JUDGMENT Sengupta, J. This application arises out of the appeal preferred by the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘C.M.D.A.’) against the interim order dated October 30, 1987, passed by the Court of the first instance. 2. By consent, the application has been treated as an appeal. The parties have agreed that the decision in this appeal would virtually dispose of the writ petition. We have, therefore, heard the elaborate arguments which have been advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 3. It is necessary to set out the facts. The first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the ‘company’) moved a writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. The case of the Company in the writ petition is as under : The Company has been carrying on business as hotelier. The Company runs a Five-Star Hotel known as “The Oberoi Grand”. The building complex of the said hotel comprises of several premises nos. such as 15A, 15/1, 15/2, 15/3, 15/4, 15/6, 15/7, 15/9, 16/2, 16/3, 16/5 & 17 Jawaharlal Nehru Road ; 1A, 2A, 3 & 4 Bertram Street ; 6A, 7B, 8A, 9A & 9B Chowringhee Place and 4 Humayun Place and has the unique advantage of having public roads on all four sides. It has the Jawaharlal Nehru Road on the West, Bertram Street on the East, Humayun Place on the South and Chowringhee Place on its North. Such a building site is rarely to be found in the city of Calcutta. 4. The main building which consist of separate premises number is very old and constructed about a century ago at different period of time. Various structures were added from time to time, long ago. Some portions of the said building complex naturally became dilapidated and insecure. It became necessary to redevelop the entire Hotel complex in order to make it suitable for housing a Five-Star Hotel of the reputation to “The Grand.” The Company took up the work of redevelopment in several phased. 5. The Company’s Scheme for redevelopment could not be confined to mere reconstruction of the existing building. It was necessary to take suitable measures to resolve certain long-standing problems. There is hardly any car parking area within the hotel complex for guests, customers and visitors. Parking of cars on the roads outside the hotel complex caused not only inconvenience but also impeded the free flow of traffic. It was necessary to take suitable measures to resolve certain long-standing problems. There is hardly any car parking area within the hotel complex for guests, customers and visitors. Parking of cars on the roads outside the hotel complex caused not only inconvenience but also impeded the free flow of traffic. The company also needed sufficient accommodation within the Hotel complex to relocate its administrative offices which are presently scattered at different places for want of adequate floor space within the Hotel complex. The physical environment around the Hotel complex was also to be improved as far as feasible. All these called for phase-wise programme of remodeling and reorganization of the existing Hotel complex with necessary addition/alteration and reconstructions of certain parts of the old buildings and structures. 6. In course of such redevelopment, on 4.4.85, the Company submitted a plan to the Corporation for sanction of a four-storied car park which would provide parking facility to 250 cars to be located towards the south of the existing main building of the Hotel. The construction was to be made after demolition of a portion of the existing structures at Humayun Place where there are large number of shops occupied by shop-keepers who are tenants of the Company. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation, in keeping with its usual practice, required the Company to give an undertaking to the effect that all the tenants who would be displaced by the proposed construction, would to provided with alternative accommodation. On the basis of such undertaking, the said plan for a four-storied car park was sanctioned by the Corporation in 1985. 7. The Company, however, could not commence the construction of the said four-storied car park. In order to commence the construction, it will be necessary to relocate some of the shops facing Humayun Place so as to be able to demolish the said shops for the purpose of the proposed construction of the four-storied car park. Thus, the Company had to submit another plan to the Corporation for the construction of a four-storied Commercial-cum-Office Building with an organized shopping complex appropriately designed, where the shop owners who would be affected by the construction of the said four-storied car park could be suitable accommodated. The construction proposed in the said plan would be made after demolition of a portion of the existing structure. The construction proposed in the said plan would be made after demolition of a portion of the existing structure. Apart, from providing such alternative accommodation to the tenants, the said four-storied Commercial-cum-Office complex would be used to house the administrative office of the Company. The said plan for the four-stories Commercial-cum-Office complex which was submitted to the Corporation on 21st February, 1986, will involve an investment of a few crores of rupees and once completed, it will change the face of the Chowringhee area and would improve the physical environment around the said complex. 8. The construction of the said four-storied car park and the proposed four-storied building would be made after demolition of existing structures and will not involve the covering up of any existing vacant land. 9. The Company had agreed to surrender in favour of the Corporation a strip of land abutting Humayun Place running through almost the entire length of the said road measuring six feet approximately in width which can be used for the purpose of widening the said road, namely, Humayun Place, which will considerably case the congestion of vehicular traffic and human overcrowding on the said road. 10. The four-storied car park once constructed would accommodate 250 cars, thereby substantially mitigating the traffic bottleneck caused by indiscriminate parking of cars in that area. More particularly, the present practice of parking cars on the Maldan side of Jawaharlal Nehru Road would be totally discontinued and the problem of finding a suitable space for parking on the four roads around the said Hotel complex will be solved. The consequential effect of such a rational arrangement for car parking will considerably case the traffic problem in the certain business zone of Calcutta, in the heart of which the Hotel is situated. 11. Thus, if the said two Projects, namely, the four-storied car park and the four-storied Commercial Complex, undertaken by the Company are allowed to be implemented, instead of hindering in any way the future town planning in that area, the same would be conducive to future town planning. Thus, on the basis of private investment to be made by the said Company, one of the most important areas of Calcutta would attain substantial planned development, which will be of immense benefit to the members of the public and will really serve a public purpose. Thus, on the basis of private investment to be made by the said Company, one of the most important areas of Calcutta would attain substantial planned development, which will be of immense benefit to the members of the public and will really serve a public purpose. As such, there cannot be any conflict between the implementation of the said Projects by the Company and the Town Planning to be undertaken by C.M.D.A. in the distant future. 12. But the projects could not be implemented because the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, acting at the behest of C.M.D.A. refused to sanction the plan for construction of the four-storied building on Humayun Place, as stated below. 13. By a letter dated July 24, 1987, the District Building Surveyor, Borough VI of the Corporation informed the Company that the Plan submitted by the Company had been referred to the Chief Executive Office of C.M.D.A. for their observation as the premises was within the “Inner Impact Zone”. But the C.M.D.A. refused to grant permission under Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979, as the ground coverage and floor area ratio of the proposed structures together with ground coverage and floor area ratio of the existing structures including the sanctioned one exceed the maximum permissible limit as prescribed in the Development Control Guidelines for the Inner Impact Area of Esplanade Metro Railway Station. 