Judgment :- Raju, J.: The short but of late often raised question that arises for consideration in these cases is as to whether the failure to furnish a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer to the delinquent employee in a disciplinary proceeding before the Disciplinary or the Punishing Authority, as the case may be, makes up its mind and records the finding of guilt as against him, would constitute violation of the principles of natural justice or the relevant statutory regulations? In the instant case, relevant regulations are ‘Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employees ‘Discipline and Appeal Regulations (hereinafter referred to as The Regulations. 2. The Writ Appeal No.1033 of 1990 has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 31.7.1990 in W.P.No.6487 of 1986 whereunder the learned Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein seeking to quash the proceedings of the appellant in B.P.Ms. (FB) 46 (Administrative Branch), dated 5.6.1986 following his earlier order in W.P.No.2690 of 1986 dated 27.6.1990. W.A.No.1142 of 1990 has been filed against the order in W.P.No.2690 of 1986 supra. 3. The salient features of the case pertaining to W.A.No.1033 of 1990 relevant for purpose of deciding the issue raised before us are as follows: The respondent was working as an Assistant Divisional Engineer/East/Arni in the services the appellant and alleging certain irregularities in effecting ‘on the line services Agricultural Pumpsets in contravention of the instructions then in force, a charge memo dated 13/20-8-1985 was issued framing two charges. A questionnaire form was enclosed to that charge memo to resubmit the same along with his explanation. submitted his explanation dated 25.10.1985 and also resubmitted the questionnaire duly filled opting for an oral enquiry. The Divisional Engineer, Tiruvannamalai was appointed as Enquiry Officer who conducted an enquiry into the charges and the respondent participated in the same. The enquiry officer ultimately submitted his report finding charge No.1 as not proved and charge No.2 as proved. On receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer as above, the appellant Board appears to have decided to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect charge No.1 and treated the said charge also as having been proved. The enquiry officer ultimately submitted his report finding charge No.1 as not proved and charge No.2 as proved. On receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer as above, the appellant Board appears to have decided to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect charge No.1 and treated the said charge also as having been proved. Consequently,, after consideration of the case with the connected records, the Board came to the conclusion that the respondent may be dismissed from the service of the Board and accordingly ordered his dismissal from service. The decision of the Board was communicated to the appellant in B.P.Ms.(F.B.) No.46 (Administrative Branch) dated 5.6.1986 and along with it, a copy of the enquiry findings submitted by the Enquiry Officer was also forwarded. 4. Thereupon, the respondent filed W.P.No.6487 of 1986 praying for a writ of certiorari quash the proceedings dated 5.6.1986 dismissing the respondent from service. Apart from other grounds of challenge with which we are not concerned presently in the appeal before us, two of the grounds require to be mentioned. One of those grounds is that the minutes the Enquiry Officer or his findings was not furnished to the respondent and therefore he had no opportunity to rebut the charges. It was also contended that the order of dismissal was against the principles of natural justice and that he has not been given any opportunity before reversing the finding of the Enquiry Officer in respect of charge No.1. The second ground raised regarding the procedure adopted was based on Regulation No.8(b) of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employees’ Discipline and Appeal Regulations. After referring the said Regulation, it was contended that the failure to issue a second show-cause notice and that though in respect of some of the employees, such a notice was being issued, in the case of the respondent, straightaway a dismissal order has been passed without any opportunity, that he should have been also given such an opportunity to state his case and the failure to do so, violated Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. The appellant filed a counter affidavit in which, while traversing the various claims made in the affidavit of the respondent, it was submitted that Regulation 8(b) referred to and relied upon by the respondent in his affidavit, was the one which stood prior to amendment in the year 1980 and that paragraph 2 of Regulation 8(b) had been amended G.O.Ms.No.368, (Secretariat Branch), dated 7.7.1980 and after such amendment, not only the provision for the second show-cause notice has been deleted, but it enabled the punishing authority to make an order imposing such penalty as it deemed fit and it shall not be necessary to give the person charged any opportunity of making a representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. On the basis of the amended regulation, it was contended by the appellant that no second show-cause notice was issued and that the final order enclosing a copy of the findings with that, was in order and valid. It was also contended in respect of Class II Officers like the respondent, it was only the Discipline and Regulations that applied and having regard to the terms of the amended regulation, failure to issue a second show cause notice unlike in the case of workmen who are governed by the Standing Orders which provided for the issue of a second show-cause notice, question of discrimination arose. 6. The learned single Judge, after hearing the submissions made before him, considered the ratio of an earlier order passed in W.P.No.2690 of 1986, dated 27.6.1990 (which the subject matter of W.A.No.1142 of 1990 before us) on the question of an opportunity be given before passing a final order of punishment, squarely applied to the present favour of the respondent therein and allowed the writ petition on that solitary ground ordered the setting aside of the order of dismissal. It may be relevant to point out stage that in W.P.No.2690 of 1986, Gov-indasamy, J. held that it was obligatory on of the Electricity Board, namely, the Disciplinary Authority, to forward a copy Enquiring Officer’s report before the Disciplinary Authority considers the entire materials the purpose of taking a decision on the disciplinary proceedings initiated against delinquent officer and the failure to forward the report of the Enquiring Authority before Disciplinary Authority passed final orders of punishment, resulted in deprivation opportunity to make a representation with reference to the findings passed Disciplinary Authority. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the above appeal. 