Judgment B. Prasad, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India. It has been filed for the issuance of an appropriate writ/orders/directions commanding upon the respondents to certify and to send to this Court all records appertaining to the order dated 19-11-1984 passed in m. J. C. No.10/82 by respondent No.4, whereby and whereunder, the application filed on behalf of respondent No.2 purported to be under Sec.33-C (2)of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act), was allowed, and also for a writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to forbear from giving effect to or acting pursuant to or in furtherence of the said order. It appears that respondent No.2 Sri I. N. Roy, was the applicant before the labour court, Bakaro Steel City, whose presiding officer is respondent No.1. , whereas, the present petitioner was the sole opposite party before the labour court. 2. From the facts of the case, it would appear that respondent No.2 had filed an application purported to be under Sec.33-C (2) of the Act, before respondent No.1 which was registered as M. J. C. No.10/82. In this petition respondent No.2 has stated that formerly he was working as the officer Superintendent at Bagchi Dobari Colliery which was later on nationalised and was taken over No.1-5-1972 by the present petitioner. The Services of respondent No.2 was transferred to Development and Construction division of the present petitioner. Respondent No.2 has been discharging his duty as Officer Superintendent with effect from 1-3-1963 without any blemish. Unfortunately however, he has not been placed in the proper scale and has "hot been paid the proper wages of the Office Superintendent by the present petitioner, although, the Deputy Chief Mining Engineer of the present petitioner with the approval of the competent authority had placed opposite party No.2 in Grade A with effect from 28-12-1978. However, payment is not being made to him as per the proper scale of Grade-a Accordingly, respondent No.2 claimed that he is entitled to receive the difference of wages with effect from 20-6-1977 as he has been doing the job of the Office Superintendent since then. Accordingly he prayed for a sum of Rs.7,681 = 44 paisc being the difference of the wages and bonus with effect from 20-6-1977 to 30-4-1982 from the present petitioner. 3. Accordingly he prayed for a sum of Rs.7,681 = 44 paisc being the difference of the wages and bonus with effect from 20-6-1977 to 30-4-1982 from the present petitioner. 3. Before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, the present petitioner filed a written statement in which it had contended that the application filed under Sec.33-C (2) of the Act is not maintainable, since respondent No.2 was seeking his promotion in the garb of the application under this section which is not permissible. In a proceeding under this section read with Rule 62 of the Industrial Disputes (C) Rules, the proceeding before the labour court is analogous to an Execution proceeding, and it function like an Executing court in which it cannot decide such a complicated and disputed question of rights or liabilities of the parties. The jurisdiction conferred on the labour court under Sec.33-C (2) of the Act is confined only to the mere calculations and computations. Under this provision of law, the labur Court has got no jurisdiction to declare that respondent No.2 occupied a higher grade than what has been assigned to him by the employer, 01 that during the relevant period he should be given a higher wage. Before the labour Court, the present petitioner denied that respondent No.2 ever worked as the Office Superintendent either from 1-3-1963 or from any other date thereafter. Any claim of respondent No.2 to the effect that he was acting in the supervisory capacity can properly be decided in a proceeding under Sec.10 of the Act, and not in a proceeding under Sec.33-C (2)of the Act. Respondent No.2 was working merely as a Clerk at Bagchi Dobari colliery in the relevent period. Before the Labour Court, in the written statement, the present petitioner had denied that respondent No.2 was ever working as the Office Superintendent, on the other hand, it has been stated that he has been promoted as Special Grade Clerk, and not as the Office Superintendent. The promotion of an employee from a lower grade to a higher grade is the function of the management, and therefore, beyond the scope of Sec.33-C (2)of the Act. The labour court exercising jurisdiction under this section cannot issue direction to the employer to place the employee in a higher grade, and to pay him wages for that category/grade. So far as the letter said to have been issued by the Dy. The labour court exercising jurisdiction under this section cannot issue direction to the employer to place the employee in a higher grade, and to pay him wages for that category/grade. So far as the letter said to have been issued by the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer is concerned, it was not issued by a competent person and it was kept in abeyance, as the same was not issued by the proper authority. For promotion to the supervisory grade, there is a departmental promotion committee consisting of the Chief Personnel manager and four others, Obviously, respondent No.2 was not given any promotion, as claimed by him, by this committee. On these grounds it was contended that the claim of respondent No.2 be rejected. 