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1991 DIGILAW 265 (BOM)

UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. FOREST DEPARTMENT

1991-06-21

G.D.KAMAT, M.L.PENDSE

body1991
JUDGMENT : M.L. Pendse, J. 1. These four appeals arise out of an award declared by the Presiding Officer of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, South Goa, Margao, in Claim Petition Nos. 127 of 1982 and 128 of 1982. Since these two claim petitions arose out of the same incident, it is convenient to dispose of all four appeals by a common judgment. First Appeal Nos. 30 of 1987 and 31 of 1987 are filed by the insurance company while the remaining two appeals are preferred by the driver, the owner and the alleged transferee of a pick-up van bearing registration No. GDZ 5642. The facts leading to the filing of the two claim petitions before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are as follows: K.M. Godinho was working as Range Forest Officer and on June 16, 1982 he went on patrolling duty along with his staff members Raghoba Naik and Anil Haldonkar. The patrolling party left, moving in a forest area, in a truck bearing registration No. GDL 9872 of the Forest Department and the truck was being driven by Harshad Parikh. The patrolling party had covered several check-posts and by 1.00 a.m. on June 17,, 1982, were at Tilamol check-post. At that time, one Laximan Naik who was the Security Guard at Tilamol check-post saw one pickup van bearing registration No. GDZ 5642 passing Tilamol check-post from Rivona to Margao without slowing down. The pick-up van was driven by Bhiku Gaonkar. The patrolling party felt suspicious as the pickup van speeded up at the check-post and the patrolling party decided to chase the pickup van in which timber logs and contraband articles were carried. Noticing that the patrolling party was chasing the pick-up van, the driver of the van started driving zigzag and prevented the truck of the patrolling party from coming towards the van. After certain distance when the patrolling party reached near the village Sirlim, the two occupants of the pick-up van threw a wooden log from the pick-up van on the road with a view to obstruct the patrolling party from overtaking the van. The driver of the Forest Department truck avoided the log and proceeded further. After some distance, a second log was thrown but the driver of the truck bypassed that log and continued the chase. The driver of the Forest Department truck avoided the log and proceeded further. After some distance, a second log was thrown but the driver of the truck bypassed that log and continued the chase. At a later stage, a third log was thrown and though the truck driver tried to avoid the log the rear tyre of the truck dashed against the log and the shaft on the rear side along with the tyre was separated from the truck with the result that the truck turned turtle and fell in the field nearby. The truck was severely damaged and Godinho suffered serious injuries. The other occupants of the truck also received some minor injuries. The pick-up van then disappeared from the scene. Godinho was removed in a semi-conscious condition and taken to Hospicio Hospital at Margao, and thereafter, transferred to the Goa Medical College at Panaji. Godinho was required to remain in the hospital for a considerable length of time. 2. The officer of the Forest Department lodged criminal complaint at the police station and the police raided the residence of driver Gaonkar who produced the pick-up van on the next day at the police station. The police called panchas and a panchanama was prepared in respect of the logs thrown from the pick-up van at various points during the chase. A panchanama was also prepared in respect of the truck lying in the field. The driver was then prosecuted. During the investigation, it was noticed that the pick-up van was registered with the R.T.O. in the name of one Bandodkar. It was also disclosed that the pick-up van was in possession of one Volvotkar and Volvotkar had engaged driver Gaonkar to drive the pick-up van. The forest authorities ascertained what would be the expenses for repairs of the damaged truck and the damages were assessed by one Luis who was working as automobile engineer with M/s. M.V. Naik who is an authorised agent of Tata-Mercedez trucks. The estimated costs of repairs were about Rs. 85,000/- and that being a very large amount the Forest Department decided not to effect the repairs but decided to dispose of the truck as scrap material. 3. Godinho who was severely injured as a result of the accident filed Claim Petition No. 127 of 1982 claiming compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for the injuries and the shock suffered. 85,000/- and that being a very large amount the Forest Department decided not to effect the repairs but decided to dispose of the truck as scrap material. 