Judgment S. B. Sinha, R. N. Sahay, JJ. 1. This writ application is directed against an order dated 25-2-1984 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application whereby and whereunder the petitioner was placed under deemed suspension with effect from 18-2-1984. 2. The fact cf the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner allegedly is a member of a voluntary organisation known as Milli Talimi Mission which runs and marages certain Institutions. On or about 5-2-1984, a criminal case was initiated against the petitioner under Sections 406, 409 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, inter alia alleging therein that the petitioner has defaloated a sum of Rs.2 lakhs and fifty thousands. In the said criminal case, no charge-sheet has been submitted as yet. 4. In connection with the aforementioned criminal case, the petitioner was taken in custody on 18-2-1984 Ho was released on bail on 23-3-1984. Bv reason of the impugned order dated 25-2-1984 the petitioner was placed under suspension with retrospective effect from 18th February, 1984, that is, the date when he was taken in custody. 5. The petitioner filed a representation before the competent authority for revocation of the order suspension, inter alia, on the ground that other rersons who were similarly situated had not been placed under suspension. The said representation, however, was rejected. The petitioner and/or his wife, thereafter filed several representations. 6. According to the petitioner, the impugned order as contained in annexure-1 to the writ application is bad in law inasmuch as the same bas been oassed by the General Manager who is not the appointing authority of the petitioner. It was next contended that in view of sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Employees (Conduct, Discipline and appeal Rules (hereinafter to be referred to and called for the sake of brevity as the said Rules), the petitioner could not have been placed under suspension in absence of initiation of any departmental proceeding or in absence of any fresh order of suspension as provided for under clause (b) of sub-rule (1)of Rule 20 thereof. 7. It was next contended that in any evant the order of suspension having been passed with retrospective effect, the same is illegal. 8. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of this court in Satya Narayan Pd. 7. It was next contended that in any evant the order of suspension having been passed with retrospective effect, the same is illegal. 8. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of this court in Satya Narayan Pd. Srivasta V/s. State of Bihar and others reported in 1978 LIC 332 and in R Jeevaratnam V/s. State of Madras and others reported in AIR 1966 SC 951 . 9. Mr A. K. Sinha learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation on the other band, submitted that admittedly a criminal case in pending as against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel as the criminal case is pending, an order passed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of the Rules may be treated to be an order passed under sub-rule (1) thereof. 10. Learned counsel further submitted that the General Manager being a disciplinary authority, he was entitled to pass an order of suspension. 11. It was next contended that an order of suspension with retrospective effect can be passed as in terms of clause (b) of sub-rule (i) of Rule 20 of the said Rules an employee of the respondent-Corporation can be suspended on the ground of criminal offence or offences being pending investigation or trial. 12. Rule 20 (ii) roads as follows :- " An employee who is detained in custody, whether on criminal charges or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours may be suspended at the discretion of the Appointing Authority with effect from the date of detention, by an order of the Appointing Authority, and shall remain under suspension until further orders. " 13. From a perusal of the impugned order as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, it appears that thereby it was directed that the petitioner would be deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of his detention i. e 18-2-1984. 14. It is true as has been contended by Mr. A. K. Sinha that under certain circumstances if there are two sources of power vested in an authority, an order passed by the said authority under a wrong provision of law would not ipso facto become vitiated if the order passed by him can be sustained on the basis of any other provision of law. A. K. Sinha that under certain circumstances if there are two sources of power vested in an authority, an order passed by the said authority under a wrong provision of law would not ipso facto become vitiated if the order passed by him can be sustained on the basis of any other provision of law. However, in this case, reading provision of Rule 20 (i) and 20 (ii) of the said Rules, it is evident that the same operate in different fields. 15. Sub-rule (i) of Rule 20 deals with initiation of a departmental proceeding or pendency of an investigation or a,trial of a criminal charge. If an employer intends to place an employee under suspension in terms of the aforementioned provision, an order in that regard has to be passed specifically. In this case, the employer has not only referred to sub-rule (ii) of Rule 20 of the said Rules in the impugned order dated 25th February, 1984, but also from the tenor of the order itself, it would be evident that the same was passed as the petitioner had been detained in custody on a criminal case for the period exceeding 48 hours and thus only because the petitioner had remained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours, he was suspended or deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of his suspension. 16. It is, therefore, not a case where the order of suspension as contained in annexure-1 to the writ petition can be sustained under sub-rule (i) of rule 20. 