7. The relevant facts pertaining to W.A.No.1142 of 1990 are as follows: The respondent, who entered the services of the first appellant-Board as Load Surveyor Papanasam Electricity System, secured in course of time successive promotions and at relevant point of time he was working as Assistant Divisional Engineer. While discharging duties as such, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him for wilful insubordination or disobedience and for dishonesty with the Board ’ s business as per Sec.5-A of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations of the Board and for neglect of work as per Sec.10 of the Regulations. After the submission of his explanation, an enquiry has been conducted and Enquiry Officer also submitted his report finding that all the three charges framed against the respondent were proved, On the basis of the report of Enquiring Authority, Disciplinary Authority, by its order dated 24.2.1986, ordered the dismissal of respondent. The main grievance of the respondent was that the report of the Enquiring Authority was not forwarded to the respondent before passing the order of punishment that this constituted deprivation of an effective opportunity to defend himself. The petition filed challenging the order of dismissal was allowed sustaining the plea that the furnishing of the report before the passing of the final order of punishment deprived respondent of an effective opportunity to make his representation. 8. The petition filed challenging the order of dismissal was allowed sustaining the plea that the furnishing of the report before the passing of the final order of punishment deprived respondent of an effective opportunity to make his representation. 8. Before proceeding with the consideration of the issue raised before us, it is necessary deal with the development of law relating to delinquent officer who is a Government servant and who is governed by, Art.311 of the Constitution of India; inasmuch as the counsel appearing on either side relied upon the ratio laid down by the apex court in a series cases pertaining to such Government servants to substantiate their respective viewpoints construing Regulation 8(b) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations and the extent, scope and substances of the right secured to an employee of the appellant thereunder. 9. Mr.M.R.Narayanaswami, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Board contended as follows: The learned single Judge was not right in holding that it was obligatory on the part of appellant, the Disciplinary Authority, to forward the copy of the enquiry report to delinquent Officer before considering the entire materials for the purpose of taking a decision on the disciplinary proceedings initiated. It was the submission of the learned counsel after the amendment to Regulation No.8(b) by B.P.Ms.No.368, (Secretariat Branch), dated 7.7.1980, it shall not be necessary to give the person charged any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed and consequently there was necessity, scope or obligation to forward the report of the Enquiry Officer and give opportunity before passing final orders on the disciplinary proceedings initiated against delinquent Officer. The learned counsel further submitted that the ratio of the decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Judge are not really decisive of the matter that there are other decisions of the Supreme Court and that of this Court the ratio of which, according to the learned counsel, were more binding upon him than those followed by learned Judge. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel was that, there other decisions of larger Bench taking a contrary view and that the conclusions rendered the learned Judge cannot be sustained in law. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel was that, there other decisions of larger Bench taking a contrary view and that the conclusions rendered the learned Judge cannot be sustained in law. In reply to the plea of the respondent placing reliance upon the decision of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported Union of India and others v. Mohamed Ramzan Khan, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 , the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the said decision should be taken to have been rendered incuriam and therefore does not operate as an effective and binding precedent and that earlier decisions reported in Union of India v. TuisiramP.Patel,A.I.R. 1985,S.C. 1416 Kailash Chander v. State of UP., A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1338, alone should be taken to have finally decided the issue and still holding the field as well as governing the present case. 10. Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent countered the submissions on behalf of the appellant and submitted that the learned single judge right in his conclusions that the latest pronouncement in Mohamed Ramzan Khan (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 , authoritatively lays down the position of law and fortifies the conclusions of the learned single Judge and that the plea based on the principle of per incuriam relevance or application to the case on hand and that no interference is called for with well-considered order of the learned single Judge in the above appeal. It was also submitted that there was no conflict of the said decision with any other decision particularly the two decisions referred to on behalf of the appellant. 11. Before proceeding further with the consideration of the respective submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side, it becomes necessary to indicate the relevant provisions of law governing the case on hand before us. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board no doubt ‘State’ within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution of India, but at the same time it is to be remembered that its employees are in the services of the Board, their conditions of services being prescribed and regulated by statutory regulations made from time to time and the employees of the Board cannot be considered to be either Government servants or members of the civil service of the State Government holding any civil post under a State. Notwithstanding the same, having regard to the series of decisions referred to before us, it becomes necessary to refer to the state of law, the provisions governing members of civil service as well as the changes those provisions underwent in stages understand the principles underlying and the ratio laid down in the various decisions referred to and relied upon. Neither Art.311 of the Constitution of India nor the relevant service rules applicable to Government servants holding posts in civil services has any direct application to the case on hand. On the other hand, it is the Statutory Regulations made in exercise the powers conferred by Sec.79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 made by the Board, that really governs the case before us. 12. The respondent in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, extracted in extenso the relevant portion of Regulation 8(b) but as it existed prior to its amendment in the year 1980. It is not in controversy before us that a portion of Regulation No.8(b) underwent amendment by virtue of B.P.Ms.No.368, (Secretariat Branch), dated 7.7.1980 and it is amended regulation alone that governs the present case. The relevant portion of Regulation No.8(b) as amended and pertaining the procedure to be followed after enquiry as is relevant for our purpose may be usefully extracted as hereunder: “8. Procedure for imposing of penalties: (a)......... (b) ... After the inquiry has been completed, the person charged shall be entitled to put in, he so desires, a further written statement of his defence. Whether or not the person charged desired or had an oral enquiry he shall be heard in person at any stage if he so desires before passing of final orders. A report of the enquiry or personal hearing (as the case may be) shall be prepared by the authority holding the enquiry or personal hearing whether not such authority is competent to impose the penalty. Such report shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence, if any, and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. A report of the enquiry or personal hearing (as the case may be) shall be prepared by the authority holding the enquiry or personal hearing whether not such authority is competent to impose the penalty. Such report shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence, if any, and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. After the enquiry or personal hearing referred to in clause (b) has been completed and after the authority competent to impose the penalty mentioned in that clause has arrived provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry, he shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall be accessary to give the person charged any opportunity of making representation on penalty proposed to be imposed.” 