MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE question referred for resolution of this larger bench in all these matters is to the effect as to whether the decision of the Division bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Abdul Kadar and Ors. [1985 (2)] XXVI (2) GLR 1146 insofar as it holds that the stage to record statement under Sec. 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is not reached till notice under Sec. 124 of the said Act, is issued, laid down good law. In order to appreciate the context in which this question is referred for decision, it will be necessary to note a few relevant introductory facts. ( 2 ) INTRODUCTORY facts :- Special Criminal Application No. 132 of 1988 is filed by the accused against whom Criminal Case No. 4626 of 1967 is filed by respondent No. 1-complainant-Inspector of Customs (Preventive) ahmedabad before the Court of the learned J. M. F. C. , Valsad for quashing and setting aside the said complaint. Special Criminal Application No. 251 of 1991 and Misc. Criminal Application No. 987 of 1991 have been filed by the Customs authorities being aggrieved by the orders passed by the concerned trial Magistrate returning the complaints filed by these authorities under the Customs Act for presentation to proper Court. Central Excise, Customs and Gold (Control) References Nos. 1 and 2 are made by the Central Excise, customs and Gold (Control) Tribunal, Bombay to this Court for deciding the question referred by the Tribunal to this Court for decision. In these matters, the contentions were raised by the concerned accused who were being prosecuted under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 that statements recorded by the Customs authorities under Sec. 108 of the said Act are not admissible in proceedings against them as they were recorded before issuance of notices under Sec. 124 of the Act to the concerned parties. This contention is based on the aforesaid decision of this Court in 1985 (2) GLR 1146 (supra ). When these matters reached final hearing before the Division Bench of this court consisting of N. J. Pandya and S. M. Soni, JJ. This contention is based on the aforesaid decision of this Court in 1985 (2) GLR 1146 (supra ). When these matters reached final hearing before the Division Bench of this court consisting of N. J. Pandya and S. M. Soni, JJ. , the Division Bench by its order dated 12-6-1991 took the view that as the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case is to be examined by this Court, it was obvious that bench of the same strength, viz. , the Division Bench consisting of two Judges will not enter into this question and propriety demanded that the question should be decided by a larger bench and that is how, the Division Bench by its aforesaid order referred the matter to the larger bench requesting the Honourable Chief Justice to get this question resolved by a larger bench and that is how, these questions have been placed before us. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties canvassing rival view points centering round the aforesaid question in controversy. Before dealing with the contentions of the learned Counsel canvassing rival view points, it will be apposite to have a quick glance at the statutory settings relevant for resolving the present controversy. ( 4 ) STATUTORY settings :- The Customs Act, 1962 is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to customs. Section 2 thereof is dictionary section and defines various terms. We will refer to the relevant provisions of this section. Section 2 (1) defines adjudicating authority to mean any authority competent to pass any order or decision under this Act. but does not include the Board, Collector (Appeals) or Appellate Tribunal. Section 2 (14) defines dutiable goods to mean any goods which are chargeable to duty and on which duty has not been paid while Sec. 2 (15) defines duty to mean duty of customs leviable under the Act. As per Sec. 2 (22), goods includes (a) vessels, aircrafts and vehicles; (b) stores, (c) baggage; (d) currency and negotiable instruments and (e) any other kind of movable property. As per Sec. 2 (22), goods includes (a) vessels, aircrafts and vehicles; (b) stores, (c) baggage; (d) currency and negotiable instruments and (e) any other kind of movable property. Section 2 (33) defines prohibited goods to mean any goods the import or export of which is subject to any prohibition under the Act of any other law for the time being in force but does not include any such goods in respect of which the conditions subject to which the goods are permitted to be imported or exported have been complied with. Section 2 (34) deal with proper officer and states that proper officer in relation to any functions to be performed under the Act means the officer of Customs who is assigned those functions by the Board of the Collector of Customs. smuggling is defined in Sec. 2 (39) to mean in relation to any goods, any act of omission which will render such goods liable to confiscation under sec. Ill or Sec. 113. ( 5 ) SECTION 3 deals with classes of officers of Customs and they include principal Collectors of Customs, Collector of Customs, Collector of Customs (Appeals), Deputy Collector of Customs, Assistant Collectors of Customs and such other class of officers of Customs as may be appointed for the purposes of the Act. Section 11 which is found in Chapter IV empowers the Central government to appoint either absolutely or subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, the import or export of goods of any specified description. Chapter V deals with levy of and exemption from Custom duties. Section 12 thereof lays down that except as otherwise provided in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, duties of Customs shall be levied at such rates as may be specified under the Customs and Tariff Act, 1975 or any other law for the time being in force, on goods imported into or exported from India. For the present purpose, we are not concerned with the machinery for levying Customs duties and for assessment of such duties. Hence, we need not dilate on the same. ( 6 ) THE next relevant Chapter for the present purpose is Chapter XIII which deals with searches, seizure and arrest. Sections 100 to 103 deal with search of persons. For the present purpose, we are not concerned with the machinery for levying Customs duties and for assessment of such duties. Hence, we need not dilate on the same. ( 6 ) THE next relevant Chapter for the present purpose is Chapter XIII which deals with searches, seizure and arrest. Sections 100 to 103 deal with search of persons. As per Sec. 100, if the proper officer has reason to believe that any person to whom this Section applies has secreted about his person, any goods liable to confiscation or any documents relating thereto, he may search that person; while Sec. 101 deals with power of custom officer empowered by general or special order of the Collector of Customs, to search a person for whom such officer has reason to believe that such person has secreted about this person any goods of the description specified in sub-sec. (2 ). Subsec. (2) deals with such specified goods like gold, diamonds, etc. As per Sec. 102, the concerned officer acting under Sec. 100 or 101 if required by the person about to be searched, has to take him to the nearest Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Section 103 deals with the procedure to be followed for screening or X-raying bodies of suspected person for detecting secreted goods and the power of proper Officer acting under Sec. 100 (2) in such cases to detain such person and produce him without unnecessary delay before the nearest Magistrate. The aforesaid sections deal with powers of Customs Officers to search persons alleged to be possessing goods liable to be confiscated under the Act, while Sec. 105 deals with powers of competent officer mentioned therein to search the premises wherein arc secreted goods liable to confiscation or any documents or things which are useful for or relevant to any proceedings under the Act. Section 104 deals with power