3. Godinho who was severely injured as a result of the accident filed Claim Petition No. 127 of 1982 claiming compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for the injuries and the shock suffered. On behalf of the Forest Department, Claim Petition No. 128 of 1982 was filed claiming damages of Rs. 85,323/- to truck bearing registration No. GDL 9872. Both the petitions were filed before the Presiding Officer, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, South Goa, Margao and in both the petitions the respondents were the driver Gaonkar, owner Bandodkar and the alleged transferee Volvotkar. The United India Insurance Co. Ltd. who had insured the truck was also joined as party respondent. The driver Gaonkar, the owner Bandodkar and the alleged transferee Volvotkar filed common written statement and resisted the claim alleging that the pick-up van GDZ 5642 was not involved in the accident as the said pick-up van was lying in the garage of one Naik for repairs at the relevant time. It was denied that the pick-up van was driven by driver Gaonkar at the relevant time and that the wooden logs were carried. The entire incident was denied by the driver, the owner and the alleged transferee. In the written statement it was claimed that the pick-up van was transferred by Bandodkar in favour of Volvotkar and therefore Bandodkar was not responsible. The insurance company filed a written statement in both the petitions claiming that as the pick-up van was transferred by the insured Bandodkar in favour of Volvotkar, the policy lapsed and the insurance company was not liable. The parties led evidence in respect of the claims made in the two petitions and after perusing the evidence the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the defence raised by the driver, the owner and the alleged transferee that the pick-up van was not involved in the incident is entirely false and frivolous. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the pick-up van was never transferred by Bandodkar in favour of Volvotkar and held that the contention of the insurance company that the liability of the insurance company had ceased in view of the transfer could not be accepted. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the pick-up van was never transferred by Bandodkar in favour of Volvotkar and held that the contention of the insurance company that the liability of the insurance company had ceased in view of the transfer could not be accepted. In the claim petition filed by Godinho the Tribunal found that the special and general damages to which Godinho is entitled is Rs. 50,000/- and all the respondents were directed to pay the said amount to Godinho. In the claim petition filed by the Forest Department, the Tribunal held that the damage suffered by the truck due to the wrongful action of the driver of pick-up van was to the tune of Rs. 85,323/- and the respondents were made liable to pay the said amount to the Forest Department. The liability of the insurance company was limited to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- in accordance with the terms of the policy. The awards declared by the Tribunal in these two petitions are challenged and the appeals filed by the insurance company and the driver, the owner and the alleged transferee are heard together. 4. First we will deal with appeal Nos. 50 of 1987 and 51 of 1987 filed by the driver Gaonkar, owner Bandodkar and the alleged transferee Volvotkar of pick-up van GDZ 5642. The first contention urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the driver, owner and the transferee is that the Tribunal was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the pick-up van was involved in the incident and that the pick-up van was driven by driver Gaonkar. It is not possible to accede to the submission of the learned counsel that the pick-up van during the relevant time was lying in the garage of one Naik and therefore could not be involved in the incident. Before adverting to the evidence led by the driver and the owner on this issue it is advantageous to refer to the evidence led on behalf of the claimants as regards the involvement of the pick-up van. As mentioned earlier, the pick-up van was initially noticed at Tilamol check-post by guard Laximan Naik who was examined at Exh. 24 in Claim Petition No. 128 of 1982. As mentioned earlier, the pick-up van was initially noticed at Tilamol check-post by guard Laximan Naik who was examined at Exh. 24 in Claim Petition No. 128 of 1982. The evidence of this witness leaves no manner of doubt that at 9.00 a.m. on June 16, 1982 he was posted at Tilamol check-post and while on duty the witness noticed that the pick-up van passed the check-post without halting, The manner in which the pick-up van was driven made the guard suspicious. The guard deposed in the witness-box that he noticed that the pick-up van was driven by Bhiku Gaonkar. The cross-examination of this witness does not reveal that the statement made by the witness is not truthful. The claimant also examined in the Claim Petition No. 128 of 1982 the Forest Range Officer Godinho at Exh. 20 and Laximan Naik (Exh. 24) who was a member of the staff proceeding in the cabin of the Forest Department truck. The claimant also examined Harshad Parikh (Exh. 25) who was the driver of the Forest Department truck. All these three witnesses deposed that after the pick-up van left Tilamol check-post towards Margao, the patrolling party decided to chase them and while chasing they noticed the registration number of the van as well as the fact that it was driven by Bhiku Gaonkar. The three witnesses deposed that there were about four labourers or occupants of the pickup van and after realising that the van was chased by the patrolling party two of the occupants left the cabin and came on the rear side of the van and threw away the logs on the road to create obstruction in the chase by the patrolling party. The chase went on for a considerable length of time and the three witnesses had ample time not only to see the registration number of the van but also to identify the driver. The Tribunal accepted the testimony of these three witnesses