4. Respondent No.2 filed a rejoinder petition before the learned court below chellenging the contentions raised in the written statement of the present petitioner in which similar points as taken in the application before the labour court were reiterated. 5. Sri Philip Topno, the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, bokaro Steel City formulated three questions in his decision. Question No.1 waswhether the applicant-workmen had been doing the work of Office superintendent. Question No.2 waswhether the applicant-Workmen has got an existing right for the claim made in this application. Question No.3 related to the relief to which the applicant was entitled. After detailed discussions so far as point No.1 was concerned, the learned Court below came to the conclusion that the applicant-workmen (respondent No.2) was doing the work of the Office Superintendent during the relevant period. So far us point No.2 was concerned, it was held by the learned court below that the applicant-workmen had got existing right for the claim that he had made in the application. Accordingly, it was held by the learned court below under point mo.3 that he was entitled to get Rs.7,681 =44 paise as difference of the wages that respondent No.2 was getting and the wages that he was entitled to get. It passed the order accordingly. 6. In this application the petitioner has contended that it is a Government company within the meaning cf Sec.617 of the Companies Act. The President of India promulgated an ordinance on or about 17-10-1971 whereby the managements of the coking coal mines was taken over by the government with immediate effect. It passed the order accordingly. 6. In this application the petitioner has contended that it is a Government company within the meaning cf Sec.617 of the Companies Act. The President of India promulgated an ordinance on or about 17-10-1971 whereby the managements of the coking coal mines was taken over by the government with immediate effect. The said ordinance was replaced by an act known as Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 On 1-1-1972 the Government incorporated the petitioner company as a Government company for taking over management of the Coking Coal mines of which the petitioner was appointed as Custodian. Thereafter, the Parliament passed an Act known as Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1972, whereby Coking Coal Mines, Coke-oven plants etc. Were nationalised and vested in the Central Government. This Act was given effect to frcm 1-5-1972 by a notification issued under Sec.7 of this Nationalisation act, 1972. The Coking Coal Mines as mentioned in Schedule appended thereto were to remain vested in the petitioner company. The employees of the company working in various collieries were governed by an agreement which is now commonly known as National Coal Wage Agreements I, II and III. 7. The petitioner contended that in a proceeding under Sec.33-C (2)of the Act, read with Rule 62 cf the Industrial Disputes (C) Rules, the labour court is only called upon to compute in terms of money or benefit which is analogous to an Execution Proceedings. In a proceeding under Sec.33-C (2) the labour court functions like an Executing Court and as such it cannot decide such complicated and dispute questions of rights or liabilities of the parties. The jurisdiction under Sec.33-C (2) is confined only to the mere calculation and computations. The claim for the actual classification or grade of an employee cannot be considered in an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The labour Court has no jurisdiction under this section to declare that the applicant (respondent No.2) occupied a higher grade than what has been assigned to him by the employer. The labour Court, however, without taking into consideration the relevant materials arbitrarily and without jurisdiction asked the petitioner to pay Rs.7,681 = 44 paise to respon No.2 by the impugned order dated 19-11-1984 passed in M. J. C. No 10/82. 8. The labour Court, however, without taking into consideration the relevant materials arbitrarily and without jurisdiction asked the petitioner to pay Rs.7,681 = 44 paise to respon No.2 by the impugned order dated 19-11-1984 passed in M. J. C. No 10/82. 8. The petitioner contended that any such application under section 33-C (2) of the Act was not maintainable in absence of any existing right by the concerned workmen. Under this provision of law, respondent no.1 had no jurisdiction to decide the disputed questions of facts in relation to the rights of a workmen. It also did not have the authority or jurisdiction to decide whether respondent No.2 was a workman or not. In a proceeding under Sec.33-C of the Act, respondent No.1 had no authority or jurisdiction to give promotion to a person in the garb of deciding whether a person is entitled to certain benefits or not. The impugned order visits the petitioner with civil consequences and on this ground also it is fit to be quashed. On these grounds it was prayed that a Rule NISI be issued for an appropriate writ/order/direction commanding upon the respondents to show cause as to why they shall not cartify and send to this court all records appertaining to the order dated 19-11-1984 passed in M. J. C. No.10/82 for being quashed by this court. It was further prayed that the respondents be restrained from giving effect to/or acting pursuant to or in furtherance of the impugned order (Annexure-4 ). 