HANSARIA, C. J. ( 1 ) THE two petitioners challenged an order dated 16-2-1991 passed by opposite party No. 1 which stated that their services shall not be required with effect from 20-3-1991. They approached this Court in C. J. C. No. 1305 of 1991 and on 18-3-1991 an order of status quo regarding cessation of the services of the petitioners was passed by a Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Justice Rath and Hon'ble Justice Jagadeb Roy. The case of the petitioners is that a xerox copy of the order along with a letter of the advocate of the petitioners Shri Milan Kanungo was served on opposite party No. 1 on 19-3-1991. On 20-3-1991 petitioner No. 1 went to work in the morning and signed the Attendance Register. Petitioner No. 2 also similarly went to office at about 10 a. m. and signed the Attendance Register. At about 10-30 a. m. or 11 a. m. , opposite party No. 2 questioned the petitioners as to why they had put their signatures in the Attendance Register in spite of their retrenchment. They replied that the order of retrenchment had been stayed by this Court and so they were entitled to work. This opposite party stated that he had no knowledge about the order of the Court and directed the petitioners to meet opposite party No. 1. The petitioners thereupon met opposite party No. 1 and stated that they had obtained the order of stay from this Court and so there was no reason to prevent them to work. At this, opposite party No. 1 stated (as mentioned in the contempt petition) that -"tuma Chakiri Lingaraj Rath Ki K. C. Jagadev Ray Rakhibe Mahele Milan Kanungo Rakhibe, Chakiri Jaincourtre, Ethi Tukaku Chakiri Miliba Nahin. "translated into English, it reads thus -"lingaraj Rath or K. C. Jagadeb Ray will keep you in service; or else Milan Kanungo will keep. Your service is in Court. You will not get your service here. "the further averment of the petitioners is that opposite party No. 1 thereafter personally came and scratched out the petitioners' signatures in the Attendance Register and asked opposite party No. 2 to mark the petitioners as absent. ( 2 ) THE allegations of the petitioners have been denied by the opposite parties. You will not get your service here. "the further averment of the petitioners is that opposite party No. 1 thereafter personally came and scratched out the petitioners' signatures in the Attendance Register and asked opposite party No. 2 to mark the petitioners as absent. ( 2 ) THE allegations of the petitioners have been denied by the opposite parties. Opposite party No. 1, Deputy Director, Survey and Map Publication, in his show cause denied any knowledge about the petitioners having signed in any attendance Register. Indeed, according to him, the maintenance of the Attendance Register was unauthentic about which he knew for the first time from the contempt petition. He denied having made any remarks as alleged by the petitioners. According to him, no one came and ventilated his grievance to him on 20-3-1991. He further averred that it was apprehended by him that opposite party No. 2 who is a Foreman was hands in glove with the petitioners and was trying to create an impression as if the order of status quo passed by this Court was not acceptable to him. In the evidence which was led by this opposite party in the case pursuant to the order passed on 24-6-1991, he took a stand that he was not present in his office on 20-3-1991 from 10 a. m. till about 3 p. m. , and as such the question of the petitioners meeting him in the office around 11 O'clock did not arise. The further averment of this opposite party in his show cause is that the attendance of the two petitioners was approved by him on 11-4-1991 and the dues of the petitioners had been drawn from 1-3-1991 to 31-3-1991. ( 3 ) OPPOSITE party No. 2, Foreman, Survey and Map Publication Office, in his show cause filed on 16-5-1991 stated that he was not aware on 20-3-1991 about any order of status quo passed by this Court and so, after finding that the petitioners had signed the attendance Register on that day he wrote against their signatures "not allowed from today as per the office order No. 388 (4) dt. 16/2/91". He further stated that he was not aware as to who had scratched or cancelled the signatures of the petitioners in the Attendance Register. 16/2/91". He further stated that he was not aware as to who had scratched or cancelled the signatures of the petitioners in the Attendance Register. In the additional show cause filed by this opposite party on 24-6-1991, he took the stand that on 20th he was called by opposite party No. 1 who asked him under what circumstances the petitioners had been allowed to sign the Register. To this, the reply given was that they had signed the same before this deponent had commenced his duty for the day. Thereupon, opposite party No. 1 asked him not to allow these employees to function, in obedience to which this deponent marked "not allowed" in the Register. The further stand, of this opposite party is that he knew about the order of status quo on 9-4-1991 when opposite party No. 1 instructed him to mark the petitioners 'present' from 20-3-1991 