JUDGMENT Chettur Sankaran Nair, J. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Chettur Sankaran Nair, J.-- Appellants 1 to 3 -- Accused 1 to 3 in S-C. 32/87 in that order, challenge the conviction and sentence imposed on them by the Court of Session, Palghat Division. In furtherance of their common intention, Appellants are alleged to have way laid deceased Rajan on the Mudappallur-Vandazhi public road, and caused his death by kicking him and hitting him with a granite stone on his chest, ribs and abdomen the offences punishable under S.302 and 341 read with S.34 I.P.C. 2. The Court of Session found Appellant No. 1 guilty of offences under S.302 and 341 I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life, and to a fine of Rs. 15,000 in default of which he was to suffer imprisonment for two years. Appellants 2 and 3 were convicted under S.323 I.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment for a year and to a fine of Rs. 1,000 each, in default of which they were to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. 3. According to the prosecution, appellants caused the death of Rajan, on account of previous enmity. Deceased and his son P.W. 1 were walking homewards, along the public road on the evening of 6th April 1986 at or about 7.30. They were seen by the appellants who were coming from the opposite direction, when they reached near the C. V. M. High School. Appellant No. 2 then said that. Rajan was corning. Upon that, appellant No. 1 caught hold of the deceased by the collar of his shirt, and asked him to divulge the name of the person who had beaten him, on an earlier occasion. Deceased pleaded ignorance. Dissatisfied with the answer, first appellant kicked the deceased on his navel. Appellants 2 and 3 also kicked him. A bundle and a torch (M.O. 5) in the hands of deceased, fell down. Third appellant then picked up the torch, and hit the deceased with it on his forehead. Then the deceased fell down, and appellant No. 1 hit him with a granite stone on various parts of his torso, including the chest, abdomen and ribs. P.W. 4, who had reached the scene meanwhile, pleaded with the appellants not to kill the deceased. Third appellant then picked up the torch, and hit the deceased with it on his forehead. Then the deceased fell down, and appellant No. 1 hit him with a granite stone on various parts of his torso, including the chest, abdomen and ribs. P.W. 4, who had reached the scene meanwhile, pleaded with the appellants not to kill the deceased. But, appellant No. 1 asked him to go his way, stating that no one had come to his rescue when he had been attacked. The injured asked for a drink of water, and then appellant No. 1 rubbed the granite stone on the lips of the deceased, and brought him a bottle of soda, asking him to drink that, and die. Thereafter, the first appellant felt the deceased with his feet, and proclaimed that they had accomplished what they had wanted, and left the place. P.W. 1 son of the deceased and a college student, watched the incident hiding himself behind a shop. P.W. 5 and others came oh the scene and informed the relatives of the dead man about the incident, P.W. 1 went to the police station at 10.30 p.m. and lodged Ext. P1 information with P.W. 13 Sub Inspector of Police, who registered Ext. P-1(a) first information report. The first information report was received by the Magistrate at 3 p.m. on 7th April 1986. An inquest was held and Ext. P-4 is the inquest report- P.W. 10 conducted post mortem and issued Ext. P-7 Certificate, noticing twenty-one external and seven internal injuries. The appellants were arrested on 18th April 1986. M. O.10 pocket notebook belonging to appellant No. 1 and recovered from the scene under Ext. P-4, was sent to the Assistant Director, State Forensic Laboratory. He issued Ext. P-10 certificate. On this evidence, appellants stood trial. Their plea was one of denial. 4. PWs 1 to 5 and 11 were examined to prove the occurrence. Of them, PWs 4, 5 and 11 turned hostile. PWs-1 to 3 speak to the incident. P. Ws. 1 and 6 speak to the motive. There was an incident in which appellant No. 1 was beaten up, and he believed that the deceased was involved in it. He appears to have told P.W. 6 that he would grow his hair and beard, until he had done away with the deceased. 5. P. Ws. 1 and 6 speak to the motive. There was an incident in which appellant No. 1 was beaten up, and he believed that the deceased was involved in it. He appears to have told P.W. 6 that he would grow his hair and beard, until he had done away with the deceased. 