13. Before going into an analysis of the case law cited which were rendered in the context a member of Government service and the provisions of law applicable to them, it will appropriate to refer to those provisions themselves to the extent relevant for our purpose and trace the development of the law relating to the rights of a Government servant sought to be punished for his acts of commission or omission. Prior to the commencement of Constitution of India, members of the civil services were governed by Sec.240 of Government of India Act, 1935, and Sec.240(3) which is relevant for our purpose read thus: “3. Prior to the commencement of Constitution of India, members of the civil services were governed by Sec.240 of Government of India Act, 1935, and Sec.240(3) which is relevant for our purpose read thus: “3. No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken regard to him.” The corresponding provision in the Constitution of India, 1950 to the said Section Art.311(2) and in the original Constitution it read thus: “ No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed taken in regard to him.” The scope of the above provision came up for consideration of the Apex Court in several cases of which the following may be usefully referred to: Khemchand v. Union of India, (1958)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 169: (1958)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 169: (1959)1 Lab.L.J. 167: 1958 S.C.J. 497:1958 S.C.R. 1060: A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300, State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, A.I.R 1963 S.C. 1612: (1963)1 L.L.J. 295 and Union of India v. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 364: (1964) 1 L.L.J. 38 : (1963-64)25 F.I.R. 159. 14. Then came the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 which brought about change in Art.311(2) which read thereafter as follows: "No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed, after such enquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry." 15. Thereafter came the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, under which Art.311(2) underwent a further change and the said provision thereupon read thus: "No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed." After such amendment, the question regarding the rights of a civil servant came up for consideration in several decisions of the Supreme Court of which the following few have been referred to before us: Union of India v. Tulsiram, P.Patel, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416, Union of India v. E.Bashyam, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1000, Kailash Chander v. State of UP., A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1338 and India v. Mohamed Ramzan Khan, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 . The decision of Srinivasan, J. reported in S.Kannan v. Member of the Local Board, S.B.I., (1990)1 M.L.J. 516 , confirmed on appeal in an unreported decision in W.A.No.1011 of 1989, dated 7.12.1989 was also referred to on behalf of the appellant. 16. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in a decision reported in Goel’s case, 1964 S.C. 364: (1964)1 L.L.J. 38 : (1963-64)25 F.J.R. 159, analysed and highlighted basic principles underlying the constitutional safeguard in Art.311 of the Constitution and opined: "Art.311 consists of two sub-articles and their effect is no longer in doubt. The about the safeguards provided to the public servants in the matter of their dismissal, or reduction in rank by the Constitutional provision contained in Art.311, has been by this Court on several occasions. It is now well-settled that a public servant who is to the protection of Art.311 must get two opportunities to defend himself. He must clear notice of the charge which he is called upon to meet before the departmental commences, and after he gets such notice and is given the opportunity to explanation, the enquiry must be conducted according to the rules and consistently requirements of natural justice. At the end of enquiry, the enquiry officer appreciates evidence, records his conclusions and submits his report to the Government concerned is the first stage of the enquiry, and this stage can validly begin only after charge has served on the delinquent public servant. After the report is received by the Government, the Government is entitled to consider report and the evidence led against the delinquent public servant. After the report is received by the Government, the Government is entitled to consider report and the evidence led against the delinquent public servant. The Government agree with the report or may differ, either wholly or partially, from the conclusions in the report. If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant, Government agrees with the said findings, nothing more remains to be done, and the servant who may have been suspended is entitled to reinstatement and consequential If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant and the Government with the said findings and holds that the charges framed against the public servant are prima facie proved, the Government should decide provisionally what punishment should imposed on the public servant and proceed to issue a second notice against him behalf. If the enquiry officer makes findings, some of which are in favour of the servant and some against him, the Government is entitled to consider the whole matter if it holds that some of all the charges framed against the public servant are, in its prima facie established against him, “then also the Government has to decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and give him notice accordingly. would thus be seen that the object of the second notice is to enable the public servant satisfy the Government on both the counts, one that he is innocent of the charges against him and the other that even if the charges are held proved against him, punishment proposed to be inflicted upon him is unduly severe. This position under of the Constitution is substantially similar to the position which governed the public under Sec.240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The scope and effect of the provisions of Sec.240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as well as the scope and effect of the Constitution have been considered by judicial decisions on several occasions unnecessary to deal with this point in detail, vide The Secretary of State for India v. (1945) F.C.R. 103, High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan I.M.Lal, 75 I.A. 225 and Khem Chand v. Union of India, (1958) S.C.R. 1080”.