ORDER Shacheendra Dwivedi, J.-- 1. This petition has been filed under section 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the petitioner-accused for quashing proceedings of Criminal Case No.7/91 (Old No.1348/84 (4702/87) presently after transfer pending in the Court of Shri A.K. Tiwari Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior, against him since 1982, on the ground of inordinate and callous delay. 2. Fact'" briefly stated are as follows. In the years 1982, report was lodged against the petitioner and other students by one Rajendra Kumar Jain, who was allegedly the joint secretary of Students Union, alleging that at about 9 O'clock in the morning on 19.7.1982, about 8-10 students assaulted a student Sunil Jain and further took him to Room No.11 of the Junior Boys Hostel. Having given him good beating, they all left the spot. On report being lodged, an offence was registered against the petitioner and other students. On completing the investigations, the challan was filed against the petitioner and 6 others by police Jhansi Road in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, on 20.8.1982, for offences under section 147,342,506(1)/149 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The case remained pending in that Court and the dates went on being adjourned till 25.5.85, by which date the charges under sections 147, 148,342, 323,506(II) and 149 IPC were framed against the petitioner and other co-accused person namely Dinesh Singh. There after the case was fixed for evidence of prosecution on 13.9.85, but as no prosecution witness was present the case was adjourned and it went on being adjourned for the prosecution evidence for a long spell of over 5 years, but the prosecution failed to produce either the complainant or any of its witnesses up to 11.5.90. Even on this date, as no prosecution witness was present, the Court further adjourned the date for prosecution evidence on 28.6.90. Curiously enough, after adjourning the case of this date, the Clerk of the Court discovered that the form of charge-against the petitioner and other co-accused Dinesh was not signed by the Presiding Officer. The record of the Court further disclosed that as against the remaining accused persons, no charge was framed as their trial was separated. Curiously enough, after adjourning the case of this date, the Clerk of the Court discovered that the form of charge-against the petitioner and other co-accused Dinesh was not signed by the Presiding Officer. The record of the Court further disclosed that as against the remaining accused persons, no charge was framed as their trial was separated. Thereafter, one more line was added to the order-sheet, when the case was fixed for 28.6.90 for the evidence, that "CHARGE PAR P.O. KE HASTAKSHAR NAHAIN HAI ATAH CHARGE HETU 28.6.90" Since then the case is pending agait1 for framing charges denove. Conclusion of trial is far away from sight. 4. On the above narration the petitioner's grievance appears to be prima facie justified and germane to the issue that criminal cases registered under sections 147,148,342,506(II) IPC is still at the stage of charge, even after the lapse of9 years. During the period the petitioner, who was a student of M.B.B.S. has qualified the course and has done even post graduation (M.S. in General Surgery). He is much aggrieved as he is held up from proceeding to United Kingdom for taking further studies due to the pendency of the present criminal case and the whole future career of the petitioner is at stake, as he is likely to lose the chance of further studies and prospects of bright career due to the present pending prosecution. 5. That apart, looking to the long term pendency of the criminal case against the petitioner, it is to be seen whether the delay is really resulting in the miscarriage of justice and whether the process of Court is being misused and further to what extent the petitioner is to be blamed for the inordinate delay. 6. Having heard the counsel for the accused and the State and having perused the record of the Court below and authorities cited, I am of the view that the petition deserves to be allowed and proceedings quashed. 7. The petitioner has suffered mental torture and agony of a pending criminal case for all these years Speedy public trial is a fundamental right, implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. They sustain strength and nourish each other. They are available to prisoners as well as to the free-men. 7. The petitioner has suffered mental torture and agony of a pending criminal case for all these years Speedy public trial is a fundamental right, implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. They sustain strength and nourish each other. They are available to prisoners as well as to the free-men. The right is based on the principle of criminal justice, that "justice delayed is justice denied." When the right is claimed, regard is to be had to the nature and gravity of offence, cause and nature of circumstances that ensued delay along with the conduct of accused, injury to others rights and an estimate of further time, likely to be taken in the conclusion of trial. 8. Shri V.G. Khot, Dy. Government Advocate appearing for the State has pressed into service the authority of Apex Court in V.K Agarwal v. Vasantraj Dhagwanji Bhatia and others ( AIR 1988 SC 1106 ) and submitted that for dropping the criminal proceedings even the pendency of criminal trial for over 20 years was not considered a good ground. Their Lordships observed that: "The fact that 20 years have elapsed since the date of the seizure of gold under Customs Act, 1962 and Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (November 5, 1968) would be no ground for not proceeding further with the matter inasmuch as the offence in question was a serious economic offence, which undermines the entire economy of the Nation. The delay occasioned in the working of the judicial system by the ever increasing worklod cannot provide an alibi for upholding such a place." But it was an offence under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and Customs Act, 1962 and the charges also being of importing gold in the Indian Custom Waters contrary to a prohibition and as observed in the above passage itself, it was 'serious economic offence, which undermines the entire economy of the Nation,' and it was in this context that the delay was not found to be a ground for dropping those proceedings. National interest is supreme and cannot be sacrificed for any cost, as we all live for the Nation, and for that is the very existence of law, as the law is the means and not the goal, and therefore it is imperative to examine the gravity and nature of the offence while applying the principle of "speedy justice." 