14. The Company by its writ petition challenged the said decision of the C.M.D.A. as also the refusal of the Corporation to deal with the application for sanction in accordance with the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, and the relevant Building Rules without taking into consideration any of the provisions of the Development Control Guidelines for Inner Impact Area of Esplanade Metro Railway under Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979. 15. On 14th September, 1987, the learned Single Judge passed an order to the following effect :- “The Court : A/O. by 2 weeks after the Vacation ; A/R. by 2 weeks thereafter. Metro to appear 5 weeks after the long Vacation as part heard application. 15. On 14th September, 1987, the learned Single Judge passed an order to the following effect :- “The Court : A/O. by 2 weeks after the Vacation ; A/R. by 2 weeks thereafter. Metro to appear 5 weeks after the long Vacation as part heard application. In the meantime, the Municipal Corporation Authorities are directed to sanction the said Plan in accordance with the Provision of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, and relevant Building Rules without taking into consideration any of the Provisions of the Draft Outline Development Plan notified under Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 within a period of three weeks from date and upon the petitioner paying the required sanction fee the Corporation Authorities shall deliver the sanction Plan to the petitioner, but the petitioner shall not start the construction without the leave of this Court. The petitioner will be at liberty to apply for such leave to start the construction according to the sanction Plan on the same petition one weeks after the re-opening of the Court after long Vacation, All parties to act on signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking.” 16. At the instance of the writ petitioner, the order dated 14th September, 1987, was modified. The modified order passed on October 30, 1987 is as follows :- “In the meantime, the Municipal Corporation Authorities are directed to sanction the said plan in accordance with the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and the relevant Building Rules without taking into consideration any of the provision of the Development Control Guidelines for impact area of Esplanade Metro Railway Station under Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979, within a period of three weeks from date.” 17. This appeal is directed against the said order :- 18. The intent and purport of the order dated 14th September, 1987, as modified by the order dated October 30, 1987, was to direct the Corporation to sanction the plan in accordance with the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and the relevant Building Rules without taking into consideration any of the provisions of the Development Control Guidelines for Inner Impact Area of Esplanade Metro Railway under Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979. The writ petitioner, however, was prevented from making any construction even after the sanction of the Plan without the leave of the Court. 19. It may be mentioned the while admitting the appeal, the Appeal Bench by an Interim Order stayed the operation of the said Interim Order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, after hearing all the parties, the Appeal Bench directed the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to process the plan submitted by the Company; for sanction and intimate to the Company if there be any objection to such sanction other than the objection of the C.M.D.A., which is under challenge in the appeal. The Corporation authorities were directed to accord sanction to the said plan if the Company complied with all other requirement pertaining to the sanction of the plan under the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act and relevant Building Rules. Thereafter, the Company processed the plan and sanctioned the same on 8.8.88 and delivered the sanctioned plan to the Company on payment of sanction fee of Rs. 19,67,644/- only. 20. At the hearing before us, the following contention have been raised on behalf of the C.M.D.A. : (a) Under Section 46 of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979, any person or body intending to carry out any “development” as defined in Section 2(7) of the said Act is required to obtain prior permission from the C.M.D.A. C.M.D.A. has delegated this power to different local authorities including the Calcutta Municipal Corporation by its Notification dated April 6, 1985, as subsequently amended on November 8, 1986. (b) C.M.D.A. has directed the local authorities that in the case of any proposal for development within the Inner Impact Area of the Metro Railway Station, pending preparation of any development plan in respect of any planning area, no permission should be given and all such cases should be directly referred to the Chief Executive Officer, C.M.D.A. (c) In order to deal with the problems arising out of them implementation of the Metro Railway Project a total development plan around the Metro Railway Station would be prepared in future. If substantial amount of uncontrolled development occurs prior to the preparation of such total development plan, that will constitute a major constrain in future for planned development. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce a “development freeze”. If substantial amount of uncontrolled development occurs prior to the preparation of such total development plan, that will constitute a major constrain in future for planned development. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce a “development freeze”. To quote the exact language from sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph 15 of the stay application : “Pending the final preparation of the development plans around metro-stations, which would take some more time, “development freeze” for the interim period should be imposed on these areas to check the haphazard and sporadic private developments. Unless the development freeze is exercised in these areas right now, the private developments within this period may stand in the way of implementing the development plans in future. Since in most of the cases, the areas adjoining the metro-stations are fairly built up, once the vacant areas are developed private parties, the scope for planned development would be very limited and/or impeded.” (d) By a Memorandum dated January 3, 1987, the C.M.D.A. had framed certain guidelines called “Development Control Guidelines.” (e) ground coverage and (b) Floor Area Ratio (F.A.R.). According to the said Guidelines of C.M.D.A., the ground coverage is not to exceed 40% of the total area of the site. As regards F.A.R., the C.M.D.A. wants to restrict it only to 3 instead of 4.40 as available under the Building Rules. 21. It is not in dispute that the plan submitted by the Company duly complied with all the Building Rules including the Building Rules relating to ground coverage and F.A.R. This would be evident from that fact that the Corporation found no fault with the said plan while considering the same in the context of the existing Building Rules and the Corporation has already sanctioned the said plan, on the basis of the interim order passed by the Court below. 22. The contention of the writ petitioner is that the C.M.D.A. is mainly concerned about vacant lands and wants to prevent private construction on such vacant so that the available open space in the adjoining areas of the Metro Railway Stations is not affected in any way. But while imposing the “development freeze” the crucial distinction between wholly vacant lands and lands already built upon was totally lost sight to. The restriction was imposed on all developments including reconstruction, renovation, addition/ alteration irrespective of the fact whether the site was vacant or a site already built upon. 23. But while imposing the “development freeze” the crucial distinction between wholly vacant lands and lands already built upon was totally lost sight to. The restriction was imposed on all developments including reconstruction, renovation, addition/ alteration irrespective of the fact whether the site was vacant or a site already built upon. 23. According to the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner, the real hitch is that the C.M.D.A. will not permit even any work of reconstruction of or addition or alteration to an existing structure unless 60% of the total building site is kept open as vacant land and the F.A.R. is restricted to only 3. As the building complex of the Grand Hotel which was constructed according to the Building Rules then prevailing (which are still applicable) leaves only 50% of the site as open space, it is absolutely impossible for the company to meet the said requirement of C.M.D.A. This applies of F.A.R. also. The existing structure has already consumed F.A.R. which is nearly 4. With the proposed construction the F.A.R. will be 3.9, which is permissible under the Building Rules. But C.M.D.A. wants to restrict the F.A.R. to 3. If the said requirements of C.M.D.A. are to be fulfilled, the petitioner Company will have to pull down a substantial portion of the hotel building so as to generate additional 10% of open space and to bring down the F.A.R. to 3. It is against the arbitrary decision of C.M.D.A. that the writ petition is directed. The said arbitrary and unreasonable requirements of C.M.D.A. have virtually made it impossible for the Company to implement the said Projects of reconstruction. 