Judgment A.M. Bhattacharjee, J. 1. MY learned brother Mookherjee, J., and 1 have discussed the matter in all its aspects and agreed with each other. Because of the great confidence that 1 have in my learned brother, 1 requested him to prepare the judgment and 1 thought that 1 would be adding a few words of mine on some of the important points involved in this appeal. But after going through the judgment prepared by Mookherjee, J., 1 have felt that in view of the weight of reasons in and all-comprehensiveness of the judgment, any further words from me would be an idle and useless parade. 1, therefore, express my unreserved concurrence in the judgment of my learned brother, appearing hereinafter and do not propose to come out with a separate note as 1 find nothing which 1 can usefully add. 2. S.K. Mookherjee, J.- The present Appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, on 10th of March, 1989. By the said order the learned single Judge allowed the application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, preferred on behalf of the respondents nos. 1 to 6 to the present appeal, by directing the State, Government inter alia to confer certain benefits, in the forms of scales of pay, such as, senior time-scale of pay, selection grade of pay, super-time scale of pay and special pay, by reducing the number of years of qualifying service for junior administrative grade, by granting house-rent allowance, dearness allowance and other financial allowances, in the same manner as were being received by the members of the Indian Administrative Service with effect, from 1st January, 1986. In the present appeal, the State of West Bengal represented by the Secretary, Department of Finance is the appellant. From the submissions made before us, the subject matter of controversy between the contesting parties, in the appeal, appears to be three-fold,, namely, (a) grant of super-time scale of pay, (b) reduction of the period of qualifying service for grant of junior administrative grade and (c) the date as fixed by the learned trial Judge with effect from which such benefits have been made available to the writ petitioners. 3. 3. IN connection with (a) and (c) above, it is to be noted that financial benefits admittedly became, available from, 1.1.1986 to the members of then Indian Administrative Service with whom the members of the Higher Judicial Service are claimed to be at par and have, since the inception of the latter, been allegedly treated as such though in the case of the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service such benefits were sought to have been conferred with effect from 5th of September, 1987. Regarding (b) the dispute appears to be that a member of Indian Administrative Service be- comes eligible to get junior administrative grade after completion of 9 years of service whereas a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service acquires such eligibility after completion of 13 years of service and this disparity constitutes the second-fold of the controversy. 4. THE basic document to which the controversy, as indicated herein above, owes its origin is the Memorandum dated 26th October, 1987 being Numbered 27088-J/J4J-11/87 embodying the direction of the Governor, inter allies, for revision of super-time scale of pay of the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service to Rs. 5900-200-6700 with effect from 5th September, 1987 and also fixing up the period of qualifying service for the junior administrative grade at 9 years from the date of one's promotion or appointment as the case may be. The West Bengal Higher Judicial Service had been constituted in pursuance of the Cabinet decision dated 10th June, 1949 (Annexure 'A' to the Writ Petition Application, page 50 of the Paper Book). The approved proposal, inter alia, provided that the scale of pay of the service will be the same as the scale of pay of the Indian Administrative Service. The said decision of the Cabinet also appears to have been acted upon and such position has been factually found by the learned Trial Judge upon meticulousness and analysis and indeed, no serious controversy or demur about such findings has been raised. 5. IT has been contended by Mr. The said decision of the Cabinet also appears to have been acted upon and such position has been factually found by the learned Trial Judge upon meticulousness and analysis and indeed, no serious controversy or demur about such findings has been raised. 5. IT has been contended by Mr. Mitra, on behalf of the appellant, that the creation of a pay scale is an executive function and the learned trial Judge had no power or authority to direct creation of the super-time scale of pay for the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service equivalent to that of the members of the Indian Administrative Service, not- withstanding the existence of the Cabinet decision, which was admittedly not followed up by any formal executive order issued in the name of the Governor. Cabinet decision, according to the appellant, therefore, had no legal effect nor could the order of the learned trial Judge be sustained on the ground of equality otherwise as there was no material to indicate that the nature and quantum of the work of the members of the Indian Administrative Service were the same as those of the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service. If there is no legal right nor material to establish that similar functions were discharged by the members of West Bengal Higher Judicial Service, question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India becomes misconceived. Mr. Mitra has referred to the cases reported in AIR 1989 SC 19 : 1980 SC 1255 ; 1986(4) SCC 632 . We have noted only some of the cited decisions to avoid multiplication. 6. THE above arguments of Mr. Mitra have been met by Mr. Mr. Mitra has referred to the cases reported in AIR 1989 SC 19 : 1980 SC 1255 ; 1986(4) SCC 632 . We have noted only some of the cited decisions to avoid multiplication. 