JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This is a Regular Second Appeal against the decree and judgment dated 14-9-1982 of Additional District Judge, Shimla, whereby the decree and judgment dated 31-7-1979 of Senior Sub-Judge, Shimla, was confirmed and the suit for possession filed by the respondent-plaintiff, Sh. Dhiraj Singh Bindra, was decreed in respect of the premises known as No 85 and 86, the Mali, Shitnia, against the appellants-defendants, S/Sh. Rawaii Singh and Nirmal Singh. 2. Premises No. 85 and 86, the Mall, Shimla, was an evacuee property. It was purchased by Sh. Bindra through a Benamidar, Sh. Devi Singh in a public auction held on 11-12-1967. Sale certificate was issued in favour of Sh Devi Singh on 26-10-1968 who further transferred the ownership of the premises to Sh. Dhiraj Singh Bindra through release deed dated 21- -IS69. As per the allegations made in the plaint, Sh Bindra had initiated eviction proceedings against S/Sh Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh on their mis-representation that they were tenants over the premises. Later, the eviction proceedings were withdrawn when Sh. Bindra learnt that their occupation was unauthorised and the present suit was filed. 3. S/Sh Rawaii Singh and Nirmal Singh resisted the suit, inter alia, on the grounds that since they were tenants, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and Sh. Bindra was estopped from filing the suit by his acts, conduct and deeds. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that S/Sh. Rawaii Singh and Nirmal Singh were not the tenants and as such liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs i 25 per month as the premises had been used as hotel. The issues of jurisdiction and estoppel were also decided against S/Sh. Rawaii Singh and Nirmal Singh The findings of the trial Court were further confirmed in appeal by the Additional District Judge. In appeal an alternative case was also put up by S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh that they were deemed to be tenants under section 29 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act of 1954) as they were in lawful possession of the premises before it was transferred to Sh. Bindra. The District Judge had negatived their plea that neither it was pleaded nor proved and also on merits. Hence the present second appeal. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Bindra. The District Judge had negatived their plea that neither it was pleaded nor proved and also on merits. Hence the present second appeal. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Admittedly, the whole controversy centres around the status of S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh over the premises in dispute. They have claimed themselves as tenants or deemed tenants under section 29 of the Act of 1954 being in authorised possession of the premises when it was transferred to Sh. Bindra. On the other hand, according to Sh. Bindra their occupation was unauthorised and they are liable to be evicted. As of today, it is well settled that question of status of a tenant in an issue of fact and findings of such fact cannot be set aside m second appeal. In Shrl Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and others AIR 1963 SC 361, the Supreme Court relying upon its previous judgments observed I - " In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanvmayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 this Court held that finding of fact arrived at by the District Judge on the consideration of all evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties cannot be set aside in second appeal. The question here is whether the respondents are the tenants of the appellant. Though for determining the question documentary evidence fell to be considered, the finding on the question is no less a finding of fact than may have been the case if the evidence to be considered was merely oral As was pointed out by this Court in that case as well as recently in Chunilal V. Mehtra and Sons Ltd. Bombay v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co, Ltd. Bombay C. A. No 417 of 1957 D/-5-3-1962 , AIR 1962 SC 1314, an issue of law does nor arise merely because documents which are not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundation of rights but are merely historical documents have to be construed " 5. It was not the case of S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh that they or Sh Tara Singh, who according to them continued residing in the premises upto 1960, were/was initially put in possession or possession was ever regularised by issuing allotment letter or agreement or any other document in their favour. It was not the case of S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh that they or Sh Tara Singh, who according to them continued residing in the premises upto 1960, were/was initially put in possession or possession was ever regularised by issuing allotment letter or agreement or any other document in their favour. For establishing their claim of tenancy over then remises they have relied upon the relevant extracts of Rent Demand and Collection Registers Exs. D-l to D-8 Rent Demand notices Ex, D-9 and Ex D-47 Rent Receipt Ex. D-10 to D-46. notices of Municipal Corporation Shimla for repairs of the premises Ex. D-49 and Ex. D-50. These documents were proved through officials of the offices of Naib Tehsildar (sales) Una Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, and Municipal corporation Shimla. These officials had no personal knowledge about the status of the persons occupying the premises in dispute and had deposed on the basis of official record. Admittedly, none of these documents are documents of title. Considering all these documents as well S the Sal evidence produced by S/Sh, Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh, both the courts below have concurrently found that they were not tenants or in authorised occupation of the premises and this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with these findings of fact. 6. Sh D. D. Sood, learned Counsel for S/Sh, Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh has vehemently urged that the inferences drawn by the District Judge from the documents Ex, D-1 to D-50 are not correct as in some of them, S/Sh Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh had been referred to as tenants and the amount demanded or received from them had been mentioned as rent This submission is also without any force. Mere inference from or the evidentiary value of a document raises only a question of fact unless it is proved that material evidence shown in it was misunderstood by the Court of fact. (Reference may be made to Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, AIR 1963 SC 884 and Jangbir v Mahavir Prasad Gupta, AIR 1977 SC 27. I have examined each pf these documents and in my opinion, the District Judge has correctly understood and drawn correct inferences of the evidence contained in them. These documents pertain to the period from 1960 whereas the premises in dispute were occupied on 15-12-1947. In none of these documents, the status of S/Sh. I have examined each pf these documents and in my opinion, the District Judge has correctly understood and drawn correct inferences of the evidence contained in them. These documents pertain to the period from 1960 whereas the premises in dispute were occupied on 15-12-1947. In none of these documents, the status of S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh is mentioned as tenant or licensee or allottee or any other authorised form of occupant. Demand notices Ex. D-9 and D-47 and receipts Ex D-10 to D-46 are on printed forms. In demand notices Ex. D-9 and D-47, it is mentioned that the amount demanded was either recovery of rent or damage charges and the words damage charges are scored off In Ex. D-10 to D-46, it is mentioned that the amount received was on account of rent/license fee/ lease money. Only in Ex D-29, Ex. D-30 and Ex. D-39, the words License fee and Lease Money stood scored off In all other documents it is not clear that the amount received was towards which of the three heads as none of them are scored off. Therefore, on the basis of a few rent receipts and demand notices which were prepared by officials of the department at lower level, it cannot be held conclusively that the status of S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh was that of tenant as alleged by them. In this regard reference may be made to Dr. H. S, Rikhy v. The New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR i 62 SC 554. In the absence of any document or any other evidence on record to show that S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh or Sh, Tara Singh had initially entered the premises by some authority or their occupation was ever regularised, it is not possible to hold that they were in authorised possession of the premises in dispute, what to hold their status as tenant. 