Judgment B. N. Agrawal, J. This application has been filed for quashing the order taking cognizance under section 52 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1974 (hereinafter to be referred to as' the Act') upon a petition of complaint. 2. Since this application has to succeed on a short, question, it is not necessary to state the facts. The question is as to whether the sanction accorded was valid in law. In the petition of complaint against the column of complainant, it has been mentioned as Patna Regional Development Authority (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Authority') through its Vice-Chairman Shri A. K. Chatterji and at the bottom the same has been signed by its Vice-Chairman. In paragraph 10 of the petition of Complaint, it has been mentioned that sanction has been obtained under section 73 of the Act. The Vice-Chairman of the Authority has accorded sanction, which order reads thus: "Sanction of prosecution - Abhiyojan Ki Swikriti. Dee Jatee Hai- Sd/-A. K. Chatterji 15. 1. 1988. Upadhyaksh Vice-Chairman, Patna Regional Development Authority. The learned Magistrate upon receipt of the petition of complaint has taken cognizance, summoned the accuse d persons and transferred the case for trial. Hence this application. 3: Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in support of this application contended that prosecution of the petitioner is bad as the sanction has not been accorded by the competent authority as enumerated In Section 73 of the Act, which reads thus: "73. Sanction of prosecution.-No prosecution-for any offence punishable under this Act, shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Authority or the Chairman or any officer authorised by the Authority or the Chairman in this behalf." It has been submitted that under section 73 of the Act, a prosecution for an offence punishable under the Act, can be instituted only with previous sanction of the Authority or the Chairman or any officer authorised by the Authority or the Chairman in this behalf. Undisputedly, the Vice-Chairman is neither the Authority nor its Chairman within the meaning of the Act, and he has not been authorised either by the Authority or by the Chairman to accord sanction. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Authority, on the other hand, submitted that there is no illegality in the prosecution as under section 88 of the Act, a Vice-Chairman is empowered to launch prosecution. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Authority, on the other hand, submitted that there is no illegality in the prosecution as under section 88 of the Act, a Vice-Chairman is empowered to launch prosecution. The said section runs thus: "88. Power of Vice-Chairman to the institution, composition, etc. of legal proceedings and obtaining legal advice-The Vice-Chairman may, on behalf of the Authority and subject to control by it- (a) institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under this Act, or any rule or regulation made thereunder; (b) compound any offence under this Act, or under any other law for the time being ill force which may be lawfully compounded by the Authority: (c) admit, compromise or withdraw any claim made by or against the Authority ; and (d) obtain such legal advice and assistance as he may from time to time think necessary or expedient to obtain or as he may be desired by the Authority to obtain for any of the purposes referred to in the foregoing clauses of this section, or for securing the lawful exercise or discharge of any power duly vested in or imposed upon the Authority or any officer or employee of the Authority. " 4. According to section 88 of the Act, a Vice-Chairman on behalf of the Authority and subject to its control could institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under this Act, or any rule or regulation made thereunder. This section only empowers the Vice- Chairman of the Authority to institute a criminal prosecution, but the question of sanction is entirely an independent matter from institution of the prosecution. For that one has to travel to section 73 of the Act, which categorically says that no prosecution can be launched without prior sanction of the concerned persons, enumerated thereunder. Section 88 of the Act, in my view, is subject to the provisions of section 73 of the Act. If is, held that in view of the provision of section 88 of the Act, the requirement of sanction enumerated under Section 73 of the Act, need not be fulfilled in that event section 73 of the Act, would become redundant. It is well settled that no provision of a statute can be, redundant. Courts should not give such an interpretation to a statute so as to make it redundant. It is well settled that no provision of a statute can be, redundant. Courts should not give such an interpretation to a statute so as to make it redundant. Section 88 of the Act, only lays down which officer of the Authority can launch prosecution but section 73 of the Act, puts a bar upon the powers of the Court in taking cognizance in the absence of an order of sanction for prosecution. Cumulative effect of these two sections is that Vice-Chairman of the Authority can launch prosecution after obtaining sanction from any of the persons required under section 73 of the Act. This being the position, I am clearly of the view that the provision of section 88 of the Act, is subject to the provision of section 73 of the Act. 5. The matter may be examined from another angle. As in the petition of complaint the name of the complainant has been described as Patna Regional Development Authority through its Vice-Chairman, the question arises as to who is the complainant-whether the Authority or its Chairman. It is well settled that for interpreting a document, entire document should be looked into. Though from the cause title of the petition of complaint it appears that the Authority was the complainant, but from the entire petition of• complaint it appears that the complainant was not the Authority, rather its Vice-Chairman. If the Authority would have been the complainant, then the seal of the Authority would have been put ill the petition of complaint. It would be useful to refer- to section 3 (2) of the Act, which reads thus: "The authority shall be a body corporate by the aforesaid name, shall have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to enter into contract and to acquire, hold and dispose of property both movable and immovable and shall by the said name sue and be sued-" From a bare perusal of Section 3 (2) of the Act, it would appear that the Authority is a juristic person and shall have a perpetual succession and common seal with power to enter into contract and acquire, hold and dispose of the properties, both movable and immovable and shall by its name sue and be sued. The expression "sue and be sued" is very wide. Can it be said that it will apply only in civil proceeding? The expression "sue and be sued" is very wide. Can it be said that it will apply only in civil proceeding? In my view, the said sub-section is not in the context of the civil proceeding only. It lays down that the company shall have a common sea1. If the Authority being the juristic person was the complainant, then its seal ought to have been put upon to complaint, but there is no seal of the Authority upon the petition of complaint. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint was filed by the Authority; rather the same dearly shows that the petition of complaint was filed by Vice-Chairman of the Authority. Therefore, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Authority cannot take any advantage from section 3 (2) of the Act. In view of the foregoing discussions, I am clearly of the view that prosecution of the petitioners is bad in view of the fact that the Vice-Chairman of the Authority who has accorded sanction was not competent to accord the same and in the absence of a valid sanction the cognizance becomes null and void, as such to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, the prosecution cannot be allowed to continue and in the ends of justice, the same is fit to be quashed. 6. In the result, this application is allowed, and prosecution of the petitioners is hereby quashed. This application is accordingly allowed. Application allowed.