24. At this stage, it is necessary to consider the relevant statutory provisions. 25. The West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 was enacted to provide for “the Planned development of rural and urban areas in West Bengal and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. According to the scheme of the Act, the concerned authorities are required to take various preparatory measures towards the implementation of the Town Planning in the Calcutta Metropolitan Area and it is only after the completion of all these measures that a full-fledge Town Planning can be implemented in the said area. It will be presently seen that none of the said measures have yet been completed. 26. It will be presently seen that none of the said measures have yet been completed. 26. One of the earliest measures to be undertaking is the preparation of the “Present Land Use Map.” Under Section 28 of the said Act, this was to be prepared within one year from 1982 but the same has not yet been made ready. Only recently, in late 1988, a Public Notice was issued to the effect that a tentative Land Use Map has been prepared which was open to inspection and objections were invited thereto. The finalization of the Land Use Map is likely to take considerable time. 27. Section 31 of the said Act contemplates preparation of Outline Development Plan (O.D.P.) for the whole of Greater Calcutta within two years from 1982. Those two years have long expired. On the basis of successive extensions granted by the State Government, so far the C.M.D.A. has prepared only two Draft O.D.Ps. for two Wards, viz., Ward No. 63 and Ward No. 45. It may be stated in this connection that the premises of The Oberoi Grand does not fall within any of these two Wards. The finalization of the Draft O.D.P. relating to the said two Wards will take a long time. Insofar as Chowringhee area is concerned, not even a Draft O.D.P. has been prepared as yet and this is admitted by C.M.D.A. in paragraph 15 of their Stay petition. 28. Under Section 32 of the said Act, within 3 years of the declaration of the Planning Area i.e. 1982, Detailed Development Plan was to be prepared. Considering the present state of affairs, the preparation of any such Development Plan may not be feasible even within the next decade. 29. Before an Outline Development Plan can come into operation, the following steps are required to be taken : (a) Approval of the State Government to the publication of notice of preparation of O.D.P. (Section 35). (b) Public Notice of the preparation of the Development Plan inviting objections (Section 36). (c) Consideration of the objections and modification of the Plan in the light of objections (Section 36) (d) Approval of the State Government with or without modification (Section 37). (e) Notification in the Official Gazette to the effect that the O.D.P. has been approved by the State Government and place or places where copies of O.D.P. may be inspected (Section 38). 30. (e) Notification in the Official Gazette to the effect that the O.D.P. has been approved by the State Government and place or places where copies of O.D.P. may be inspected (Section 38). 30. Section 38 (3) makes it clear that the O.D.P. shall come into operation from the date of publication of the aforesaid notice in the Official Gazette. 31. O.D.P. may be superseded by the Detailed Development Plan to the extent that the former varies with the letter (Section 38(4)). For Detailed Development Plan all the measures as outlined above in the context of O.D.P. are to be followed. 32. Under sub-section (5) of Section 38, it is provide that any regulation referred to in Clause (d) of sub-section (4) of Section 31 contained in the Development Plan shall be liable to be enforced by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation only after it comes into operation. 33. It is significant to note that even with the approval of the State Government, the O.D.P. does not attain its finality. Under Section 39 of the said Act, within one month of coming into operation of the O.D.P. any person aggrieved may make an application to the High Court questioning the validity of the O.D.P. or any provisions contained therein. If such an application is made, the High Court may stay the operation if the O.D.P. by and interim order and may also quash the plan to the extent it is found to be illegal. 34. In Section 44 of the said Act, it has been provided that after the coming into operation of any Development Plan in any area, no person shall use or permit to be used any land or carry out any development in that area otherwise than in conformity with such Development Plan. But even after the coming into operation of a Development Plan, the concerned authority may allow relaxation of the embargo for a period not exceeding 7 years upon such terms and conditions as may be imposed. This follows from the proviso to Section 44. 35. Section 45 relates to prohibition of development without payment of development charges and without permission of the authority concerned. This follows from the proviso to Section 44. 35. Section 45 relates to prohibition of development without payment of development charges and without permission of the authority concerned. Under the provision, after the coming into force of the Act and subject to the provisions relating to development charge and other provisions, no development, institution or change of use of any land can be undertaken or carried out in any area without obtaining a certificate from the authority concerned with regard to payment of development charges and without obtaining the permission in writing as provided for in the Act. For this purpose, development will mean “the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over, or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land or in the use of any building or land any includes a division of any land (vide Section 2(7)). Building operations have been defined in Section 2(3) to include, inter alia, erection or re-erection of a building or any part of it and any material alteration of enlargement of any building.” 36. Section 46 deals with permission for development and it requires any person or body intending the carry out any development on any land to make an application in writing to the Planning Authority and on such application being made, the authority may pass an order, either granting permission unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may think fit or may refuse permission. 37. Chapter VII of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 deals with “Control of Development and Use of Land”. Section 44 of the said Act provides that after the coming into operation of any Development Plan in any area, no person shall use or permit to be used any land or carry out any development in that area, otherwise than in conformity with such Development Plan. Sections 45 and 46, which come immediately thereafter in the same Chapter, deal with “Prohibition of development without payment of Development Charges and without permission.” The provisions of Section 45 are to be read subject to the provisions relating to the Development Charges as contained in Chapter IX and the other provisions of the Act, including all the provisions relating to Development Plan as contained in Chapter VI of the said Act and also Section 44 which immediately precedes the said Section. Section 46 which follows Section 45 is really a sequel to Clause (b) of Section 45. 38. On a combined reading of the said provisions and applying the principles of harmonious construction of different provisions of a statue, it is clear that the provisions of Section 45 and 46 will apply only after the coming into operation of the Development Plan in an area, and the imposition of Development Charges. Otherwise, an anomalous situation may arise. Admittedly, no such Development Plan has yet been prepared in respect of the said area and, as such, there is no question of any Development Plan coming into operation. Nor has any notification been issued relating to the imposition of Development Charges. Accordingly, Sections 45 and 46 cannot be invoked at all in the instant case by the authority concerned. 