6. THE above arguments of Mr. Mitra have been met by Mr. Mukherjee, upon reference to various judicial pronouncements, by submitting that the materials produced on behalf of the writ petitioners (Respondents 1 to 6) unequivocally show that the nature of the decision taken on the basis of the approval of the Cabinet is akin to a policy decision and as such, even, with- out specific order or rule, the same may be implemented ; in the background of the admitted factual position that there is no legislative provision or statutory Rule contrary to the said decision, which has been communicated and acted upon for a very long time, even assuming that such decision has been issued in the form of an executive instruction, the same becomes enforceable under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, as after having taken such a decision it was acted upon for a very long time, the members of the Higher Judicial Service refrained from getting their cases examined and weighed by any Pay Commission without any idea that they would ultimately be deprived of the benefits of such decision on a very technical ground. THE doctrine of promissory estoppel, therefore, become applicable with full force and the State Government could not now be allowed to go back and refuse grant of super-time scale of pay or reduction of the period of qualifying service for junior administrative grade to the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service. It is not necessary, according to Mr. Mukherjee, as the law presently stands, to establish that the promise had altered his position to his detriment. In the instant case, however, the non-assertion of their demands by the writ petitioners for examination of their cases by the Pay Commission can be construed to satisfy the test of suffering a detriment by, alteration of position and as such the correctness of the last proposition need not be fathomed. We have given our anxious consideration to the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the contesting parties and it appears, to us that the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents 1 to 6 are substantially correct, and deserve to be accepted. We have given our anxious consideration to the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the contesting parties and it appears, to us that the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents 1 to 6 are substantially correct, and deserve to be accepted. We have already indicated that the analysis of facts made by the learned trial Judge has not been in dispute. Since the position remains admitted that there is no rule or legislation contrary to the decision that the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service are to be treated at par with the members of the Indian Administrative Service, including with regard to their scales of pay, and since admittedly the members of the Indian Administrative Service were granted the super time scale of pay the same cannot be refused as far as the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service are concerned. It is well established by the decisions of the Supreme Court, as pronounced in the cases of Santram v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1967 SC 1910 and the case of V. T. Khanzode v. R. B. I. .and Ors. reported in AIR 1982 SC 917 that in the fields not covered by statutory rules nor any legislative provision or where the Rules are silent, the government, by issuing administrative instructions and notifications, can supplement the procedure relating to service matters and that the government .does in exercise of its executive power not conferred by the provisions of Articles 309 of the Constitution but which derives its enforceability from the provisions of Article 162 thereof. In the instant case, the decision of the government to treat the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service at par with the members of the Indian Administrative Service, even if treated as bare cabinet decision, such decision not being contrary to any statutory rule or legislative provision nor there being any other provision governing the field, and having been acted upon for about 4 decades, as evident from references to specific occasions by Ld. Trial Judge becomes fully operative and enforceable. Reference, in this connection may be made to the case of State of M. P. v. Nandalal reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 . It is, therefore, idle for the appellant to contend that unless the governor, no legal right to claim its enforcement accrues. Trial Judge becomes fully operative and enforceable. Reference, in this connection may be made to the case of State of M. P. v. Nandalal reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 . It is, therefore, idle for the appellant to contend that unless the governor, no legal right to claim its enforcement accrues. The above view, again, does not militate against the principles laid down in the cases of Delhi Veterinary Association v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1221 , Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1988) 3 SCC 91 , State of U. P. v. J. P. Chaurasia reported in AIR 1989 SC 19, W. C. Singhal v, Union of India reported in AIR 1980 SC 1255 , Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1979 SC 220 and State of Kerala v. Smt. A. Lakhmikutty and Anr. reported in (1986)4 SCC 632 . The factual distinction of the present case negates the strong emphasis put by Mr. Mitra on the last of the above cited decisions. 