JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Petitioners assail correctness of the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur in a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the. Code). 2. Background facts are that on the basis of a report of the Officer- in-charge of Barchana Police Station that the original petitioner in this revision application was creating disturbance in the possession of opposite party herein, a proceeding u/s 144 of the Code was initiated by the, learned Executive Magistrate, Jaipur. Therein the present opposite party and one Bansidhar Tripathy (since dead) was arrayed as second party. By preliminary order dated 25-10-1979 said Banshidhar Tripathy was restrained from interfering in the disputed land. Subsequently the proceeding was converted to one u/s 145 of the Code and both parties were called upon to file their written statements and examine witnesses. Learned Executive Magistrate passed final order on 26-9-1983 declaring possession of the petitioner. The matter was carried in Criminal Revision No. 537 of 1983 before this Court and by order dated 24-4-1985, the order of the learned Executive Magistrate was set aside and the matter was remanded to him for fresh disposal in accordance with law On re-adjudication possess- ion of Bansidhar Tripathy was declared by the learned Executive Magistrate. In revision the-order was reversed. The revisional authority set aside the order of the Executive Magistrate passed in favour of Bansidhar, and directed that if there was any fresh apprehension of breach of peace, proper proceeding was to be drawn up afresh on proper materials and against the necessary parties. 3. The order of the revisional authority is being challenged on the ground that the same is not in terms of Section 145 of the Code, was passed without taking into consideration all relevant materials and was based on irrelevant materials. It is submitted on behalf of the Seamed counsel for the opposite party that the revisional order is absolutely justified and there is no scope for any interference. 4. It may be mentioned here that during pendency of revision application Banshidhar had died and was substituted by his would, sons and daughter. 5 On a perusal of order passed by the revisional authority, I find that he was prima facie satisfied that possession was with the present opposite party, but he has not passed a specific and definite order to that effect. 5 On a perusal of order passed by the revisional authority, I find that he was prima facie satisfied that possession was with the present opposite party, but he has not passed a specific and definite order to that effect. He has not passed any order to drop the proceeding and has merely said that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate was set aside and if there was any fresh apprehension of breach of peace necessary, proceeding was to be drawn up. Apprehension of breach of peace is a condition precedent to give jurisdiction to a Magistrate u/s 145, From the operating part of the order it appears that he was satisfied about absence of apprehension of breach of peace, u/s 145(1) of the Code. But, there is nothing to indicate that any material in that regard was placed before him. any event, there is no discussion of that aspect. 6. Sub-section (6) of Section 145 provides for final order to be passed by the Magistrate on the result of the inquiry as to possession made under Sub-section (4). It contemplates two eventualities; (i) where the Magistrate finds that one of the parties is in actual possession, but not as a result of forcibly or wrongfully dispossessing another party within two months previous as specified in the proviso to Sub-section (4), in such a case the proper order would be to declare his right to be in possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law and forbid other parties from disturbing his possession; or (ii) where the Magistrate finds that a party was in possession but has been forcibly or wrongfully dispossessed by another party within two months previous as specified in the proviso to Sub-section (4) in such a case the proper order would be to declare the party, so dispossessed, as being entitled to possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law and to forbid the other parties from disturbing his possession. 7. An order under Sub-section (6) is equal to an inquiry under Sub - Section (4). No order under Sub-section (6) can be made without any definite finding that a particular party was, or should under the proviso to Sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession on the material date. 7. An order under Sub-section (6) is equal to an inquiry under Sub - Section (4). No order under Sub-section (6) can be made without any definite finding that a particular party was, or should under the proviso to Sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession on the material date. In the instant case as indicated above, there was no material before the revisional Court to come to the conclusion that there was no apprehension of breach of peace, and therefore, it could not have directed the parties to come to Court again in case of fresh apprehension of breach of peace. That conti- ngency arose only when the proceeding which was pending was dropped on a definite finding of absence of apprehension of breach of peace. The order of the revisional Court is interdicted on that ground. 8. Further, I find that the revisional Court has not referred to all materials which were part of the record on being placed by the parties concerned before it. In revision it has set aside on order passed in favour of Banshidhar. It was, therefore, necessary to refer to all the materials which were placed before it. A revisional Court, when it upsets an order, has to refer to all relevant materials which are placed before it. Otherwise its order would be vulnerable having been passed by keeping out of consideration relevant materials. Therefore, without expressing any opinion about merits of contentions raised by the parties, I feel, interest of justice would be best served if the matter is re-adjudicated by the revisional Court. To avoid unnecessary delay the parties are directed to appear before it on 7th of August, 1991, when a date of hearing shall be fixed. It would do well to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as feasible, keeping in view the fact that the matter has not reached its finality even after a decade. The revision is, accordingly, disposed of.