9. Respondent No.2 has filed a counter-affidavit in which he has denied the facts alleged in this writ application. It was further contended that the order passed in M. J. C. No.10/82 allowing the claim of respondent No.2 was perfectly valid and legal and the same cannot be said to be arbitrary. The claim of respondent No.2 was based on existing right determined on the basis of cogent evidence and admitted documents, and as such respondent no.1 had jurisdiction and authority to decide the claim of respondent No.2. On these grounds it was prayed that the writ application be dismissed. Along with the counter-affidavit number of documents have also been filed. 10. It is apparent that the petition filed before respondent No.1 was under Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. On these grounds it was prayed that the writ application be dismissed. Along with the counter-affidavit number of documents have also been filed. 10. It is apparent that the petition filed before respondent No.1 was under Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. Therefore, before proceeding to discuss the respective cases of the parties, I would firstly like to state the nature and the scope of Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. It runs as follows : "33-C (2 ). Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within period not exceeding three months. Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he may think fit. " From a reading cf this provision of law it would appear that it relates to the entitlement of a workman with respect to any money cr any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, be decided by the Labour Court. Thus, the scops of this section is limited. The above provision of law came up for consideration before the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Central bank of India Ltd. V/s. P. S. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 . In its paragraph 15 the following observations were made : "the legislative history to which we have just referred clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes on the basis cf collective bargaining, the legislature recognised that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and so, inserted Section 33-A in the Act in 1950 and added Sec.33-C in 1956. These two provisions illustrate the cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to Section 10 (1) of the Act, or without having to depend upon their Union to espouse their cause. Therefore, in construing Sect on 33-C we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations The con struction should not be so bread as to bring within the scope of section 33-C cases which would full under Sec.10 (1) Where industrial dispute arise between employees acting collectively and their employers they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act,as for instance,by reference under Section 10 (1 ). These disputes cannot be brought within the perview of section 33-C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting Sec.33-C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute Sr existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words though in determining the scope of Sec.33-C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under Sec.1001 of the act tor instance, cannot be- brought within the scope of Section 11. The case of Central Bank of India Lid. (Supra) is considered to be the leading case on this point. Apart from the above mentioned observetions made in paragraph 15 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has further proceeded to clearify the scope of Sub-section (2) of Sec.33-C by making the following observations : "in our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of Sub-section (2) ,t is clear that if workmans right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the labour court Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the labour court inevitably has to seal with the question as to whether the workman has right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed nothing more needs to be done and the labour court ran proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed the labour court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the labour court answers this point in favour of the workmen that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise " Proceeding further their Lordships observed : "the Claim under Sec.33-C (2) clearly postulates that the determi nation of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be proceeded by an enquiry into the existence of that right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assisned to the labour court by Sub-section (2 ). . . . . . " From these observations made by the Hon ble Supreme Court the true scone and import of Sec.33-C (2) will become clear. In this connection a further reference may be made to the observations made by the Hon ble Suprem court in the case of C. I. W. T. Corporation V/s. Workman, AIR 1974 SC 1604 in this decision the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "it is now well-settled that a proceeding under Sec.33-C (2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the labour court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows that there exists an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged or otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief mining