7. THE above conclusion of ours gets justification also from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. From the analysis of facts made by Mr. Mukherjee and the learned trial Judge, it can be, said without any scope of contradiction, that the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service was decidedly being treated at par regarding the service conditions including grant of pay scale and other benefits with the members of the Indian Administrative Service and such decision since 1949 was being acted upon. Super-time scale having been granted to the latter service cannot now be withheld from being granted to the latter service cannot now be withheld from being granted to the former. This doctrine of promissory estoppel, as is now very firmly established, requiring only the existence of a possibility of the promise suffering a detriment in case the promissor, be he a private individual or a government or a governmental agency, going back on his or its promise, applies with full force in the present case and the facts and circumstances herein fulfil all the required criteria for application of the said doctrine. THE mere non-existence of formally binding executive order or claim of its non-enforcibility on a technical ground cannot be accepted by this Court as a good ground for exonerating the government from the obligation to honour its promise. In this connection we would like to refer to the principle enunciated by Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 . In another later decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1985(3) SCC 38 (Surya Narayan Yadav v. Bihar State Electricity Board), even the existence of a contrary rule was not accepted to bar the operation of this equitable doctrine. 8. WE are almost at the end of our journey and two other points remain to be dealt with. The first one is concerning the grievance, which hag been accepted by the learned trial Judge regarding the applicability of the government order with effect from 5th of September, 1987. The learned trial Judge has concluded, from the standpoint of the deprivation of the benefits, that the fixation of the date bears no reasonable justification and the applicable date, namely, 8th September, 19'87, is not reasonable or fair, considered in the context of the Central Government decision, accepting the recommendation of the 4th Central Pay Commission, that the revised pension rate would be available for All India Services including the I.A.S. with effect from 1.1.1986. To describe this fixation of 8.9.1987 as the operative date, in the language of the Supreme Court in the case of D. R. Nim v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 SC 1301 ), the date seems to have been picked out from a hat. To describe this fixation of 8.9.1987 as the operative date, in the language of the Supreme Court in the case of D. R. Nim v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 SC 1301 ), the date seems to have been picked out from a hat. However, this part of the government order is severable from the remaining part and, accordingly, we quash this part of the government order embodying the date of retrospective operation following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of D. S. Nakara v. Union of India reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 and we approve the decision of the learned trial Judge making the benefit available under the order with effect from 1.1.1986 i.e. the date on which such benefits became available to the members of the Indian Administrative Service on the basis of the direction contained in the I.A.S (Pay) Rules, 1954 as amended from time to time and instructions issued by the Government of India in respect of the said Rules regarding officers of the Indian Administrative Service shall apply mutatis mutandis to the members of the WEst Bengal Higher Judicial Service. Once the decision to treat the writ petitioners at par with the members of the Indian Administrative Service is taken, it would not be open to the appellant to set up a defence of absence of materials showing equality of the nature of work of the two disciplines. The second or the last point is about the period for entitlement to the junior administrative grade, which works out to 13 years. From the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it appears that a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service is treated at par with a member of the Indian Administrative Service getting senior scale of pay, namely, Rs. 800/to Rs. 1800/-. Considering that position it would be unfair to prescribe two different periods for grant of Junior Administrative Grade to members of the two different services. 800/to Rs. 1800/-. Considering that position it would be unfair to prescribe two different periods for grant of Junior Administrative Grade to members of the two different services. Since we have already expressed our view that the members of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service are to be treated at par with their Counterparts of the Indian Administrative Service from the date-of entry to a senior scale, a period of 5 years from the date of entry to a senior scale of pay having been prescribed for a member of the Indian Administrative Service, the same period must also be the period of entitlement to junior administrative grade for a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service, taking the date of his entitlement to the senior scale of pay as the starting point of such period. The argument of Mr. Mitra on this point to the effect that same period of 9 years have been provided for entitlement to junior administrative grade with regard to both the disciplines suffers from a fallacy by overlooking the above aspect of the matter and the absence of right to claim parity of pay scale also, in view of our foregoing reasonings and conclusions, canvassed on behalf of the appellants does not survive. 9. FOR the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. We, however, extend the date for all payments till 31.8,1991. In the facts of the case, however, we propose not to impose any cost. 10. AFTER the delivery of the judgment the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has prayed that the operation of the judgment may be stayed for four weeks. The matter is dragging on for a long period from the Court below to this Court. We have fully governed ourselves on every point by the decided cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and on facts which are also undisputed and that being so we find no reasons to grant the stay of the operation of the order as prayed for. After all, the operation of the order will, by and large, result in payment of money and that is also an additional reason why stay should be declined. The prayer made on behalf of the appellant is, therefore, rejected. Appeal dismissed.