to 31-3-1991. ( 4 ) THE above is the case of the parties in short. The question for examination is whether on the basis of the materials on record which include the affidavits of the parties and evidence of the two petitioners as well as of opposite party No. 1, a case for contempt, has been made out or not. ( 5 ) WE shall first take up the case of opposite party No. 1. Here we shall first examine the question as to whether this opposite party was available in the office at the relevant time as is the case of the petitioners. As to this, the stand of this opposite party, as unfolded in his evidence given on 3-7-1991, is that at about 10 a. m. of 20-3-1991 he had gone to the Board of Revenue, Cuttack, to discuss some official matters with the Director and his discussion had continued till 1-30 p. m. whereafter he left for his residence for lunch and came to the office at about 3 p. m. on that day. This plea of alibi does not, however, find place in the show cause of this opposite party filed on 16-5- 1991. As to this, it is contended by Shri Patra that this opposite party having been given only two days to file show cause, this aspect missed him. We are not at all satisfied with this explanation for many reasons. This plea of alibi does not, however, find place in the show cause of this opposite party filed on 16-5- 1991. As to this, it is contended by Shri Patra that this opposite party having been given only two days to file show cause, this aspect missed him. We are not at all satisfied with this explanation for many reasons. First, the order to issue show cause notice was passed on 29-3-1991 though it was served on the opposite parties on 9-5-1991 pursuant to which they appeared in the Court on 14-5-1991. Thereafter, two days' time was allowed to file show cause. So, it is not a fact that the opposite parties got only two days' time to have their say- in fact they got a week's time. Secondly, extension of time to file show cause was not prayed for which shows they faced no difficulty in having their say in the matter. Thirdly, the show cause filed by opposite party No. 1 runs into six pages along with which five documents were annexed. This evidences that the opposite party was not handicapped in any way in filing the show cause because of paucity of time. So, if this opposite party would have really been not in the office at the crucial time, his very first defence would have been the plea of alibi. This could not have missed any reasonable person. Non-mention of this plea in the show cause, therefore, clearly indicates taking of this plea as an after-thought. We have, however, not deemed it sufficient to reject the plea merely because mention was not made in the show cause. We propose to examine this plea on the basis of the materials on record. On this aspect, the oral evidence is that of this opposite party as against which we find the evidence of the two petitioners and the affidavit statements of opposite party No. 2 who is directly subordinate to opposite party No. 1. Opposite party No. 2 in his first show cause itself had stated in para 4 that he had met opposite party No. 1 in his office on 20-3-1991 in the first hour. It may be stated that the first show cause by opposite party No. 2 had also been filed on 16-5-1991 along with that of opposite party No. 1. Opposite party No. 2 in his first show cause itself had stated in para 4 that he had met opposite party No. 1 in his office on 20-3-1991 in the first hour. It may be stated that the first show cause by opposite party No. 2 had also been filed on 16-5-1991 along with that of opposite party No. 1. We find no reason to accept the statement of opposite party No. , 1 that opposite party No. 2 is hands in glove with the petitioners and is trying to create an impression as if the order of status quo was not acceptable to opposite party No. 1. The petitioners being mere daily rated workers, we do not find any cogent reason to believe as to why the Foreman would have joined hands with them to find fault with his immediate boss. ( 6 ) TO bring home the plea of alibi, the Deputy Director has sought to rely on an entry in the log book maintained for the official vehicle in which the journey was allegedly taken to the office of the Board of Revenue. That entry has been marked as Ext. A. A perusal of this entry shows that the time of departure has been mentioned as 10 a. m. and the time of arrival as 1-30 p. m. It does speak about the visit of the Deputy Director to the office of the Board of Revenue on 20-3-1991. For the purpose of this case, we are not examining the question whether this opposite party had at all gone to the office of the Board of Revenue on 20-3-1991 - we would assume it to be so, though in this connection our attention has been invited to the fact that Ext. A entry has been initialled by two persons, of whom one is Assistant Director (who is said to have accompanied opposite party No. 1) and as to the other initial, opposite party No. 1 could not say whose it was. As to the absence of the initial of opposite party No. 1 against this entry, he took a stand that he had never signed the log book when he had used the vehicle. As to the absence of the initial of opposite party No. 1 against this entry, he took a stand that he had never signed the log book when he had used the vehicle. It may be so, as our attention has not been invited to any entry in the log book which has been initialled by this opposite party though he had travelled alone also in the vehicle on many occasions as would appear from other entries. 