9. However, in the instant case, where the charges on the petitioners, are not for the offences of capital punishment or of imprisonment for life but are for the offence out of which only 506(II) IPC is non-bailable. The pendency of the criminal proceedings for over nine years, yet at the stage of charge, cannot be said to be 'just, fair and reasonable.' The procedure depriving a person of his liberty as contemplated by Article 21 has to be tested with reference to Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the early case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras ( AIR 1950 SC 27 ) while considering the sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution provided somewhat narrow literal interpretation. In that case, the Court held that the preventive law would not be violative of Article 21, if it satisfied the requirement of Article 21. If the deprivation of personal liberty was permissible by, 'Procedure established by law' it was immaterial whether that law was reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust, fair or unfair and the right of a person of his personal liberty, guaranteed by Article 21 was not violated. This interpretation continued to hold ground and the dimensions of Article 21 appeard to be constricted till Menka Gandhi's case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) when it was reviewed and radically changed, giving Article 21 a wider interpretation. And it was found: "The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Art. 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law in so far as it shridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that Article." and it was further found that it was also liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14. It was also observed in that case that "The principle of reasonableness which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential clement of equality or non- arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. "The procedure, therefore, must ensure a speedy trial and determination of the guilt of an accused. It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. Speedy trial is the essence of criminal justice. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ), it was pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that, "No procedure which does not ensure reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Art.21." 10. The legal system must develop and come true to the expectations of the forefathers of Constitution, in its spirit so as to provide substantial justice to its subjects. Disapproving the technical approach, the Supreme Court expressed in Rajkapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration) and others. ( AIR 1980 SC 258 ): "A besetting sin of our legal system is the tyranny of technicality in the name of finical legality, hospitably entertained sometimes in the halls of justice. Absent orientation, just icing becomes 'compute-ring' and ceases to be social engineering." Existence of Court is for imparting justice between the rival parties. Although justice has to be administered according to law, ends of justice are higher than the ends of the mere law. Finality and infallibility are beyond Courts which must interpret and administer the law with pragmatic realism rather than romantic idealism or recluse extremism. Although justice has to be administered according to law, ends of justice are higher than the ends of the mere law. Finality and infallibility are beyond Courts which must interpret and administer the law with pragmatic realism rather than romantic idealism or recluse extremism. It is, therefore, not possible, rather not desirable to provide any rigid or inflexible rule or to lay down the specific periods for the conclusion of trials for different offences to that it may he urged that the pendency of a prosecution beyond that specified period would involve the breach of fundamental right of speedy trial. Cases are to be judged on the consideration of various factors involved in those cases to determine, whether the delay amounts to infraction of an accused's fundamental right of speedy trial, under Article 21 of the Constitution, furnishing him the foundation for an order of dropping the proceedings. The Courts must bear in mind that benevolence and over jealousness of doing justice with one, do not result in injustice to another. 11. After referring to situations where an accused may be seriously jeopardised in the conduct of his defence with the passage of time, it was observed in State of Maharashtra v. Champalal ( AIR 1981 SC 1675 ), that in " such situations, in appropriate cases, we may readily infer an infringement of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, denial of a speedy trial may with or without proof of something more lead to an inevitable inference of prejudice and denial of justice. It is prejudice to a man to be detained without trial. A fair trial implies a speedy trial. The Supreme Court again reiterated the view in Sheela Barso v. Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 1773 ) and observed, " If an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless, of course, the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by a superior Court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right." 12. If the prosecution intends to call upon the accused to meet the charges on merits rather than to rest on the infirmities of the prosecution case that is possible only when the case is fresh and the memory of witnesses have not fainted. Stale claims have never been favoured by law. In many a cases the accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible; but it is the duty of the Court to avoid adjournments and of the prosecution to provide opportunity and atmosphere for speedy trial. 13. Shri V.G. Khot, learned counsel for the State, turning the tune of his arguments, submitted that the right of an accused for speedy trial was confined to the serious offences as the minor offences do not directly imperil 'life or liberty' as envisaged under Article 21. I do not find substance in the stand taken by the State counsel. The right to speedy trial is more meaningful and significant in minor offences. Whilst the capital crimes, because of the gravity and heinousness of the acts alleged, there may be some justification to carry the trial to its logical conclusion, in minor crimes, the prolongation of the proceedings leads to patent injustice, hardship and harassment to accused. The right of speedy trial cannot be con fined or constricted to a particular category of crimes. It is available to an accused in all offences, major or minor, and in all criminal proceedings. In this context, reference may be made to Hussainara Khatoon (supra), State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar ( AIR 1981 SC 641 ) and S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Ltd. ( AIR 1986 SC 289 ). 