17. The question which also arises for consideration is as to whether in such an event the order of suspension can be allowed to remain operative for an indefinite period only because sub-rule (ii) of Rule 20 authorises tbe appointing authority to pass an order of suspension until further orders. 18. From a conjoint reading of the said provision, it appears that sub-rule (i)of Rule 20 and sub-rule (ii) of Rule 20 operate in two fields and in that view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Sinha to the effect that the impugned order must be held to have been passed under sub-rule (i) of Rule 20 of the said Rules. 19. Sinha to the effect that the impugned order must be held to have been passed under sub-rule (i) of Rule 20 of the said Rules. 19. Although sub-rule (ii) of Rule 20 postulates that a person may be put under suspension until further orders, evidently a person cannot be kept under suspension in terms thereof after he is released from the custody. 20. In Satya Naray cm Pd, Shrivastata V/s. Stale of Bihar and others, reported in 1978 BBCJ 208 , a Division Bench while repealing the contention that rule 99 of the Bihar Service Code contemplates the period when the criminal charges against the employees is pending investigation, inquiry or trial, held :- - "if it is held that the order under Rule 99 can remain in force till the proceeding which has been taken on it criminal charge is terminated, then there was no necessity of making a specific provision to cover that very situation under Rule 100 when such person is not actually detained in custody. If Rule 99 is interpreted to cover even that period, then, in my view. Rule 100 will be redundant. It is well settled principle of construction that different sections of different rules should not be interpreted in a manner which may result in any of the sections or the rules being held to be redundant, and in such a situation Courts have also construed such sections and rules in a harmonious manner so as to give justification for their existence. In my opinion, applying the aforesaid principle the two rules have to be interpreted to mean that under rule 99 a Government servant is to be considered as under suspension only for the period during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment. After he is released from custody, then in order to put him under suspension, a specific order under Rule 100 has to be passed. " 21. In Jethan Prasad V/s. State of Bihar, reported in 1980 Bihar Law judgment, 601, a Division Bench of this Court followed the aforementioned decision in Satya Narayan Prasad Srivastavas case (supra) and held that the order of suspension passed under Rule 100 of the Bihar Service Code cannot be passed with retrospective effect. 22. " 21. In Jethan Prasad V/s. State of Bihar, reported in 1980 Bihar Law judgment, 601, a Division Bench of this Court followed the aforementioned decision in Satya Narayan Prasad Srivastavas case (supra) and held that the order of suspension passed under Rule 100 of the Bihar Service Code cannot be passed with retrospective effect. 22. In Sidhinath Jha V/s. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1988 Bihar law Judgment 756, another Division Bench of this Court held :- "since the petitioner was arrested by the police on 1-8-1987 and was released on bail on 14-8-1987 during that period, he shall be deemed to suspended by operation of law under Rule 99 of the bihar Service Code. The petitioner cannot challenge the order of suspension so far this period is concerned So far the period after he was released i. e. from 15-8-1987 the competent authority, if so advised, ought to have passed the order under Rule 100 by disclosing the grounds on which suspension of the petitioner was necessary. So far Annexure-2 is concerned, nothing has been said why the petitioner was required to be suspended under rule 100, because it does not disclose that any departmental proceeding was pending or contemplated or he was suspended because he was accused in the criminal case. " 23. Similar view has been taken by us in Satyendra Tiwary V/s. State of bihar being CWJC No, 2396 of 1990 (R) disposed of on 7-1-1991. 24. Mr. A. K. Sinha learned counsel appearing for the respondents, however, strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the government of A, P. V/s. F. Shivaraman, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1157 . In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Rule 13 (1)of the A. P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In that case, the concerned employee was put under suspension by the Commissioner pending investigation of a criminal case instituted against him, and the Tribunal without disturbing the order cf suspension directed the Government to review the case of respondent. On 6th December, 1988, the government reviewed the case of the respondent and issued an order extending his suspension In the meanwhile, in the criminal case, charge-sheet was filed. The employee concerned again moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative tribunal seeking revokation of the order of suspension. On 6th December, 1988, the government reviewed the case of the respondent and issued an order extending his suspension In the meanwhile, in the criminal case, charge-sheet was filed. The employee concerned again moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative tribunal seeking revokation of the order of suspension. The Tribunal revoked the order of suspension and directed the respondents to pay the full salary from 6-1c-1988 when there was no extention of the order of suspension. 25. In this connection Rule )3 (1) and () of the Andhra Pradesh Civil services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules may be quoted :- "13 (1) A member of service may be placed under suspension from service pending investigation or enquiry into grave charges where such suspension is necessary in the public interest: provided that where a member of a service has been suspended by an authority other than the Government and the investigation has not been completed and the action proposed to be taken in regard to him has not been completed within a period of six months of the date of suspension, the fact shall be reported to the Government for such orders as they may deem fit.13 (5) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may, at any time, be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have been made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. " Thus under Rule 13 (1) where a member of a service has been suspended by an authority other than the Government and the investigation has not been completed within a period of six months of the order of suspension, this same does not automatically lapses or becomes invalid or non est. The supreme Court held that the Government instructions on which the Tribunal rested its conclusion has no statutory force nor the expiry of the period of six months would confer an automatic right of reinstatement in service upon the petitioner. The Supreme Court on construction of the order of suspension held that the same was not a retrospective suspension order but an order continuing the suspension further. It was further held that in the first order of suspension, no particular period was prescribed and as such it will continue unless it is revoked. 26. The Supreme Court on construction of the order of suspension held that the same was not a retrospective suspension order but an order continuing the suspension further. It was further held that in the first order of suspension, no particular period was prescribed and as such it will continue unless it is revoked. 26. The aforemention decision, therefore, has no application at all in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Director General and Inspector General of Police Andhra Pradesh y. K. Ratnagirit reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1423 upon which Mr. Sinha again placed reliance, the Supreme Court merely followed Us earlier decision in V. Shivaramans case (supra ). In that case, the order of suspension read as follows :- "sri K. Ratnagiri Circle Inspector of Police, Sanjiva Reddy Nagar p. S. Hyderabad is placed under suspension with immediate effect in public interest until further orders pending prosecution against him in the case of death of U. Narasimha in Police lockup. " 27. In that case, respondent was being prosecuted for causing death of one U. Narasimha in police lock up. In that situation, it was held that the order of suspension is within the scone of Rule 13 (1) of gthe Andbra Pradesh civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and it was held that merely because it bad used the word prosecution instead of investigation into charges against the respondent, the order of suspension cannot be said to be beyond the scope of Rule 13 (1 ). It was observed :- "a wrong wording in the order does not take away the power if it is otherwise available. " Again such is not the position here. 28 As noticed hereinbefore, it has been held by us that Rule 20 (I) and rule 20 (ii) operate in two different fields. Once an order of Suspension is passed under Rule 20 (ii), there is no scope of holding that such an order can be passed also under Rule 20 (i ). 29. It is not a case where only a wrong word has been used although scope, effect and purport of the order comes within the purview of Rule 20 (i ). 29. It is not a case where only a wrong word has been used although scope, effect and purport of the order comes within the purview of Rule 20 (i ). In the instant case, the impugned order of suspension has clearly been passed by the authority purported to be under Rule 20 (ii) and, thus, the question of invoking the provisions of Rule 20 (i) in this case does not arise. 30. In this view of the matter, the petitioner could not have been kept under suspension after he was released on bail i. e.25-3-1988, In anv event, in our opinion, the order of suspension should not have been continued assuming that such a power exists beyond a reasonable period. In our opinion, keeping a person under suspension for more than 7 years must be held to be an arbitrary exercise of power. Such arbitrary exercise of power must be held to be wholly illegal and violative of Articles A and 16 of the constitution. 31. However, we must observe that the contention of Mr. Allam to the effect that no order of suspension with retrospective effect could be passed, cannot be accepted in view of the fact that in terms of Rule 20 (ii) the appointing authority is entitled to pass as order of suspension from the date of detention of the concerned employee. 32. Further, in this case, the impugned order of suspension has been passed by the General Manager. The petitioner has rightly contended that bis appointing authority was the Managing Director. It is true that the general Manager is the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. However, in view of the rules as noticed hereinbefore, whereas the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority can pass order of suspension under Rule 20 (i); appointing authorits alone can pass an order of suspension in terms of rule 20 (ii ). In this view of the matter also, the impugned order of suspension is bad in law. 33. In Dr. (Mrs.) Rekha Sharma V/s. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1991 (1) Bihar Law Judgment 388, a Division Bench of this Court has held that if an order is not passed by a competent authority, the same will be illegal. 34. For the reasons aforementioned, the order of suspension as contained in annexure-1 to the writ application cannot be sustained. 35. 34. For the reasons aforementioned, the order of suspension as contained in annexure-1 to the writ application cannot be sustained. 35. In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned order of suspension as contained in Annexure-1 is quashed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.