Judgment Ruma Pal, J. 1. IN this petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing of a complaint dated December 29, 1988, filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Sections 276C, 277 read with 278B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. THE grounds disclosed in the said complaint are briefly : that the petitioner-company had filed a return for the assessment year 1981-82 claiming a liability of Rs. 1,09,299 as expenditure towards charges payable to the State Government of Gujarat for deployment of Special Reserve Police personnel at the petitioner's factory at Gujarat for the period September 28, 1980, to December 10, 1980. It is stated that, on scrutiny, it was found that no S.R.P. personnel had in fact been deployed at the assessee's factory during that period. It is further stated that the liability was fictitious and the account showing such liability was false. Finally, it is stated that there was, therefore, a wilful attempt to evade tax imposable under the Act. The said complaint concludes with this prayer : "In the circumstances, it is prayed that the learned court may be pleased to take cognizance of the offences under Sections 276C and 277 of the Income-tax Act against accused No. 1 and also under Sections 276C and 277 read with Section 278B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, against accused Nos. 2 to 10 and issue process against them accordingly for taking their trial." 3. THE petitioners have challenged this complaint basically on the ground that the complaint was made without jurisdiction because (i) the facts disclosed in the complaint were contrary to the records. In March, 1989, a notice of demand had been raised by the State Government for the balance period from which it would be clear that SRP personnel had been deployed at the petitioner's factory during the period in question. Reliance has been placed on State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha in this connection. 4. (II) SRP personnel having been deployed during that period, the petitioner was, therefore, liable to pay the dues of the Government in the accounting year ending on March 31, 1981. The petitioner-company maintained its accounts on the mercantile basis and, therefore, had made a provision for such liability in the year in which the liability arose. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. CIT in this connection. The petitioner-company maintained its accounts on the mercantile basis and, therefore, had made a provision for such liability in the year in which the liability arose. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. CIT in this connection. (III) There was no wilful attempt to evade tax. The petitioners had acted bona fide. In fact, the SRP personnel had been deployed at the petitioner's factory from August 27, 1980 to December 10, 1980. The State Government had raised only a part bill for the period August 27, 1980 to September 28, 1980, which had been paid by the petitioner in the next year. The petitioner provided for the liability to pay the State Government for the balance period in its accounts. The State Government having delayed in raising the bill for the balance period, the petitioners wrote back the amount provided for such balance period in the assessment year 1983-84 and paid tax on the amount. The following cases have been cited as authorities for the proposition that, unless the filing of an inaccurate return is accompanied by a guilty mind, Section 276C, 277 or 278B cannot be invoked : (a) Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. v. Asst. CST ; (b) Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. ITO (c) ITO v. Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. 5. IT is further contended by the petitioners that, if the chance of ultimate conviction is bleak, proceedings will be quashed even at the preliminary stage. Reliance has been placed on Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao. 6. FINALLY, it is submitted by the petitioners that the complaint being without jurisdiction, the question of delay was immaterial. Reliance has been placed on the following : (a) Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust reported in AIR 1937 PC 265 ; (b) S. Santosha Nadar v. First Additional ITO reported in [1961] 42 ITR 715 (Mad) ; (c) Girindranath Paul v. ITO, Smt. Suniti Devi Jaipuria v. ITO ; (e) P. C. Doshi v. Seventh ITO reported in [1967] 65 ITR 187 (Bom). The respondents have contended : (1) The complaint as it stood disclosed the offences contemplated under Sections 276C, 277 and 278. The respondents have contended : (1) The complaint as it stood disclosed the offences contemplated under Sections 276C, 277 and 278. The bill raised by the Gujarat Government was much after the making of the complaint and, therefore, it could not be said that the complaint was issued without jurisdiction by reason thereof. (2) If the bills raised by the Gujarat Government were genuine, the same should be produced before the Magistrate for enquiry and dismissal of the complaint. (3) The complaint was dated October 29, 1988. The petitioners were guilty of laches. There was no explanation for such delay. 7. I am of the view that the contentions of the respondents must be upheld. 8. WITH regard to the first contention of the petitioner, I cannot hold that the complaint was without jurisdiction. It is true that, in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha, the Supreme Court has stated : "Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In considering whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be made, is disclosed or not, the court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint or the F.I.R. and the court may in appropriate cases take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. On a consideration of all the relevant materials, the court has to come to the conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual." However, the "relevant material" considered by the Supreme Court in that case was not any material which had come to light after the filing of the F.I.R. The principle as I see it is that the complaint and its context should be considered in determining whether any offence has been disclosed. On the basis of the complaint as made, and assuming the facts contained therein to be correct, it cannot be said that no offence as alleged has been disclosed. 9. THIS brings us to the second contention of the petitioners for urging that the complaint was without jurisdiction. There can be no doubt that, in the mercantile system of accounting, a liability incurred may be debited as an expenditure before it is actually disbursed but, in this case, the income-tax authorities have disputed the incurring of the liability itself or so it appears from the complaint. In other words, the complaint proceeds on the basis that no SRP personnel having been deployed at the petitioner's factory during the period September 28, 1980, to December 10, 1980, no expenditure could be said to have been incurred for such a liability and as such the provision for such expenditure was false. 10. THE third ground of the petitioners for arguing that the complaint was without jurisdiction cannot be accepted in view of the statutory presumption of a guilty mind under Section 278E of the Act. That section reads as under : "Presumption as to culpable mental state.--(1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation.--In this sub-section, 'culpable mental state' includes intention, motive or knowledge of a fact, or belief in, or reason to believe, a fact." In none of the cases cited by the petitioners in this regard, did the courts have occasion to consider the import of Section 278E of the Act. 11. THE further contention of the petitioners is based upon a misreading of the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia's case. THE paragraph of the judgment relied on by the petitioners is set out below : "THE legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. THE paragraph of the judgment relied on by the petitioners is set out below : "THE legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 12. THE Supreme Court had merely restated the well-known proposition, viz., the court, in exercise of its power under Article 226, will interfere to quash a criminal proceeding when "the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused", As stated in the case State of Haryana v. Chaudhury Bhajan Lal. In that case, the Supreme Court gave seven categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the power under Article 226 could be exercised after extensively considering the decisions on the subject. 13. THE opinion of the court that "chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak" must relate to the complaint/FIR and the context in which they were issued and not to an assessment of the likelihood or chances of acquittal of an accused on the basis of a defence disclosed. THE bill of the Government of Gujarat would be the cornerstone of the petitioner's defence. THE bill of the Government of Gujarat would be the cornerstone of the petitioner's defence. Although, in this case, the defence may be a complete answer to the complaint and may even seem prima facie acceptable, it would be a dangerous precedent for the court to lay down that, as a general principle, the defence of an accused to a complaint/FIR could be considered for the purpose of quashing such complaint/FIR by a court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. 14. IN view of my decision negativing the four points raised by the petitioners, it is not necessary to decide whether this writ application should be rejected on the question of delay. For the reasons aforesaid, I reject the writ application. However, it appears from the petition that the complaint has not yet been entertained by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. It will be open to the petitioners to raise all points taken in this petition before the Magistrate in appropriate proceedings. 15. AS no affidavit in opposition has been used, it is recorded that the allegations contained in the petition are not admitted. There will be no order as to costs.