and we do not find any infirmity in the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal that the evidence of the patrolling party and the Security Guard at Tilamol check-post is reliable. In addition to the testimony of these witnesses the claimants examined Raul Pereira who is resident in a house situated on Margao-Chinchinim Road. The truck of the Forest Department fell in a field near about 5 metres from his house. Pereira (Exh. In addition to the testimony of these witnesses the claimants examined Raul Pereira who is resident in a house situated on Margao-Chinchinim Road. The truck of the Forest Department fell in a field near about 5 metres from his house. Pereira (Exh. 30) deposed that at the relevant time, he was awake due to illness of his son, and heard a big noise and coming out of the house found that a truck was lying in the field while a pick-up van was parked somewhere nearby. Raul Pereira noticed the registration number of the pick-up van. The claimants also examined one Fernandes (Exh. 31) who was nearby at the relevant time. This witness also supported the claim that the pick-up van GDZ 5642 was parked on the road at the relevant time. There is nothing in the testimony of these two witnesses who are independent and who have no grudge against the respondents, to discard their testimony. In our view, the Tribunal was right in accepting the evidence and concluding that the pick-up van GDZ 5642 was involved in the incident and was driven by Gaonkar. In addition to these witnesses, there are various circumstances to indicate that the claim made by the claimants about the involvement of the pickup van in the incident is true. The immediate conduct of the patrolling party in lodging the complaint at the police station and disclosing the fact that the pick-up van was involved in the incident and was driven by Gaonkar establishes the claim. The witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants have deposed truthfully. The claimants were unlikely to falsely implicate the driver of the pick-up van and their immediate conduct in lodging of complaint at the police station speaks volumes. In our judgment, the finding of the Tribunal about the involvement of the pick-up van and of the driver cannot be faulted with. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants urged that the contention of these appellants about the pick-up van lying in the garage of one Naik, who was running the garage at Guddi Paroda in the name and style of 'S.V. Industries', should have been accepted. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants urged that the contention of these appellants about the pick-up van lying in the garage of one Naik, who was running the garage at Guddi Paroda in the name and style of 'S.V. Industries', should have been accepted. It was urged that Naik deposed that the pick-up van was brought to his garage for repairs on several occasions and Naik had no occasion to give false testimony in support of the claim that the van was lying in his garage for repairs at the relevant time. It is not possible to accede to his submission. In examination-in-chief, Naik did not depose as to when the van was brought to his garage for repairs. In the cross-examination, Naik stated that the van was brought to his garage on June 3, 1982 but had to concede that there is not an iota of evidence to support this claim. The witness did not disclose as to when the van was repaired and left the garage. The witness produced a carbon copy of the bill supplied to Volvotkar in respect of the charges for the repairs. A perusal of the copy of the bill dated June 30, 1982, makes it clear that the production of the carbon copy of the bill is totally dishonest. We have perused the original bill books and we find that the bills issued prior to the alleged issuance of the bill to Volvotkar are of subsequent date. It is obvious from the perusal of the carbon copy that antedated bill was issued by Naik to support the claim of the appellants. The reliance on such fabricated bill clearly indicates that the testimony of Naik that the pick-up van was lying in the garage for repairs at the relevant time cannot be accepted. The driver Gaonkar deposed that the pick-up van was lying in the garage from the first week of June, 1982 and as his services were not required he left the job and did not drive the vehicle after the first week of June. It is impossible to place any reliance upon the testimony of the driver whose presence was noticed by several witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants. The witness had to concede in the cross-examination that he produced the pick-up van at the police station on June 18, 1982. It is impossible to place any reliance upon the testimony of the driver whose presence was noticed by several witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants. The witness had to concede in the cross-examination that he produced the pick-up van at the police station on June 18, 1982. The explanation offered that on police inquiries he went to the garage and brought the van to the police station is impossible of acceptance. The alleged carbon copy of the bill produced by Naik, the owner of the garage, is of June 30, 1982 and it is impossible to imagine how the garage owner permitted the van to be taken away by the driver on June 18 without payment of the repair charges. It is, therefore, obvious that the claim that the van was in the garage for repairs and was not involved in the incident is a false claim made to avoid responsibility. In our view, the Accidents Claims Tribunal was fully justified in discarding the evidence. 