39. The C.M.D.A. in enforcing the so called development freeze seems to rely on Section 45 and 46 of the said Act. But the provisions do not contemplated the imposition of any general development freeze. Nor do they authorities the C.M.D.A. to impose the same. 40. Section 45 prohibits any development work without payment of development charges and without obtaining permission of the authorities concerned. Three being no question of payment of any development charges in the instant case, the only question is with regard to permission. Permission has to be obtained under Section 46 of the said Act. 41. Analyzing Section 46 of the said Act to the extent it is applicable to the instant case, we find the following :- (a) Any person intending to carry out any development on any land shall make an application in writing in the prescribed form to the Planning Authority of Development Authority. (b) Upon such application being made, the authority concerned may either grant permission unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may think fit or refuse permission. (c) In dealing with an application for permission, the authority concerned shall have regard to the provisions of the Development Plan if it has come into operation and any other material consideration. (d) When permission is granted subject to the conditions or is refused, the grounds of imposing such conditions or such refusal shall be recorded in the order in the order shall be communicated to the applicant. 42. (d) When permission is granted subject to the conditions or is refused, the grounds of imposing such conditions or such refusal shall be recorded in the order in the order shall be communicated to the applicant. 42. It appears from the above analysis that Section 46 does not seek to impose any general “development freeze” whether as an interim measure or at all, nor does it authorize the authority concerned to impose any such “development freeze”. Rather, the provisions of Section 46 contra-indicate the imposition of any general “development freeze”. 43. According to Section 46, the authority concerned is required to deal with each application for development permission on its merits and it has to pass a speaking order in respect of each individual application. The order made by the authority concerned under Section 46 is appealable under Section 47 of the said Act. Such being the requirements of Section 46, it is absolutely clear that it does not contemplate a general prohibitory order or any pre-determine embargo applicable to all and sundry. It certainly does not contemplate a general development freeze, irrespective of the individual facts and circumstances and the merits of a particular case. 44. Obviously, if the Legislature intended to empower the authority concerned to issue general control orders which would be applicable to every person intending to carry out any development work, the Legislature would have provided such power in express terms. Not only that the Legislature did not do so, but the Legislature expressly provided for consideration of each individual application on its merits in a quasi-judicial manner and required the authority to give reasons, making the decision subject to appeal. The provisions of Section 46 are clearly incompatible with any General Control Order. 45. It the authorities fetter their quasi-judicial discretionary power by imposing a pre-determine General Control Order and seeks to apply the same in each case irrespective of the individual merits of a particular case, then the statutory requirement of making an application, dealing with the application by the authorities, recording of reasons and communication thereof to the applicant, and the provision as to appeal will be rendered entirely superfluous, if not nugatory. 46. 46. The conclusion is irresistible form the above that the so-called Development Control Guidelines, on the basis of which the application for permission was refused in the instant case, were without any authority of law and the C.M.D.A. by refusing permission on the basis of such pre-determined guidelines failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it and to act in discharge of the statutory powers and obligation. 47. It is well settled that fettering a discretion by self-created rules or policy amounts to a failure to exercise a discretion. To quote from S.A. De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition (1980) page 311 : “A tribunal entrusted with a discretion must not, by the adoption of a fixed rule of policy, disable itself from exercising its discretion in individual cases. Discretion may not generally be validly exercised by a public body solely on the basis of some policy or rule that it had informally previously adopted……..Again, a factor that may properly be taken into account in exercising a discretion may become unlawful fetter upon discretion if it is elevated to the status of a general rule that results in the pursuit of consistency at the expenses of the merits of individual cases…… A fortiori the authority must not pre-determine the issue, as by resolving to refuse all applications, or all applications of a certain class, or all applications except those in a certain class, and then proceeding to refuse an application before it in pursuance of such a resolution; although it is not obliged to consider every application before it with a fully open mind, it must at least keep its mind ajar.” 48. A case of non-application of mind also arises when the authority having discretion imposes fetters on its discretion by announcing rules of policy to be applied by it rigidly to all cases coming before it for decision. When a statute confers power on an authority to decide an issue in a quasi-judicial manner, such authority concerned is required to consider each case on its merits and then decide it one way or the other. If, instead, it lays down a general rule to be applicable to each and every case then it is preventing itself from exercising its mind according to the circumstances of each case and this amounts to going against what the statute has intended the authority to do. 49. If, instead, it lays down a general rule to be applicable to each and every case then it is preventing itself from exercising its mind according to the circumstances of each case and this amounts to going against what the statute has intended the authority to do. 49. Reference may be made to a very old decision of the Bombay High Court in (1) Gell v. Teja Noora reported in (1903) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 307, in this connection. Under the Bombay Police Act, 1863, the Commissioner of Police had discretion to refuse to grant a licence for any public conveyance which he might consider to be insufficiently sound or otherwise unfit for the conveyance of the public. Instead of applying his discretion to grant the licence or not after examining each carriage, he issued a general order setting forth the details of construction which he required to be adopted in each victoria prevented to him for licence ; he had a sample victoria prepared and required all new victorias to conform to the pattern. The order being challenged, it was held by the Bombay High Court that the order was illegal. The Court held that the discretion is not an absolute one but one which is to be exercised after the Commissioner has made himself acquainted with the conveyance to be licensed, and has considered whether it, as an individual carriage, is fit for the conveyance of the public. In the exercise of this discretion he is not to fetter himself with rules which would prevent him in each cases from being quite free to consider the merits of each particular carriage. 50. The matter can be looked at from another point of view. When the Legislature provides for decision of individual cases on merit, it does so because in the opinion of the Legislature there cannot be a standard solution to the problem due to variations in fact and circumstances which are likely to have an important bearing on the decision-making individual and calls for a distinct decision in each case. Otherwise, the Legislature would have enacted general rules applicable to each case or would have authorized the executive to do so. The very fact that the Legislature empowered the executive to decide each case on individual merits clearly indicates the legislative decision that the problem cannot be solved within the four corners of pre-determined rules. Otherwise, the Legislature would have enacted general rules applicable to each case or would have authorized the executive to do so. The very fact that the Legislature empowered the executive to decide each case on individual merits clearly indicates the legislative decision that the problem cannot be solved within the four corners of pre-determined rules. If the Administrative Authority attempts to lay down a rule which the Legislature did not do, nor intended to do, the authority would plainly violate the legislative mandate and its so-called rules will be ultra vires and illegal. 