to arrest which is conferred on an officer empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Collector. In exercise of that power, the concerned authority if has reason to believe that any person in India or within the Indian customs waters has been guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 135, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. Such arrested person has to be taken to the Magistrate. Such arrested person has to be taken to the Magistrate. Section 106 deals with power to stop and search conveyances which are being or about to be used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any goods which have been smuggled. Section 106a deals with power to enter any place and to inspect any goods kept or stored therein in the circumstances mentioned in that Section. Then follow Sees. 107 and 108 with which we are directly concerned in these proceedings and hence they are required to be extracted in extenso as under :"107. Power to examine persons :- Any oflicer of Customs empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Collector of Customs may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any goods : (a) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the inquiry; (b) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. 108. Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents :- (1) any Gazetted Officer of Customs shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. (2) A summon to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain description in the possession or under the control of the person summoned. (3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct; and all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents and other things as may be required. Provided that the exemption under Sec. 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under this section. (4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sees. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Provided that the exemption under Sec. 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under this section. (4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sees. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. "section 109 deals with power of Custom Officer appointed for any area adjoining the land frontiner of India and empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Board, to require any person in possession of any goods which such officer has reason to believe have been imported into India by land, to produce the order made under Sec. 47 permitting clearance of the goods. The last Section in this Chapter deals with seizure of goods, documents and things. It empowers the proper officer if he has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under the Act, to seize such goods. As per sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 110, where any goods are seized under sub-sec. (I) and no notice in respect thereof is given under clause (a) of Sec. 124 within six months of seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. However, this period of six mouths can on sufficient cause being shown, be extended by the Collector of Customs for a period not exceeding six months. Then follows Chapter XIV dealing with confiscation of goods and conveyance and imposition of penalties. Section 111 deals with various types of goods brought from a place outside India which are liable to confiscation. Section 112 deals with penalty for improper importation of goods. Section 113 deals with confiscation of goods attempted to be improperly exported etc. Section 114 deals with penalty for attempt to export goods improperly etc. Section 115 deals with confiscation of conveyances and indicates types of conveyances which are liable to confiscation. Section 116 deals with penalty for not accounting for goods which are loaded in conveyances or any goods transhipped under the provisions of the act or coastal goods carried in a conveyance if they are not unloaded at their place of destination in India or if the quantity unloaded is short of the quantity to be unloaded at that destination. Section 117 makes the provisions for penalties for contravention etc. not expressly mentioned and is thus a residuary provision. Section 117 makes the provisions for penalties for contravention etc. not expressly mentioned and is thus a residuary provision. Section 118 deals with confiscation of packages and their contents and their seizure while Sec. 110 deals with confiscation of goods used for concealing smuggled goods. Section 120 deals with confiscation of smuggled goods notwithstanding any change in form etc. Section 121 deals with confiscation of sale proceeds of smuggled goods. Then follows Section 122 which is relevant for our present purpose and hence it is extracted in cxtenso as under :"122. Adjtidication of confiscations and penalties :- III every case under tins chapter in winch anything is liable to confiscation or any person is liable to a penalty such contiscation or penalty may be adjudged - (a) without limit, by a Collector of Customs or Deputy Collector of Customs. (b) where the value of the goods liable to confiscation does not exceed twcntyfive thousand rupees, by an Assistant Collector of Customs; (c) where the value of the goods liable to confiscation does not exceed two thousand five hundred rupees, by a Gazetted Officer of Customs lower in rank than an Assistant Collector of Customs. "section 123 deals with burden of proof in certain cases. Then follows Sec. 124 which is required to be reproduced in extenso. It reads as under :"124. Issue of show cause notice before confiscation of goods etc. :-No order confiscating any goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made under this chapter unless the owner of the goods or such person - (a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty; (b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein; and (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter: provided that the notice referred to in clause (a) and the representation referred to in clause (b) may, at the request of the person concerned, be oral. " ( 7 ) REST of the Sections deal with option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation and consequences of orders of confiscation and about effect of award of confiscation or penalty. Then follows Chapter XV dealing with appeals. " ( 7 ) REST of the Sections deal with option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation and consequences of orders of confiscation and about effect of award of confiscation or penalty. Then follows Chapter XV dealing with appeals. We are not directly concerned with the provisions of this Chapter. It is followed by Chapter XVI relating to offence and prosecutions. In that Chapter, sec. 138b is relevant for our present purpose. It lays down as under"138b. Relevancy of statements under certain circumstance:- (I) A statement made and signed by a person before any Gazetted Officer of Customs during the course of any inquiry or proceeding under this Act shall be relevant, for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act the truth of the facts which it contains - (a) when the person who made the statement is dead or cannot be found or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or whose presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable; or (b) when the person who made the statement is examined as a witness in the case before the Court and the Court is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice. (2) The provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to any proceeding under this Act, other than a proceeding before a Court, as they apply in relation to a proceeding before a Court. (2) The provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to any proceeding under this Act, other than a proceeding before a Court, as they apply in relation to a proceeding before a Court. " ( 8 ) WE have reached the conclusion that on the clear scheme of the Act and also in the light of various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts to which we will make a reference hereafter, it