JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—In this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has challenged F. I. R. No. 21 of 1991, dated 24-1-1991, registered at police station Saddar Simla and the order dated 28-1-1991 passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 2, Simla The petitioner is the Principal of Auckland Honse School Simla where education is imparted to girls. This school is day school as well as boarding school 2. The FIR. was lodged by one George who is presently working as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur. As stated in the F.I.R. the wife of the complainant Mrs. Amita George is working as teacher in the school since June 1986. She has been allotted residential accommodation in the school premises. The complainant was residing with his wife till February, 1990 when he was posted outside Simla. Since then he has been visiting his wife in the school premises off and on. He has given two incidents in his complaint, Annexure A-2 to the reply-affidavit of the State of Himachal Pradesh, which led him to lodge F.I.R. The first incident is of 24-12-1990) when the main gate of the school was got locked by the petitioner At that time the personal car of the complainant was parked in the school premises He had to take police help to get his car out of the school premises The second incident is of 22-1-1991 when he could not get ingress to the school premises with his car, as the petitioner had got the main gate of the school locked With the result he had to park his car on the road itself near the main gate of the school. According to him this had exposed him to security risk as his car was parked on the road unattended and any explosive substance could be planted in it. 3. After registering the F. I R., the investigation officer one Shri Rajinder Singh Head Constable, proceeded with the investigation. Considering the main gate of the school alongwith the lock and chain put on it as the case property and necessary for completing the investigation, he moved the Illaqa Magistrate for necessary orders. His application was infact taken up by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 2, by assignment, as stated by him in his order dated 18-1-1991, which is as under:— "Application received by assignment. His application was infact taken up by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 2, by assignment, as stated by him in his order dated 18-1-1991, which is as under:— "Application received by assignment. This is an application filed by the I.O. for seeking permission to take the gate alongwith lock and chain into possession. Heard. Perused. The gate in question is stated to be locked on the spot. The Principal of the school who is in possession of key of the lock in question, is stated to have refused to open the lock The gate, lock and chain in question are allegedly required to be taken into possession to complete the investigation of the case. Accordingly, the application is allowed. Gate and lock in question alongwith chain are allowed to be taken into custody by the police in accordance with rules for the completion of investigation of the case. However, Sh. Rajinder Singh, I O. is directed to make every possible effort to open the lock by obtaining key from the person who is in possession of the key and if key is not handed over, then, lock in question is allowed to be taken into custody by breaking it open. The application is decided accordingly and be sent back to the Court of concerned Illaqa Judicial Magistrate. Announced in the open Court this 28th day of January, 1991. 4. The facts emerging from the complaint, the police file and the pleadings of the parties in the present petition are as under. Admittedly, the wife of the complainant has been allotted residential accommodation in the school premises from July 1986, where the complainant resides along with his wife and children during his stay at Simla. From the Service Rules for the Employees of the Auckland House School, Simla, especially Rule 18 (iv), placed on record as Annexure PA to the petition it is clear that the wife of the complainant is only a licensee in the residential accommodation, which has been allotted to her to facilitate the work of the school, on the terms and conditions mentioned in other sub-rules of Rule 18. It is not the case of the complainant that any garage or other parking facility was also given to his wife as one of the terms and conditions of her license or allotment. It is not the case of the complainant that any garage or other parking facility was also given to his wife as one of the terms and conditions of her license or allotment. On the other hand it is admitted by the petitioner in her petition as well as rejoinder that the complainant and one Dr. Parveen- husband of another teacher of the school who also owns a car, were permitted purely as a matter of courtesy to park their cars in junior school premises called Belvedere, which is at a distance of 200 metres from the main gate of the school. 