JUDGMENT U. C. Banerjee, J.- This appeal is directed against the order of learned Single judge setting aside the order of dismissal of the writ petitioner from service and with a direction to reinstate the writ petitioner with all back wages. On the factual score it appears that the writ petitioner the respondent herein being a constable in the police force was convicted for offences under s. 147/323 real with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, however, a charge-sheet was issued to the writ petitioner on two counts; the first being that the petitioner was convicted of offences involving moral turpitude and on the second count it was alleged that the writ petitioner unauthorisedly absented himself from his duties. 2. It appears that by reason of all order of dismissal passed by the respondent authorities in the departmental proceedings, the petitioner was dismissed from service by reason where for a, writ application was moved. The matter, however, eventually went before the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court remanded the matter back to the Departmental Authorities for consideration of the matter afresh. Since, according to the petitioner, the consideration yielded no benefit to the writ petitioner, yet another writ application was moved before this Court and the learned Trial Judge allowed the writ petition With an observation that land dispute being a common occurrence in village areas, involvement of the writ petitioner in such dispute cannot be termed to be an immoral act by itself. The learned Trial Judge observed that it may be that forming an unlawful assembly and by injuring some member of the opponent group, the petitioner tried to take the law into his own hands but it cannot be said that thereby he committed an act which shocks the moral conscience of the dociety in general or that the act was immoral or involving moral turpitude. The learned Trial Judge, as a matter of fact did set aside the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from service and the impugned order of the appellate authority was also quashed. The learned Trial Judge, as a matter of fact did set aside the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from service and the impugned order of the appellate authority was also quashed. Further the State Appellants were directed by issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus to reinstate the petitioner within the period of thirty days from the date of the order and to pay him his full back wages since the date of his dismissal from service within a period of ninety days from the date of his reinstatement. On the other count viz., the unauthorized absence, the Learned Trial Judge, however, directed that since the petitioner has been found guilty of the second charge for unauthorised absence, a month's basic salary should be deducted from his back wages, The Learned Trial Judge further was pleased to observe that this is strictly not by way of punishment but only to remind the writ petitioner that he should maintain discipline in future and he should not indulge in unauthorised absence. In addition thereto, the Learned Judge also recorded that the petitioner may also be censured. 3. The State-respondent in the main writ petition came up before this Court as against the order of the learned Single Judge and prayed for interim relief by way of stay of operation of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Appellate Court while disposing of the Hay petition did grant the interim relief by way of stay of operation of the order. 4. Before proceeding further in the matter the factual aspect ought to be adverted to in slightly more greater detail at this juncture for the purpose of better appreciation of the contentions raised in the appeal. 5. The petitioner a constable in the Calcutta Police has been in the police force since 1956. In the year 1968 the petitioner was involved in an incident by reason wherefor the proceedings under ss. 147 and 325/149 of the Indian Penal Code were initiated against him and he was convicted accordingly. Such conviction, however, on appeal to the Sessions Judge was converted to one under ss. 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code and the petitioner, having been found guilty, had to undergo an imprisonment for a period of three months. 147 and 325/149 of the Indian Penal Code were initiated against him and he was convicted accordingly. Such conviction, however, on appeal to the Sessions Judge was converted to one under ss. 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code and the petitioner, having been found guilty, had to undergo an imprisonment for a period of three months. Subsequently thereto, the petitioner however, joined his duty but was put under suspension and in April, 1970, he was charge-sheeted for having been sentenced by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence involving moral turpitude and was however followed by a second charge-sheet in May, 1970 for absenting himself from the Barrack without permission. The enquiry, following the charge-sheet, was conducted by the State Authorities and the petitioner was found guilty on both the counts and was dismissed form service. On 5th September, 1970. Though an appeal was preferred but before, however, the disposal of the appeal, the petitioner filed a writ application before this Court being C.R.no. 5622(w) of 1971 which was disposed of with a direction upon the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal with expedition. The appeal, however, was thereafter heard and was disposed of with an order of dismissal. The petitioner again had taken recourse to the writ jurisdiction of this Court being C.R. no. 9846(w) of 1976 and this Court did set aside the order. The State-respondents, however, preferred an appeal from the order of the learned Single Judge being F.M.A. 334 of 1976 and the Appellate Court while disposing of the matter remitted the matter back to the Appellate Authority for consideration of the matter afresh. The Appellate Authority once again by its order dated February 15, 1979 dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner again challenged the order and invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court and this Court by an order dated January 28, 1981 quashed the impugned order of the Appellate Authority and remitted the case back for reconsideration of the appeal in accordance with the direction given earlier by the Division Bench after allowing the petitioner a personal hearing. 