6a. Important question is whether reliance can be placed on the timings noted in Ext. A. Before we express our view on this aspect, may we say that the office of the Board of Revenue and the office of opposite party No. 1 both being in Cuttack, the time taken in journey would not have been significant. As to the authenticity of the timings mentioned in Ext. A, Shri Patra contends that the log book having been maintained in the regular course of business, we should accept the recordings made in it. A perusal of the log book, however, shows that timings have not been mentioned in all the entries - it is rather sporadic. That, however, cannot be a ground to reject the timings as given in Ext. A. A careful examination of the entries, however, shows that the timings were not entered in Ext. A along with the entry of other particulars. We have said so because the ink of the entries relating to timings is a shed deeper than that of other entries. This apart, the timing of arrival (1-30 p. m.) has been squeezed between two lines whereas in all other places of the log bock wherein mention has been made about the time of arrival, the same is quite free from any element of squeezing the distance in the space between the recording of timings in other entries of the log book in this column is almost uniform. Reference may be made in this connection to some of the entries of the month of March itself, the same being of 5-3-1991, 6-3-1991, 12-3-1991, 15-3-1991, 21-3-1991 and 22-3-1991. Similar is the position in other entries of other months. We, therefore, held that the time of arrival (1-30 p. m.) was subsequently mentioned in Ext. A. As time of departure (10-00 a. m.) is in the same pen and ink, we take same view about it. Similar is the position in other entries of other months. We, therefore, held that the time of arrival (1-30 p. m.) was subsequently mentioned in Ext. A. As time of departure (10-00 a. m.) is in the same pen and ink, we take same view about it. These insertions had apparently been done to boost up the plea of alibi taken by this opposite party. There can be nothing to doubt that the same must have been done at the instance of this opposite party. We decry and bemoan this action. ( 7 ) BEING of the view that the Deputy Director was not out of office at the relevant time, the further question for examination is whether the two petitioners had met him on 20-3-1991 after they had not been allowed to work by the Foreman. On this, aspect of the case, we entertain no doubt inasmuch as it is but natural that having obtained the order of status quo from this Court on 18-3-1991, they must have met the Deputy Director to assert their right especially when the Foreman told them to meet the Deputy Director when they were questioned as to why they had signed the Attendance Register. The order of termination having been passed by the Deputy Director, the approach to the Deputy Director to allow them to work because of the order of status quo passed by this Court, on the face of defiant attitude taken by the foreman, sounds very plausible. We, therefore, accept that the two petitioners had met the Deputy Director in his office at the relevant time to allow them to work on the strength of this Court's order. ( 8 ) THE further question is as to what transpired thereafter. As to this, the petitioners' case is that on being told about this Court's order, the Deputy Director made the observation quoted above which shows in no uncertain terms the wilful disobedience of this Court's order so also lack of proper regard for the Hon'ble Judges who had passed the order of status quo. As to this, the petitioners' case is that on being told about this Court's order, the Deputy Director made the observation quoted above which shows in no uncertain terms the wilful disobedience of this Court's order so also lack of proper regard for the Hon'ble Judges who had passed the order of status quo. May we say here that as to the knowledge of the Deputy Director on 20-3-1991 about the order of status quo, there is nothing to doubt inasmuch as he admitted in his cross-examination that the letter of the advocate which was delivered on 19-3-1991 must have been placed before the Assistant Director (Admn.) and the Assistant Director had informed him at once about the letter. So, the Deputy Director knew about the order of status quo on 19-3-1991. In the show cause also it is clearly admitted that the letter of the advocate had been placed before him on 20-3-1991. ( 9 ) SHRI Patra contends that the remarks said to have been made by opposite party No. 1 when the two petitioners met him, as quoted in the petition for contempt (and which we have excerpted in para 1) may not be believed because in