5. It is also clear from the pleadings that the school is housed in two estates which are at a walking distance of two to three minutes from each other The senior school alongwith its boarding house is in one estate and the junior school with its boarding house is in another estate i.e Belvedere. The allotted residential accommodation to the wife of the complainant is in the senior school premises, but no other car except the car of the school, which is used by the Principal and Board of Governors, is permitted to be parked in these premises. The cars of other teachers are permitted to be parked in the premises of Belvedere, The approach to the senior school premises, where the main gate is installed, is from the circular road which leads to Sanjauli. This necessitates that the main gate should be kept closed to avoid unhindered access to the school by the motorists. It is seated in the petition that during working hours only half of the gate is kept open to permit entry of the students and other persons on foot and thereafter the gate is locked by means of a chain which permits the entry of only staff on foot. But from 10 30 p. m. to 5 30 a. m. the gate is completely locked, as not to permit any entry in the school. 6. But from 10 30 p. m. to 5 30 a. m. the gate is completely locked, as not to permit any entry in the school. 6. Though the complainant has stated in his complaint that he was using the passage for the last five years and was parking the car inside the school premises yet it is clear from letter dated 25-12-1990 (Annexure P-F, to the rejoinder) of the Principal addressed to Mrs Amita George, wife of the complainant, that he was permitted to park his car only in the junior school premises i. e. Belvedere. The dispute arose when he insisted to park his car in the senior school premises. The letter dated 25-12-1990 was in reply to the letter of the complainant written on the same date. In his letter he had requested to arrange for keeping the main gate unlocked during his visits and also at 5.30 a. m on the next morning, that is 2612-1990 to facilitate him to load his luggage in the car for his intended trip to Delhi. He also asserted his right of passage and claimed that the petitioner could not put restraint over it by locking the main gate. In the reply dated 25-12-1990 the petitioner has made it clear that there was no question to create any impediment in the right of passage of the complainant and he was welcome to come and go as he pleased. She has further stated that the complainant was permitted to park his car in the premises of Belvedere for the last two years, since when he had his personal car. On 25-12-1990 the complainant was permitted to bring his car in the senior school premises to load his luggage but she has made it clear that under the norms and procedure of the school private cars of the staff members could not be permitted to be parked in the senior school premises. The petitioner not only sought the co-operation of the wife of the complainant but also extended her assistance in accommodating the complainant but within the "norms" of the school. The petitioner not only sought the co-operation of the wife of the complainant but also extended her assistance in accommodating the complainant but within the "norms" of the school. From the tenor of this letter it is very clear that the Principal had no intention whatsoever to create any hindrance in the ingress and outgress of the complainant from the school premises She only wanted in the interest of the school that private cars of the staff members including the car of the complainant were not parked in the senior school premises. In fact the complainant had not right to park his private car in the school premises, still he was permitted to do so in the premises of Belvedere as a matter of courtesy But the courtesy was returned with high-handedness by asserting that he had a right to park his car at a particular place, that is, the senior school premises. At the top of it when the petitioner showed resistance the complainant proceeded to drag the petitioner in a criminal case by lodging F. I. R in the police. When by lodging the F. I R. be could not achieve his aim of getting the main gate opened as and when he visits the school premises he saw to it that the main gate and the lock alongwith its chain is removed by the court order dated 28-1-1991. This Court has drawn the conclusion from the speed with which everybody acted. The complaint was lodged on 24-1-1991 afternoon, the order was obtained by the Investigation Officer on /8-1-991 when 25-1-1991 and 26-M9M1 were gazetted holidays and 27-1-1991 was Sunday. Had this been the normal way of conducting investigation of our police even in most heinous crimes, the law and order of our country would not have reached the lowest ebb. 7. Though in the back-drop of the present case the learned Assistant Advocate General (Shri M. S. Guleria) appearing on behalf of the State, has not raised preliminary objection that this court has no power to quash the F. I. R. at the investigation stage, yet it is proper if this matter is examined from this angle, before it is seen that whether the facts and circumstances of this case warrant exercise of such a power The police officer gets his statutory power to investigate the cognizable offence under section 156, Cr. P. C. on information received of commission of such an offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is correct that on recording such an information the First Information Report comes into existence. The procedure for investigation is provided in section i57, Cr. P. C. which is as under. “157. Procedure for Investigation.