has to be held that the powers conferred on the concerned officers under Sec. 108 can be exercised both at the stage of inquiry and investigation where material is to be collected before issuance of notice under Sec. 124 and also during the adjudication proceedings following issuance of notice under Sec. 124 and the ratio of the decision of the Division bench in (Union of India v. Abdul Kadar) [1985 (2)] XXVI (2) GLR 1146 (supra) to the extent it rules out resort to Sec. 108 prior to issue of notice under Sec. 124 does not lay down good law. We now proceed to give reasons for this conclusion of ours. ( 9 ) VARIOUS statutory provisions found in Chapter XIII of the Act close the concerned officers with powers of search, seizure and arrest. These powers are all in connection with inquiry regarding smuggling of goods. At that stage, what is necessary for the officer is to make search inquiry and investigation with a view to finding out as to whether the concerned goods are smuggled goods or not. While exercising this power of inquiry and investigation, stage is not reached for the Customs Officer till adequate material is collected, to reach a conclusion that the concerned goods are liable to confiscation and penalty proceedings are also required to be initiated against persons involved in illegal activities concerned with such goods. It is pertinent to note that under Sec. 107, any officer of customs who is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Collector of Customs can during the course of any enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any goods require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the enquiry or examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. Such empowered officer in the course of such inquiry can forthwith require any person to produce documents or thing and can examine any such person. It is obvious that this power can be exercised by the empowered officer in the course of inquiry in connection with smuggling of goods. The learned Advocates for the department were right when they contended that these are emergency powers with which the empowered officers are armed to forthwith examine any person or to ask him to produce goods or deliver things without going into detailed procedure of getting summons issued to him by a gezetted officer as the situation may not brook sucsuch delay and such evidence may be lost if the gamut of issuance of summons under Sec. 108 is to be followed. An illustration will make the position clear. If an empowered officer comes to know that a person has secreted smuggled goods say gold biscuits on his person and is about to run away, he can act under Sec. 107 and apprehend him, record his statement and ask him to produce the gold biscuits. If he cannot do so and has to inform the gazetted officer and then get summons issued to such person after ascertaining his address, the person in the meantime may run away and may not be foundnd thereafter. Result would be that Sec. 108 power cannot be exercised in such a case and the evidence of smuggling and the goods smuggled will be lost for ever. To avoid such contingencies, emergency powers are conferred on empowered officers to promptly act under sec. 107 so that Customs authorities may not be reduced to the helpless position of attempting to close the stable after the horses have bolted. Thus, sec. 107 deals with emergent situations arising during the inquiry in connection with smuggling of goods. But save and except in such emergent situations during the course of the very inquiry, in connection with smuggling of goods, detailed procedure of issuance of summons to persons to give evidence and produce documents is laid down by Sec. 108. It is necessary to note that the empowered officer of customs can exercise powers under Sec. 107 while a gazetted officer of customs can exercise power under Sec. 108. It may be that an officer empowered to act under Sec. 107 may not be gazetted officer. It is necessary to note that the empowered officer of customs can exercise powers under Sec. 107 while a gazetted officer of customs can exercise power under Sec. 108. It may be that an officer empowered to act under Sec. 107 may not be gazetted officer. Hence, he may be able to exercise power under Sec. 107 but may not be able to act under Sec. 108. When we turn to Sec. 122, we find that power to adjudicate for confiscation and penalty is conferred only on gazetted officers as mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that Section. So far as Sec. 108 is concerned, it is clear that power under Sec. 108 can be exercised by any gazetted officer in any inquiry which he is making in connection with smuggling of any goods. Inquiry contemplated by Sec. 107 is the same inquiry which is contemplated by Sec. 108 as the same phraseology is used in connection with such inquiry in both these Sections. Consequently, when both these Sections are read together, it becomes obvious that they represent two different stages of inquiry and investigation in connection with smuggling of goods. In the first stage, viz; under Sec. 107, emergency powers are given to empowered Custom Officer to forthwith require any person to produce or deliver any documents to examine any person said to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case; while Sec. 108 deals with a detailed procedure during the same inquiry or investigation in connection with smuggling of goods after having followed the procedure of issuing a summons to the concerned person. But till the stage of notice under Sec. 124 is reached, the inquiry remains at the stage of investigation and collection of evidence. It is also pertinent to note that as seen from Sec. 110 (2), even after goods are seized during the course of inquiry and investigation by the competent authority, such seizure can ultimately continue for six months or one year, as the case may be within which time notice under Sec. 124 can be issued and once it is issued, the seizure would continue till the end of adjudication proceedings. Consequently when Sec. 110 (2) is read with Sees. Consequently when Sec. 110 (2) is read with Sees. 107 and 108, the statutory scheme becomes at once clear that issuance of notice under Sec. 124 has nothing to do with exercise of powers during inquiry and investigation by the competent authority either under Sec. 108 or under Sec. 110. It is also pertinent to note that Sec. 122 deals with adjudication of confiscation and penalties by different competent authorities as laid down therein. By the thrust of Sec. 124, no order under Sec. 122 can be passed till the procedure of issuing of show cause notice and hearing of concerned parties as laid down by Sec. 124 is complied with. Thus, Sec. 124 has to be read with Sec. 122 and the latter has to be read subject to the former. But so far as Sec. 108 is concerned, it nowhere provides that it has to be read subject to Sec. 124. Even impliedly, it cannot be so read for the simple reason that issuance of notice under Sec. 124 contemplates a stage which is reached after sufficient material is collected during the inquiry and investigation in connection with smuggling of goods by the competent authority and on the basis of which grounds are to be prepared and communicated to the person concerned who has to show cause on the basis of these grounds as to why goods should not be confiscated and/or penalty should not be imposed on him. Thus, collection of material during investigation and inquiry in connection with smuggling of goods has to precede issuance of notice under Sec. 124 and it cannot be vice versa. The contention of the learned Advocates for the accused that notice under Sec. 124 can be issued on the basis of the material collected under Sec. 107 only also cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that Sec. 107 deals with only emergency powers of the empowered officer of examining a person immediately available on the spot and who may be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case or of requiring any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the inquiry. But such an on-the-spot