5. The Court of Session found that common intention was not proved, but it found that appellant No. 1 had caused the death of Rajan, and that appellants 2 and 3 had committed the offence under S.323 I.P.C. These findings are based on the evidence of PWs 1 and 6. The Certificate Ext. P-10, was also relied on. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 were not accepted. 6. Learned counsel for appellants contended that the first information report was a belated refinement on the occurrence, that P.W. 1 could not be believed, and that P-Ws-2 and 3 are chance witnesses. He argued further that M.O. 10 is not admissible in evidence, and that there is nothing to prove that the handwriting in M.O. 10, was that of appellant No. 1. According to him, the first information report was registered only on 7th April 1986, though it is stated to have been registered at 10.30 p.m. on 6th April 1986. That P.W. 1 used the expression 'yesterday' at one place in the first information statement, is used to lace this argument. Had it been on 6th April 1986, the expression 'yesterday' would not have occurred, submits counsel. The fact remains that elsewhere in the first information statement, P.W. 1 stated that the occurrence took place 'today'. In his evidence, P.W. 1 maintains that he used the word 'today' and not 'yesterday'. Apparently, there is an error. The first information report reached the Magistrate at Alathur at 3 p.m. the next day. Perhaps, events of early evening, described late in the night might have been referred as "yesterday's incident'. P.W. 1 was weary in body and mind, and under mental stress at the time he made the statement. Besides, it is difficult to see what the prosecution had to gain by changing the time by a few hours. The first information statement contains a natural and graphic version of the incident, and we are inclined to accept it as true. 7. Besides, it is difficult to see what the prosecution had to gain by changing the time by a few hours. The first information statement contains a natural and graphic version of the incident, and we are inclined to accept it as true. 7. Counsel argued further that the evidence of P.W. 1 is liable to be rejected on four grounds, namely: (a) omission to name P.W. 4 in the first information report; (b) omission to mention about giving soda water to the deceased; (c) omission to mention the beating with the torch; and (d) omission to mention that kicks were administered on the ribs and abdomen in addition. (P.W. 1 mentioned only that the deceased was kicked on his chest). The argument has to be noticed, only to be rejected. A first information report is not a catalogue or chronicle of events. Nor, can one expect a boy seeing his father being killed, to be in a composed state of mind to recall the events and give a feed back with computer precision. A reasonable view of men and matters, must prevail in the area of appreciation of evidence. 8. A criminal trial is not a fairy tale, where one is free to give flight to imagination and fantasy [see Kali Ram v-State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1973 S.C. 2773 ]. The law of evidence cannot be far apart from the law of life. Courts in dealing with ordinary human beings, prone to error make innocent mistakes, cannot import a rigour of discipline alien to day-to-day life, merely because the person speaks as a witness. A realistic approach, counselled by ordinary probabilities of life and informed by experience of life, must enter judicial evaluation of facts.' Realistic diversity, and not rigid uniformity, is the law of life. Trivialities cannot be the touch-stone to test evidence. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal and another AIR 1988 S.C. 2154 , Venkatachaliah, J. speaking for the Court, said: "There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of degree of probability and the question of proof. Forensic probability in the last analysis must rest on robust commonsense and intuitions of the Judge............... Uninformed legitimation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice." Viewed in this profile, the evidence of P.W. 1 commends acceptance, and the court below was right in finding the charge on the evidence of P.W. 1. Forensic probability in the last analysis must rest on robust commonsense and intuitions of the Judge............... Uninformed legitimation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice." Viewed in this profile, the evidence of P.W. 1 commends acceptance, and the court below was right in finding the charge on the evidence of P.W. 1. 