Engieer East India Coal Co. Ltd. V/s. Rameshwar, 1968 ISCR 143 : AIR 1968 SC 218 it was reiterated that proceedings under section 33-C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by the Workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing Court. Ltd. V/s. Rameshwar, 1968 ISCR 143 : AIR 1968 SC 218 it was reiterated that proceedings under section 33-C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by the Workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing Court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between and industrial workman and his employer. " Also in paragraph 13 of this judgment, the Supreme Court observed that since the proceeding under Sec.33-C (2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation to determine (i) the plaintiffs right to relief and (ii) the "corresponding liability of the defendant, including whether the defendant is at all liable or not, are normally out side of its scope. It was further observed that in a proceeding under this section, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made, if there is a challenge on that score, But that is merely incidental. So far as the claims mentioned in items (i) and (ii)above, it was observed, that to call their determinations as in incidental to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out is just consequential upon the determination of (i) and (ii) and reprscnts the last stage in a process leading to final relief. It was further observed in paragraph 13 of this judgment that, It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur V/s. R. L. Khandelwal, (1968) 2 Lab LJ 589 (SC), that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under Sec.33-C (2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference under section 10 of the Act. . 12. . 12. These questions had come up for considerati on before the Division bench of this Court in the case of Bihar W. D. Corporation V/s. Presiding Officer, labour Court, (1989 (1) BLJ 252) in which reliance was placed on the above mentioned decision and a view was taken that it was within the competence of the labour court while dealing with an application under Sec.33-C (2)to enter into an enquiry for determining as to whether the workman was entitled to the benefit claimed by him. 13. I have analysed above the position of law with respect to the scope of Sec.33-C (2) of the Act as determined from time to time by the Hon ble Supreme Court and this Court. From these it would appear that a proceeding under Sec.33-C (2) is a proceeding generally in the nature of an execution proceeding in which the labour court is called upon to calculate and determine the amount of money due to workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being paid in terms of money, the labour court will proceed to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation, however, has to be done upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged. However, for any such claim for the relief involved, an investigation is directed for the determination of the plaintiffs right to the relief or the corresponding liability of the defendant it will not to be within the scope of Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. 14. Having thus stated law on the subject, I now proceed to discuss the facts of this case, as also the arguments advanced by the parties. In course of the argument, both parties submitted that they were confining their argument only to the maintainability of the proceeding under Sec.33-C (2)of the Act before the learned court below. It was in this background that I have briefly analysed the law on the subject as laid down by the Hon ble supreme Court as also by this Court. 15. In course of his arguments the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 has submitted that his claim is only with respect to the revised scale of the salary of the Office Superintendent and nothing more. 15. In course of his arguments the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 has submitted that his claim is only with respect to the revised scale of the salary of the Office Superintendent and nothing more. From his this submission, it would, however, appear that he has proceeded on the assumption that respondent No.2 was getting the scale of the Office superintendent and his claim is only confined to placing him in the revised scale of pay in place of the prevailing scale of pay. This does not, however, appear to be the correct position. In this connection, I will firstly like to refer to Annexure-XIV filed alongwith the counter-affidavit of respondent no.2. Paragraph-5 of Annexure-XIV which is a note of Personnel Officer (D and C) to the Dy. C. M. E. (D and C) and the Chief Mining Engineer (D and C), runs as follows : "5. Shri Roy is the Senior most staff in D and C. Division, Bihar building and working as Office Superintendent. this shows that respondent No.2 was not promoted as Office Superintendent, but was simply working as such. However, on behalf of respondent No.2 reliance has been placed on Annexure-vi of this counter-affidavit which is an office order passed by the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer, D and C Division. It is dated 28-12-1978. In this office order it has been observed that the following members of the staff of the D and C Division are promoted to the next higher grade/re-categorised, as indicated against their individual names with affect from 