the evidence the two petitioners stated differently about the remarks made. According to petitioner No. 2, who was examined as P. W. 1, the Deputy Director had then stated as below:-"tamaku Judge Chakiri Debe Jao. Courtre Chakiri Debe Se Milan Kanoongo Tamaku Chakiri Debe. ""the Judge will give employment to you. You will be employed in the Court. That Milan Kanoongo will give you the employment. "petitioner No. 1 who was examined as P. W. 2 stated that the remarks made by the Deputy Director were these:-"tume Stay Order Jeun Courtrco Anichha Seithi Chakiri Kariba Jao. Athi Tamara Au Chakiri Nain. Se Milan Kanungo and Judge Ka Pakhare Chakiri Kariba. ""you go and work in the Court from where you have obtained the stay order. There is no employment for you here. You go and work in the office of Shri Milan Kanungo and the Judge. "this shows that though there is some variation in the wordings of the remarks said to have been made by the Deputy Director at the relevant time, the substratum of the remarks remains undiluted. There is no employment for you here. You go and work in the office of Shri Milan Kanungo and the Judge. "this shows that though there is some variation in the wordings of the remarks said to have been made by the Deputy Director at the relevant time, the substratum of the remarks remains undiluted. We would, therefore, accept the case of the petitioners that the Deputy Director had told them that there was no place for them in his office and they had to work in the Court and employment to them would be given by the Judge or the advocate. A more defiant attitude is not required to be established to bring home the charge of contempt. Whether in the observation made by the Deputy Director he had specifically named the two Hon'ble Judges of this Court who had passed the order of status quo is not very material. What is important to note is the utter lack of regard shown to the order of this Court as well as to the Hon'ble Judges who had passed the order. We are, therefore, fully satisfied that the Deputy Director had committed contempt by wilfully disregarding the order of status quo passed by this Court. ( 10 ) WE are fortified in reaching this conclusion because of what has been stated by the Foreman in his additional show cause. As per this show cause, the Deputy Director sent for this deponent and asked him under what circumstances he had permitted the petitioners to sign the register when their orders of termination dated 16-2-1991 passed by him had come into effect from that day. On being told that they had attended office before the deponent had commenced his duty, the Deputy Director asked the deponent not to allow the petitioners to function. We are of the view that the Foreman must have been sent by the Deputy Director after the petitioners had met him and his instruction to the Foreman not to allow the petitioners to function despite knowing about the order of status quo passed by this Court speaks a volume about the scant regard the Deputy Director had shown to the order of this Court. The wilful violation of the order of status quo is thus writ large on the defiant attitude taken by the Deputy Director. The wilful violation of the order of status quo is thus writ large on the defiant attitude taken by the Deputy Director. For this purpose, it is not material whether the Deputy Director had himself scratched out the petitioners signatures in the Attendance Register. The materials on record do not permit us to come to a definite finding that it was the Deputy Director who had himself scratched the signatures, as the Foreman in his first show cause had stated that he was not aware as to who had done so. ( 11 ) SHTI Patra, however, urges us not to believe the allegations made by the petitioners against the Deputy Director because his office was not required to maintain at all any Attendance Register for workers like the petitioners. This stand of the Deputy Director has been refuted by the Foreman himself, according to whom, the Muster Roll which is required to be maintained for the workers like the petitioners even according to the Deputy Director, is prepared at the end of each month after referring to the Attendance Register. This is the statement made by the Foreman in his very first show cause. Filing of copies of the Attendance Register by the petitioners along with their affidavit dated 27-4-1991 does not leave room to doubt that such a register was being maintained. Whether the office rules require maintenance of such a register is besides the point. ( 12 ) ANOTHER submission made by Shri Patra is that Annexure-E to the show cause would show that by 28-3-1991 the Deputy Director had informed the Director of Land Records and Surveys (Board of Revenue) that the order of this Court had been carried out. We do not think if this communication which was in reply to the Board of Revenue's letter dated 22-3-1991 can be called in aid by the Deputy Director as after the higher authority had sought for a report about the compliance of this Court's order, the Deputy Director had no alternative but to say that the same had been carried out. The letter of