inquiry regarding smuggling of goods may require further investigation and collection of material regarding ownership of the goods, dealings of the goods by the concerned person and diverse other requirements for making out a case under Sec. Ill or 113 of the Act. The material concerning all these requirements before the stage is reached for issuance of notice under Sec. 124 can obviously be not collected in a summary or on-the-spot inquiry as contemplated by Sec. 107 by the empowered officer. It is pertinent to note that as per Sec. 108, it is the gazetted officer who is in contemplation when he is making inquiry in connection with smuggling of goods. Such gazetted officer acting under Sec. 108 in connection with inquiry about smuggling of goods would be denuded of all his investigational powers of collecting evidence by examining persons if a view is taken that he cannot act under Sec. 108 till notice under Sec. 124 is issued to the concerned party. In our considered opinion, inquiry in connection with smuggling of goods in any case as contemplated by Sees. 107 and 108 and for that matter Sec. 122 would consist of three stages. In the first stage, emergency powers can be exercised by the empowered officer under Sec. 107 for collecting evidence. In the second stage, which may also be parallel with the first stage, or which may follow or precede the first stage, a detailed inquiry in connection with smuggling of the very goods can be done by the gazetted officer and therefore, he would be competent to exercise power under sec. 108 at the stage of collection of evidence. After sufficient mntterial is gathered by the combined operation of Sees. 107 and 108, is reached the third and last stage of inquiry wherein, on the basis of the material collected, the competent authority reaches the tentative conclusion that the goods in connection with which investigation was made and material was collected, are liable to confiscation and the concerned person involved, in dealing with such goods is liable to be penalised. 107 and 108, is reached the third and last stage of inquiry wherein, on the basis of the material collected, the competent authority reaches the tentative conclusion that the goods in connection with which investigation was made and material was collected, are liable to confiscation and the concerned person involved, in dealing with such goods is liable to be penalised. At that stage, the question of issuing notice after framing proper grounds on the basis of this collected material, would arise and once such notice is issued under Sec. 124, adjudication proceedings under Sec. 122 would be resorted to and after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the concerned person, proper order of adjudication in connection with confiscation and penalty can be passed. This is the last stage of the same inquiry in connection with smuggling of goods. Moment that stage is reached and notice under Sec. 124 is issued, seizure of goods effected by the competent authority during investigation would get continued as per sec. 110 (2) of the Act and the authority will not be liable to return such goods to the person from whose possession they were seized till proceedings under Sec. 124 read with Sec. 122 are over. Even during this last stage, necessary powers under Sec. 108 can be exercised by a gazetted officer who is acting as adjudicating authority as Sec. 108 (2) can continue to apply event the last stage of inquiry, as it is the gazetted officer who is empowered to summon any person to give evidence or to produce any document in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection with smuggling of goods even though last stage of inquiry partakes the character of adjudication proceedings, after issuance of notice under Sec. 124, still it remains an inquiry in connections with the smuggling of goods nevertheless. Enquiry in connection with smuggling of goods is the genus, investigatory inquiry as per Sees. 107 and 108 on the one hand and adjudicatory inquiry under Sec. 122 read with sec. 124 on the other hand are its species. At the later stage Sec. 108 can also be pressed in service if required. Interaction of these provisions projects the following picture. Enquiry in connections with smuggling of any goods : investigatory stage Adjudicatory stage sec. 107 Sec. 108 Sec. 122 Sec. 108 sec. 124 on the other hand are its species. At the later stage Sec. 108 can also be pressed in service if required. Interaction of these provisions projects the following picture. Enquiry in connections with smuggling of any goods : investigatory stage Adjudicatory stage sec. 107 Sec. 108 Sec. 122 Sec. 108 sec. 124 (when required) in this connection, we may also press in service by rough analogy, the process of investigation which is done by the Police under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the procedure adopted by the Magistrates Court before framing of charge in a warrant triable case, because though Customs Officers are not Police Officers, when they collect material and evidence before issuance of notice under Sec. 124, they can be said to be doing investigation work at the stage of Sec. 108. Under Sec. 108, the inquiry reaches the stage which can roughly be compared with the stage in an inquiry when a Magistrate in warrant triable case has to take a decision before he chooses to frame a charge. In such cases, the Magistrate after recording prosecution evidence, decides whether to frame a charge or to discharge the accused, while holding an inquiry under Sec. 108, the gazetted officer may ultimately come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient evidence or material to issue a show cause notice under Sec. 124. In that case, proceedings would be dropped but if the material gathered is found to be sufficient, grounds will be framed on the basis of this material and will be made subject-matter of notice under Sec. 124. That may roughly correspond with the decision of the magistrate in warrant triable cases not to discharge the accused but to frame charge and thereafter a fullfledged trial may start. Similarly, if the material collected at the stage of Sec. 107 in 108 inquiry is found sufficient to issue notice under Sec. 124, then, such notice would be issued after framing proper grounds and adjudication proceedings which will be the last stage of inquiry would begin. It, therefore, cannot be said that Sec. 124 stage must necessarily reach prior to investigation and inquiry under Sec. 108 without collection of material for the purpose of issuance of notice under Sec. 124. It, therefore, cannot be said that Sec. 124 stage must necessarily reach prior to investigation and inquiry under Sec. 108 without collection of material for the purpose of issuance of notice under Sec. 124. Consequently, it is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Advocates of the accused that Sec. 108 can be pressed in service only after issuance of notice under Sec. 124 and not before that. In our view, the scheme envisaged by Chapters XIII and XIV is a well-knit scheme encompassing the comprehensive inquiry into the smuggling of goods by the Customs Officers who are in substance revenue officers and who are concerned with collection of Customs duties and also who will be under an obligation to see that evasion of Custom duty is avoided by plugging the loopholes of smuggling activities. Section 138b referred to by us earlier also highlights the legislative intent that a statement may be made and signed by a person before any gazetted officer during the course of inquiry or proceeding under the Act and such statement becomes relevant in criminal proceedings as well as other proceedings under the Act. ( 10 ) IT is now time for us to have a close look at the decision of this Court in [1985 (2 J J XXVI (2) GLR 1146. It is no doubt true that the Division bench in this case took the view that stage for recording of statement under Sec. 108 arises only when an inquiry is started either for confiscation of goods or for imposition of penalty. This conclusion was reached by the Division Bench on the wording of Sec. 108. In