14. Now coming back to the instant case, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code. The spirt of the Code also mandates the speedy trial. Section 309(i) directs that the trial will proceed as expeditiously as possible except on reasons the case is not to be adjourned. Section 309(i)may be reproduced with profit. "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. The spirt of the Code also mandates the speedy trial. Section 309(i) directs that the trial will proceed as expeditiously as possible except on reasons the case is not to be adjourned. Section 309(i)may be reproduced with profit. "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. -- (1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded." Similar is the direction under sub-section (2) of section 309 Cr. P.C. In a way, the Code recognises that delay is denial of justice and under Chapter XXXVI prescribes the period limiting the taking of cognizance of offences by the Court. In the cases, which are tri-able by a Magistrate, there is implicit direction of completing the trial within 60 days as the provision mandates the release of accused on bail thereafter: 15. In the given case, the challan was filed on 20.8.82. The petitioner appeared in Court on 1.1.83. Separating the trial of the petitioner and co-accused Dinesh Singh from that of remaining accused persons, as they absconded after appearing in the Court; the charges were framed only against the petitioner and co- accused Dinesh Singh on 25.5.85. There after, the case was fixed for prosecution evidence, but the record of the trial Court shows that not a single witness, ever attended the Court and despite a large number of opportunities, the prosecution failed to produce any witness. It is painful to note that the learned Magistrate also had no control on the case. A few dates were adjourned by the Court for summoning the remaining accused, although the present proceedings were separated for trial from those accused and later the Court on detecting the mistake, listed the case for prosecution evidence again but with no response from the prosecution. The form of charge having remained unsigned by the Magistrate, speaks volumes of his callous carelessness and want of his control on the proceedings. The defect having been detected on 11.5.1990, what is more painful is the non-framing of charge since then. The accused is not shown to be at all responsible for the delay and defaults. The form of charge having remained unsigned by the Magistrate, speaks volumes of his callous carelessness and want of his control on the proceedings. The defect having been detected on 11.5.1990, what is more painful is the non-framing of charge since then. The accused is not shown to be at all responsible for the delay and defaults. The instant case highlights the non-serious approach and the conduct of the prosecution in conducting the criminal cases and the callous careless working of the Magistrate. Resulfantly the ultimate sufferer is the poor litigant, the accused, who is kept on the leash and directed to appear before the Court for years. 16. In S. Guin (supra) their Lordships considering the prejudice to accused on the question of re-trial after seven years as ordered by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal, observed, "We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants and other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High Court should have directed the dropping of proceedings in exercise of it inherent powers under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code even if for some reason it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong, fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process." 17. The pending criminal proceedings are an impediment in the movement of the petitioners, as he intends to go to abroad, i.e., United Kingdom and has filed certain documents with this petition as Annexures, from the codependence with General Medical Council, London, to show that he has deposited the form for admission and is now to be interviewed. The petitioner's right to go abroad because of the long-drawn proceedings, against him is in jeopardy. Their Lordships found in Manaka Gandhi's case case (supra) that "It will be seen at once from the language of Article 21 that the protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means 'enacted law' or 'State law', vide A.K. Gopalan's case. Their Lordships found in Manaka Gandhi's case case (supra) that "It will be seen at once from the language of Article 21 that the protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means 'enacted law' or 'State law', vide A.K. Gopalan's case. Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and that deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure. It was for this reason, in order to comply with the requirement of Article 21, that Parliament enacted the Passports Act, 1967 for regulating the right to go abroad. It is clear from the provisions of the Passports Act, 1967 that it lays down the circumstances under which a passport may be issued or refused or cancelled or impounded and also prescribes a procedure for doing so, but the question is whether that is sufficient compliance with Art, 21. Is the prescription of some sort of procedure enough or must the procedure comply with any particular requirements? Obviously, the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable." It is averred on petitioner's behalf reiterated repeatedly that the proceedings are being kept pending with mala fide intentions in order to jeopardise his career and future prospects. The heart rendering delay in disposal of the case against petitioner requires redressal and interference of this Court under the inherent powers vested under section 482 of the Code. By continuance of proceedings even for many more years the conclusion of trial would not be in sight, the way this case has proceeded so far in the trial Court. 18. Thus, having given my anxious consideration to the totality of the fact" and circumstances of the case and provisions of the Code and the Constitution, I am of the view that the continuance of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would be the violation of his fundamental right", interrelated by Arts. 14,19 and 21 and would also be abuse of the process of law and as such are liable to be quashed. 19. The case of co-accused Dinesh Singh is also similar except little variation of fact" and although he has not filed any petition, yet the interference under section 482 Cr. 14,19 and 21 and would also be abuse of the process of law and as such are liable to be quashed. 19. The case of co-accused Dinesh Singh is also similar except little variation of fact" and although he has not filed any petition, yet the interference under section 482 Cr. P.C. is called for extending him the relief in view of Pirenwa v. State of M.P. (1978 JLJ SN 74). 20. In the result, the petition is allowed. The criminal proceedings, i.e. Criminal Case No.7/91 (Old No.1348/84(4702/87), presently. after transfer, pending in the Court of Shri A.K. Tiwari, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior, against the petitioner and co-accused Dinesh Singh, are hereby quashed.