7. Once it is found that S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were not in authorised occupation,^ they cannot be held to be deemed tenants under section 29 of the Act of 1954. Section 29 of the Act of 1954 reads as under:— "29. 7. Once it is found that S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were not in authorised occupation,^ they cannot be held to be deemed tenants under section 29 of the Act of 1954. Section 29 of the Act of 1954 reads as under:— "29. Special pr9tection from ejectment to certain classes of persons — (1) Where any person to whom the provisions of this section apply, is in lawful possession of any immovable property of the class notified under sub-section (2), which is transferred to another person under the provisions of this Act, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, such person shall, without prejudice to any other right which he may have in the property, be deemed to be a tenant of the transferee on the same terms and conditions as to payment bf rent or otherwise on which he held the property immediately before the transfer ; Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any such terms and conditions no such person shall be liable to be ejected from the property during such period not exceeding two years as may be prescribed in respect of that class of property, except on any of the following grounds, namely :— (a) that he has neither paid nor tendered the whole amount of arrears of rent due after the date of the transfer within one month of the date on which a notice of demand has been served on him by the transferee in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 188? ; (b) that he has, without obtaining the consent of the transferee in writing— (i) sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the property, or (ii) used the property for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was using it immediately before the transfer ; (c) that he has committed any act which is destructive of, or permanently injurious, to the property. (2) The Central Government may, from time to time by notification in the official Gazette, specify the class of persons to whom and the class of immovable property in the compensation pool, other than agricultural lard, in respect of which, the provisions of this section shall apply and in issuing any such notification the Central Government shall have regard to the following matters, that is to say— (a) the length of the period for which any such person may have been in lawful possession of the property ; (b) the difficulty of obtaining alternative accommodation ; (c) the availability of any other suitable residential accommodation for the use of the transferee ; and (d) such other matters as may be prescribed " 8. Mere reading of this section shows that it was enacted to protect all those who were not tenants but were in authorised occupation of the evacuee property notified by the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Act of 1954. Assuming that the requisite notifications were there in the present case, for extending benefits of sub-section (t) of section 29 of the Act of 1954, it was yet to b3 established that S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were in lawful possession of the premises in dispute. The phrase lawful possession used in this provision is nothing but authorised possession which is not unauthorised and illegal In this view of the matter, I need not refer to the arguments as well as the case law cited by Sh D D. Sood, learned Counsel for Sh Rawail Singh and Ninnai Singh, that once a person is held deemed tenant under section 29 of the Act of 1954, he becomes statutory tenant and can be evicted under the tenancy laws only, 1 need not even refer to another argument raised by Sh. D. D Sood that for becoming lawful occupant of the evacuee property, S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were not required to show that they had entered into agreement with the Central Government in terms of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. D. D Sood that for becoming lawful occupant of the evacuee property, S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were not required to show that they had entered into agreement with the Central Government in terms of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. For becoming deemed tenant under section 29 of the Act of 1954 and thereby statutory tenant, an agreement under Article 299 of the Constitution might not be necessary but the occupant claiming his occupation lawful must show some authority permitting him to occupy the premises initially or regularising his occupation at later stage. 9. In the administration of Evacuee Property Act and the Rules made thereunder, the Custodian has been given ample powers to lease out or allot or regularise the occupation of evacuee property in the interest of its administration and management. But it has not been shown whether any such order was passed in the present case. Sh. D. D. Sood has cited some judgments in Smt. Jamna Bai and another v. Union of India and others, 1965 PLR 394, Kesaf Das and others v Jaisa Ram and others, 1967 PLR 499, Gurcharan Singh v. Sh. Devki Nandan and another^ 1970 Current Law Journal, 49 and Faquir Singh v. Kasturi Lai, 1981 (1) RCR 437 where the occupants of the evacuee property were allottees, therefore, the courts held them as deemed tenants as well as statutory tenants liable to be evicted in accordance with the tenancy laws. In another case Union of India v. Santokh Singh and another, 1967 Current Law Journal 619 long possession of the evacuee property was held to be authorised on the admitted stand of the Department that rent of the property was accepted from the occupant. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, none of the authorities cited by Sh. D D. Sood is applicable. Above all, the District Judge was right in holding that S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh had not put up their alternative case either in the pleadings or in evidence which had prejudiced the case of Sh. Bindra S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were lawful occupants of the premises and were entitled to protection under section 29 of the Act of 1954, was a mixed question of law and fact and for its decision, pleadings as well as evidence was required. 10. Bindra S/Sh. Rawail Singh and Nirmal Singh were lawful occupants of the premises and were entitled to protection under section 29 of the Act of 1954, was a mixed question of law and fact and for its decision, pleadings as well as evidence was required. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.