fact, the aforesaid conclusion of the Division Bench rests solely on the observations of the Supreme Court in para 15 of its judgment in the case of Balkrishna v. State of W. B. , AIR 1974 SC 120 . The said para is extracted by the Division Bench in para 13 of its judgment. It reads as under :"does Sec. 107 enable the interrogation of even the potential delinquent or must it be confined only to witnesses who throw light on the delinquents contravention of the law ? "any person" in the section certainly covers every person including a suspect and potential accused. These words of the statute have to be interpreted in the light of the policy and purpose of the law. "any person" in the section certainly covers every person including a suspect and potential accused. These words of the statute have to be interpreted in the light of the policy and purpose of the law. The object of Sec. 107, located in the neighbourhood of sec. 108 indicates that while the normal process of inquiry is facilitated by Sec. 108, investigatory emergencies are taken care of by Sec. 107. May be, situations arise where the failure to question a witness quickly may mean irretriable loss of a valuable material and Sec. 107 meets this need. The context in which the words any person occur, the object of the provision and the policy underlying Chapter XIII of the Customs Act assume relevance and become material in the construction of the text. "having extracted this para 15, the Division Bench reached its conclusion in para 20 of its judgment which reads as under :"in this connection, we would like to refer to Sec. 107 of the Act which says that any officer of the Customs Department empowered in that behalf by general or special order of the Collector of Customs may, during the course of any inquiry in connection with the smuggling of goods, examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 108 is quite different and the difference between the two sections is explained by the Supreme Court as discussed by us a little earlier. It appears from the observations made by the Supreme Court in the ease of Balkrishna v. State of W. B. (supra) which we have extracted in this judgment that the stage of recording of statements under Sec. 108 arises only when an inquiry is started either for confiscation of the goods or for imposing penalty. This is very clear from the wordings of Sec. 108 of the Act. So far as Sec. 107 is concerned, it takes care of investigatory emergencies, as observed by the Supreme Court. "with respect, the aforesaid conclusion to which the Division Bench reached does not flow from the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Balkrishnas case or from the observations of the Supreme Court in para 16 of the said judgment. "with respect, the aforesaid conclusion to which the Division Bench reached does not flow from the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Balkrishnas case or from the observations of the Supreme Court in para 16 of the said judgment. In balkrishnas case (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether statement of the person who is subsequently arraigned as an accused in the trial in respect of smuggled goods could be legally recorded under Sec. 107 of the act by the competent authority and whether the words any person as employed by Sec. 107 can cover in their sweep such a person. This question was answered in the affirmative by Krishna lyer, J. speaking for himself and Sarkaria, J. Khanna, j. in his concurring judgment laid down that "there is nothing in the language of sec. 107 to indicate that the words any person do not include a person who is subsequently arraigned as an accused. The language of Sec. 107 is clear and unambiguous". Similarly, Krishna lyer, J. who delivered the main judgment took the very same view on the express terminology of Sec. 107. While taking that view, a question was posed in para 15 of the report by Krishna Iyre, J. as under :"does Sec. 107 enable the interrogation of even the potential delinquent or must it be confined only to witnesses who throw light on the delinquents contravention of the law? "this question was answered by observing that the words any person would certainly cover every person including a suspect and potential accused and these words of the statute have to be interpreted in the light of the policy and purpose of the law. Having made these observations Krishna Iyre J. , in para 15 of the report, thereafter made the observations which have been heavily relied upon by the Division Bench for reaching its aforesaid conclusion. The observations as who entire are to the effect that "the object of Sec. 107, located in the neighbourhood of Sec. 108, indicates that while the normal process of enquiry is facilitated by Sec. . 108, investigatory emergencies are taken care of by Sec. 107. May be situations arise where the failure to question a witness quickly may mean irretrivable loss of a valuable material and Sec. 107 meets this need". 108, investigatory emergencies are taken care of by Sec. 107. May be situations arise where the failure to question a witness quickly may mean irretrivable loss of a valuable material and Sec. 107 meets this need". It is difficult to appreciate how these observations made in entirely a different context could have been transplanted for dealing with totally different controversy by the Division Bench. In Balkrishnas case (supra), the Supreme Court was not at all concerned with the question whether power under Sec. 108 can be exercised before issuance of notice under Sec. 124. As that question was not on the anvil, there obviously could not have been any decision of the Supreme Court on this question. The short question with which the Supreme Court was concerned was whether potential delinquent can be subjected to questioning under Sec. 107. Answering this question in the affirmative, Krishna Iyre, J. considered the statutory settings in which Sees. 107 and 108 were enacted and observed that Sec. 107 dealt with investigatory emergencies while Sec. 108 dealt with normal process of inquiry, meaning thereby, normal inquiry in connection with investigation and collection of material can go on under Sec. 108 but in emergency, special power under sec. 107 can be utilised so that evidence may not be lost. Nothing more was observed by the Supreme Court in this connection. Consequently, it is difficult to appreciate how the Division Bench could read into these observations made in connection with entirely different context of controversy, the implicit conclusion of the Supreme Court that Sec. 108 inquiry should necessarily be preceded by notice under Sec. 124. With respect, the Division Bench read much more from the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in para 15 of the report in Balkrishnas case (supra) than what was warranted by the said observations. Even otherwise, the clear setting of the statutory scheme which we have discussed earlier contraindicates such a conclusion and cannot be countenanced. In this connection, we may refer to a later decision of the division Bench of the Madras High Court in Vlttalnathan v. Collector of customs. 1989 (43) ELT 19 . In the said decision, this very question was examained and the Division Bench judgment of this Court was cited and was dissented from. In this connection, we may refer to a later decision of the division Bench of the Madras High Court in Vlttalnathan v. Collector of customs. 