6. It was then contended by the learned counsel that the claim for compensation made in the two petitions was not maintainable as the accident did not occur out of the use of the vehicle. To appreciate the submission of the learned counsel it is necessary to make reference to the provisions of Section 110 (1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The sub-section empowers the State Government to constitute Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles cr damages to any property of a third party, or both. Relying upon the expression "in respect of accidents arising out of the use of vehicles" it was contended by the learned counsel that the accident did not involve the use of the vehicle, i.e. pickup van GDZ 5642. The submission was that the truck of the Forest Department went in the field not as a direct conduct of the pickup van but because of dash against the wooden log which was lying on the public road. The submission was that the truck of the Forest Department went in the field not as a direct conduct of the pickup van but because of dash against the wooden log which was lying on the public road. The learned counsel submitted that unless and until the accident was as a result of a collision with the pick-up van the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal could not entertain the claim and remedy, if any, was in the civil court under the Law of Forests. It is impossible to entertain the submission urged by the learned counsel. The facts established before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal clearly indicate that the truck of the Forest Department met with an accident due to the action of the driver and his colleagues of the pick-up van. The evidence un-mistakenly establishes that the occupants of the pick-up van with a view to obstruct the chase by the patrolling party made efforts after efforts to prevent the truck from overtaking the van. On three occasions the occupants of the van threw the logs on the public road with a view to obstruct the chase. The driver of the truck avoided the logs on one or two occasions, but ultimately, the third log was thrown from such a short distance from the truck that the truck driver could not avoid the log, with the result that the rear tyre and the shaft were separated from the truck. The accident to the truck was a direct result of the action of the occupants of the van, and therefore, it is futile to suggest that the accident did not arise out of the use of the vehicle or the van. The learned counsel submitted that as the logs were intentionally thrown by the occupants to prevent the chase by the patrolling party the accident cannot be said to have arisen out of the use of the van. The submission is entirely misconceived. We inquired from the counsel as to whether in case the log fell down from the van due to the negligence of the van driver and then an accident occurs to another vehicle, can the van driver be held responsible and the answer was in the affirmative. The submission is entirely misconceived. We inquired from the counsel as to whether in case the log fell down from the van due to the negligence of the van driver and then an accident occurs to another vehicle, can the van driver be held responsible and the answer was in the affirmative. The learned counsel urged that in case due to negligence of the driver of the vehicle the accident occurs, then the liability to pay compensation cannot be avoided, but if the accident occurs due to deliberate intention and voluntary action of the driver of the other vehicle, then the liability cannot be fastened on him. We are unable to appreciate the submission. Take for example a case where fuel is being carried in a truck. The fuel is not properly stored and due to the negligence the fuel is thrown on the road resulting into accident to the other vehicles. The liability of the vehicle carrying the fuel is obvious. Can it ever be accepted that if driver of such a vehicle throws the fuel intentionally on the road resulting into fire to the other vehicles, then the driver of the vehicle is not responsible? In our judgment, where the accident to other vehicles is as a result of some wrongful act on the part of the driver, then the liability is clearly established and the accident does arise out of the use of the vehicle. In the present case, the accident to the truck of the Forest Department was due to wrongful action of the occupants of the pick-up van, and therefore, the compensation demanded by the occupants of the truck both for personal injuries and damage to the truck clearly arises out of the use of the vehicle of the pick-up van. In our judgment, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was perfectly justified in entertaining the claim u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. A faint attempt was made to urge that the claimant did not establish that it was the driver Gaonkar who had thrown the logs on the road to obstruct the patrolling party. The submission was that when the driver himself had not thrown the logs on the road, the accident cannot be said to have arisen out of the use of the van. The submission is only to be stated to be rejected. The submission was that when the driver himself had not thrown the logs on the road, the accident cannot be said to have arisen out of the use of the van. The submission is only to be stated to be rejected. The logs could not have been thrown by the driver who was trying to run away from the patrolling party. The van was occupied by three or four labourers and the driver must have instructed the labourers to throw the logs on the road to create obstruction in the way of the chasing party. We are unable to appreciate how the liability arising out of the wrongful acts of the occupants of the van can be avoided on such unsustainable grounds. 