Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J.: This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment learned single Judge in C.M.A.No.500 of 1983. That civil miscellaneous appeal, in directed against the orders of the Subordinate Judge of Pattukkot-tai, in C.P.No.20 The appellants herein are the petitioners in the original petition. The respondents herein the respondents in the original petition. We are referring to the parties in this judgment ours as per their nomenclature in the original petition. 2. The original petition was one presented by the petitioners under O.33, Rule 1 of the of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, for permission to sue as persons. The first court held that the petitioners are indigent persons. However, court held that the proposed suit would be barred by limitation. In this view, the first dismissed the original petition. There was no accord of time to the petitioners to requisite court-fees. The petitioners appealed in C.M.A.No.500 of 1983 to this Court learned single Judge of this Court dismissed it upholding the finding of the first court proposed suit would be barred by limitation. As stated above, this Letters Patent Appeal directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge in C.M.ANo.500 of 1983. 3. Mr.K.Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the petitioners, though initially ventured make submissions with regard to the question as to whether the proposed suit would barred by limitation, later confined his submissions to say that even if the application as indigent person taken out by his clients is to be rejected, time ought to have granted for payment of the court-fees, as enjoined by O.33, Rule 15-A of the Code, and pleads for grant of time at least by us. This submission of the learned counsel for petitioners obliged us to order notice of motion. Mr.KJayaraman appears for respondents. We heard submissions made by both the sides on the question as to whether we should grant time to the petitioners to pay the requisite court-fees on the proposed as requested by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 4. O.33, Rule 15-A of the Code introduced in 1976 certainly enables the court, rejecting the application, to grant time to the applicant to pay the requisite court- such time as may be fixed by the court and upon payment of the cost of the application. 4. O.33, Rule 15-A of the Code introduced in 1976 certainly enables the court, rejecting the application, to grant time to the applicant to pay the requisite court- such time as may be fixed by the court and upon payment of the cost of the application. O.33, Rule 15-A of the Code in terms reads as follows: “Nothing contained in Rule 5, Rule 7 or Rule 15 shall prevent a Court, while rejecting application under Rule 5 or refusing an application under Rule 7, from granting time applicant to pay the requisite court-fee within such time as may be fixed by the court extended by it from time to time; and upon such payment and on payment of the referred in sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 within that time, the suit shall be deemed to have instituted on the date on which the application for permission to sue as an indigent was presented.” In the present case, the payment of costs would not arise because both the first court the learned single Judge of this Court did not award costs. Then the question is whether, while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal finding no merits in it, we should time to the petitioners to pay the requisite court-fees for the proposed suit. Mr.K.Jayaraman, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that when there is a finding that the proposed suit would be barred by limitation, that must hold good as a final decision on that point it would be futile to permit the payment of court-fees on the proposed suit, granting therefor. As against this, Mr.K.Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the finding under O.33, Rule 5 of the Code on the question as to whether the proposed suit would be barred by limitation is only for a limited purpose, namely, to find out whether the petitioners should be permitted to sue as indigent persons or not and that conclusive and final on that question and the question can be agitated by the respondents and adjudicated upon by the court, even after the payment of the court-fees and the regularly entertained. We find that the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners deserves acceptance at our hands when we analyse the implications of the relevant provisions of the Code. We find that the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners deserves acceptance at our hands when we analyse the implications of the relevant provisions of the Code. O.33, Rule 5 of the Code sets forth the grounds on which the application to sue as an indigent person could be rejected. Clause 1) introduced in this State even in 1940, reads as follows: “Where the suit appears to be barred by any law, or,” Clause (f) was inserted by Central Act 104 of 1976 and it runs as follows: “Where the allegations made by the applicant in the application show that the suit would barred by any law for the time being in force.” 0.33, Rule 15 of the Code itself contemplates that while a refusal to allow the applicant sue as an indigent person, will be a bar for a subsequent application of like nature, applicant shall be at liberty to institute a suit in the ordinary manner in respect of such after paying the costs of the application. 5. The expression ‘appears’ occurring in Clause (d-1) inserted in this State in O.33, Rule the Code, clearly indicates that the enquiry as to the bar of limitation is a limited one and a final one. Equally so, the language of Clause (f) of O.33, Rule 5 of the Code extracted above bears out that the enquiry and finding are only prima facie and not conclusive. 6. Clause (d) of O.33, Rule 5 of the Code contemplates rejection of the application to an indigent person, where the allegations do not show a cause of action. While dealing that clause, as to what the court does and the scope of it, have been explained by Supreme Court in Vijaya Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, (1964)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) to the following effect: “But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action, the court does not upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It take into consideration, the defence which the defendant may raise upon the merits; the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions law or fact By the statute, the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to ascertaining whether the allegations a cause of action is shown; the jurisdiction does not extend to trial of which must fairly be left for decision at the hearing of the suit. ” It must be noted that though the language of clause (d), clause (d-1) and clause (f) may slightly different, yet their manner of operation and effect are one and that same. Kunhamed Kutty, J. in Lakshminarayanan v. Premier Bank of India, (1968)1 M.L.J. 333 , clauses (d) and (d-1) of O.33, Rule 5 of the Code and he opined as follows: “The court, of course, is not justified in determining a doubtful question of limitation or an elaborate enquiry into doubtful and complicated questions of law at this stage, by Rule 5, C.P.C” In Rajkumar Bhagwatsaran v. V.K.V.Rajan and others, (1971)1 M.L.J. 510 , a Bench Court consisting of Veeraswami, C.J., and Raghavan, J. while dealing with clause (d O.33, Rule 5 of the Code, held as follows: “ Under O.33, Rule 5(d-1) of the Code of Civil Procedure which was introduced amendment in Madras, the court should reject an application for permission to sue pauper, where the suit appears to be barred by any law. The court is, therefore, entitled in fact bound to find the facts necessary for deciding this question of limitation, not finally course, but to form a prima facie view on that.” We are not exhaustive in referring to the pronouncements in this connection and we find uniformly the pronouncements are to the above effect only. While deciding the application sue as an indigent person, court is not required to enter into consideration of complicated and doubtful questions of fact or of law. In view of the above petition, we do not think should take the finding, rendered on this question, as to whether the proposed suit would barred by limitation, as a final one. The decision is only for the limited purpose of finding as to whether the applicant could be permitted to sue as an indigent person. The court not render a final finding on this question at that stage. The decision is only for the limited purpose of finding as to whether the applicant could be permitted to sue as an indigent person. The court not render a final finding on this question at that stage. That question is still open agitation if a regular suit is instituted as per O.33, Rule 15 of the Code, or when on payment of court-fees, the application gets converted into a regular suit as per O.33, Rule 15 Code. In the said circumstances, we are prepared to countenance the plea put forth behalf of the petitioners for time to pay the requisite court fees on the proposed Mr.K.Chandrasekaran learned counsel for the petitioners explains to us that due to oversight there was an omission to put forth the alternative plea for payment of court-fees, before the first Court and before the learned single Judge of this Court. We accept it. 7. We have not been persuaded to take a different view on the primary question that proposed suit appears to be barred by limitation. Accordingly, while we dismiss this Patent Appeal, taking note of the pleas of the learned counsel for the petitioners, we the petitioners two months time from today to pay the requisite court-fees on the proposed suit, subject matter of O.P.No.20 of 1981 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Pattukkottai, We make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.