28-12-1978. In this list the name of respondent no.2 is at Serial no.1, and the grade shown against his name is Supervisory Grade-A. Annexure-VII is a latter dated 31-5-1978 from the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer (D and C) to respondent no.2 describing him as the Office Superintendent, and assigning him the duties mentioned in it. Annexure-VIII is a letter from the Administrative Officer (D and C), in which respondent no.2 has been described as the Office Superintendant and was authorised to draw the salary of staff of D and C Division for the month of October, 1976. Similarly annexure-IX is another latter from the same Administrative Officer in which respondent no.2 was described as the Office Superintendent and his signature was attested. Similarly annexure-IX is another latter from the same Administrative Officer in which respondent no.2 was described as the Office Superintendent and his signature was attested. Also Annexure-X which has been issued by the same Administrative officer, in which respondent no.2 has been described as the Office superintendent. The same is the case with Annexures-XI to XIII and annexures-XV to XVIII, in which respondent no.2 has been described as the Office Superintendent. On the strength of these letters, it has been submitted on behalf of respondent no.2 that he was recognised as the Office superintendent by the different functionaries of the petitioner, and as such, was entitled to the difference in the salary. 16. As against it, on behalf of the petitioner my attention has been drawn to page No.117 of the paper book which shows that different departmental committees were formed for selection of the persons in the supervisory grade in company wise basis. This letter dated 20-6-1977 was issued by the petitioner to all the General Managers and all heads of the departments. This letter shows that the promotion policy of the petitioner for filing of the post in the supervisory grade, and also the post in the special grade and grade-I for which the departmental promotion committees were constituted consisting of a number of persons. In paragraph-12 of the petition filed on behalf of respondent no.2 before the learned court below, it has been contended that the office order dated 28-12-1978 was issued under the signature of the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer with the approval of the competent authority. In this paragraph it has not been clearified, which is the competent authority. Its reply has been given in paragraph-20 of the written statement filed before the learned court below by the present petitioner, in which it has clearly been stated that the departmental promotion committee constituted for the promotion from Special grade clerk to Office Superintendent, was to consist of five persons named in this paragraph including the Chief Personnel Manager and one of the Area general Managers. As stated above, respondent no.2 has claimed his promotion in Supervisory Grade-I on the strength of Annexure-VT to the counter-affidavit. This annexure was issued by the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer. As stated above, respondent no.2 has claimed his promotion in Supervisory Grade-I on the strength of Annexure-VT to the counter-affidavit. This annexure was issued by the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer. In it there is nothing to show that it was issued after the approval of any competent authority as mentioned in paragraph-20 of the written statement filed before the learned Court below by the petitioner. There is no whisper of the fact in Annexure-VI that it was being issued after the approval by the concurred competent authority as mentioned in this paragraph. On this ground alone Annexure appears to have been i ssued without any proper authority and is therefore of no value. So far as other annexures are concerned, Annexure-VII has been issued by the same Dy. Chief Mining engineer on the strength of Annexure-VI and Annexures-VIII, IX and X which have been issued under the signature of the Administrative Officer, namely, an officer comparitively junior in the rank. Similarly, other annexures in this connection also appears to have been issued on the strength of Annexure-I which was itself without jurisdiction. In this background it cannot be said that respondent no.2 was already promoted to the rank of the Office Superintendent and was acting as such in clear violation of the letter of the petitioner dated 20-6-1977 as mentioned in paragraph-20 of the written statement. 17. I will next proceed to refer to paragraphs 2 to 6 of Annexure-i which is a petition filed on behalf of respondent no.2 before the learned court below. According to paragraph nos.2, 5 and 6, respondent no.2 has simply claimed that formarily he was working as the Office Superintendent in the Private Colliery before its nationalisation. In paragraph-6 respondent no.2 has stated that he is discharging his duties as Office Superintendent with effect from 1-3-1963. This has been denied in paragraph-10 of the written statement filed by the present petitioner before the learned court below in which it has been stated that it is denied that respondent no.2 had been working as the Office Superintendent either from 1-3-1963 or from any date thereafter. Thus, this fact does not appear to be admitted. This has been denied in paragraph-10 of the written statement filed by the present petitioner