9. PWs 2 and 3 also speak to the occurrence. P.W. 2 stated that he saw the incident on his way back from Vadakkenchery, where he had gone to purchase Novalgin. There was a tube light at the scene, and he saw the Appellants assaulting the deceased. The evidence of P.W. 3 is also to the same effect. The Sessions Judge rejected the evidence of these witnesses on grounds, which we consider puerile. The Sessions Judge felt that it was ludicrous' to think that P.W. 2 would travel seven or eight kilometres to get Novalgin", or that "he alighted from the bus near the scene". There is nothing 'ludicrous' in alighting at the scene, or in travelling seven or eight kilometres to get a medicine, if one needed it. Travelling a few kilometres is not extraordinary. Perceptions of life, in the closing decade of the Twentieth Century, persuade us to think that P.W. 2 did nothing in congruous or incredible in travelling seven or eight kilometres to satisfy a need of his. When the Sessions Judge said that their 'evidence is apparently coloured by political antagonism', he said the untenable. There is no element of politics or antagonism, revealed from the evidence. We find the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 reliable and acceptable. The Sessions Judge should have acted on it". The matter is, however, academic as the conviction is liable to be upheld, solely on the evidence of P.W. 1. 10. Two other circumstances relied on by the Sessions Judge were also challenged by counsel for Appellants. P.W. 6 speaks to the motive. He would say that long before the occurrence, Appellant No. 1 had told him that he would do away with the deceased, before having a hair cut or shave. P. W. 6 was questioned by the police soon after the occurrence, and he had stated this to the Investigating Officer. P.W. 1 would also say that a similar statement was made by Appellant No. 1. This evidence was rightly accepted by the Sessions Judge to find the motive. P. W. 6 was questioned by the police soon after the occurrence, and he had stated this to the Investigating Officer. P.W. 1 would also say that a similar statement was made by Appellant No. 1. This evidence was rightly accepted by the Sessions Judge to find the motive. M. O.10 Notebook belonging to Appellant No. 1, was recovered from the scene of occurrence. The handwriting therein was compared with the admitted handwritings of Appellant No. 1, and the Assistant Director, State Forensic Laboratory came to the conclusion that the handwriting in M.O. 10 was the handwriting of Appellant No. 1. Ext. P-10 is the Certificate issued by him to that effect. We have also examined the handwriting in M.O. 10, comparing it with the admitted writings in Exts. P-5 and P-9 (a) to P-9 (e). We, are satisfied that the handwriting is the same. Ext. P-10 is admissible in evidence, in the light of the provision in S.293(4)(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The presence of the first Appellant, at the scene is thus reassured. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and 6 clearly establish the charge against the first Appellant. 11. Appellants 2 and 3 were acquitted of the charge under S.302 read with S.34 I.P.C. by the Sessions Judge, in the view that common intention was not proved. There is no appeal against the order of acquittal. Hence, we do not propose to go into the matter in any great detail. We are constrained to say that the reasons stated for the conclusion in Para.42 of the, judgment, are too transparent to stand scrutiny. The Sessions Judge stated that Appellants 2 and 3 : "did not grow their beard or hair, vowing that they would finish Rajan. They did not chase Rajan at any time for assaulting him. The f act, that none of the accused were armed also speaks volumes about the absence of malice on the part of the accused." Growing a beard or hair, and a vow are not invariable concomitants of common intention. 12. The conviction entered against Appellants 2 and 3 for the offence under S.323 is eminently justified in the light of the evidence of PWs 1 to 3, which we have discussed hereinbefore. The conviction is therefore proper. Counsel then pleaded for reduction of sentence. 12. The conviction entered against Appellants 2 and 3 for the offence under S.323 is eminently justified in the light of the evidence of PWs 1 to 3, which we have discussed hereinbefore. The conviction is therefore proper. Counsel then pleaded for reduction of sentence. Having regard to the nature of the attack, the persistence with which it was carried out, the circumstances in which it took place, and the nature of the injuries, we see no justification for interfering with the sentence. The conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellants are confirmed, and the Appeal, is dismissed.