S. C. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal by plaintiffs who were unsuccessful in their claim for eviction in the two courts below was by order dated 5-11-85 admitted for final hearing on the substantial question of law set out below :- "whether on facts and circumstances of the case defendant has acquired suitable vacant accommodation for residence and plaintiffs are entitled to eviction under S. 12 (1) (i) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act ?" ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs case in brief is that they are owner of the house bearing No. 2, Kanoongo Bakhal, Indore. The defendant is a tenant of one room and osari for residential purpose on the first floor of the plaintiffs' commences from the first of every month according to English Calendar. The plaintiffs claimed for eviction on the ground under S. 12 (1) (e) and (it of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act) - Bona fide requirement for residence for himself and for any member of his family and there being no other alternative accommodation of his own in the city and that the defendant has acquired vacant possession of house bearing No. 13/30 Peer Gali, Indore on 28-12-1972 which is suitable for his residence he has also acquired premises consisting of five rooms at 146 Pandharinath Path, Indore and his need does not exist. The plaintiff after serving quit-notice, Ex. P/4 germinating tenancy on 31-1-78 filed the suit claiming mesne profits and eviction. The defendant resisted the suit contending that house at 146, Pandharinath Path did not belong to him but was gifted to his wife and sons and could not be taken into consideration in judging defendant's need. About house No,13/30 Peer Gali it was submitted that house is Kachcha and old and has no water connection and lavatory and is not suitable for his residence. The suit was filed with ulterior motive to getting the rent increased and it was res judicata. ( 3 ) THE trial Court (6th Civil Judge, Class II, Indore) by judgment and decree dated 25-1-85 held that the defendant had acquired house bearing Municipal No, 13 / 30 Peer Gali, Indore on 28-12-72 but the same was not suitable for residence. ( 3 ) THE trial Court (6th Civil Judge, Class II, Indore) by judgment and decree dated 25-1-85 held that the defendant had acquired house bearing Municipal No, 13 / 30 Peer Gali, Indore on 28-12-72 but the same was not suitable for residence. The plaintiffs did not require the house bona fide for residence of members of his family, that he was not possessed of any alternative accommodation at Indore, that it was not resjudicata; that house at 146 Pandharinath Path is not suitable for defendant's residence. With these findings the trial Court dismissed the suit for eviction. Parties were directed to bear their own costs. ( 4 ) IN appeal by plaintiffs the first appellate Court by judgment and decree dated 1-8-85 held that house at 146, Pandharinath Path, Indore was obtained in gift by sons and wife of defendant and could not be taken into consideration in judging the need of the defendant's residence. Besides, the defendant with his wife and children was living in that house. About the house at Peer Cali (i. e. No. 13 / 30) he held that it has no lavatory but only common Public lavatory near by which would not fulfil the defendant's need. Till the lavatory is constructed it would not be suitable for defendant's residence. The first appellate Court however, granted mesne profits from 1-2-78 but dismissed the claim for eviction. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. Hence, the present appeal. ( 5 ) AT the hearing of the appeal, Shri R. G. Waghmare Senior Advocate with Shri Uday Wadnerkar representing the plaintiff/ appellants submitted that admittedly the defendant had acquired the house No. 13 / 30 situated at Peer Gali, Indore which was at one time a Paiga i. e. hourse stable belonging to Erstwhile Jagirdar and the wife and sons of the defendant had been sifted the house at 146, Pandharinath Path, Indore. Shri Waghmare emphasized that while the defendant had only one room in plaintiff's house, the house at 13/30 Peer Gali had two rooms and a Varanda and had been let out by defendant to a tenant. Earlier, it was used by the tenant for residential purposes and when the defendant purchased it is was being used by one Khedkar for residential purpose. Earlier, it was used by the tenant for residential purposes and when the defendant purchased it is was being used by one Khedkar for residential purpose. The two Courts below were in error in holding that this accommodation which was much larger than one room occupied by the defendant in the plaintiff's house was not suitable for defendant's residence merely because there was no separate lavatory therein. He emphasized that absence of lavatory would not detract from reasonable suitability of accommodation qua the defendant. In that connection he also emphasized that the house has electric and water connection and in that a tenant resides therein. ( 6 ) PROCEEDING further, Shri Waghmare submitted that two Courts below in error have held that merely because the house at 146 Pandharinath Path, Indore was gifted to wife and sons of the defendant it could not be taken into consideration for judging plaintiff's claim under S. 12 (1) (i) of the Act as an acquisition of the defendant himself. He submitted that wife had not been examined in the case, that defendant and his wife were living together, there was nothing to show that there was any disruption of matrimonial relationship between them. Therefore, even if the house at 146, Pandharinath Path may have been gifted to defendant's wife and sons the wife's share ought to have been taken into consideration in judging plaintiff's claim for eviction as defendant's acquisition of suitable residence. In support of his argument Shri Waghmare relied on the following decisions :- (1) S. P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta, AIR 1987 SC 222 : (1987 All LJ 88); (2) Ahmed Khan Rajja Khan v. Michel Nath Bhola Nath, 1977 MPLJ 574; (3) Akshaya Kumar v. Smt. Chhail Kunwarbai, 1981 MPRCJ 182; (4) Manak Chand v. Kamal Prabha, 1984 MPRCJ 129. ( 7 ) OPPOSING Shri Waghmare's contentions, Shri Sisodia learned advocate representing the defendant / respondent submitted that the Courts below had rightly held that the house at 146 Pandharinath Path belonging to wife and sons of the defendant could not be taken into consideration as alternative accommodation belonging to defendant for judging plaintiff's claim for eviction under S. 12 (1) (i) of the Act. He defended the interpretation of the word "suitable for his residence" in S. 12 (1) (i) made by the Courts below and submitted that the accommodation acquired by the plaintiffs at 13/30 Peer Gali, Indore was not suitable for defendant's residence. He prayed for dismissal of the appeal. ( 8 ) S. 12 (1) (i) of the Act is reproduced below :- "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only namely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (i) that the tenant as whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possesion of or been allotted an accommodation suitable for his residence. ( 9 ) THE trial court discussed the defendants sutiability of residence in respect of the house acquired by the defendant at 13/30 Peer Gali, Indore in paras 10 and 11 of its judgment. The first appellate Court while affirming the finding in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiffs discussed the same in paras 9 and 10 of its judgment. The first appellate Court mainly found that the house is not suitable for residence of the defendant for the reason that it has no exclusive lavatory but has a common public lavatory nearby called "bum pulis". The first appellate Court mainly found that the house is not suitable for residence of the defendant for the reason that it has no exclusive lavatory but has a common public lavatory nearby called "bum pulis". He observed that the defendant in the suit accommodation had the facility of exclusive lavatory used by all the tenants and it would be improper to compel him to use a public latrine and that till this construction was made in the Peer Gali house the residence could not be said to be suitable for his residence. ( 10 ) ORDINARILY whether or not a house is suitable for residence would be a question of fact and this court would be loath to interfere with the finding unless in arriving at the finding the appellate court is shown or found to have committed an error of law. In S. P. Jain's case (supra) though in a slightly different context where the landlord Govt. servant/appellant lived on the ground floor of the house where there was a joint latrine which created difficulty for the appellant and he claimed possession of the first floor occupied by the defendant, the Supreme Court held as under (at page SC 229; of AIR 1987) :- "here in the instant case, Shri Mahrota, counsel for the appellant, however, stressed that in order to be a dwelling house or residential accommodation it must be capable of being separately enjoyed and separately locked up. It is true that without that facility, the concept of safe and separate dwelling gets hampered. Yet in view of the fact that premises can be enjoyed with common facilities for dwelling purposes would constitute a separate and independent dwelling houses. In our opinion to be the dwelling house or residential accommodation it must be capable of being separately enjoyed and whether or not the premises in question can be so enjoyed does not depend merely because that a portion cannot be locked up independently or separately. " as already observed above, observation came to be made in different context. In that case the appellant wanted to have recourse to summary remedy of eviction available under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In the present case the defendant in the suit accommodation is using a lavatory used by all the tenants. In that case the appellant wanted to have recourse to summary remedy of eviction available under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In the present case the defendant in the suit accommodation is using a lavatory used by all the tenants. The defendant himself admits that at Peer Gali at present there is no exclusive lavatory. The neighbours of house No. 13/30 at Peer Gali constructed their own lavatory. The record also discloses that it has tap connection which could be reconnected with payment of usual charges. The witnesses on the point are defendant, Onkarlal himself and the plaintiff's witness, Madanlal (P. W. 2) and Keshav Lal (P. W. 3) who are neighbours with respect to the house No. 13/30 Peer Gali, Indore. In this house one Prakash Bottle Wala is a tenant at present. From the statement of these witnesses it appears that earlier one Baburao Khedkar was living there along with his family and at that time there was arrangement of common lavatory. Thereafter, from the statement of Madan Lal and Keshav Lal it appears that neighbours have constructed their own lavatories but the defendant has not made any such construction in the house. From the statement of Keshav Lal (P. W. 3) it appears that Prakash to whom the house was rented was using it as his residence and is now using half portion of it as godown and half of it as residence where there is also telephone. The defendant, Onkar Lal himself it appears had got Ex. D/2 Plan for construction of Peer Gali house approved. This map would show that it has provision besides other things of lavatory and bath rooms, but he could not get the same done because his tenant resisted his attempt to get the same vacated. The defendant, Onkar Lal himself it appears had got Ex. D/2 Plan for construction of Peer Gali house approved. This map would show that it