51. Even if it is considered permissible for the Executive Authority to lay down a general rule of policy, the Authority must at the same time keep an open mind to consider each individual case on its merits and to consider whether having regard to the peculiar circumstances of a particular case the general policy should be applicable or not. 52. In (2) H. Lavender and Son v. Minister of Housing reported in 1970 (3) All E.R. 871, this question of fettering discretion by pre-determined general policy was considered in the context of the English Town and Country Planning Act, 1962. In this case, the applicants required planning permission in order to extract certain minerals from an agricultural holding, the greater part of which fell within a reservation area which was land of a very high agricultural quality. Permission was refused on the ground that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food objected to the proposed use for agricultural reasons. The applicants appealed to the Minister of Housing and Local Government under Section 23 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962. In dismissing the appeal, the Minister of Housing and Local Government stated his reasons, inter alia, as follows :- “It is the Minister’s present policy that land in the reservations should not be released for mineral working unless the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is not opposed to working. In the present case the agricultural objection has not been waived and the Minister has, therefore, decided not to grant planning permission for the working of the appeal site.” 53. In the present case the agricultural objection has not been waived and the Minister has, therefore, decided not to grant planning permission for the working of the appeal site.” 53. On an application under Section 179 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, for an order to quash the decision of the Minister of Housing and Local Government, it was held by Wills, J. that it was clear that the decision of the Minister to refuse planning permission to the applicants was made solely in pursuance of a pre-determined policy. Accordingly, the said policy became the decisive factor. As such, the Minister had failed in the proper exercise of his discretion by acting solely in accordance with his stated policy. Hence, the order was liable to be quashed. 54. An authority entrusted with the duty of making individual administrative decision in a fair and impartial manner any nevertheless have a general policy in regard to matters which are relevant to those decisions, provided that the existence of that general policy does not preclude him from fairly judging all the issues which are relevant to each individual case as it come up for decisions. 55. The principle has been reiterated the House of Lords in (3) British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Technology reported in (1970) 3 WLR 488. There Lord Reid observed as follows : “There are two general grounds on which the exercise of unqualified discretion can be attacked. It must not be exercised bad faith, and it must not be so unreasonably exercised as to show that there cannot have been any real or genuine exercise of the discretion. But, apart from that, if the Minister thinks that policy or good administration requires the operation of some limiting rule. I find nothing to stop him………..But the circumstances in which discretion are exercised vary enormously. The general rule is that anyone who has to exercise a statutory discretion must not ‘shut his cars to an application.” 56. H.W.R. Wade in his treatise on Administrative Law (5th Edition, 1982) at page 330 has commented on such abuse of discretion under the caption ‘Over-rigid Policies’ in the following terms : “An authority can fail to give its mind to a case, and thus fail to exercise its discretion lawfully, by blindly following a policy laid down in advance. H.W.R. Wade in his treatise on Administrative Law (5th Edition, 1982) at page 330 has commented on such abuse of discretion under the caption ‘Over-rigid Policies’ in the following terms : “An authority can fail to give its mind to a case, and thus fail to exercise its discretion lawfully, by blindly following a policy laid down in advance. It is a fundamental rule for exercise of the discretionary power that discretion must be brought to bear on every case : each one must be considered on its own merits and decided as the public interest requires as the time.” 57. The House of Lords in (4) Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council reported in (1982)2 WLR 62, found that the Greater London Council fell foul of the above principle when it proceeded to make a large subsidy to the London bus and underground services as a matter of course because the ruling party had promised to do so in their election campaign. The sacrifice of discretion to commitment in advanced would be an act ultra vires and void. Again, no authority is allowed to pursue a policy of consistency at the expense of the merits of individual cases. Professor Wade comments :- “In enforcing this rule the courts are underlining the difference between judicial and administrative processes. The legal rights of litigants are decided according to legal rules and precedents which are sometimes held to prevail over the court’s own opinion. But if an administrative authority acts in this way its decision is ultra vires and void. It is not allowed to ‘pursue consistency at the extense of the merits of individual cases’. This doctrine is applied even to statutory tribunals, despite their resemblance to courts of law”. (See Wade, Page 331) says Wade, (at page 335) of the said treatise : “It undoubtedly remains true that the Court will not accept indiscriminate use of a power where the cases ought to be considered on their own merits.” “There can be no substitute for the genuine exercise of discretion on every occasion.” 58. (See Wade, Page 331) says Wade, (at page 335) of the said treatise : “It undoubtedly remains true that the Court will not accept indiscriminate use of a power where the cases ought to be considered on their own merits.” “There can be no substitute for the genuine exercise of discretion on every occasion.” 58. In the premises, the refusal on the part of the C.M.D.A. and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to entertain the application for sanction submitted by the writ petitioner on the ground that the same did not conform to the so-called Development Control Guidelines without considering the particular aspect of the instant case and the individual merits and demerits of the proposal amounted to a failure to exercise discretionary power vested in the said authority under Section 46 of the said Act. In my view, the discretion has to be exercised in each particular case and an exercise of the power in the fetters of self imposed rules, purporting to bind the authority in all cases would not be within the amble of the Act. 59. Even if the C.M.D.A. is entitle to impose such Development Control Guidelines during the interim period when the Development Plan is yet to be prepared, then the impugned Guideline are open to attack on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. 60. We are concerned in this case with two provisions of the said Guidelines : one relating to open space and the other relating to F.A.R. Both these matters are ordinarily dealt with by the Building Rules contained in the Calcutta Municipal Act-Schedule XVI which are still in force. In Rule 20 of Schedule XVI of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, it has been provided that the covered area for all building on a site not exceeding 18 meters in height (the building in the instant case falls in this category) shall not exceed 2/3rd of the total area of the site. This means that the vacant open space that is mandatorily required to be maintained is 1/3rd of the total area of the site. But under the Development Control Guidelines, the C.M.D.A. requires 60% of the site to be maintained as open space and the covered area to be restricted to 40% of the site. This means that the vacant open space that is mandatorily required to be maintained is 1/3rd of the total area of the site. But under the Development Control Guidelines, the C.M.D.A. requires 60% of the site to be maintained as open space and the covered area to be restricted to 40% of the site. Similarly, F.A.R. admission under Rule 21 of the said Schedule is 4.40 inclusive of the service area, but the C.M.D.A. will not allow F.A.R. of more than 3. 