1989 (43) ELT 19 . In the said decision, this very question was examained and the Division Bench judgment of this Court was cited and was dissented from. In paras 3 and 4 of the report, Chandurkar, C. J. made the following pertinent observations :"the power under Sec. 108 of the Act like the one under Sec. 171a of the Sea customs Act could be exercised for the purpose of obtaining any information with regard to the alleged smuggling. Section 108 itself contemplates an enquiry as will be clear from the decision in Rustomji v. Stale of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 1087 in which it was pointed out that a Customs officer making an enquiry under Sec. 107 or 108 of the Customs Act is not a Police Officer and the person against whom enquiry made is not an accused person. Thus the enquiry made under Sec. 108 is an enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any goods and in any such enquiry a Customs Officer of gazetted rank has been given the power to summon any person to give evidence The object of such an enquiry is to ascertain facts with regard to smuggling of goods. A person who is summoned under Sec. 108 may have nothing to do with the actual smuggling of goods although he may know other relevant facts regarding such goods. That is why even a person who has nothing to do with actual smuggling of goods can also be summoned in an enquiry under Sec. 108. In Batkrishnas case. it is undoubtedly observed by the Supreme Court that while the normal process of enquiry is facilitated by Sec. 108 investigatory emergencies are taken care of by Sec. 107. In the same decision, it was pointed out that the provision of Sec. 107 was wide in its terms and was designed to facilitate the investigatory process by examination without restriction on person, place or time. This was in the context of the contention that interrogation under sec. 107 could be only of the potential delinquent or whether it must be confined only to witnesses who threw light on the delinquents contravention of the law. This was in the context of the contention that interrogation under sec. 107 could be only of the potential delinquent or whether it must be confined only to witnesses who threw light on the delinquents contravention of the law. The words any person in Sec. 107 were construed as covering every person including a suspect and potential accused. It is not possible for us to construe these observations as laying down that Sec. 108 can be invoked by the Customs authorities only in a case in which a notice under Sec. 124 of the Act is issued. "we respectfully, concur with the aforesaid view of the Division Bench of the Madras high Court. ( 11 ) WE may very usefully refer to certain the decisions to which our attention was invited by the learned Counsel appearing for respective parties. In case of State of punjab v. Barkat Ram, AIR 1962 SC 276 , the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether a Customs Officer acting under the Customs Act or Sea Customs Act is a police officer within the meaning of the term in Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. Raghubar Dayal, J. speaking for majority answering the question in the negative held that :"the Customs officer is not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment of crime committed by a person but is mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and safeguarding the recovery of Customs duties. He is more concerned with the goods and Customs duty, than with the offender. The duties of the customs officers are very much different from those of the police officers and their possessing certain powers which may have similarity with those of Police officers for the purpose of detecting the smuggling of goods and the persons responsible for it, would not make the Police officers. . . . . . . . . . . . The Customs officers when they act under the Sea Customs Act to prevent the smuggling of goods by imposing confiscation and penalties, act judicially. . . . . . . . . . . . The Customs officers when they act under the Sea Customs Act to prevent the smuggling of goods by imposing confiscation and penalties, act judicially. "in the case of Ramesh Chandra v. State of W. B. , AIR 1970 SC 940 , the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether a person against whom inquiry is held under Sec, 171a of the Sea customs Act is a person accused of offence as contemplated by Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution. The said question was answered in the negative, Similarly the question whether Custom Officer is a Police Officer within the meaning of Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act was also answered in the negative. While answering this question in negative, Shah, J. speaking for the Supreme Court held that powers are conferred upon the Customs Officer primarily for collection of duty and prevention of smuggling. He is for all purposes an officer of the revenue. Thus, a Customs Officer is under the Act of 1962 not a Police officer within the meaning of Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. In para 24 of the report the following observations are made by Shah, J. :"the Customs Officer, is, it is true, invested with the powers of an officer in charge of a Police Station for the purpose of releasing any person on bail or otherwise. The expression or otherwise does not confer upon him the power to lodge a report before a Magistrate under Sec. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The power to grant bail, power to collect evidence, and power to search premises or conveyances without recourse to a Magistrate do not make him an officer in charge of a Police station. Proceedings taken by him are for the purpose of holding an enquiry into suspected cases of smuggling. His orders are appealable and are subject also to the revisional jurisdiction of the Central Board of revenue and may be carried to the central Government. Powers are conferred upon him primarily, for collection of duty and prevention of smuggling. He is for all purposes an officer of the revenue. His orders are appealable and are subject also to the revisional jurisdiction of the Central Board of revenue and may be carried to the central Government. Powers are conferred upon him primarily, for collection of duty and prevention of smuggling. He is for all purposes an officer of the revenue. "these observations do suggest that Customs Officer while acting under various provisions of the Act acts as a revenue officer and is concerned with collection of revenue and holding of inquiry into goods suspected to be subject-matter of smuggling. These observations clearly support our conclusion that whatever inquiries into smuggling of goods are done by appropriate officers under chapters XIII and XIV of the Act they would cover all stages of inquiry and would encompass collection of material and ulimate culmination into issuance of notice under Sec. 124 and finally resulting into adjudication proceedings for confiscation and penalties and may also lead to prosecution of the concerned accused. Similar view has been taken by another Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Illias v. Collector of Customs, air 1970 SC 1065 . ( 12 ) IN the case of H. H. Advani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 44 , the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether statement made to the Customs Officer during investigation under Sec. 171a of the Sea customs Act, 1878 is admissible in evidence against the maker in criminal proceedings launched against him subsequently. Answering this question in the affirmative, Mitter, J. speaking for the Supreme Court has made the following observations in the said decision :"far from being authorities bound by any rules of evidence or procedure established by law and invested with power to enforce their own judgments or orders, the Sea Customs authorities are merely constituted administrative machinery for the purpose of adjudging confiscation, increased rates of duty and penalty prescribed in the Act. They are not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute a judgment or order of a Court or judicial tribunal necessary for the purpose of supporting a plea of double jeopardys at the stage envisaged by Sec. 171 A, a Customs Officer is given the power to interrogate any person in connection with the smuggling of any goods which it is his duty to prevent. Such a person may have nothing to do with the smuggling of any goods although he may know where such goods are or who has or had them. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 171 A does not compel any person to make a statement but if he makes a statement he lias to state the truth so as to avoid punishment under Sec. 193, IPC. At that stage, nothing may be known as to whether an offence has been committed or who has committed it and the person interrogated at that stage is not a person accused of or charged with an offence. He is merely called upon to give evidence to facilitate the inquiry. He is not a witness giving evidence in a Court and his testimony will make him liable under Sec. 193, IPC only because of the express provision of law in sub-sec. (4) of See. 171a. "it is pertinent to note that Sec. 171a of the Sea Customs Act is precursor of Sec. 108 of the Customs Act and both these provisions are pari materia. Consequently, in the light of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it must be held that a Customs Officer, under Sec. 108, can interrogate any person in connection with the smuggling of any goods which it is his duty to prevent and such a person may have nothing to do with the smuggling of any goods although he may know where such goods are or who has or had them. When a Customs Officer exercises such function under Sec. 108, there would arise on occasion to first issue notice under Sec. 124 of the Act to such a person to any one. The matter will be at the stage of inquiry and investigation with a view to finding out the real culprit. Even at that stage, as per the aforesaid decision, the Customs Officer can exercise his power of recording statement under Sec. 171a of the Sea Customs Act which is analogous to Sec. 108 of the Customs Act. This decision also, therefore, runs counter to the view propounded by the Division Bench of this Court in. In the same volume to page 1087 ( AIR 1971 SC 1087 ) is reported another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Rustomji v. State of maharashtra. This decision also, therefore, runs counter to the view propounded by the Division Bench of this Court in. In the same volume to page 1087 ( AIR 1971 SC 1087 ) is reported another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Rustomji v. State of maharashtra. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether a Customs Officer, making inquiry under Sec. 107 is a Police Officer and whether a statement made to him during the inquiry by any person is hit by Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. Answering this question in the negative, the Supreme Court speaking through Vaidialingam, J. , having considered the scheme of Sees. 107 and 108 of the Act and also succeeding Sees. 122, 124 and 165 of the Act, held that the Customs Officer conducting inquiry under Sec. 107 is not a Police Officer and the person against whom inquiry is made is not an accused person and the statement made by such person in that inquiry is not a statement made by a person accused of any offence. The same view is taken by a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 1167 . ( 13 ) WE may also refer to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of C. P. Pandya v. Motilal Lallu, (1980) XXI GLR 699 wherein the Division Bench took the view that statements of the accused recorded under Sec. 108 are relevant, admissible and can be acted upon. They are not hit by Sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code as they are not statements made to a Police Officer during investigation of crime. This decision falls in line with the aforesaid series of decisions of the Supreme Court on the point. ( 14 ) OUR attention was also invited by the learned Advocates of the department to another Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of j. K. Bardolia Mills v. M. L. Khunger, (1975) XVI GLR 119. This decision falls in line with the aforesaid series of decisions of the Supreme Court on the point. ( 14 ) OUR attention was also invited by the learned Advocates of the department to another Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of j. K. Bardolia Mills v. M. L. Khunger, (1975) XVI GLR 119. The Division Bench in that case speaking through A. D. Desai, J. had to consider the question whether the goods which were earlier seized under Sec. 110 and which were liable to be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized when no notice under Sec. 124 was issued within time permissible under Sec. 110 (2) could be made subject-matter of adjudication proceeding under Sec. 122 of the Act. Answering this question in the affirmative, it was observed as under :"the provisions relating to the seizure of the goods and those relating to the confiscation of the goods or imposition of penalty stand on different footing, Section 124 of the Act does not lay down any period within which the notice required by it has to be given. The period laid down in Sec. 110 (2) of the Customs Act relates only to the seizure of the goods and not the validity of the notice. Once the order of confiscation of the goods is passed under the provisions of Sec. Ill of the Act the question of retrurn of goods after expiry of the period mentioned in Sec. 110 of the Act cannot survive. "this judgment also brings out the difference between the investigation procedure contemplated by Chapter XIII and adjudication procedure contemplated by chapter XIV. ( 15 ) WE may lastly refer to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras high Court in the case of Collector of Customs v. Kotumal, AIR 1967 Mad. 263 . This judgment was referred to in the later decision of the Madras High court in 1989 (43) ELT 19 (supra ). In the case of Kotumal (supra), the Full bench was concerned with the question whether the statement made by the witnesses in inquiry under Sees. 107 and 108 of the Act were hit by Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. This question was answered in the negative by the Full bench of the Madras High Court. In the case of Kotumal (supra), the Full bench was concerned with the question whether the statement made by the witnesses in inquiry under Sees. 107 and 108 of the Act were hit by Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. This question was answered in the negative by the Full bench of the Madras High Court. The very same view is taken by various decisions of the Supreme Court which we have referred to earlier. However, it would be profitable to refer to the observations on the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act as found in the above decision wherein Ramkrishnan, J. spoke for the Full Bench. In para 32 of the report, the following observations on Sees. 107 and 108 of the Act are made by Ramkrishnan, J. while repelling the contention that statements made in inquiries under Sees. 107 and 108 are hit by Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act :"the splitting up of the provision for investigation into two sections. Sections 107 and 108 in the new Customs Act of 1962 in our opinion will not make any difference to the application of the principles above cited. Section 107 refers to an enquiry by a Customs Officer. As mentioned already, such enquiry does not have the attributes of a judicial proceeding unlike the enquiry under sec. 108. It also does not enable the enquiring officer to compel the attendance or production of documents or things and the witnesses also cannot be compelled to speak the truth under penalty. What Sec. 107 contemplates is therefore, a jess formal and rigorous type of enquiry by customs Officers; where as Sec. 108 contemplates an enquiry which is almost parallel to the enquiry under Sec. 171a of the old Sea Customs Act and is considered to be a legal proceeding But neither the enquiry under Sec. 107 nor the enquiry under Sec. 108 can in any way in substance or in law be considered to be the same as an investigation into a criminal offence by an officer in charge of a Police Station under Chapter XIV Criminal Procedure Code which is the primary test for the application of Sec. 25 Indian Evidence Act as laid down by the Supreme Court in the latest decision. "in our view, however, both the aforesaid Sees. "in our view, however, both the aforesaid Sees. 107 and 108 in substance represent two different stages of the very same inquiry into smuggling of goods as we have already discussed earlier. ( 16 ) MR. J. G. Shah for the accused submitted, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Balkrishnas