has provision besides other things of lavatory and bath rooms, but he could not get the same done because his tenant resisted his attempt to get the same vacated. ( 11 ) IN Akshaya Kumar v. Smt. Chhail Kunwarbai and others, 1981 MPRCJ 182 comparing clauses (e) and (f) with clause (i) of S. 12 (1) of the Act this court held as under :- "a reference to S. 12 (1) (e) and (f) of the Act would show that in terms of those clauses a landlord is entitled to get ejectment of his tenant from the tenanted accommodation if he requires that accommodation either for his residence or for his business provided he is not in occupation of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. In these clauses, the expression 'suitable accommodation' is qualified by the word 'reasonably' in clause (i) of S. 12 (1) of the Act is not without any significance. The expression 'reasonably' as used in clauses (e) and (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 of the Act does not appear to be capable of any precise definition, 'reasonable'. However, means rational, according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate'. Qualifying the term 'suitable accommodation' as it does, the expression 'reasonably' becomes a relative term. An accommodation may be reasonably suitable to A but may not be so to B and vice versa. In considering whether an accommodation is reasonably suitable to a person, the nature of his work, the vocation, the status of his health, his status in society and like considerations may well be taken into account. Such considerations may, therefore, weigh in finding out the reasonableness of the suitability of the accommodation within the meaning of clause (e) and ably or resonably does not find place in S. 12 (1) (i), it has to be held that the legislature did not intend to bring within its ambit the consideration of reasonableness regarding suitability of the accommodation which the tenant may have built, a, acquired vacant possession of or may have been allotted for his residence. Normally, when the premises are built by a tenant for his residence, it may be assumed that he had taken into account all relevant circumstances and has provided such amenities as may make the accommodation suitable for his residence. May be that the house so built by the tenant is less economical or less comfortable or less convenient than the one he is occupying as a tenant. Nevertheless merely for that reason, it cannot be held that the house so built by him is not suitable for his residence. This view finds support from the decision of the Mysore High Court reported in H. Anantha Rao v. Indumathi. What is to be seen is the suitability for purpose of residence of that accommodation which the tenant has either built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted for his residence. " ( 12 ) IN Ahmed Khan Rajju Khan v. Michel Nath Bhola Nath (1977 MPLJ 574) it was inter alia held that "looking to the language of clause (i) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 of the Act, it is apparent that there is nothing therein to require that the tenant should continue to have the vacant possession of the accommodation built by him on the date of the suit. Once he had acquired vacant possession, either by building or by allotment of otherwise, and the same was suitable for his residence, all the requirements of clause (1) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 of the Act are satisfied. The consequence thereby is that the tenant becomes disentitled to protection available to him under the Act, the moment he acquires vacant possession of the accommodation suitable for his residence, in either of the three circumstances stated above. " in view of the difference in language in clause (i) in juxtaposition with clauses (e) and (f) of sub-s. (1) and omission of the term 'reasonably' in clause (i) as noticed and discussed in Akashya Kumar's case (supra) the test of reasonableness in respect of the alternative accommodation available to the tenant would appear unnecessary and only suitability for residence would have to be examined. Considering that even now the defendant uses only common lavatory used by all tenants and the accommodation at 13/30 Peer Gali has common Public Lavatory, finding of the first appellate court that house No. 13/30 at Peer Gali is not suitable for residence of the defendant is not acceptable. The defendant himself in his cross-examination admits that he had obtained vacant possession of the house at 13/30 peer Gali Gate, therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in Ahmed Khan's case (supra) even if the same may have been subsequently occupied by a tenant, the defendant has become disentitled to protection under the Act. As a result of the aforesaid discussion the finding of the first appellate court is set aside and it is held that accommodation at 13/30 Peer Gali is suitable for residence for the defendant. In view of the foregoing it would appear unnecessary to consider whether wife's share in house at 146 Pandharinath Path gifted to defendant's wife and sons could be taken into consideration as alternative accommodation to defendant for judging the plaintiffs' claim under S. 12 (1) (i) of the Act. Besides on record there is nothing to show as to what is the share of the wife in the house at 146 Pandharinath Path. ( 13 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is modified. That part of the judgment and decree dismissing claim for eviction is set aside and instead, the claim for eviction under S. 12 (1) (i) of the Act is decreed against him. The defendant is granted two months time to vacate the accommodation and hand over possession of the same to plaintiff. Defendant/respondent shall pay costs of this appeal and bear his own. Pleader's fee according to schedule or certificate whichever is less. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal allowed. Appeal allowed. .