Judgment B. Prasad, J. 1. These three appeals have been heard together since they involve similar questions of law and facts. They are being disposed of by this common judgment. In all of them M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (in short the B. C. C. L.) are the appellants. They were the defendants in all three suits. They have filed these appeals under Sec.39 (i) (vi) of the arbitration Act, 1940 (in short the Act). 2. M. A.65 of 1985 (R) has been filed against the judgment and decree passed in title (Arbitration) Suit No.32 of 1983 by the Subordinate Judge 1st court, Dhanbad. M. A. No.71 of 1985 (R) has been filed against the judgment and decree passed in Title (Arbitration) Suit No.43 of 1982 by the same court. Similarly, M. A. No.72 of 1985 (R) has been filed against the judgment and decree passed in Title (Arbitration) Suit No.2 of 1983 also by the same court. All these judgments are dated 27-7-1985 and all the decrees have signed on 9-8-1985 by Sri Dahaur Baitha, Subordinate Judge, 1st court, Dhanbad. 3. Title (Arbitration) Suit No.3 of 1983 (out of which M. A.65 of 1985 has arisen) was filed by the present respondent for directing the present appellants to file the agreement No.22/saraidhela/76 dated 17-3-1976 and also for appointing an independent arbitrator in place of the named arbitrator. It was based on the aforesaid agreement for the construction of 21 "8 type quarters. This agreement was executed between the parties. The work was completed on 30-6-1978 and a sum of Rs.23,87,334= 12 paise was paid to the respondent from time to time, thus leaving a balance of Rs.12,60,120= 18 paise. The respondent sent a letter dated 20-6-1981 to the appellants for the appointment of an arbitrator to decide the dispute as per clause (23) of the agreement. Finding no response from the appellants, the respondent filed the aforesaid suit before the learned Subordinate Judge, who after hearing the parties passed the order dated 27-5-1983 appointing Sri T. D. Ghose, ex. Additional Chief Engineer B. C C. L. Ranchi as the sole arbitrator and accordingly a reference was made to him for adjudication. The said learned arbitrator submitted his award dated 23-1-1985 in which an objection was filed by the defendant-appellant on 11-3-1985. 4. Additional Chief Engineer B. C C. L. Ranchi as the sole arbitrator and accordingly a reference was made to him for adjudication. The said learned arbitrator submitted his award dated 23-1-1985 in which an objection was filed by the defendant-appellant on 11-3-1985. 4. As per this objection filed under Sec.30 read with Sections 16 and 33 of the Act, the appellants contended that since the work was not completed by the respondent within time schedule, a prayer was made on its behalf for extention of time which was allowed by the appellants. The security money, after the expiry of the maintenance period, has been refunded back to the respondent. All the items, whether under the contract schedule, or the extra works have duly been entered in the measurement book. The respondent never submitted the proposed rate for extra work in accordance with Clause (11) of the agreement. The appellant asked the respondent to examine the measurement book and the revised estimate by 25-10-1980 and then to file the objection. This has not been done. The claim of the respondent as made out in the notice dated 20-6-1981 and 29-9-1982 are extremely vague. The award as given by the arbitrator is not in accordance with the reference made by the court. The award of any lump-sum by the learned arbitrator was without any jurisdiction. By awarding a sum of Rs.10,48,500/- the arbitrator passed the award not only in respect to issue No.1 but also in respect to other issues. On these grounds amongst others, the appellant filed the objection petition. The learned Lower court, however, impugned judgment rejected the objection petition and made the award the rule of the court. 5. In the judgment the learned Subordinate Judge framed three points, which are as follows : (i) Whether the learned arbitrator had gone beyond the reference made by the Court (ii) Whether the plaintiff is bound to pay the royalty (iii) Whether the award is fit to be set aside, or it is fit to be modified ? sofar as point No.1 is concerned, the learned Subordinate Judge answered this question in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. So far as point no.2 is concerned, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff-respondent was not liable to pay the royalty, and as such, no clearance certificate on this score was required to be given to the defendant-appellant. sofar as point No.1 is concerned, the learned Subordinate Judge answered this question in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. So far as point no.2 is concerned, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff-respondent was not liable to pay the royalty, and as such, no clearance certificate on this score was required to be given to the defendant-appellant. It was, accordingly, held that the appellants were not justified in keeping the final bill in abeyance. So far as point No.3 is concerned, the learned subordinate Judge held that there was no justification to set aside or modify the award. Accordingly the learned Subordinate Judge rejected the objection of the appellants and made the award a rule of the Court. The plaintiff-respondent was also held entitled to get the interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the decreetal amount till its payment. 6. In this appeal the defendants-appellants have contended that the learned Subordinate Judge has wrongly appointed Sri T. D. Ghose, Ex. Additional Chief Engineer B. C. C. L. as the arbitrator by his order dated 27-3-1983. This order is against Clause (23) of the agreement, according to which the dispute between the parties was only to be referred to the Chief Engineer/additional chief Engineer/deputy Chief Engineer of B. C. C. L. Hence, the order dated 27-3-1983 appointing Sri T. D. Ghose as the arbitrator is without jurisdiction. The arbitrator illegally gave award for a sum of Rs.10,48,500/-. The arbitration was for adjudication of the specific issues referred to by the court at the instance of the plaintiff-respondent. The learned arbitrator should have answered those specific issues. The award of any lump-sum by the learned arbitrator without adjudicating each item is void and illegal. The very fact that the arbitrator had awarded a sum of Rs.10,48,500/- clearly goes to show that he prepared the award not only in respect of issue No.1, but also in respect to other issues as well. The agreement entered into between the parties clearly prohibited any compensation in respect of item No.2 of the reference. As such the award is not based on the agreement but on some extraneous matters. The arbitrator had no authority to import any new term in the agreement. There is no material on record to substantiate the issue relating to the transport lead beyond three miles. No royalty clearance certificate has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent. As such the award is not based on the agreement but on some extraneous matters. The arbitrator had no authority to import any new term in the agreement. There is no material on record to substantiate the issue relating to the transport lead beyond three miles. No royalty clearance certificate has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent. The final bill of the plaintiff could only be paid when it produces this clearance certificate. There was no contract for the payment of interest and there is no scope for allowing any interest at all. On these grounds amongst others it was prayed that the judgment of the lower court be set aside. 7. So far as title (arbitration) Suit No.43 of 1982 (out cf which M. A.71 of 1985 has arisen) is concerned, the claim of the respondent is based on the agreement No.24 Saraidhela/76 dated 17-3-1976. As per the case of the respondent, it had entered into a contract with the appellants for constructing 22 units of c types quarter at Saraidhela as per the aforesaid agreement and the work was completed on 31-12-1977 but the final bill was not prepared inspite of the repeated request and reminders. Accordingly, a petition under Sec.20 of the Act was filed before the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Dhanbad for directing the present appellant to file the agreement a and for appointing an independent arbitrator in place of the named arbitrator. While the contract was being executed by the respondent, there were changes in the design and specification of the works. After the completion of the works part payment was made to the respondent, thus, leaving a balance of Rs.6,27,309.90 paise which the appellants are not paying inspite of several reminders. Accordingly, the respondent wrote a letter, invoking the provisions of the arbitration clause to the appellants who did not even care to give a reply. As such, the respondent is entitled to have an independent arbitrator. After hearing the parties, by the order dated 27-5-1983 the learned Subordinate Judge appointed Sri T. D. Ghose, the Ex. Additional chief Engineer, B. C. C. L. , Ranchi as the sole arbitrator and made a reference to him for adjudication. The said learned arbitrator submitted his award dated 23-1-1985 to which an objection was filed by the present appellant. After hearing the parties, by the order dated 27-5-1983 the learned Subordinate Judge appointed Sri T. D. Ghose, the Ex. Additional chief Engineer, B. C. C. L. , Ranchi as the sole arbitrator and made a reference to him for adjudication. The said learned arbitrator submitted his award dated 23-1-1985 to which an objection was filed by the present appellant. In this objection petition filed under Sec.30 read with Sections 16 and 33 of the Arbitration Act similar grounds have been taken by the appellant as taken in Title (Arbitration) Suit No.3 of 1983. However, by the impugned judgment passed in the aforesaid Title (arbitration) Suit no.43 of 1982 the learned lower court rejected the objection of the defendant-appellant and made the award a rule of the court. It further held that the respondent was entitled to get interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the decreetal amount till the realisation. 8. In this appeal it was contended that the judgment and the award of the learned court below are contrary to law and wrong on facts. The learned court below gravely erred in making the awarded d rule of the court and rejecting the objection filed by the appellants. It ought to have held that the arbitrator had misconducted himself. The award given by the learned arbitrator is vitiated as the same is not in accordance with the reference made by the court. The learned court below has erred in deciding the point No.3, against the appellants. It also wrongly held that the respondent was not required to pay royalty. The award of lump-sum by the arbitrator without adjudication of the specific items is without jurisdiction. On these grounds amongst others, it has been prayed that the award is illegal and the judgment and award of the learned court below be set aside. 9. So far as the Title (arbitration) Suit No.2 of 1983 (out of which m. A. No.72 of 1985 (R) has arisen is concerned, it related to the agreement no.23 B. C. C. L. /saraidhela/76 dated 17-3-1976 entered into between the parties, for the construction of 18 units ofb type quarters. The work was completed on 30-9-1977, but the final bill was not prepared inspite of repeated requests and reminders made by the plaintiff-respondent. The work was completed on 30-9-1977, but the final bill was not prepared inspite of repeated requests and reminders made by the plaintiff-respondent. On account of difference that arose between the parties, the respondent wrote a letter dated 29-9-1980 to the present appellant for the appointment of the arbitrator as per Clause (23) of the agreement. Since this letter proved ineffective, the respondent filed the suit under Sec.20 of the Act. After hearing the parties the learned Subordinate Judge appointed Sri T. D. Ghose, the ex-Additional Chief Engineer B. C. C. L. Ranchi as the sole arbitrator who submitted his award dated 23-1-1985 to which the present appellant filed an objection on 11-3-1985. In this suit the claim of the respondent was for the payment of the balance amount of Rs.4,14,760.39 paise. 10. The appellant filed an objection petition under Sec.30 read with sections 16 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, in which thsy took similar grounds as in the other two appeals. In it also it was contended that all the extra works done by the respondent were properly entered into the measurement book. The respondent, however, failed to produce the royalty clearance certificate, and to sign the measurement book for the final payment. So far as extra works are concerned, the payment for it was made as per schedule rate of the district. By letter dated 9-10-1980 the appellant asked the respondent to examine the measurement book and to raise the estimate by 25-10-1980. However, this has not been done. On these grounds amongst others it was contended that the award be set aside or alternatively it may be modified. The learned Subordinate Judge by the impugned judgment rejected this objection filed on behalf of the appellant and made the award a rule of the Court. He also held that the respondent is entitled to get interest at the rate of 12% per annum, on the decreetal amount till its realisation. 11. In this appeal it was contended that the judgment and the award of the learned court below are contrary to law and wrong on facts. The learned court below gravely erred in making the award a rule of the court rejecting the objections filed by the appellant. It ought to have held that the arbitrator had misconducted himself. 11. In this appeal it was contended that the judgment and the award of the learned court below are contrary to law and wrong on facts. The learned court below gravely erred in making the award a rule of the court rejecting the objections filed by the appellant. It ought to have held that the arbitrator had misconducted himself. The award given by the learned arbitrator is vitiated as the same is not in accordance with the reference made by the court. The learned court below has erred in deciding point No.3 against the appellant. It also wrongly held that the respondent was not required to pay the royalty. The award of lump-sum by the arbitrator without adjudication of the specific items is without jurisdiction. On these grounds amongst others, it has been prayed that the award is illegal and the judgment and the award of the learned court below be set aside. 12. On behalf of the appellants, it has seriously been contended that the order dated 27-5-1983 passed by the learned court below appointing Sri t. D. Ghose, the Ex-Additional Chief Engineer B. C, C. L. Ranchi is without jurisdiction and not in terms of Clause (23) of the agreement. Clause (23) of the agreement has been reproduced in the plaint, according to which in case of any dispute or difference between the parties with respect to this contract, or any condition mentioned therein, either party shall forthwith give the notice of such dispute or difference, and such dispute or difference shall be referred to the Chief/additional Chief/deputy Chief Engineer of B. C. C. L. and his decision therein shall be final, conclusive and binding on all the parties. The appellants have contended that in view of this clause in the agreement, the learned court below could not have appointed Sri T. D. Ghose, the Ex-Additional Chief Engineer B. C. C. L. which was clearly in violation of Clause (23) of the agreement. It has further been pointed out that even before the learned Subordinate Judge (before he could pass the order dated 27-5-1983) the appellant had appeared and had filed objection petition praying for the appointment of the arbitrator from amongst the persons named in this agreement. The learned court below, however, appointed Sri Ghose as the sole arbitrator relying on Sec.22 of the Arbitration Act. Section 22 of the Arbitration Act runs as follows : "22. The learned court below, however, appointed Sri Ghose as the sole arbitrator relying on Sec.22 of the Arbitration Act. Section 22 of the Arbitration Act runs as follows : "22. Appointment of an arbitrator. The arbitrator shall be appointed in such a manner as may be agreed upon between the parties. " the learned court below, however, interpreted this section to mean that if the parties can agree with respect to the nomination of the arbitrator and the parlies are desirous that the nomination shall be made by the court, the court shall appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators as will become clear from subsection (4)of Sec.20 of this Act. Sub-section (4) of Sec.20 runs as follows : " (4) Where no sufficient cause is shown, the Court shall order that the agreement be filed, and shall make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties, whether in the agreement or otherwise, or where the parties cannot agree upon the arbitrator, to an arbitrator appointed by the Court. " after taking aid of these provisions, the learned court below appointed Sri t. D. Chose as the sole arbitrator. It is difficult to accept any such interpretation of these provisions of the Arbitration Act specially when from the order dated 27-5-1983 it would appear that this departure was made by the learned Court below only on the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that there had been some en quiries by the Vigilence department against some of the officers/staff of the appellants and so the respondent apprehended that there may not be justice at the hands of the named arbitrator. Also it was submitted before him that in view of the prevailing atmosphere in the administration of the appellants authorities thereof, are afraid of taking independent decisions in general and against the administration. On these grounds the respondent contended before him that the dispute should not be referred to the named arbitrators. 13. It need not be stated here that these submissions made on behalf of the respondent before the learned court below were extremely vage. It was simply alleged that some enquiries are pending against some officers of the appellants by the Vigilence Department. This cannot be made a ground for assumption that the respondent will not get justice at the hands of the named arbitrators. It was simply alleged that some enquiries are pending against some officers of the appellants by the Vigilence Department. This cannot be made a ground for assumption that the respondent will not get justice at the hands of the named arbitrators. So far as the allegation that the prevailing atmosphere of the administrat on of the appellants was not conducive to a fair award, less said the better. These are the allegations of very general and vague nature. It was advisible that the learned court below should not have appointed sri Ghose as the sole arbitrator in place of the named arbitrators as mentioned in the agreement even with the Sec.20 (4) and Sec.22 of the Act. 14. On behalf of the respondent, however, it has seriously been contended that once the appellants had participated in the arbitration proceeding before Sri T. O. Ghose, it was no longer open to them to challenge his appointment and award. In this connection the respondent has placed reliance on the case of Neel Kanthan and Bros. Construction V/s. The Superintending engineer, National Highway Salem, AIR 1988 SC 2045 . In the said case one Thiru Mohan was the Superintending Engineer at the relevant time and he had entered into the reference. Before, however, he could conclude the arbitration he was replaced by one Thiru J. R. Cornelius as superintending Engineer. Before him also the petitioner antered into appearance and actively participated in the proceeding. He had the knowledge of this change in the person holding the post of Superintending Engineer and had even agreed to the extention of the period of arbitration. The arbitrator had made an award which was ultimately challenged by the petitioner on the ground that when initially Thiru Mohan had entered into the reference, Thiru J. R. Cornelius had no authority to give the award. The Hon ble Supreme Court, however, over ruled this objection. It held that this objection cannot be entertained. If the parties to the reference either agree before-hand to the manner of the appointment or afterwards acquiescence in the appointment made with the full knowledge of the circumstances, they will b e precluded from objecting to such appointment as invalidating the subsequent proceeding. In this case, reliance was placed on the case of prasun Roy V/s. Calcutta M. D. Authority, AIR 1988 SC 205 . In this case, reliance was placed on the case of prasun Roy V/s. Calcutta M. D. Authority, AIR 1988 SC 205 . In this case there was an arbitration agreement to the effect that the dispute between the parties was to be referred to the sole arbitrator of Director/unit head c. M. D. A. not connected with the particular work, as may be nominated by the Authority. It was further agreed that the award of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding on all the parties to the contract. 15. In this case Respondent No.1 moved a petition under Sec.20 of the Act for the following reliefs : (i) The order for filing the arbitration agreement, (ii) For appointment of an arbitrator. AND, (iii) For other consequential reliefs. He also filed a petition before the High Court for the removal of the named arbitrator. By the order dated 19-4-1983 the learned Single Judge appointed sri Amitabh Guha, Advocate. Since according to him (as submitted by the appellant) all the units of C. M. D. A had already expressed their opinions in respect to the dispute. The appellant further submitted that under the circumstances he apprehended that be migh not get justice or proper relief. This order was set aside by the another learned single judge of the high Court by the order dated 8-12-1986. The subsequent order dated 8-12-1986 was set aside by the Hon ble Supreme Court by this Judgment in which it was held that if the respondents were not satisfied with the appointment of sri Amitabh Guha, Advocate, they could have moved an appeal against this order. Instead of doing so they participated in this arbitration proceeding and acquiescenced in such appointment. Both parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the High Court and filed their respective claims and documents before the learned arbitrator. Both of the secured extention of the arbitration proceeding and it was only in the year 1985 that respondent No.1 challenged the validity of the order of the order of the appointment of the arbitrator. The question that arose in this connection was "can a party be permitted to do so. " ?. The Hon ble Supreme Court observed that a party should not be allowed to blow hot and cold simulteneously. Long participation and acquiescence in a proceeding precluded such party from contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. The question that arose in this connection was "can a party be permitted to do so. " ?. The Hon ble Supreme Court observed that a party should not be allowed to blow hot and cold simulteneously. Long participation and acquiescence in a proceeding precluded such party from contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. It was further held that since there was acquiescence by conduct, it defeated the right of the applicant at a later stage. Also it was also observed that even in cases where the initial order was not passed with the consent of the parties, by participation and acquiescence a party can be precluded from challenging it in future. Accordingly, the order of the learned single judge dated 8-12-1986 was set aside and the order dated 19-4-1983 of the learned Single Judge appointing sri Amitabh Guha Advocate as the sole arbitrator was restored. 16. From these two decisions it becomes perfectly clear that even when the appointment of the sole arbitrator is made beyond the terms of the agreement and in cases where any such arbitrator enters into the reference and submits his award, the same cannot be set aside on these grounds if the parties had actively participated in the arbitration proceeding before him. In the present case as will appear from the award that even after the initial extention of time granted by the court up to 28-3-1984 further extention of time was granted with the consent of the parties up to 27-3-1985. that situation, it will amount to acquiessnce by conduct of the parties and at a later stage neither of them can be allowed to challenge the award. 17. In view of these authoritative pronouncement of the Hon ble supreme Court, I do not find any merit in this objection of the appellants that since Sri T. D. Ghose, the Ex. Additional Chief Engineer, E. C. C. L. was not one of the named arbitrators in the agreement, the award has to be set aside. 18. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that in the agreement there was no stipulation for the payment of the interest, and as such, the arbitrator could not have awarded any interest. It appears that the agreement has not been brought on the record. 18. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that in the agreement there was no stipulation for the payment of the interest, and as such, the arbitrator could not have awarded any interest. It appears that the agreement has not been brought on the record. However, the award given by the learned arbitrator shows that before him the interest at the rate of 16% per annum up to December, 1982 was claimed alongwith pendentilite interest. Paragraph no.2 of the award shows that the awarded amount carried interest at the rate of 15% per annum which the learned arbitrator considered reasonable. He has devided the period in three parts. First part is from 1-10-1980 to 2-7-1983, i. e. before entering into the arbitration since the appointment letter of the sole arbitrator issued by the learned court below is dated 2-7-1983. The second period is from 3-7-1983 to 22-4-1983 which appears to be the period during which the arbitration proceeding was pending. The third period is from 23-1-1985 (the date of submission of award) till the date of the payment of the date of the decree which ever was earlier. 19. On behalf of the appellants, it has been contended that the respondent was not entitled to any interest for any these periods. In particular, it has been contended that the respondent was not entitled to any pendentilite interest, i. e. the interest from the period from 3-7-1983 to 22-1-1985, during the period when the arbitration proceeding was pending. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant has seriously contended before me that the respondent is not entitled to the interest before entering into the arbitration proceeding. He is also not entitled to the pendentilite interest. In this connection, my attention has been drawn to the interest Act, 1978 (Act No.14/78) which had come into force on 19-8-1981. In the present case, the suit itself was filed in 1983 and from the order dated 27-5-1983 it appears that the dispute between the parties was ordered to be referred to the sole arbitration to Sri T. O. Ghose on this date. This shows that the suit was filed and this reference was made after coming into force of interest Act, 1978. The question that will now naturally arise is whether under this circumstance the respondent is entitled to interest prior to the making of the reference. This shows that the suit was filed and this reference was made after coming into force of interest Act, 1978. The question that will now naturally arise is whether under this circumstance the respondent is entitled to interest prior to the making of the reference. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Executive Engineer Irrigation Galimala V/s. Abhaduta Jena, AIR 1988 SC 1520 . In this case it was held that in the cases to which 1978 interest Act applies, the award of interest prior to the proceeding is not open to question. It was further held in this case that in regard to the pendentilite interest, i. e. interest from the date of the reference to the date of the award, the claimant would not be entitled to the same for the simple reason that the arbitrator is not a court within the meaning of Sec.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor were the references to the arbitration made in course of the suit. It was further observed that in the cases which arose before the commencement of the Interest Act, 1978 , the claimants are not entitled to interest either before the commencement of the proceeding or during the pendency of the arbitration since Interest Act, 1839 did not apply to their cases. However, in the present case all the three units were filed in the year 1983 and the reference to the sole arbitrator was made on 27-5-1983. Both the dates are subsequent to the coming into the force of this Act on 19-8-1981. No doubt the agreement in question was prior to 19-8-1981, but that is hardly going to make any difference so far as the payment of interest is concerned, since the interest was awarded by the arbitrator to whom the reference was made by the order dated 27-5-1983. 21. The learned Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance in the case of State of Orissav. J. P. Lath, AIR 1989 SC 1987 and also on the case of Uchhaba Pradhan, 1991 (1) SCC 446 . 21. The learned Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance in the case of State of Orissav. J. P. Lath, AIR 1989 SC 1987 and also on the case of Uchhaba Pradhan, 1991 (1) SCC 446 . In the case of State of Orissa V/s. J. P. Lath, it was held that since the case arose before coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978 , the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to allow interest either before the commencement of the proceeding or during its pendency, and to this extent the award was modified. In this decision, reliance was placed on the case of the Executive Engineer (supra ). In the subsequent case of State of Orissa V/s. Uchhaba Pradhan, (supra) also a reference was made before coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978 , and as such, it was held that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest for the period subsequent to the making of the reference to the arbitrator. These two decisions are, therefore, of no avail to the learned counsel for the appellants since in the instant cases the suits were filed in the year 1983 and the references to the arbitration were made on 27-5-1983. Hence, since, the reference were made after coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978 (on 19-8-1981) the respondent is entitled to interest prior to the institution of the suit. However, as has been held in the case of the Executive Engineer (Supra), the respondent is not entitled to the pendentilite interest i. e. interest from the period from 3-7-1983 to 22-1-1985. So far as item no.3, namely, the interest from 23-1-1985 (date of award) till the date of the payment or the date of the decree which ever is earlier is concerned, this interest can be awarded since there is no bar to the same. 22. In this connection, I would like to briefly refer to the case of gujarat W. S. and S. B. V/s. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1989 sc 973 , in which it was held as follows : I. Interest for the period prior to commencement of arbitration proceeding can be granted in these cases in which references to arbitration were made after the commencement of the Interest act, 1978. II. Pendentilite interse cannot be granted by the arbitrator, and iii. II. Pendentilite interse cannot be granted by the arbitrator, and iii. Interest from the date of award to the date of decree can be granted by court in view of Sec.3 (1) (a) of Interest Act and section 29 of the Arbitration Act. 23. From the judgments under appeal, it appears that the interest was also awarded at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the judgment till the date of the payment. There does not appear to be any legal bar in awarding the interest from the date of the judgment to the date of the payment. Proviso to Sec.34 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly mandates that if the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of the commercial transaction the rate of such further interest may exceed six percent per annum but shall not not exceed the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. According to Explanation II to Sec.34 (1) a transaction is a commercial transaction if it is connected with the business of the party incurring liability. In the present case there is no denying the fact that the aforesaid provisions of law would be attracted and as such the awarding of interest at the rate of 12% per annum cannot be interfered with. 24. From the detailed discussions made above, it becomes perfectly clear that these appeals can only be allowed in part to the extent as mentioned above, namely, that the respondent will not be entitled to any pendentilite interest from 3-7-1983 to 22-1-1985 in any of these three appeals. In the result these appeals are allowed in part in the manner indicated above and the aforesaid judgments and decrees are modified to this extent. However, under the circumstances of these cases there would be no order as to cost. Appeals partly allowed.