[ supplied]. 17. 17. Regarding the nature and efficacy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the Apex Goel’s case, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 364: (1964)1 L.L.J. 38 : (1963-64)25 F.J.R. 159 thus: “ In this connection, we may add that unless the statutory rule or the specific order which an officer is appointed to hold an enquiry so requires, the enquiry officer make any recommendations as to the punishment which may be imposed on the officer in case the charges framed against him are held proved at the enquiry; if, the enquiry officer makes any recommendations, the said recommendations like his on the merits are intended merely to supply appropriate materials for the consideration the Government. Neither the findings, nor the recommendations are binding Government vide A.N.D ’ Silva v. Union of India, (1962)1 S.C.R. (Supp.) 968. 18. Another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Bimal Kumar Pandit case, (1963)1 295: A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1612, to which a reference has also been made in Goel’s 1964 S.C. 364: (1964)1 L.L.J. 38 : (1963-64)25’ F.J.R. 159 had also an occasion the position of law as to the duties of the disciplinary authority and the rights delinquent officer at different stages of the proceedings in the following manner:” Art.311(1) provides, inter alia, that no person covered by the said sub-article dismissed or removed by an authority subordi-, nate to that by which he was appointed. are not concerned with this sub-article in the present appeal. Art.311(2) provides such person as specified in Art.311(1), shall be dismissed or removed or reduced until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed to be taken in regard to him. It is now well settled that a public officer whom disciplinary proceedings are intended to be taken is entitled to have two opportunities before disciplinary action is finally taken against him. An enquiry must be held and conducted according to the rules prescribed in that behalf and consistently requirements of natural justice. At this enquiry, the public officer concerned would be to test the evidence adduced against him by cross-examination, where necessary, lead his own evidence. In other words, at the first stage of the proceedings he is have an opportunity to defend himself. At this enquiry, the public officer concerned would be to test the evidence adduced against him by cross-examination, where necessary, lead his own evidence. In other words, at the first stage of the proceedings he is have an opportunity to defend himself. When the enquiry is over and the enquiring submits his report, the dismissing authority has to consider the report and decide agrees with the conclusions of the report or not. If the findings, in the report are against public officer and the dismissing authority agrees with the said findings, a stage is for giving another opportunity to the public officer to show why disciplinary action be taken against him. In issuing the second notice, the dismissing authority naturally come to a tentative or provisional conclusion, about the guilt of the public officer as well as about the punishment which would meet the requirement of justice in his case, and it is only after reaching conclusions in both these provisionally that the dismissing authority issues the second notice. There is no doubt response to this notice. The public officer is entitled to show cause not only against action proposed to be taken against him, but also against the validity or the correctness the findings recorded by the enquiring officer and provisionally accepted by the authority. In other words, the second opportunity enables the public officer to whole ground and to plead that no case had been made out against him for disciplinary action and then to urge that if he fails in substantiating his innocence, the proposed to be taken against him is either unduly severe or not called for. This position in dispute.”[Emphasis supplied]. We ought, however, to add that if the dismissing authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, it is necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf should specified in the second notice. It may be that the report makes findings in favour delinquent officer, but the dismissing authority disagrees with the said findings and proceeds to issue the notice under Art.311(2). In. such a case, it would obviously be necessary dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be taken against delinquent officer. Without such an express statement in the notice, it would be impossible issue the notice at all. In. such a case, it would obviously be necessary dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be taken against delinquent officer. Without such an express statement in the notice, it would be impossible issue the notice at all. There may also be cases in which the enquiry report may findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some issues and against him on some issues. That is precisely what has happened in the present case. If the dismissing authority accepts all the said findings in their entirety, it is another matter; but if the dismissing authority accepts the findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs from or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the proposed to be taken on its own conclusions, it would be necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice. In this category of cases. The action proposed taken would be based not only on the findings recorded against the delinquent officer enquiry, but also on the view of the dismissing authority that the other charges not proved by the enquiring officer are, according to the dismissing authority, proved In order give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Art. 311 (2): essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must, in cases, be specified in the notice. But where the dismissing authority purports to proceed issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting the enquiry report entirety, it cannot be said that it is essential that the dismissing authority must say has so accepted the report. As we have already indicated, it is desirable that even in oases a statement to that effect should be made. But we do not think that the words used Art.311(2) justify the view. that the failure to make such a statement amounts contravention of Art.311 (2). In dealing with this point, we must bear in mind the fact dopy of the enquiry report had been enclosed with the notice and so, reading the notice common sense manner, the respondent would not have found any difficulty in realizing the action proposed to be taken against him proceeded on the basis that the appellants accepted the conclusions of the enquiring officer in their entirety.” [Emphasis supplied]. It was thus held that the enquiry report along with the evidence recorded constitutes material on which the Government or the Punishing Authority has ultimately to act and is the only purpose of the enquiry held by the competent officer and the report which makes as a result of the said enquiry. 