984, a money-decree was passed in favour of the applicant-bank and against the non-applicant directing the non-applicant to pay the applicant-bank a sum of Rs. 6,37,000 and odd together with interest. The non-applicant has filed an appeal against that decree before this Court. Application to stay execution of the decree filed in that appeal has since been dismissed. The appeal is pending adjudication. The applicant, therefore, filed an application before the trial Court to execute the decree. On 14-9-1987, the non-applicant/judgment-debtor made an application under Order 20, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure for facility for payment of the decretal sum in easy instalments of Rs. 25,000/- per year. An application was also made for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 20, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. It was supported by an affidavit. The averments in that application are that earlier the non-applicant had approached the local counsel at Satna to file an application for permission to pay the decretal amount by instalments. The counsel is said to have advised the non-applicant/ judgment-debtor that as and when the decree was put to execution, application for payment of decretal amount by instalments would be filed. That is how the delay occasioned in making that application. Thus, in substance, the wrong advice by the counsel allegedly given bona fide is pleaded to defend the delay. This application was opposed. No evidence was recorded by the executing Court. The applicant made a prayer to cross-examine the persons swearing affidavits in support of that application. That prayer was disallowed as belated. The allegations in the affidavits were accepted and by the impugned order, the executing Court allowed the application and has condoned the delay in filing the application under Order 20, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. The present revision is directed against that order. ( 2 ) IT is no doubt true as explained by the Supreme Court, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , that the Courts should adopt liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay since such power has been conferred on Courts by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of the matter on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of institution of Courts. (See also : State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 .), Bona fide mistaken advice by counsel when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to him should be accepted as 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay for a litigant need not be allowed to suffer for such mistaken advice. (See Punjabi University v. Acharya Swamy Ganesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 and Matadin v. A. Narayan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 . Even so the above decisions do not lay down that however careless the applicant may be in making such application for condonation of delay, the application must be allowed. One also should bear in mind that by lapse of time fixed by any statute for approaching the Court, a valuable right accrues to the opposite party and that such right should not be lightly taken away. There should be proper allegations duly proved by adequate evidence before the Court can pass an order condoning the delay. If allegations are not proved and if the Court finds the applicant negligent and careless in approaching the Court within the prescribed time, the party in default must thank itself as the Courts are meant to do justice to all the parties to a litigation. Let us, therefore, examine the circumstances of the present case. ( 3 ) THE decree was passed in the year 1984. An immediate attempt was made to obtain order from the High Court in appeal to stay the execution of the decree. That was refused. Thereafter, for long three years, no attempt was made to approach the Court for such facility for payment by instalments. An application was made when the execution of decree was taken out by an application. Undoubtedly, the limitation for making such an application is thirty days under Article 126 of the Limitations Act, 1963. (Article 175 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ). What made the applicant to wait for such a long period after his application for stay of execution of decree was rejected, is not known. Undoubtedly, the limitation for making such an application is thirty days under Article 126 of the Limitations Act, 1963. (Article 175 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ). What made the applicant to wait for such a long period after his application for stay of execution of decree was rejected, is not known. The counsel who is said to have given an advice did not bother in the least to know the prescribed period of limitation. After all a counsel has to be imputed with the minimum knowledge, that is, a time limit prescribed for actions in Court and that the starting point of limitation is also fixed. Any advice given without acquainting oneself about such provisions is inexcusable and cannot be said to be bona fide. ( 4 ) THIS apart, even the allegation made in the application has not been established. The non-applicant adduced no evidence in support of the allegation made in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The counsel for the non-applicant did not state at the bar that ever any attempt was made by the non-applicant to support the allegations in the application by adducing oral and or documentary evidence. He, however, submitted that along with the application an affidavit of Radhesyam, one of the partners of the non-applicant firm and an affidavit of Shri Pulin Bihari Singh Chandel, Advocate were furnished and that the averments in these affidavits have not been rebutted. In my opinion, these affidavits which were filed with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be taken as evidence. Keeping in view the provisions of Order 19, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, a Division Bench of this Court, in Mithailal ;. Inland Auto Finance, New Delhi, AIR 1968 MP 33 : 1967 MPLJ 776 , held that an affidavit in support of an application is not evidence. It is intended merely to satisfy the Court, prima facie, that the allegations in the application are true so that the Court may issue notice to the opposite party and the Court may act upon it if the opposite party does not contest the allegations in the application. There is a distinction between an affidavit filed on a motion and an affidavit which is filed to prove a fact. There is a distinction between an affidavit filed on a motion and an affidavit which is filed to prove a fact. Where the adverse party desires production of the deponent for cross-examination, the Court should ordinarily order attendance of the deponent for cross-examination. According to Order 19, it is only when for sufficient reasons, the Court orders that any particular fact or facts may be proved by an affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing that a given fact can be proved by affidavit. A party may also apply to the Court to give evidence by affidavit in which event at the instance of the opposite-party, the deponent may be kept in attendance for cross-examination. It was not disputed before me that the law does not require that an evidence on application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act be given by affidavit. It was also not disputed by the learned counsel that the Court did not pass any order nor did the non-applicant pray that affidavit evidence may be accepted in the present case on the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is, therefore, clear that the affidavits annexed to the application lost all their efficacy when accepting them on their face value supporting the allegations in the application, the Court accepted the motion and issued notice to the opposite party, viz. , the applicant. No further material was placed on record nor was opportunity sought to adduce evidence. This time the non-applicant does not have to say and possibly cannot say that he was represented by a counsel who was as negligent as Shri Chandel. The non-applicant instead of making a prayer for adducing evidence, even opposed the prayer of the applicant for cross-examination of the deponents. The affidavits, therefore, cannot be taken as evidence supporting the allegations in the application. ( 5 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the allegations in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act remained absolutely not proved because of no evidence. Shri Ramayan Prasad Pandey, learned counsel for the non-applicant, submitted that in these circumstances, the matter may be sent back to the executing Court where the evidence may be adduced and the applicant may cross-examine the deponents. Shri Ramayan Prasad Pandey, learned counsel for the non-applicant, submitted that in these circumstances, the matter may be sent back to the executing Court where the evidence may be adduced and the applicant may cross-examine the deponents. I would have followed that course but what I find is that all steps by the non-applicant have been utterly negligent and he did not act in accordance with law. Even in this Court, no prayer was made for adducing evidence nor was a prayer made that the affidavits tendered may be treated as evidence and the Court may pass an order in that regard under Order 19, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure. Only a mention for remand of the case was made so that the deponents may be cross-examined by the applicant. I am, therefore, satisfied that the contents of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, although controverted, remained completely unsupported by any evidence. The non-applicant thus failed to prove in Court any ground for condonation of delay. ( 6 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) THE revision is allowed and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/ -. Order accordingly. .