before the learned court below in which it has been stated that it is denied that respondent no.2 had been working as the Office Superintendent either from 1-3-1963 or from any date thereafter. Thus, this fact does not appear to be admitted. So far as paragraph-6 is concerned, in it respondent no.2 has simply stated that he has not been placed in the proper scale and has not been paid the proper wages, though he has been doing the job of the Office Superintendent. Its reply has been given in paragraphs-15 and 16 of the written statement. In paragraph-15 it had been stated that respondent no.2 was promoted as special Grade clerk and has been placed as such. In paragraph-16 it has been stated that the present proceeding was misconceived in as much as, the promotion from lower grade to the higher grade is the management function, and is therefore, beyond the scope of Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. This also shows that the petitioner was not properly promoted to the post of the office Superintendent. 18. I will next refer to the claim of respondent no.2 that he is functioning on the post of the Office Superintendent since long and therefore, he is entitled to that pay of the scale of the Office Superintendent. It may be stated here even at the cost of representation that determination of the entitlement of respondent no.2 to the scale of pay of the Office Superintendent is beyond the scope of Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. Even when promoted as Special Grade Clerk if he is acting as the Office Superintendent this will not entitle him to get the scale of the Office Superintendent. At best he can claim for some Officiating pay for working as the Office superintendent. Even if his plea that he is working as such, is accepted for a moment, simply because an employee works on a superior post in addition to his own duty, this will not entitle him to the pay scale of the superior post. At best he will be entitled to get special pay for the same. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. (Supra ). At best he will be entitled to get special pay for the same. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. (Supra ). In the said case in Civil Appeal Nos.823 to 826 of 1962, the case of the respondents was that besides attending to their routine duties as clerk they had been operating the adding machine in the Bank, and therefore, they were entitled to the payment of Rs.10/- per month as the special allowance for operating the adding machine as provided for under the shastri Award. The Central Government Labour Court found that the respondents were entitled to a claim of special allowance under the relevant clause of the shastri Award. Before the Hon ble Supreme Court on behalf of the appellant, question of jurisdiction was raised and it was argued that the labour court had exceeded its jurisdiction by intertaining applications made by the respondents because the claims made by the respondents in their respective applications were out side the scope of Sec.33-C (2) of the Act. This objection raised by the appellant was sustained by the Supreme Court. In the case of P. K. Singh V/s. Presiding Officer, AIR 1988 SC 1618 , the workman claimed under Sec.33-C (2) that they should be classified as b grade fitter even when they had been appointed as c grade fitter, on the ground that they had been performing the duties which were similar to the duties of b grade fitters. It was held that such a relief could not be claimed under section 33-C (2) of the Act. By merely doing the same kind of work which is done by b grade fitter, the workman appointed as c" grade fitter will not be entitled to claim wages as b grade fitter unless he is duly promoted after getting through the prescribed trade test. Such a workman cannot complain that he is not being paid the salary and allowances due to the b grade fitter, since he does not possess with the existing right and claim for it. Such a workman cannot complain that he is not being paid the salary and allowances due to the b grade fitter, since he does not possess with the existing right and claim for it. If an application was made on the said question on a reference made under section 10 (1) of the Act, and it was held that he should be deemed to be the member of the cadre of b grade fitter, then only he should be able to claim the salary and allowances payable to b grade fitters. From this decision also it would become clear that since respondent no.2 was not properly promoted to the rank of the Office Superintendent by the Competent authority, he cannot get the pay scale of the office Superintendent even if it be presumed for a moment that he was acting as such since long. 19. From these detailed discussions, it becomes clear that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is therefor e, liable to be quashed. This civil writ application is accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed to certify and send to this court all records appertaining to the impugned order passed by respondent No.4 in M. J. C. No.10/82. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to for bear from giving effect to or acting pursuant to or in furtherance the said order dated 19-11-1984. The writ application is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is quashed. Under the circumstances of this case, however, there would be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.