the Director of Land Records and Surveys which is dated 22-3-1991 might have been addressed to the Deputy Director as this Court's order of status quo passed on 18-3-1991 had been communicated to the Director also by this Court on 18-3-1991 itself. The letter of the Director of Land Records and Surveys which is dated 22-3-1991 might have been addressed to the Deputy Director as this Court's order of status quo passed on 18-3-1991 had been communicated to the Director also by this Court on 18-3-1991 itself. The further act of the Deputy Director in allowing the petitioners to work during April and May, 1991 by passing orders to that effect on 6-4-1991 and 3-5-1991 cannot at all assist the Deputy Director in trying to absolve him from the charge of wilful disobedience of this Court's order because of what has transpired on 20-3-1991. We would also take the same view about some actions of this contemner by which he had approved the attendance of the petitioners on 11-4-1991. Long before that the matter about compliance of this Court's order had been taken up by the Director himself and the Deputy Director must have felt that there was no alternative but to carry out this Court's order. ( 13 ) IN view of all that is stated above, we find opposite party No. 1 guilty of contempt. This takes us to the case of opposite party No. 2. Though he has taken a stand that he knew about the order of status quo passed by this Court only on 9-4-1991, we are not at all inclined to accept this statement. According to us, this opposite party knew on 20-3-1991 itself about the order of status quo as it was on that day that the petitioners had admittedly put their signatures in the Attendance Register maintained by him to which objection was taken by this opposite party which must have brought the answer from the petitioners that they were doing so pursuant to the order passed by this Court. It is the admission of this opposite party in para 4 of his first show cause that he met the Deputy Director on 20-3-1991 in the first hour and the further statement in para 3 of the additional show cause that on being asked by the Deputy Director not to allow the petitioners to function, he had marked against the name of petitioner No. 1 not allowed' does not leaves room to doubt that he had come to know about this Court's order on 20-3-1991 itself; otherwise there would have no occasion for him to meet the Deputy Director and for the Deputy Director to call for this opposite party to meet him. As already held, the Deputy Director must have sent for the Foreman after the petitioners had met the Foreman on the latter not allowing them to work. Shri Mohanty appearing for this O. J. C. a copy of this Court's status quo order was not made available to him because of which he remained ignorant, about the same. We would accept the contention of Shri Mohanty that the order of status quo as passed by this court was not made available to this opposite party, but then, the facts and the events as they had happened on the morning of 20-3-1991 do not leave any doubt in our mind that he had come to be apprised of the order of status quo passed by this Court. Of course, this opposite party was in a way horn of dilemma inasmuch as on one side there was an order of this Court by force of which the petitioners could have worked on 20-3-1991 and, on the other hand, there was the order of his immediate superior not to allow the petitioners to work on that day. But then, in the mind of a law abiding citizen, there could not have been any conflict as to which order between the two required compliance. Opposite party No. 2, therefore, had also violated this Court's order by his action of not allowing the petitioners to work on 20-3-1991 after his having come to know about the order of status quo passed by this Court. We would, therefore, find him as well guilty of contempt. ( 14 ) THIS takes us to the question regarding the sentence to be awarded to the two contemners. We would, therefore, find him as well guilty of contempt. ( 14 ) THIS takes us to the question regarding the sentence to be awarded to the two contemners. Before we express our view on this aspect of the matter, we would like to state that this Court has noted with regret the growing tendency of wilful violation of this Court's orders. As early as March, 1990, this, Court had described this tendency in Original Criminalmisc. Case No. 16/90 as a cancerous growth in the system of administration of justice prevalent in the Country and had desired to put an immediate stop to the tendency. This is what was, observed in this connection in that case:-"it has been a sad experience of this Court that orders passed by it are not strictly obeyed and not complied with at all times. A spate of contempt petitions would bear this statement. If an order obtained even from this Court is not complied with, there is no doubt that people at large would lose faith in the entire system of administration of justice and the same would cause a great dent to the rule of law which this Court has to upheld at any cost. People approach the courts when they are in distress, and if after spending