61. It is to be noted in this connection that the said Building Rules are parts of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, and were framed by the Legislature. The said Building Rules are still in force, by virtue of Section 635(2)(f) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The effect of the imposition of the said Guidelines is to make the Building Rules more rigorous than what was considered justified by the Legislature. And this is being done by an executive order, without any statutory provision in that behalf. 62. The only justification offered by the C.M.D.A. for the imposition of the said restrictions is that pending the preparation of the Development Plan around the Metro Railway Station, in order to check the haphazard and sporadic private development, it is necessary to impose a development freeze for the interim period to facilitate the implementation of the Development Plan in future. Assuming that this may be a valid argument in the case of a wholly new construction on a completely vacant land, where no construction exists at all, in a case of reconstruction or addition or alteration this reasonable simply cannot apply. If the site is already covered according to the old Building Rules, it will be an absurd proposition to say that in order to make a reconstruction of an existing site or an addition thereto, one has to first demolish the said existing structure so as to generate 60% open space and then make reconstruction or addition. The same would apply in F.A.R. also. The absurdity of this requirement can be illustrated by an example. The same would apply in F.A.R. also. The absurdity of this requirement can be illustrated by an example. It in the vicinity of the Metro Railway Station there is already an existing building, according to the Building Rules leaving only 1/3rd open space and consuming F.A.R. as permissible under the Building Rules, in order to add only one room to the existing building, according to the requirement of C.M.D.A., one has to first demolish about 27% of the existing structure simply to have an open space of 60% of the site and only then one becomes eligible to add one additional room to the existing structure. The absurdity would be no less in the case of simple reconstruction of a building which has become insecure and requires to be reconstructed. In order to make such reconstruction, one has to substantially reduce the existing built-up area so as to cover only 40% of the site laving 60% open space and then undertake the reconstruction. 63. It is not difficult to appreciate that the above requirements of 40% ground coverage and restricted F.A.R. when sought to be applied to the case of reconstruction of/or addition or alteration to an existing building really operates as a total ban on any such work. This follows from the absurdity of the said requirement and the impracticability of fulfilling the same. Surely, no one will be able to carry out any work of reconstruction of or addition to an existing building if he has to forgo about 27% of the existing ground coverage and is also required to bring down the F.A.R. substantially. 64. Reference may be made in this context to the provisions of Section 46 of the said Act which deals with the interim provision pending the preparation of Development Plan. This Section provides that where the Planning Authority or the Development Authority in exercise of its functions and powers with respect to any area under it is required to have regard to the provisions of the Development Plan before such Development Plan has become operative, the authority concerned shall have regard to the provisions which, in its opinion will be required to be included for securing the proper planning of the concerned area. In order to invoke the aid of this provision, the following conditions must be fulfilled : (a) The authority is required to have regard to the provisions of the Development Plan before such plan has become operative. (b) The provisions of the Development Plan must be in existence even though the same has not yet become operative. (c) Formation of opinion by the authority concerned that certain provisions of the said Development Plan, which has not yet become operative, will be required to be included for security the proper planning of the concerned area. It may be pointed out that none of these conditions are fulfilled in the instant case. First and foremost the Development Plan has not yet been prepared in respect of the said area and, as such, there is no question of the existence of the provisions of the Development Plan. Secondly, the expression “is required to have regard” must mean, “required to have regard to some other provisions” or in other words, a requirement which is not subjective but which flows from an obligation imposed by the statute. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word "required" means "direct, order, demand, instruct, command, claim, compel or to ask for authoritatively or imperatively," So, the requirement must be imposed by law and not by one's own volition. Such a requirement can be found in the case of proposal for development submitted by any department of the Central or the State Government or any Local Authority governed by sub-section (5) and (6) of Section 46 of the said Act. In such cases, the authority concerned is required to have regard to any Development Plan even though it may be under preparation. There is no such requirement in the case of persons other than such departments of Government or Local Authority ; in other words, cases which are government by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 46 of the said Act. It is noteworthy that even in a case governed by sub-section (6) of Section 46, the Development Plan must be under preparation, but in the instant case there is not even any Development Plan under preparation. Unless the first two conditions are fulfilled, obviously it is not open to the authority to form any opinion which is the third condition for exercise of powers under Section 46 of the said Act. Unless the first two conditions are fulfilled, obviously it is not open to the authority to form any opinion which is the third condition for exercise of powers under Section 46 of the said Act. As such, there can be absolutely no question of invoking Section 46 of the said Act in the instant case. 65. It may be mentioned in this connection that a portion of S.S. Hogg Market, commonly known as the New Market, which was seriously burnt out in a devastating fire is being reconstructed after complete demolition and is being constructed as an entirely new building. This construction is being made only a few metres from the proposed site of the petitioner and it falls within the so-call Inner Impact Zone of the Metro Railway Station. But the said construction is going on without any objection from C.M.D.A. Under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 46 of the said Act, in the case of the Corporation which is a local authority, even the provision of a Development Plan under preparation could be a ground for raising objection (which is not the case under sub- section (3) of that section). But no objection was raised by C.M.D.A. even on the basis of the so-called Development Control Guidelines, although the said building of the New Market is being constructed with leaving 60% open space and without any restriction as to F.A.R. When this fact was pointed out in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Company in the Appeal Court, the C.M.D.A. relied by stating that the said construction by the Corporation was not a new construction but only repair and renovation, which is absurd, if not a blatant lie. The entire old structure was pulled down and an entirely new building is being constructed from the stage of foundation. The writ petitioner also wants to do the same thing. But here the C.M.D.A. objects and refuses permission although the circumstances are absolutely similar and there is no distinguishing feature between the two cases. On the one hand, this amounts to hostile discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution ; on the other hand, it demonstrates that the objection of the C.M.D.A. is without any justification and is not based on any lawful ground or any objective consideration, but is purely harassing. 66. On the one hand, this amounts to hostile discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution ; on the other hand, it demonstrates that the objection of the C.M.D.A. is without any justification and is not based on any lawful ground or any objective consideration, but is purely harassing. 