6. On the further factual score it appears that after the matter was remitted back to the Commissioner of Calcutta Police, the latter again rejected the petitioner's appeal and the petitioner again moved this Court under writ jurisdiction. 6. On the further factual score it appears that after the matter was remitted back to the Commissioner of Calcutta Police, the latter again rejected the petitioner's appeal and the petitioner again moved this Court under writ jurisdiction. The learned Judge, however, dealing with the matter rejected' the application summarily, since there is no merit in the matter according to the learned Judge, The matter thereafter was taken before the Appellate Court and the rule was issued and the matter came eventually before the learned Single Judge for the disposal which was subsequently dealt with by the learned Single Judge in favour of the writ petitioner as noted above. 7. It would be convenient at this juncture, however, to refer to Regulation 5 of Chapter XIX of the Police Regulations, Calcutta. Regulation 5 provides :- "5. Every police officer sentenced by a Court for an offence implying moral turpitude shall, unless the Commissioner of Police otherwise orders be dismissed. A police officer sentenced by a Court in an offence not involving moral turpitude shall ordinarily be dismissed but in trivial cases some more lenient form of punishment than dismissal may be awarded or the offender may not be punished. In such cases the proceedings shall contain a record of the reasons for dismissing or not dismissing the offender." 8. Let us now analyse the offence for which the petitioner was charged and convicted. Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code provides that "Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both". Rioting has been defined in s. 146 of the Code as "Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof. in prosecution of the common object of such assembly. every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting." 9. Section 325 provides :- "Whoever, except in the case provided for by s. 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description •for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." 10. every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting." 9. Section 325 provides :- "Whoever, except in the case provided for by s. 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description •for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." 10. As stated above on an appeal by the writ petitioner before the Sessions Judge, the conviction under s. 325 was converted to one under s.323 Section 323 provides:- "Whoever, except in the case provided for by s. 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." 11. On the factual score, therefore, one finds that a constable being a member of a disciplined force has used force or violence while in unlawful assembly in prosecution of such common object of such an assembly and has voluntarily caused hurt, by reason wherefor the constable being the writ petitioner was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for three months. 12. Mr. Banerjee appearing in support of the appeal on behalf of the State-respondents has submitted that though, the, offences under s. 147 and s. 323 by themselves strictly, by the letters of law may not be one involving moral turpitude, but considering the petitioner's case and being a member of the disciplined force it cannot but be treated to be at great significance Involving moral turpitude. It was contended that the police force is for the preservation of law and order and if the police officers take upon themselves the role of an offender and voluntarily cause hurt to another, it would rather be setting up a dangerous precedent and that would be a death-nail for the police force. Preserver of law and order cannot act as a destroyer of la wand order. It was can tended that no court should lend its assistance howsoever technical it might be so as to allow the member of a disciplined force continuing in service In the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration. 13. The Learned Trial Judge, however, bad taken a different view altogether stating therein in his judgment that on a plain reading of the provision as above question of there being any moral turpitude does not and cannot arise. 13. The Learned Trial Judge, however, bad taken a different view altogether stating therein in his judgment that on a plain reading of the provision as above question of there being any moral turpitude does not and cannot arise. The Learned Judge went on to observe that since the petitioner was served with a specific charge having committed offence involving moral turpitude and no charge has been framed in terms of the second count of Regulation 5, the petitioner ought to be granted a relief as otherwise the same would be a travesty of justice. 14 The Learned Trial Judge also relied upon the meaning of the expression moral turpitude in Black's Law Dictionary where it bas been stated to be an act which grievously violates the moral sentiment or accepted moral standard of community. The two English decisions as mentioned in the dictionary and relied upon by the Learned Trial Judge have also expressed the same view. The Indian decisions do not also lend a different colour nor does it render any further assistance in the matter. Apparently, however, the decision of the Learned Single Judge of the Gujrat High Court in the case of Thakorbhai Bhagabhai vs. D.D.O, Surat & Anr. (1980) 21 Gujrat Law Reporter 966 seems to have weighed with the Learned Judge. In that decision the Learned Single Judge of Gujrat High Court observed: "...................It may be that before condemning an Advocate for misconduct, courts are inclined to examine the question as to whether such gross negligence involves moral turpitude or delinquency. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, however, it is of almost importance to remember that the expression moral turpitude or delinquency” is not to receive a narrow construction. Wherever conduct proved against an Advocate is contrary to honesty, or opposed to good morals, or is unethical, it may be safely held that it involves moral turpitude. A willful and callous disregard for the interest of the client may, in a proper case, be characterized as conduct unbefitting an Advocate………..- Any conduct which makes a person unworthy to belong to the noble fraternity of lawyers of makes an advocate unfit to be entrusted with the responsible task of looking after the interest of the litigant, must be regarded as conduct involving moral turpitude………” 15. While it is true that the Learned Single Judge observed that the expression moral turpitude should not be given a restrictive meaning but with all due respect to the Learned Single Judge, it appears that such a restriction has been attributed to the words moral turpitude by the Learned Judge himself in coming into the conclusion that the conduct and acts complained of could not constitute a conduct which may be stated to be involving moral turpitude. The test is whether the act complained of contradicts or violates the accepted standards of the community. Moral turpitude in our view means and implied a conduct which does not befit a person of his present avocation or employment Too narrow or pedantic approach would not subserve the ends of justice. What is moral turpitude ought to depend upon the facts and circumstances of matter under consideration. In this Context the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of In the matter of Mr. 'P' an Advocate AIR 1963 SC 1313 ) seems to be very apposite. In that decision the Supreme Court observed :- "It is no doubt that the word, "involving moral turpitude" should not be given restrictive meaning. Nonetheless, in the ultimate analysis, an office- bearer sought to be removed under the aforesaid provision must be imputed with the act constituting offence which is dishonest or immoral, or conduct which is so unethical as to render him un-fit to hold the office". 16. Coming back to the facts of the matter under consideration it seems that the writ petitioner being the respondent in the appeal is a member of the disciplined force, the force is maintained for the preservation of law and order and if a member of that particular force responsible for maintenance of peace himself commits an offence and is subsequently punished for unlawful assembly and causing hurt to another, can he be termed to be a person worthy of belonging to the disciplined force or worthy to be termed fit enough to be entrusted with maintenance of law order so far as the 'society is concerned-This ought to be the test in the matter of deciding as to whether the act complained of can be termed to be involving moral turpitude. 16A. 16A. The decision of the another learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Patel Bhogilal Manordas v The Development Commissioner of Gujarat State & Anr. (1976) 17 Gujrat LR 724 seems to have taken the view as expressed hereinabove. The above-noted decision in Patel Bhogilal's case though referred in the decision in Thokorbhai (supra) was not "pressed into service on facts", but in our view has correctly recorded that it is the duty of a Sarpanch to cater to the welfare of the village people and since the Sarpanch was behaving in a manner which is contrary to his duties or functions under the act by straying away his cattle into the fields of others, he not only committed criminal trespass but directly violated s. 161 of the Act which the Sarpanch is supposed or required to implement in order to cater to the welfare of the people, and which behaviour would, therefore, shock the general conscience of the society and rendered him unfit to become the Sarpanch. 17. The exposition of law as recorded by the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the Thakorbhai case (supra) cannot be termed to be, with utmost respect to the learned Judge a correct exposition of law and as such we record a note of dissent herein. 18. Before proceeding further, however, it is to be noted that the offence under s. 147 read with s. 323 of the Indian Penal Code, though by itself be not termed to be an offence involvif1g moral turpitude but when committed by an official of the law enforcing agency, the same cannot but shake the confidence of the people in that particular official of the law enforcing agency. It is not maintaining at all a dual standard, but it is the feeling of the community at large-Which has to be considered and in the event of there being likelihood of the community being affected, there is no escape from the conclusion that the conduct of the official of the law enforcing agency involves moral turpitude. 19. Let us now analyse the situation in a little more greater detail. 19. Let us now analyse the situation in a little more greater detail. A police constable is sent out to maintain law and order and to restore peace and order and to restore peace and tranquility in an area-That particular police constable was convicted of unlawful assembly and causing hurt on an earlier occasion-Would the people of the, locality wherein peace has been disturbed and tranquility has been affected can have faith on to the officer to bring back peace and tranquility. In our view the answer cannot but be in the negative. A person guilty of an offence cannot be expected to be an acceptable official by the community at large to restore tranquility when he himself is guilty of an unlawful assembly-When he himself is guilty of causing hurt to another. 20. The other aspect of the matter ought also not to be lost sight of viz., observation of the Appellate Court while remitting the matter back to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Court observed :- "Primarily it is for the disciplinary authority to determine whether the conviction and sentence of a police officer by a Criminal Court imply his moral turpitude. Whether or not an offence committed by a police officer implied moral turpitude ought to be considered according to the standard of conduct expected of a member of the Calcutta Police Force in relation to his official and private acts, This Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot substitute its own views about the standard of morality expected of a member of the Police Force who are under the discipline and control of the respondents". 