M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is defendant's Second Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Courts below. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF filed the suit claiming that the suit schedule property was his having fallen to his share at a family partition at an earlier point of time; that he had permitted the defendant to occupy the house as a licensee; that the defendant obtained his signature on a blank paper representing that it was required to give "varadi" to the revenue authorities in regard to partition and on securing such signature on a blank paper, he got an agreement for sale written up alleging that the suit schedule property was being sold under the said agreement to the defendant by the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 300/- of which a sum of rs. 100/- was paid as advance on the date of agreement which was in the year 1977. He further averred that such a document was a fraudulant one and when plaintiff wanted possession of the suit schedule property, the defendant refused stating that the property was his under the so- called agreement for sale and that in any event, he had perfected his title by adverse possession. ( 3 ) THE defendant, on such plea of the plaintiff,resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that he was in possession in part performance of the contract under the said agreement for sale and in any event he had perfected his title by adverse possession. On such pleadings as many as six issues were framed. Burden on four of them was cast on the plaintiff, while two of the issues were required to be proved by the defendant. Those two issues were with reference to the agreement for sale and plea of adverse possession. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant having admitted possession pursuant to the agreement for sale, possession could only be permissive and could never be adverse and therefore, it rejected plea of adverse possession. On the question of execution of agreement for sale having regard to the conduct of the defendant inasmuch as he never sought specific performance of contract for many years, though the agreement provided for payment of balance of consideration within a year from the date of agreement. On the question of execution of agreement for sale having regard to the conduct of the defendant inasmuch as he never sought specific performance of contract for many years, though the agreement provided for payment of balance of consideration within a year from the date of agreement. In those circumstances, it was held that agreement for sale whether genuine or fraudulant, was not a document intended to be acted upon. ( 4 ) THE lower appellate Court, appreciating the evidence on record, has concurred with the findings of the trial Court as there was no dispute with regard to the title of plaintiff to the suit schedule property. Suit came to be decreed and appeal dismissed. ( 5 ) THE only point urged in this Court is that there had been no proper consideration of Exhibit d1, the agreement for sale said to have been executed by the plaintiff, I do not see that such question may be raised in the Second Appeal at all. Undoubtedly, general rule is that no limita- tion may be read into a contract for sale of immovable property unless it can be demonstrated that time was the essence of the contract. The appellate court has pointed out that one of the recitals in Exhibit D1 was to the effect that balance of consideration would be paid within a year before next Ugadi. But there is no evidence whatsoever, the defendant ever offered to pay the balance of consideration or that he called upon the defendant to perform his remaining part of the contract under the said agreement for sale by executing the registered sale deed. He kept quiet for many years. It was only when he was confronted with a lawyer's notice seeking vacant possession of the building that he put up the plea of the agreement for sale and continued to resist the same on the same ground in the suit as well. It is in that circumstance that the lower appellate court having regard to the conduct of the plaintiff was unwilling to come to the conclusion that there was any bar or limitation for agreement which was not intended to be acted upon. It is in that circumstance that the lower appellate court having regard to the conduct of the plaintiff was unwilling to come to the conclusion that there was any bar or limitation for agreement which was not intended to be acted upon. ( 6 ) I do not, therefore, see any ground to interfere with that finding of fact appreciating evidence, much less that a question of law that too of a substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. As such, it is dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant asked for time to vacate. On facts and circumstances and having regard to the plea taken by the defendant, even a day's time should not be granted. Prayer is refused. He must deliver possession of the house to the respondent forthwith or face execution proceedings. --- *** --- .