66. There can be no dispute that the implementation of the Development Plan is not going to take place in the near future, as no such plan has yet been prepared. It is absolutely uncertain at this stage as to when the protracted process of preparation of the Development Plan and the various statutory steps required to be taken to put it into operation will be completed. It is also difficulty to foresee as to what will be the final shape of the Development Plan and what will be the specific contents thereof. In this state of affairs, it is absurd to suggest that no existing building or structure in the so-called Inner and Outer Impact Zones of the Metro Railway Station should be reconstructed. Nor should any work of addition or alteration be undertaken until coming into operation of the Development Plan. Calcutta is full of old buildings and structures. Many of such buildings may need urgent repairs. Some repairs may not be feasible without partial reconstruction. The owners of some old buildings may need additional accommodation, requiring them to make additional construction on the existing structure. Certain alterations in an existing structure may also be urgency needed in some cases. To say that all these must remain absolutely forbidden for an indefinite period and that status quo should be maintained in respect of all existing buildings, while the authorities will go on with their long-drawn exercise of Town Planning, is an absurd proposition. If such a restriction is sought to be imposed by executive flat, it will amount to an arbitrary executive action. Such an arbitrary action on the pare of the Executive Authority offends the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. 67. Our attention has been drawn to the observations of Bhagawati, J. in (5) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 , where the Supreme Court considered the decisions in (6) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 and (7) Ramana Dayaram Shetti v. International Airport Authority reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . The observations are as follows : “Now the question immediately arises all to what is the requirement of Art. 14 : What is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article. There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning for, to do to would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits..... Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or no arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence. “This was again reiterated by this Court in International Airport Authority’s case (1979)3 SCR (1014 ) at p. 1042 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) (supra), of the Report. It must, therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. The doctrine of classification which is evolved by the Courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached. Wherever, therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action, whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an “authority” under Article 12, Art, 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Construction.” 68. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Construction.” 68. Even if the C.M.D.A. has the statutory power to frame Development Control Guidelines pending the preparation of the Development Plan, the impugned provisions of the Guidelines relating to ground coverage and F.A.R., if sought to be applied to the case of reconstruction of or addition or alteration to an existing building and the structures, will lead to an absurd situation which is inherently unreasonable and arbitrary to the core. Further, it may be pointed out that any such restriction is entirely uncalled for and has no rational nexus with the object of Town Planning. If an existing building which already stands on a site with 50% ground coverage and 50% open space is reconstructed with the same ratio of ground coverage and vacant space or with same F.A.R., surely no fresh impediment to Town Planning can be caused by such reconstruction. The impediment, if any, is already there is the shape of the existing structure. As such a total ban on work of reconstruction or addition or alteration in relation to an existing structure as sought to be imposed by C.M.D.A. by virtue of the said Guidelines cannot be sustained in law and the same has to be struck down. 69. In (8) Samaresh Das v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in 1986(1) CHN 380 , Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J., while dealing with a case arising out of similar facts and circumstances had to consider the validity of the self-same Development Control Guidelines of the C.M.D.A. It was held that under the Scheme of the Act it is no where provided that the C.M.D.A. had been conferred with any power to prohibit the use of the land in a particular manner in contemplation of preparation of Development Plan. In other words, the authorities concerned had no power to freeze such land. It was pointed our that the proviso to Section 44 of the said Act expressly permitted the Planning Authority to allow a person to use a land contrary to the provisions of the Development Plan for a period upto 7 years from the date of enforcement of the Development Plan. It was pointed our that the proviso to Section 44 of the said Act expressly permitted the Planning Authority to allow a person to use a land contrary to the provisions of the Development Plan for a period upto 7 years from the date of enforcement of the Development Plan. This shows that even after a Development Plan has come into operation, the provisions of the Development Plan could be relaxed upto a period of 7 years from such enforcement. This Legislative policy of flexibility during the transitional period extending upto 7 years certainly indicates that no rigid embargo was intended to be imposed by the Legislature even after the enforcement of the Development Plan. That being so, the Planning Authority cannot impose a rigid embargo when no Development Plan has even been prepared. 70. Under such circumstances, it is not open to the Authority to prevent a person from constructing a building on the speculative ground that when such Development Plan is prepared in future the land in question might be required for surface dispersal facilities, near the Metro Railway Station. An embargo based on such speculative hypothetical ground is not only unwarranted in law but also amounts to deprivation of property without the authority of law. It would amount to a casa of exercising discretionary power on irrelevant consideration. The authority vested with discretionary power could not use discretion to frustrate the policy of the Act. 71. Assuming that Section 46 of the said Act would apply even in the absence of a Development Plan, this would only mean that when no Development Plan has been prepared or enforced, any person intending to make any work of construction or reconstruction of or addition or alteration to an existing building will have to apply for permission to do so from the C.M.D.A. The C.M.D.A. in dealing with such permission must confine itself to the expressed terms of sub-section (3) of Section 46. The said sub-section is quoted below : "Sec. 46(3) : (i) The concerned authority in dealing with the application for permission shall have regard to : (a) the provisions of the Development Plan, if it has come into operation ; and (b) any other material consideration ; (ii) The provision of sub-section (1) shall not apply to application under sub-section (5).” It no Development Plan has come into operation as in the instant case, the Authority will have no occasion to refer to any Development Plan. The Authority can only have regard to any other material consideration. Now, let us consider the meaning of this expression. 72. It is clear that the material consideration will be a consideration other than the Development Plan itself. This is obvious from the use of the words “any other” preceding the words “material consideration”. Material consideration will mean a consideration that is material to the issue in question. The issue being permission to make development, the consideration must be directly germane to it or, in other words, a relevant consideration. Therefore, in dealing with the particular application for permission to develop a land, the authority can only consider matters which are relevant to the question of granting permission to make the proposed construction. 