—(I) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer-in-charge of police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender: Provided that ………………………………………………………….. A mere reading of section 157 makes it clear that sine qua non for lawful investigation by the police under section 156 and 157 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure is a reasonable suspicion of commission of a cognizable offence by the police officer on the basis of information received by him or otherwise. In other words if on the basis of information in possession of the police from any source whatsoever suspicion of commission of any cognizable offence does not arise the police officer has no mandate to investigate the matter. If on the information in possession of the police whether as recorded in the First Information Report or collected later on reasonable suspicion of the commission of a cognizable offence emerges the police officer has a statutory power to launch the investigation. In such a case the courts must abstain from interfering with throttling the investigation by quashing the F.I R. The decision in each case will depend upon its facts and circumstances keeping in view the object to promote the ends of justice. In such a case the courts must abstain from interfering with throttling the investigation by quashing the F.I R. The decision in each case will depend upon its facts and circumstances keeping in view the object to promote the ends of justice. Therefore, it cannot be said that this Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the challenge to the F. I. R and quash it if in its judgment it comes to the conclusion that from the First Information Report and other material collected during investigation by the police no cognizable offence is made out For forming this opinion I am supported by the Division Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered in Vinod Kumar Sethi, and others v. State of Punjab and another, 1982 (1) CLR 638. The Chief Justice Sandhawalia speaking for the Court concluded "I see no blanket bar against the quashing of a First Information Report and the consequent investigation (even before a charge-sheet is filed in Court) provided that the requisite pre-conditions formulated above for the exercise of the power stand satisfied. Without being exhaustive, these may be briefly summarised as under:— (i) when the first information report, even if accepted as true, discloses no reasonable suspicion of the commission of a cognizable offence; (ii) when the materials subsequently collected in the course of an investigation further disclose no such cognizable offence at all; (iii) when the continuation of such investigation would amount to an abuse of power by the police thus necessitating interference in the ends of justice ; and (iv) that even if the first information report or its subsequent investigation purports to raise a suspicion of a cognizable offence, the High Court can still quash if it is convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised mala fide." 8. On the facts and circumstances of this case as enumerated above this Court has no hesitation to hold that if the impugned F. I R and the order dated 28-1-1991 is not quashed and the police is not derailed from the tracks of its investigation not only the petitioner will be humiliated and harassed the legal system will also be put to disrepute. Taking every word of the complaint as correct no cognizable offence is made out whatsoever. Taking every word of the complaint as correct no cognizable offence is made out whatsoever. On his own statement the complainant was never restrained from using the passage leading to the school premises, more precisely the senior school premises where his wife has been allotted residential quarter. His only grievance is that he is not permitted to take in and take out his car from the senior school premises and park it there which cannot be held a wrongful restraint as defined under section 339 of the Indian Penal Code Under sections 339 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code the criminal restraint to a person is punishable and not any obstruction whatsoever caused for plying/parking of a vehicle at a particular place. In State v. Nazuesh G. Shet Govenkar and another, AIR 1970 Goa, Daman & Diu 49, while interpreting the wrongful restraint the Court observed: "The admitted position is that the complainant and others were not obstructed from proceeding in any direction in which they wanted to proceed and, therefore, there was no wrongful restraint within the meaning of this section.. .The word person in this section ………would not seem to include obstruction of a truck when its occupants are not obstructed. This word is to be understood in its ordinary sense." 9. Even for investigation of a case for wrongful restraint under section 341 of the Indian Penal Code the main gate and the door alongwith its chain cannot be held to be a case property which should be taken into custody by the investigating officer by uprooting the gate and unlocking the door. This order does not seem to be passed by exercising judicial wisdom. 10. In the result the petition succeeds. The F I. R. No. 21 of 1991 and the order dated 28-1-1991 passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 2, Simla, is quashed. 11. Before parting with this case this Court is constrained to observe that it was expected of the complainant, being himself a judicial officer, to have exercised restraint in rushing to the police and lodging complaint for petty routine matter, which could be resolved by talking to the petitioner and having a reasonable attitude. Petition allowed.