7. It was then contended by the learned counsel that the quantum of damages awarded by the Tribunal in respect of the damage suffered to the truck was excessive and unsustainable. It was urged that initially the claim made for damage to the truck was Rs. 40,000/- and three years after the institution of the claim an amendment was sought and granted to raise the claim from Rs. 40,000/- to Rs. 85,323/-. The learned counsel urged that the Tribunal committed an error in granting the amendment, as it was obvious, that claim was exaggerated after a period of three years. The submission is not correct. In the first instance, once the claim is filed within the period of limitation for damage to the truck then the amendment could have been granted to enhance the quantum of the claim at any stage before the disposal of the claim petition. In the present case there were reasons to grant the amendment for raising the claim from Rs. 40,000/-to Rs. 85,323/-. The claimants examined one G.M. Chowdhury who was working as Deputy Conservator of Forests at the relevant time. The witness deposed that after the truck turned turtle in the field the Forest Department was desirous of assessing the damages and expenses required to repair the truck. The Forest Department approached M/s. N.D. Naik, a company which was authorised agent of Tata-Mercedez trucks. The authorised agent could not undertake the task due to the strike of the workers in their garage. Thereafter some mechanic was contacted and the mechanic submitted the report with the expenses of the repairs at Rs. 40,000/-. The Forest Department approached M/s. N.D. Naik, a company which was authorised agent of Tata-Mercedez trucks. The authorised agent could not undertake the task due to the strike of the workers in their garage. Thereafter some mechanic was contacted and the mechanic submitted the report with the expenses of the repairs at Rs. 40,000/-. In accordance with that estimate the claim was lodged within the period of limitation. After the strike was withdrawn the Department again approached M/s. N.D. Naik to assess the damage and submit a detailed report. The authorised agent then advised one Luis who was working as automobile engineer and who submitted a detailed report after examination of the damaged truck. The report was submitted on April 4, 1984 by Luis, a copy of which is produced at Exh. 34. Luis reported that the expenses would be within the range of Rs. 1,00,000/- and on the strength of that report, amendment was sought to raise the claim from Rs. 40,000/- to Rs. 85,323/-. There is hardly anything in the cross-examination of Chowdhury or the automobile engineer Luis to indicate that the claim made by them is not genuine. In these circumstances, we are unable to find any infirmity in the action of the Tribunal in granting the amendment and permitting the claimants to increase the quantum of the claim even after the period of three years. We fail to appreciate as to how the grant of amendment has caused any prejudice to the appellants. In our judgment, from the perusal of the testimony of the automobile engineer Luis and the estimate report submitted by him at Exh. 34 there is hardly any difficulty in concluding that the damage suffered by the truck was to the extent of Rs. 85,323/-. In our judgment, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in granting that amount. 8. The learned counsel then submitted that the compensation amount of Rs. 50,000/-awarded to Range Forest Officer, Godinho, for the personal injury suffered by him is excessive. The learned counsel urged that the injuries suffered by Godinho in the accident were not to such extent demanding general and special damages to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-. It is impossible to find any merit in this contention. Godinho was examined in Claim Petition No. 127 of 1982 at Exh. The learned counsel urged that the injuries suffered by Godinho in the accident were not to such extent demanding general and special damages to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-. It is impossible to find any merit in this contention. Godinho was examined in Claim Petition No. 127 of 1982 at Exh. 60 and the witness deposed that initially he was admitted to Hospicio Hospital at Margao in semi-conscious condition and thereafter shifted to Goa Medical College. The witness deposed that his half body was paralysed at the time of admission to the hospital and he could not even open his mouth. In Goa Medical College he was given treatment and his neck was put in traction for a period of three weeks. Thereafter his body right from head to abdomen was put in minerva jacket (plaster) leaving open only his mouth, eyes and ears. The plaster was removed on August 7, 1982 and again he was put on collar with four posters for a duration of six months. The witness was required to wear plastic collar thereafter. Godinho deposed that as a result of the accident he is unable to lift his hand and also cannot make free movements of his neck. The witness could not lift any weight and also cannot walk in the forest. The witness stated that while