time, money and energy, the orders obtained are flouted or not complied with, a serious view of the same has to be taken. According to us, it is high time that the tendency, be of officials or non-officials, in not carrying out orders of the courts is put to a stop before it is too late to be cured. The tendency to violate courts' orders is almost like a cancer in the system of administration of justice and this has to be stopped before it spreads and eats away the whole system. "a lenient view about sentence was, however, then taken and the contemner was let off with imposition of fine only. Subsequently finding that imposition of fine was not having the desired result, in some other cases token punishment of imprisonment of one day was awarded. This too has made no difference. It is, therefore, felt that time has come to award really deterrent and exemplary sentence to keep in tact the majesty of law and the fabric of administration of justice. This too has made no difference. It is, therefore, felt that time has come to award really deterrent and exemplary sentence to keep in tact the majesty of law and the fabric of administration of justice. ( 15 ) IN so far as opposite party No. 1 is concerned, his guilt is unpardonable. He had not only openly and valiantly wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court but had thought it fit to belittle the Hon'ble Judges who had passed the order of status quo. In his effort to protect him, he even went to the length of creating evidence by causing interpolation in official document. The position this opposite party holds being very responsible, we would have expected him to show full regard to the order of the Court established by law. Maintenance of rule of law should have been very dear to his heart. But all our expectations from him are belied as he took the order of status quo passed by this Court as a challenge to his authority. Such a person has to be adequately punished. Keeping in view the background of this case and the ever increasing tendency of showing scant regard to the orders even of this Court and the need to pass in the larger public interest a deterrent sentence, as sentence this opposite party to civil imprisonment for one month. ( 16 ) IN so far as opposite party No. 2 is concerned, the magnitude of his guilt is far less. His fault is that he allowed himself to disobey this Court's order because of the order of his superior. We cannot, however, tolerate a situation where a person would wilfully disobey the order of this Court because of the order of his superior though the superior's order, to that person's knowledge, is not lawful. The uprightness in opposite party No. 2 would have required him to state clearly to opposite party No. 1 that he would not obey the illegal order of the latter. Opposite party No. 2, however, faltered. But then, how many upright officers we would get these days? Realising the position and status of opposite party No. 2 and the circumstances under which he disobeyed the order of this Court, we would take a lenient view in so far as awarding of sentence on him is concerned. Opposite party No. 2, however, faltered. But then, how many upright officers we would get these days? Realising the position and status of opposite party No. 2 and the circumstances under which he disobeyed the order of this Court, we would take a lenient view in so far as awarding of sentence on him is concerned. We think ends of justice would be met if this contemner is sentenced to civil imprisonment for one week. May we say that we are imposing this sentence on this opposite party whereas we have sentenced opposite party No. 1 to imprisonment for one month, because (i) he is not the prime offender; (ii) had not belittled the Judges of this Court and (iii) has not taken recourse to manipulation of official record to save his skin. These are some factors which mitigate the guilt of this opposite party. There is, however, an aggravating factor. The same is that it was he who raised objection in the first instance to the two petitioners joining work on 20-3-91. If he would have shown respect to the Court's order, the situation might not have taken the turn it took. Even so, we would be candid in stating that we would have awarded a lesser sentence than just mentioned on this opposite party, if he would have made a clean breast of everything by saying that though he knew about this Court's order on 20-3-1991, but as he was ultimately ordered by the Deputy Director not to allow the petitioners to work, he obeyed his order to avoid any harm to him in his service career. If after saying so, he would have tendered unqualified apology, we would not have sent him to jail for one week. But he too took recourse to falsehood by denying any knowledge of this Court's order on 20-3-1991. ( 17 ) IN the result, the petition is allowed by finding the opposite parties guilty of contempt and by awarding on them sentences as aforesaid. We also order the opposite parties to pay all the dues of the petitioners and allow them to work till the order of status quo lasts. ( 18 ) A. K. PADHI, J. I agree. Petition allowed.