73. In the instant case, the proposal is to construct a modern Shopping-cum-Commercial Complex on a land which is already built upon, where there are already clusters of shops. If the proposal had been considered on its own merits, taking into account the relevant facts and circumstances, the authorities would have found that far from causing any hindrance to Town Planning, the implementation of the said proposal, namely, the construction of an ultra modern Shopping Complex side by side with a four-storied car parking arrangement would be conducive to Town Planning. It will lead to a radical improvement of the area concerned. The authority should have taken into consideration the present state of affairs of the said site near Humayun Place where at present there are unplanned and haphazard clusters of shops, some of which encroach on the pavements, with two cinema houses on the South and the newly constructed S.S. Hogg Market on the East. The said area, namely, Humayun Place is notorious for serious congestion of vehicular traffic and human over-crowding. The said area, namely, Humayun Place is notorious for serious congestion of vehicular traffic and human over-crowding. One-half of Humayun Place, which is already a narrow road, is perpetually occupied by cars parked in the Fee Parking Zone of the Corporation and the remaining portion of the road is too inadequate for vehicular traffic. The present condition of the said site is certainly antagonistic to any concept of Town Planning. Instead of retaining the said structures in their present condition with the possibility of their inevitable deterioration, the petitioner Company wants to redevelop the same to convert it into a modern Shopping-cum-Commercial Complex and a four-storied Car Parking area. The Project also envisages the widening of the said narrow road. Once completed, the said reconstruction will really effect a total face-lift for the entire area. Not only that there will be substantial improvement in the physical condition of the said site but the changes will also lead to a better environment for the said locality. Such a Project, far from being a hindrance to future Town Planning, will, in fact, be conducive to the implementation of the future Development Plan in the area. If the authority concerned had taken into consideration these aspects of the matter which are all relevant considerations and hence material considerations within the meaning of Section 46(3) of the said Act, then instead of refusing permission to develop, the authority should have welcomed the idea of such improvement and redevelopment taking place entirely on the basis of private investment which will contribute substantially to the planning and development of the said area. 74. It may be repeated that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has already sanctioned the petitioner's plan for construction of four-storied parking area on condition that the existing shopkeepers cannot be evicted for constructing such parking space and they would have to be given alternative space. If the petitioner cannot construct the proposed complex in the site proposed by the petitioner, such plan sanctioned for parking area will be meaningless, though the petitioner has paid considerable fee and spent considerable money on such project. In other words, rejection of the plan for the proposed Shopping Complex would virtually mean that the plan already sanctioned for the car parking area cannot be implemented and it virtually means that and same plan also stands rejected. 75. In other words, rejection of the plan for the proposed Shopping Complex would virtually mean that the plan already sanctioned for the car parking area cannot be implemented and it virtually means that and same plan also stands rejected. 75. The so-called concept of "Inner Impact Zone" and "Outer Impact Zone" as used by C.M.D.A. in the said purported Guidelines and also in their Stay petition, appears to be without any legal basis. The Metro Railways are governed by Specific Statutory Provisions, such as metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978, Railways Act, 1890, etc. There is no provision in these statutes relating to the creation of such zones. Nor is there any such provision in the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979, either creating such Zones or empowering the authorities to do so, except by way of Development Plan. In the absence of any statutory provision in that behalf, the C.M.D.A. as a statutory authority cannot introduce such concepts or create such Zones, simply by using such expressions in their so-called Guidelines. It is not known as to how the limits of such Zones are to be determined and as to what is the criterion for determining such limits. Whether a particular site will fall within such Zone or outside the same may be a matter of crucial importance if the said Guidelines are to be followed. But there is neither any procedure for such determination nor any statutory provision in that behalf. It may be open to C.M.D.A. to incorporate such concepts in the Development Plan. In that event, any person affected may lodge objection and his objection has to be considered before the Development Plan is finalised and brought into operation. But when there is no Development Plan in respect of the said area, the whole exercise seems to be dependent on the whims and caprice of the executive authority, acting do hors the statute, in seeking to enforce such ill-conceived concepts. 76. As regards the problems of surface dispersal of the commuters in the Metro Railway Station area which is the basis of the so-called concept of Inner Impact Zone and Outer Impact Zone, it can be easily appreciated that the instant projects cannot in any way impede any programme of the Planning Authority for rational dispersal of such commuters. 76. As regards the problems of surface dispersal of the commuters in the Metro Railway Station area which is the basis of the so-called concept of Inner Impact Zone and Outer Impact Zone, it can be easily appreciated that the instant projects cannot in any way impede any programme of the Planning Authority for rational dispersal of such commuters. In the first place, this being a building site which is already covered up, any reconstruction of the existing structure will not lead to reduction of any available vacant land in the area. Vacant land will remain the same in the area, whether the said construction is made or not. But the very fact that the implementation of the instant Projects will lead to widening of the road, rational car parking arrangement, removal of traffic bottleneck and a general improvement of the said site as also the surrounding area, the completion of the said work is bound to have a salutary effect on the entire neighbourhood which, in its turn, will aid the process of planning including the surface dispersal of Metro Railway Commuters in that area. 77. After all, the parameters of Town Planning in the case of an old city like Calcutta which sprang up in a historical process sporadically and in an unplanned and haphazard manner, must be adjusted to the realities of the situation. The flexibility that the Planners may enjoy and the restriction that they may impose with case while planning for a new city which is yet to be born, cannot be applicable when the process of Town Planning is to be super imposed on a city like Calcutta. The existing buildings and structures, existing lay-out of roads, streets, lanes and by-lanes and the existing pattern of land use and the like are some of the constraints which cannot be wished away for the convenience of Town Planning. Town Planning must proceed keeping in view the said constraints and skillfully negotiating the same. 78. Town Planning is a protracted process. It will take a long time. No Town Planner can expect that during this long period of preparation of plans, all the old buildings and structures in Calcutta shall maintain their status quo and no repair or addition or alteration or reconstruction would be effected to the said old structures until the finalisation of the plans. It will take a long time. No Town Planner can expect that during this long period of preparation of plans, all the old buildings and structures in Calcutta shall maintain their status quo and no repair or addition or alteration or reconstruction would be effected to the said old structures until the finalisation of the plans. Any such expectation or requirements, whether contained in the statute or in the executive order must yield to a more reasonable view which will permit such private developments to be carried out as do not come in conflict with the basic strategy of the Town Planning. 79. In the instant case, as already discussed above, there is no such conflict. On the contrary, the implementation of the said Projects of the Company will, in fact, aid the process of Town Planning. As such, the C.M.D.A cannot have any reasonable objection to the said projects. 80. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The writ application is allowed. The order under appeal is confirmed. 81. The Respondent will be at liberty to commence the construction in accordance with the plan already sanctioned. 82. There will be no order as to costs. 83. Filing of paper book is dispensed with, undertaking is discharged. All parties concerned to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking. Yusuf, J. : I agree.