19. That being the position of law pertaining to the protection of a civil servant under Art.311 of the Constitution of India, even prior to the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, the amendments introduced in the year 1963, as could be seen from the above, merely substantially gave statutory effect to the principles laid down by the Apex court Khemchand v. Union of India, (1958)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 169: (1958)1 An. W.R. (S.C.) (1959)1 Lab.L.J. 167:1958 S.C.J. 497:1958 S.C.R. 1060.A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300, and the cases referred to above, which further clarified the legal position with great clarity. came the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 under which underwent substantial alteration and after such amendment, the Article read thus: “ No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed, after such enquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation the penalty proposed. ” The question that is now raised before us for our determination came up in the same and manner directly for consideration of the Apex Court after the amendment in 1976 a Division Bench of three learned Judges presided over by the learned Chief Justice decision reported in Union of India v. Mohamed Ramzan Khan, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 . Mishra, C.J., who spoke for the Bench, held the position to be thus: “9. Where, however, the Inquiry Officer furnishes a report with or without proposal punishment the report of the Inquiry Officer does constitute an additional material would be taken into account by the disciplinary authority in dealing with the matter. Mishra, C.J., who spoke for the Bench, held the position to be thus: “9. Where, however, the Inquiry Officer furnishes a report with or without proposal punishment the report of the Inquiry Officer does constitute an additional material would be taken into account by the disciplinary authority in dealing with the matter. where punishment is proposed there is an assessment of the material and a conclusion is reached for consideration of the disciplinary authority and that action where the prejudicial material against the ” delinquent is all the more pronounced. (13).....There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facts do make the quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. As this court rightly pointed the Gujarat case, (supra) the disciplinary authority is very often influenced conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and even by the recommendations relating to the punishment to be inflicted. With the Forty-second Amendment, the delinquent officer associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent officer and the Inquiry submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used against the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. 15.. Deletion of the. second opportunity from the scheme of Art.311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Art.311(2) been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against conclusion of the inquiry officer holding that the charges or some of the charges established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Art.311(2) been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against conclusion of the inquiry officer holding that the charges or some of the charges established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have proceedings completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by Law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or trun-cate nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42ndAmendment. We, there come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along recommendations, if any, in the matter Of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be , within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled supply of a copy thereof. The Forty-Second amendment has not brought about any change this position, [emphasis supplied] (17) There have been, several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken view. Since we have reached a different conclusion, the judgments in the different Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or .a larger Bench of this court taking view. Therefore, the conclusions to the contrary reached by any two Judge Bench Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. Therefore, the conclusions to the contrary reached by any two Judge Bench Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. We make it clear that wherever there has been an inquiry officer and he has furnished report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter. [Emphasis supplied] 20. The above decision of the Apex Court, in our view, has finally settled the proposition most absolute and clear terms in respect of the rights of a civil servant under Art.311 Constitution of India. But the learned counsel appearing for the appellants seeks inspiration from the observations made at paragraph 17 that their Lordships have not shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger Bench of that Court taking a contrary and, therefore, wants to re-agitate the very issue once again before us relying upon decision of the Apex Court reported in Union of India v. Tulsiram P.Patel, A.I.R. 1985 1416 and Kailash Chander v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1338 contending decision in Union of India v. Mohamed Ramzan Khan, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 offends both the principles of ‘stare decisis’ and ‘per incurium’. 21. Before going into the aspect of the applicability of the principle of ‘ per incurium above, it will be useful to refer to the two decisions referred to by the learned counsel appellant to consider whether there was really any conflict as claimed on behalf appellant. In Tulsiram Patel’s case,A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416, a Constitution Bench of the Court was considering the question of the validity and scope of the second proviso to (2) and the rival submissions noticed in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the judgment would than clearly indicate the issues that were directly under consideration for the determination of the Apex Court. In Tulsiram Patel’s case,A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416, a Constitution Bench of the Court was considering the question of the validity and scope of the second proviso to (2) and the rival submissions noticed in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the judgment would than clearly indicate the issues that were directly under consideration for the determination of the Apex Court. In that context and in the course of discussion and consideration, court made an observation as follows: “The question which then arises is, whether the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) 1976, which further amended substituted clause (2) of Art.311 with effect from lst Janu 1977, has made any change in the law? The amendments made by this Act are that (2) that portion which required a reasonable opportunity of making representation proposed penalty to be given to a Government Servant was deleted and in its place proviso was inserted, which expressly provides that it is not necessary to give to a delinquent Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the proposed Does this affect the operation of the original proviso which by the Constitution (Forty Amendment) Act became the second proviso. Such obviously was not and could been the intention of Parliament: vide para 68).” That is how the further consideration of the issues before that Court continued and it vis the second proviso to Art.311(2) that all further aspects of the case were considered. The second proviso to Art.311(2) deals with only situations where no was called for as well as where the enquiry can be dispensed with. The other decisions Supreme Court report in Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, (1985)4 S.C.C. 252 , Shivaji Sowant v. State of Maharashtra and others, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 617:1986 Lab.I.C. 585: 2 S.C.C. 112: (1986)52 Fac.L.R 474: (1986)1 Serv.L.J. 358: (1986)1 S.C.J. 372, cases dealing with the applicability of the second proviso to Art.311 (2) in the context where the very enquiry had been dispensed with. 22. The next case was that of the Apex Court in Kailash Chander Case, AIR 1958 S.C. where a Division Bench of that Court consisting of three learned Judges considered made on behalf of a Government servant relying upon Explanation to sub-rule (3) of the U.P.Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 which provided a copy of the recommendation of the tribunal as to the penalty should be furnished charged Government servant. While repelling such a plea, the Apex Court observed question of service of copy of report arose on account of a second show cause notice Government servant before the 42nd Amendment and since the proceedings in that one initiated after the 42nd Amendment, the petitioner cannot legitimately demand opportunity. The true and real nature, extent and scope of the second opportunity and the extent the 42nd Amendment really curtailed or abolished it was never the subject of direct consideration of the learned Judges in that case, nor were the learned obliged to express any opinion on the applicability of the principle of natural justice became the basis and the theme of the judgment in Mohamed Ramzan Khan’s case, L.L.J. 29. 23. Apart from the decision in the latest Mohamed Ramzan Khan’s case, (1991)1 reliance was also placed for the respondents on the decision of the Supreme E.Bashyam’s case, A.I.R 1988 S.C. 1000, wherein the question arose directly consideration as to whether the supply of copy of report of the Enquiry Officer delinquent is necessary before the disciplinary authority records a finding of Considering the relevance as well as the importance of the question and the necessity have the same adjudicated by a larger Bench, while recommending consideration of the matter to a larger Bench, the learned Judges observed as follows: “ The question arising in this matter is not with regard to the giving of notice limited question of what penalty should be imposed. The question is whether it is the right delinquent to persuade the authority which makes up its mind as regards the guilt delinquent that such a finding is not warranted in the light of the report of the Officer.” (vide para 6 of the judgment). On a careful consideration of the decision in Tulsiram Patel’s case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 Secretary Central Board of Excise and Customs v. K.S. Mahalingam, AI.R. 1987 S.C. 1919, Apex Court pointed out in categorical terms that clause (2) of Art.311 required that Government servant was dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, an inquiry must be which he should be informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. It was also pointed out that the nature hearing to be given to a government servant under Clause (2) of Art.311 has elaborately set out by this Court in Khem Chand’s case, A.I.R 1958 S.C. 300, though that case related to the original clause (2) of Art.311, the same applied present clause (2) of Art.311 except for the fact that now a government servant has to make any representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. (See 96 of Tulsiram Patel’s case, A.I.R 1985 S.C. 1416. The first proviso to Art.311(2) 42nd Amendment also states that “it shall not be necessary to give such person opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. ” 24. There can, therefore, be no serious controversy over the fact that more than Constitution Benches of the Apex Court consistently and repeatedly laid down the position law that the first stage of the enquiry is upto the stage of the submission of the report Government or the Disciplinary Authority by the Enquiry Authority after appreciating evidence and recording his conclusions in the form of a report and that the second the inquiry involved the formation of an opinion or arriving at a prima facie regarding the proof or otherwise of the charges levelled or the guilt of the delinquent as it is called and provisionally propose the punishment and give an opportunity delinquent officer to show cause against the further course of action proposed opportunity has been invariably held to include not only an opportunity to show against the imposition of the punishment or its severity alone but also against the otherwise of the charges and thereby the very guilt of the delinquent officer. Consequently, the opportunity at that stage included a right to show that he is innocent of the charges framed against him before Punishing Authority or Disciplinary Authority and that the charges were themselves proved against him. Consequently, the opportunity at that stage included a right to show that he is innocent of the charges framed against him before Punishing Authority or Disciplinary Authority and that the charges were themselves proved against him. When that was the position of law prevailing on the eve of the Amendment and the amendment specifically and guardedly used the phraseology representation on the penalty proposed”, can it be allowed to contend that such amendment had the effect of depriving the delinquent officer the opportunity he had to show make representation against the proof or otherwise of the charges themselves which was held to be a substantial right of the government servants it open to assume on the part of those concerned with the Forty-Second Amendment of the prevailing law and take it for granted that the phraseology carefully chosen and deliberately no significance or meaning whatsoever. If that were the intention or object sought achieved, it could have been made clear that the delinquent officer or government shall not be entitled to any further opportunity after the stage of enquiry or that there no need to give any second or further show cause notice or opportunity after the conclusion of the enquiry. It is a well accepted proposition that the object of the enquiry by a other than the Disciplinary Authority itself is not merely to collect the materials and forward them, but appreciate the evidence and record his conclusions and submit them form of a report which by itself constitutes as a material for the Disciplinary. Authority take further action. Though the report as such is not binding upon the Disciplinary and it is open to such authority either to agree or disagree with the findings of the Officer, the fact that the findings or conclusions in the report influences the mind Disciplinary Authority considerably and form as basic material having great persuasive cannot be ruled out. That being the position, the relevant question that necessarily to be decided will be whether the Disciplinary Authority can act upon such a report behind the back of the delinquent officer even before the same was communicated and such officer was given an opportunity to explain anything said adverse against him report before arriving at a finding of guilt or otherwise or holding the charges proved on the basis of such a report. That is what we are concerned with in the matter before the question in that form directly was posed only in E.Bashyam’s case, A.I.R. 1988 1000, though not answered but came to be ultimately decided in the latest pronouncement Mohamed Ramzan Khan’s case, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 . 