sleeping he is unable to take pillow under his neck and while turning he has to take equal weight of his head and shoulder. Godinho stated that he has still pain in his chest as a result of the accident. The testimony of Godinho is well supported by Dr. Rodrigues (Exh. 38) who treated Godinho in the Hospicio Hospital. The claimant also examined Dr. Edwin Araujo (Exh. 29) who was working as Senior Resident Doctor in the Goa Medical College. Dr. Araujo deposed that Godinho had stiff neck, muscles spasm, pain and severe pain shooting down both the upper limbs, at the time of admission. Godinho was immediately immobilised in soft cervical collar and the X-rays disclosed a fracture and dislocation of 5th and 6th cervical vertebrae. The patient was immediately immobilised in a crutch field, skull traction and was kept in traction for about 3 weeks. Subsequently, Minerva plaster jacket was fixed on the patient and after the plaster was removed the patient was put in four poster cervical collar for a period of about 6 months. The patient was immediately immobilised in a crutch field, skull traction and was kept in traction for about 3 weeks. Subsequently, Minerva plaster jacket was fixed on the patient and after the plaster was removed the patient was put in four poster cervical collar for a period of about 6 months. The doctor deposed that the injuries suffered by the patient required treatment for a considerable length of time and the patient had to undergo physiotherapy to avoid continuous pain. The claimant also examined Dr. S.K. Sardessai (Exh. 40) and the doctor deposed that Godinho was partially dependent for dressing, feeding and toilet activities. He could not get up without assistance nor could be turn to either side in bed, to sit, stand, and walk without using collar. The patient could not bend forward and could not carry heavy weight in left hand and walk. Godinho was advised to restrict his activities and carry on with physiotherapy. The testimony of the doctors leave no manner of doubt that the injuries suffered by Godinho were of serious nature and permanently left a mark on his body. The injuries have created serious restriction in the discharge of his duties of the Range Forest Officer. It hardly requires to be stated that an injury to the spinal cord is of a permanent nature and puts the patient in a serious handicap in respect of his activities. The claimant Godinho deposed in the witness-box about the expenses incurred by him for undergoing treatment both in the hospital and after discharge, with private doctors. The witness had to spend a considerable amount both for medicines as well as for conveyance to reach the hospital. In these circumstances, taking into consideration the amount spent by the claimant, the learned Tribunal concluded that the claimant is entitled to a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,000 under the various sub-heads of 'special damages'. The Tribunal also held that the claimant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 20,000/-towards pain suffered, shock and a further amount of Rs. 20,000/- in respect of restriction on the movements which is of permanent nature. The Tribunal computed 'special damages' under various heads and arrived at a total figure of Rs. 55,000/-. The Tribunal ultimately awarded a sum of Rs. 20,000/-towards pain suffered, shock and a further amount of Rs. 20,000/- in respect of restriction on the movements which is of permanent nature. The Tribunal computed 'special damages' under various heads and arrived at a total figure of Rs. 55,000/-. The Tribunal ultimately awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and, in our judgment, the grant of compensation is extremely reasonable, indeed on a lower side, in the facts and circumstances of the case. We have no hesitation in concluding that in case Godinho had made a claim for over Rs. 50,000/-, the Tribunal would have been able to grant the proper compensation. In our judgment, the contention of the appellants that the award of Rs. 50,000/- is excessive is required to be rejected. In our judgment, there is no merit whatsoever in the two appeals preferred by the driver Gaonkar, the owner Bandodkar and the alleged transferee Volvotkar, and the appeals are required to be dismissed. 9. Turning to First Appeal Nos. 30 of 1987 and 31 of 1987 preferred by the United India Insurance Co. Ltd., the contention urged by Mr. Rebello, learned counsel for the company, is that the Tribunal was in error in holding in both the claim petitions that the insurance company was liable to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-. The learned counsel urged that the liability of the insurance company under the insurance policy had come to an end as the insured Bandodkar had transferred the pick-up van in favour of Volvotkar. The learned counsel urged that on transfer of the pick-up van, the liability undertaken by the insurance company in respect of the compensation had come to an end and, therefore, the Tribunal was not right in holding the insurance company liable as regards the payment of compensation in the two claim petitions. It is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel. Mr. Rebello urged that the written statement was filed on behalf of the driver Gaonkar, owner Bandodkar and the transferee Volvotkar on June 7, 1983 and in this written statement it was claimed that the pick-up van was transferred by Bandodkar in favour of Volvotkar. It is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel. Mr. Rebello