case (supra) that paras 10 and 11 of the report indicated that the Supreme Court was dealing with the functions of the Customs Officer under the Customs Act and powers and functions Police officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure and in that light, observations in para 15 of the report are to be appreciated. So far as para 15 of the report is concerned, it was submitted that while analysing Sees. 107 and 108 of the Act, the Supreme Court had indicated that inquiry under Sec. 107 was of investigatory type while inquiry under Sec. 108 was considered to be a normal inquiry which would be inquiry in adjudication proceedings, after issuance of notice under Sec. 124. It is not possible to agree with this contention of Mr. Shah for the simple reason that the Supreme Court was not at all concerned with the question whether the powers under Sec. 108 can be exercised by the concerned officer only after issuance of notice under Sec. 124 or not. Even that apart, no such decision of the Supreme Court is discernible from the aforesaid paras of the report. It is not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Shah that there are water tight compartments like Sees. 107 inquiry, 108 inquiry and proceedings under Sec. 124 representing three different types of inquiries. No such decision is rendered by the Supreme Court in Balkrishnas case (supra ). ( 17 ) MR. Shah and Trivedi then invited our attention to Sec. 146a and sec. 138b of the Act and submitted that these provisions indicate that while exercising power under Sec. 108, the Gazetted Officer concerned can administer oath to persons whose statements are to be recorded and consequently, proceedings under Sec, 108 would become judicial proceedings and to that extent, the decision of the Supreme Court in Advanis case (supra) rendered in connection with pari materia provisions of the Sea Customs Act (Sec. 171a) can no longer be pressed in service by the other side. It is not possible to agree with this contention also for the simple reason that as seen above, while interpreting the provisions of Sec. 171a of the Sea Customs Act which contains pari materia provisions like Sec. 108 of the Act, the Supreme Court has in terms held that the Customs Officers exercising powers under the said provisions are not acting as judicial authorities or tribunal and they remain revenue officers, even though their proceedings may be deemed to be judicial proceedings for the limited purpose indicated by sub-sec. (4) thereof. We are not directly concerned with the question whether a Gazetted Officer holding inquiry under Sec. 108 of the Act is required to administer oath to persons whose statements are to be recorded especially in view of Sec. 146a of the Customs act, and therefore, we need not dilate on it. But even assuming for the sake of argument that on account of enactment of Sec. 146a, now there may not remain any restriction for a Gazetted Officer of Customs in administering oath to persons whose statements are recorded under Sec. 108, even then, it would be too much to suggest that Sec. 108 proceedings which are in the nature of investigation proceedings would partake character of a full-fledged judicial proceedings or that they can be started only after issuance of notice under sec. 124. It is equally not possible to accept the submission of Mr. Shah that as the word evidence is employed by Sec. 108, it would mean evidence before a judicial authority. This suggestion stands rejected by the Supreme court decision in H. H. Advanis case (supra ). Even on the clear language of Sec. 108, such argument gets ruled out. It may be that at the stage of investigation and collection of evidence and material, before issuance of notice under Sec. 124 or even at the stage of adjudication proceedings after issuance of notice under Sec. 124, a Custom Officer may be entitled to administer oath to the concerned persons whose statements are recorded. That would not convert those proceedings into a full-fledged judicial proceeding. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in H. H. Advanis case (supra) cannot be said to have been in any way whittled down only because Sec. 146a has been brought on the statute book. That would not convert those proceedings into a full-fledged judicial proceeding. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in H. H. Advanis case (supra) cannot be said to have been in any way whittled down only because Sec. 146a has been brought on the statute book. On the parity of reasoning, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Trivedi for the accused that because of Sec. 138b, all the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have stood watered down. We have extracted Sec. 138b in the earlier part of this judgment. All that the said provision lays down is that a statement made and signed by a person before any Gazetted Officer of Customs during the course of any inquiry or proceeding under the Act shall be relevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts mentioned therein and under the circumstances indicated in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1) and such statements can be utilised in any other proceedings under the Act. It is easy to visualise that as per sec. l38b (1), such statements become relevant for proving truth of the facts mentioned therein, before the Criminal Courts. The very same provision is made applicable by sub-sec. (2) to other proceedings under the Act meaning thereby even in adjudicating proceedings provision of Sec. 138b can he pressed in service for proving the truth of the contents of the statements. It is difficult to appreciate how this provision can in any way whittle down the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court which can directly be made applicable for discussing the scope and ambit of Sec. 108 of the Customs Act which is pan materia with Sec. 171a of the Sea Customs Act. It is difficult to appreciate how this provision can in any way whittle down the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court which can directly be made applicable for discussing the scope and ambit of Sec. 108 of the Customs Act which is pan materia with Sec. 171a of the Sea Customs Act. ( 18 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, it becomes obvious, in the light of the statutory scheme and the settled legal position in connection therewith, that at the stage of inquiry regarding smuggling of goods which is at investigation stage and when evidence is being collected before any tentative conclusion is reached by the Customs authorities, that the goods are liable to be confiscated and proceedings for confiscation and penalty are required to be initiated, the procedure of Sec. 108 could be resorted to by the competent authority and for invoking such procedure and for recording statements thereunder, it is not necessary to issue any notice under Sec. 124. In other words, Sec. 108 cannot be read subject to Sec. 124 though even after issuance of notice under Sec. 124, the competent adjudicating authority can resort to procedure of Sec. 108 if thought fit and necessary. Hence, statements recorded under Sec. 108 prior to issuance of notice under Sec. 124 cannot be treated to be inadmissable in evidence on that ground. It may be mentioned that ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench in [1985 (2)] XXVI (2) GLR 1146 (supra) to the effect that once notice under Sec. 124 is issued, power under Sec. 108 can be exercised was not brought in challenge before us by any side. Even otherwise, to the extent the Division Bench holds the procedure of Sec. 108 applicable to proceedings after issuance of notice under Sec. 124, no fault can be found with the said decision. However, to the extent the Division Bench holds that Sec. 108 power cannot be exercised prior to issuance of notice under Sec. 124, the said decision, in our view, does not lay down good law. The Division Bench decision will stand overruled to that extent. Our answer to the question posed for our consideration is, therefore, in the negative. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .