JUDGMENT S. N. Jha, J. This application purported to have been filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against an order of eviction of the petitioners from the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity in terms of section 11 (1) (c) of the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. For the purpose of disposal of this application it is not necessary to set out the facts in detail. Suffice it to say that in a suit for eviction bearing Title Suit No. 48 of 1985, no application for grant of leave accompanied by an affidavit in terms of section 14 (4) of the Act was filed by the defendant-petitioners. The court below by its impugned order relying on the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 14 has held that the consequence of non-filing of the application for grant of leave and the affidavit will be that the petitioner-tenants shall be deemed to have admitted the claim of the landlord and that the landlord-opposite party shall be entitled for an order of eviction on the ground of personal necessity. Sub-section (4) of section 14 reads as follows- "14 (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by the ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided, and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid." 3. It is true that the provisions of section 14 (4) are mandatory and non-compliance therewith will result in the consequence in the nature indicated above, as submitted by Mr. Raghib Ahsan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party. The question for consideration, however, is whether the statute casts any further duty on the court before the decree for eviction is passed in the case of non-compliance of the provisions of section 14 (4). Raghib Ahsan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party. The question for consideration, however, is whether the statute casts any further duty on the court before the decree for eviction is passed in the case of non-compliance of the provisions of section 14 (4). In other words, whether the decree for eviction in such a case should be passed as a matter of course without any further investigation in a mechanical manner. Clause (o) of section 11 (1) of the Act, which provides for the ground of personal necessity reads as follows :- “(c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord : Provided that where the court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning or clause (b) of section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5." It would appear that in the terms of the aforesaid provisions in order to grant a decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity the court has to see that the necessity alleged by the plaintiff-landlord is not only reasonable but also bonafide. It is also to be seen by the court that such a need is not a mere wish or desire or a pretence on the part of the plaintiff. It follows, therefore, that although in a given case the plaintiff-landlord has made averments seeking eviction on the ground of personal necessity it is the duty of the court to examine as to whether the averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint do constitute the ground of personal necessity in terms of clause (c) and whether the same is reasonable and bonafide or not. A perusal of the impugned order in the instant case shows that there is no finding whatsoever to the effect that the plaintiffs have not any personal necessity, not to mention about such a personal necessity being reasonable or bona fide. In my considered opinion, therefore, even in a case where the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act have not been complied by the tenant, it is the duty of the court to examine further with reference to the averments made in the plaint and to record a finding that the plaintiff-landlord has got a reasonable and bonafide requirement or the suit premises. That having not been done in the instant case the order of eviction cannot be sustained. 4. The impugned order suffers from still another infirmity inasmuch as no finding in terms of proviso to clause (c) of section 11 (1)(c) of the Act has been recorded to the effect that partial eviction of the tenants from the suit premises would fulfil the requirement of the plaintiffs substantially or not. It is well settled by catena of judicial pronouncements that compliance of the provisions of the said proviso is mandatory and even in a case where the defendant has not taken that plea it is the duty of the court to examine that aspect and to record a finding. Reference in this connection may be made to only one of them, namely, the case of Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand and others (AIR 1978 Supreme Court, 413). For this reason also the impugned order has to be set aside. 5. It is unfortunate that the impugned order of eviction passed on 28.11.85 has to be set aside after lapse of about six years, but law has to take its own course. However, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, I would direct the trial court to take up the hearing of the suit on priority basis. 5. It is unfortunate that the impugned order of eviction passed on 28.11.85 has to be set aside after lapse of about six years, but law has to take its own course. However, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, I would direct the trial court to take up the hearing of the suit on priority basis. Learned counsel for the opposite party has drawn my attention to paragraph 3 of the impugned order wherein the trial court has taken notice of the petition for grant of leave to contest filed belatedly on 4.10.85, a copy whereof has been annexed to the present revision application as Annexure-3, and has submitted that the said application should be considered to have been filed in terms of section 14 (4) of the Act and the court should be directed to proceed on that basis from that stage. It appears from the order that the court did not consider the aforesaid petition dated 4.10.85 on merits since according to the court it had been filed at a late stage. I would, on the facts of the case, direct the court to consider the petition on merits under section 14 (5) and pass appropriate orders and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law. In the event examination of witness is necessary, that must be done and concluded on day-to-day basis without giving unnecessary adjournments to any of the parties. 6. For the reasons stated above, the application is allowed, the impugned order of eviction is set aside and the case is remanded to the court below with the abovementioned directions. There will be no order as to costs.