21. It is to be noted that subsequent to the order of the Appellate Court, the Disciplinary Authority did deal with the matter and on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the matter passed an order to the following effect :- "He (the delinquent), however, mentioned that the conviction under Ss.147 and 323/149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may not be treated as offences which tantamount to moral turpitude. Thus, considering whether these offences come within the ambit of moral turpitude or not. I have given my anxious consideration and hold that the offences under Ss. Thus, considering whether these offences come within the ambit of moral turpitude or not. I have given my anxious consideration and hold that the offences under Ss. 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code come within the ambit of moral turpitude and it is not desirable to retain the services of a person whose depraved conduct led to a conviction in a Criminal Court and upheld by the Session Judge. It is also derogatory to the prestige of the government particularly Calcutta Police, to retain in service a person of such character." 22. The Learned Trial Judge, however, while dealing with the matter observed that the Appellate Authority has acted on purely subjective manner since no attempt has been made to decide on facts whether the offence committed by the writ petitioner which indicates 'depravity of his mind'. The Learned Trial Judge further recorded that the Disciplinary Authority could not make him shake off his bias against the writ petitioner. At the outset we, however, record our note of dissent from the observation of the Learned Trial Judge in regard to the bias of the Commissioner of Police. There is no material on record to suggest any bias and the observations are, with utmost respect to the Learned Judge, wholly unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration. The Appellate Court directed the Disciplinary Authority to consider the matter according 'to the standard of conduct, expected of a member of the Calcutta Police Force in relation to his official and private act and the Commissioner of Police has held that it is derogatory to the prestige of the Calcutta Police Force to retain in service a person of such character upon coming into a finding that the offences under ss. 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code vis-a-vis the writ petitioner cannot but be termed to be offences involving moral turpitude. In our view, the Learned Judge has clearly exceeded his jurisdiction in this regard. 23. The Learned Trial Judge proceeded with the matter on a highly technical manner and observed that the finding of the Disciplinary Authority is wholly unwarranted. In our view, the Learned Judge has clearly exceeded his jurisdiction in this regard. 23. The Learned Trial Judge proceeded with the matter on a highly technical manner and observed that the finding of the Disciplinary Authority is wholly unwarranted. Learned Trial Judge recorded:- "This approach, I should say, is wholly unwarranted since the petitioner was specifically charged for having been convicted and sentenced for an offence involving moral turpitude and not under part two of Regulation 5 That being so, there is no difficulty in striking down this part of the order of the Commissioner of Police as without jurisdiction." 24. As noted above the Learned Judge has dealt with the matter on a much narrow compass and in accordance with the strict letters of law. It is no gain-said that only in the event of bribery and corruption that the offence can be said to be involving moral turpitude A disciplined force has a duty to the public in general and the public in general ought to have confidence on to such a disciplined force that the force would be able to maintain peace, tranquility and the law and order in an effective manner. If that faith is shaken by reason of employment of persons who have suffered conviction for violation of the provisions of law in the matter of maintenance of law and order, question of taking recourse to technicality does not and cannot arise. Cause of justice shall have to be subserved and technicality alight not to outweigh the course of justice. Does the course of justice demand that the personnel of a disciplined force having this conviction under s. 147 and s. 323/149 Indian Penal Code as his background, ought to be allowed to continue to act as a member of such a disciplined force-In our view the answer is in the negative. 25. As regards the other charge of unauthorised absence, Mr. Banerjee for the appellant submitted that the writ Court does not have the jurisdiction to inflict a punishment and the same ought to remain with the respondent authority. For convenience's sake the observation of the Learned Trial Judge on this count ought also to be noted at this juncture. The Learned Trial Judge observed :- "However, since the petitioner has been found guilty of the second charge for unauthorised absence, a month's basic salary should be deducted from his back wages. For convenience's sake the observation of the Learned Trial Judge on this count ought also to be noted at this juncture. The Learned Trial Judge observed :- "However, since the petitioner has been found guilty of the second charge for unauthorised absence, a month's basic salary should be deducted from his back wages. This is not strictly by way of punishment but only to remind him that he should maintain discipline in future and should not indulge unauthorised absence. He may also be censured accordingly. " 26. We record our agreement with the submission of Mr. Banerjee that it is no part of the duty of the writ court to inflict punishment by itself and 1Isurp the power of the authority concerned. The finding of the Leaned Trial Judge on the second count cannot also thus be sustained. 27. In that view of the matter the order of the Learned Trial Judge cannot be sustained and is thus set aside. The writ petition is dismissed. Each party, however, to pay and bear its own cost. Writ petition dismissed; impugned order set aside.