25. That apart, considering the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appellants as well as the latest decision of the Apex Court in Mohamed Ramzan Khan (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 , we do not find either the fact, situation or the question directly therein are one and the same. To find out the ratio of a decision of a case, it is not enough merely pick up a word or a sentence from a judgment and treat it as the complete exposition of law on the subject unmindful of the facts and circumstances of the case or the context which those observations were made. The Apex court has not only cautioned against practice but indicated that such sentences or words divorced of the situation and cannot be considered as binding precedents themselves. No doubt, Art.141 Constitution of India mandates that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding other Courts but it is not that every observation can be treated as the full and exposition of law. Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530, In yet decision reported in P.A.Shah v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1986S.C. 468: (1986)1 S.C.C. (1986)1 S.C.J. 106, the Apex court opined that while applying a decision to a later court which is dealing with it, should carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid the previous decision and that the fact that a decision often takes its colour question involved in that case in which it was rendered cannot be ignored and the scope authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs given situation. We have already considered and expressed our views as to the ratio various decisions referred to and our conclusions in that regard will go to show that absolutely no scope for even contending that the latest decision in Mohamed Ramzan case, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 , conflicts with any other decision of a coordinate or larger the Apex Court. 26. We have already considered and expressed our views as to the ratio various decisions referred to and our conclusions in that regard will go to show that absolutely no scope for even contending that the latest decision in Mohamed Ramzan case, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 , conflicts with any other decision of a coordinate or larger the Apex Court. 26. Viewed thus, as it ought to be, we find that there was no scope or occasion visualising any conflict as suggested on behalf of the appellants. The decisions-referred to and relied by the learned counsel for the appellants are not authorities for the proposition that rules natural justice have no application in such cases and that the delinquent officer government servant is not entitled to have an opportunity to explain the conclusions findings against him by the Enquiry Officer, to the Disciplinary Authority before authority arrives at a finding of guilt or otherwise of the delinquent officer holding charges proved or not proved. That being the position, we see no conflict of the expressed or ratio laid down by the learned Chief Justice of India in the pronouncement in Mohamed Ramzan Khan’s case, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 , with the ratio of earlier decisions referred to on behalf of the appellants. It was observed at para 17 of above case thus: "(17) There have been several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken view. Since we have reached a different conclusion, the judgments in the different Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. have not been shown any decision of a co-ordinate or a larger Bench of this Court taking view. Even on some occasions this Court has taken view. Since we have reached a different conclusion, the judgments in the different Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. have not been shown any decision of a co-ordinate or a larger Bench of this Court taking view. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two-judge Bench in this will also no longer to be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground." The above observation, in our view, only is indicative of the fact that all relevant decisions have been, though not referred to, considered and there was no judgment of the Apex rendered by a coordinate or a Larger Bench taking a view contra to the one taken by them regard, particularly to, the requirement of the supply of the enquiry report as a necessary requirement of the supply of the enquiry report as a necessary requirement for the compliance with the principles of natural justice. The earlier judgment had not looked provisions and requirement of the supply of the copy of the report from that angle. according to us also fortifies our view that in the cases relied upon on behalf of appellants, the question never arose directly as in the latest pronouncement referred supra and that it has been since authoritatively decided and the said decision is very binding upon us having regard to the declaration contained in Art.141 of the Constitu India. For the very same reason, we consider that the decision reported in S.Kannan Member of the Local Board, S.B.I., (1990)1 M.L.J. 516 as well as the order made appeal from the same in W.A.No.1011 of 1989, dated 7.12.1989 can any longer be said lay down the correct position of law after the latest pronouncement of the Apex Court apart, we find that those decisions also turned upon the peculiar provision contained rules governing that case providing for service of report only along with the final orders. 27. For what all has been said above, we consider it to be unnecessary to refer to decisions pertaining to "‘per incuriam" and "stare decisis" cited at the Bar on behalf of side or deal with and adjudicate upon those submissions as they do not strictly arise in case. 28. 27. For what all has been said above, we consider it to be unnecessary to refer to decisions pertaining to "‘per incuriam" and "stare decisis" cited at the Bar on behalf of side or deal with and adjudicate upon those submissions as they do not strictly arise in case. 28. We consider it necessary, even at the expense of repetition to state that we had to all those decisions and deal with the scope of Art.311(2) having regard to the fact entire gamut of case law produced concerned cases of Government or civil servants State. We were alive to the position that the cases before us pertained to employees Board constituted no doubt under a statute, and the rights of such employees undertaking were governed by statutory regulations made by the Board and not Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India or the other rules governing civil servants State. The case law referred to, therefore, would be relevant, so far as the present concerned, as of persuasive value and not as directly binding authority. 