urged that the written statement was filed on behalf of the driver Gaonkar, owner Bandodkar and the transferee Volvotkar on June 7, 1983 and in this written statement it was claimed that the pick-up van was transferred by Bandodkar in favour of Volvotkar. Prior to the date of the filing of the written statement by the driver, the owner and the transferee, the insurance company had filed written statement in April, 1983 specifically claiming that the liability of the insurance company had come to an end on account of the transfer of the pick-up van. Mr. Rebello also invited our attention to the averment made in the claim petition that the pick-up van was owned by Volvotkar at the relevant time. On the strength of these pleadings, the Tribunal framed the issues and issue No. 6 was as to whether the insurance company proves that the alleged sale of the pick-up van was not communicated to the insurance company and, therefore, the policy had lapsed and the liability of the insurance company had come to an end. The framing of the issues leaves no manner of doubt that though averments were made in the written statement, the claimants were not accepting the claim that the pick-up van was transferred by Bandodkar to Volvotkar and, therefore, the liability of the insurance company under the insurance policy had ceased to exist. What has transpired in the evidence is that the pick-up van was not transferred. Volvotkar entered the witness-box on 29th March, 1986 and deposed in the cross-examination that the pick-up van was hired by him from Bandodkar. The witness claimed that he had documentary evidence in his possession in respect of hire agreement and that document would be produced at the next hearing. The witness never produced any document in support of the claim. In the cross-examination at the behest of the insurance company, attention of Volvotkar was drawn to the averment made in the written statement that the pick-up van was bought by Volvotkar after sale by Bandodkar. The witness admitted that such an averment was made in the written statement but did not depart from the statement made in the witness-box that the van was not sold by Bandodkar. The witness admitted that such an averment was made in the written statement but did not depart from the statement made in the witness-box that the van was not sold by Bandodkar. The owner Bandodkar entered the witness-box on September 25, 1986, i.e., almost six months after the testimony of Volvotkar was recorded. Bandodkar did not speak anything in examination-in-chief except that the pick-up van was registered in his name and was insured with United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Bandodkar claimed that the original insurance policy was misplaced. The insurance company chose not to put any question in the cross-examination. It was incumbent upon the insurance company to ascertain from Bandodkar as to whether he transferred or sold the van in favour of Volvotkar, and more so, when Volvotkar had claimed in the witness-box six months earlier that the van was never sold by Bandodkar but was in his possession under hire agreement. The fact that the insurance company did not choose to put a single question to Bandodkar is enough to warrant a conclusion that the insurance company never persisted in the contention that the van was sold by Bandodkar to Volvotkar. Mr. Rebello submitted that it was not necessary for the insurance company to put any question to Bandodkar about the sale of the van in view of the averments made in the written statement. The learned counsel obviously is overlooking the fact that the averments made in the pleadings are not evidence and the Tribunal is required to decide the issue on the strength of the testimony in the witness-box. It is undoubtedly true that while assessing the testimony, the Tribunal would take into consideration the averments made in the pleadings, but by no stretch of imagination the pleadings can be treated as substantive evidence. Realising that Volvotkar had departed from the claim made in the written statement and insisted that the van was in his possession only under hire agreement, it was necessary for the insurance company to ascertain from Bandodkar as to whether he had sold the van to Volvotkar. Failure to do so, in our judgment, clearly establishes that Bandodkar continued to be the owner of the pick-up van all along and was the owner at the time when the van was involved in the incident on June 17, 1982. It is, therefore, not possible to accede to submission of Mr. Failure to do so, in our judgment, clearly establishes that Bandodkar continued to be the owner of the pick-up van all along and was the owner at the time when the van was involved in the incident on June 17, 1982. It is, therefore, not possible to accede to submission of Mr. Rebello that the liability of the insurance company stands extinguished on the transfer of the van and the Tribunal cannot enforce the liability against the insurance company. In our judgment, the Tribunal was right in concluding that the liability of the insurance company subsists and in accordance with the terms of the policy the insurance company is liable to pay Rs. 50,000/- to Godinho in respect of injuries suffered by him in the accident and Rs. 50,000/- to the Forest Office in respect of damages suffered by the truck. In our judgment, the appeals preferred by the insurance company are without any merit and are required to be dismissed. 10. Accordingly, all the four appeals stand dismissed with costs.