29. The provisions of law that directly apply and really govern the case are those in Regulation No.8(b) of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employees Discipline and Regulations made in the purported exercise of powers conferred under Sec.79(c) Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 referred to supra. The provision therein that "After the has been completed, the person shall be entitled to put in, if he so desires, a further statement of his defence, whether or not the person charged desired or had an oral enquiry; he shall be heard in person stage if he so desires before passing of final orders," assumes great significance importance in deciding the question directly in issue before us. The enquiry officer report only and does not pass final orders. Therefore, before the passing of final the Disciplinary Authority so far as the guilt of the delinquent officer is concerned and the findings are arrived at finally one way or the other, the delinquent officer is entitled "be heard". The second para of Regulation 8(b) has to be harmoniously read with portion and if so read, the second para has to be limited in its operation to the stage purpose of showing cause against the penalty proposed to be imposed. The second para of Regulation 8(b) has to be harmoniously read with portion and if so read, the second para has to be limited in its operation to the stage purpose of showing cause against the penalty proposed to be imposed. Thus, the amendment introducing the second para to Regulation No.8(b) is that the disciplinary authority is not obliged to inform beforehand the nature of the penalty proposed imposed and hear or give an opportunity to the delinquent officer against the imposition such penalty and that the delinquent officer cannot claim that he should be opportunity to show cause against the quantum or nature of punishment before delinquent officer being visited with such penalty. Apart from this, we are unable appreciate or countenance the plea of the appellants that no opportunity need be the delinquent officer, after receipt of the report submitted behind his back but before agreeing or disagreeing with the findings recorded or arrived at by the enquiry officer finding the delinquent officer guilty of the charges or condemning him. The fact that findings recorded or conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer are not per se binding the disciplinary authority has no relevance or impact upon the decision of the before us for our consideration. The report is a material which comes into the hands disciplinary authority and the conclusions and findings recorded play a vital condemning or exonerating the delinquent officer and that being the real position, the of an opportunity as prayed for becomes all the more important and necessary either on the basis of the Regulation or on the basis of the principles of natural justice, conclusions of ours as expressed supra become inevitable and inescapable. 30. The plea incidentally raised at some stage of the argument that the application principles of natural justice can be excluded by a specific statutory provision equally not appeal to us, so far as the present case is concerned. It is no doubt, by now, settled principle of law that natural justice does not supplant but supplement the law application of those general principles cannot only be modified but also be excluded particular statute or statutory provision. At the same time, such exclusion ought not readily inferred. It is no doubt, by now, settled principle of law that natural justice does not supplant but supplement the law application of those general principles cannot only be modified but also be excluded particular statute or statutory provision. At the same time, such exclusion ought not readily inferred. That is because the Apex Court on more than one occasion categorically down the proposition that to treat a person in violation of the principles of natural would amount to arbitrary and discriminatory treatment and would violate the guarantee secured under Art.14 of the Constitution of India. Principles of natural justice have been uniformly recognised to have become part of the guarantee secured under the Constitution of India. That apart, though the employees of the Board are not members the civil service of the State, the appellant-Board is indisputably ‘State’ within the of Art.12 of the Constitution of India and thus the action of the appellants shall answer requirements of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, which in turn will compliance with the principles of reasonableness, fairness and justness as opposed arbitrariness and acting at whimsically and capriciously. Consequently, though a provide for the exclusion of the principles of natural justice in a given case, yet the subject to scrutiny on the touchstone of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. So far case on hand is concerned, we are unable to agree with the submission that the paragraph of Regulation No.8(b) has the necessary consequence of excluding applicability beyond the stage or purpose for which it has been designed. 31. The submissions on behalf of the appellants proceed upon fallacy that once opportunity to make representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed has been away, the right of the delinquent officer to make representations against the otherwise of the charges and against the finding of guilt also has been lost. The imposition of penalty is the consequence of the delinquent officer having before thereto found guilty. Finding of guilt is the first or anterior stage and the imposition penalty is posterior step That in respect of these two stages or aspects the delinquent had a right to show cause against or make his representation is not before us. The imposition of penalty is the consequence of the delinquent officer having before thereto found guilty. Finding of guilt is the first or anterior stage and the imposition penalty is posterior step That in respect of these two stages or aspects the delinquent had a right to show cause against or make his representation is not before us. They are two different and distinct stages and though the destruction opportunity at an anterior stage may by implication sometimes be said to have resulted deprivation of the opportunity at the later stage, the converse cannot follow or be said correct The question whether a delinquent officer has to be punished at all depends to whether the charges levelled have been properly substantiated and validly proved. not the same as to the question of what nature of punishment or quantum of punishment has to be imposed commensurate with the gravity of the charges held proved. The paragraph of Regulation 8(b) inserted after amendment takes away the opportunity making representations against the nature of quantum of punishment to be imposed. because in the by-gone days, having regard to the fact that it was the disciplinary punishing authority which dealt with and handled both stages, that the matter was with as a combined measure clubbing both the aspects of finding of guilt of charges imposition of punishment together and in common, the right to make representation in respect of those two stages cannot be said to have been destroyed by the specific restricted language employed for the purposes of the amendment in question. If that really the object, we are constrained to state that those who devised the amendment miserably missed their target and failed in achieving their objects. 32. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the conclusion of the learned single Judge was correct, though for different reasons assigned by us, and we see no to interfere with the order of the learned Judge allowing the writ petitions. The writ appeals consequently fail and shall stand dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no as to costs. Appeals dismissed.