JUDGMENT - M.S. VAIDYA, J.:---All of these proceedings have arisen out of an externment order dated 6-5-1988, passed against the petitioner in Writ petition No. 132 of 1989 by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chalisgaon Division, District-Jalgaon. 2. The fact giving rise to the aforesaid proceedings are, in brief, as follows :- The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 was a Police Patil of the village Kalamsare, Taluka Pachora, District Jalgaon. A show cause notice dated 21-1-1988 was issued to him by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chalisgaon Division, in Externment Proceeding No. 15 of 1987, then pending on his file, stating that certain offences were registered against him at Pimpalgaon Police Station, bearing C.R. Nos. 26 of 1985, 27 of 1985, 54 of 1987, N.C. No. 6 of 1985, and that certain proceedings under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code were launched against him. It was also averred in the said notice that on account of the acts of terrorism in which the petitioner had indulged from time to time, the villagers were not prepared to lodge complaints against him. It was further added in the notice that the life and the property of the villagers was in danger on account of criminal activities of the petitioner and that witnesses were not prepared to come-forth to give evidence against him. On these grounds, the petitioner was called upon to show cause why he should not be externed. (Exh. A of W.P. No. 132 of 1989). The petitioner had appeared before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and had filed his say (vide Exh. B in the same writ petition), contending that he did not even remember to have committed any offences which were registered as C.R. Nos. 26 of 1985 and 27 of 1985. As regards the complaint registered at C.R. No. 54 of 1987, his contention was that he was falsely implicated in connection with that offence on account of political motives of some people, who were interested in bringing him to dis-repute and de-gradation. He maintained that about 54 persons were falsely implicated by the persons concerned in connection with that offence. As regards C.R. No. 128 of 1987, he contended that he had not threatened a woman, by name Mainabai, and that he had not asked her to withdraw her complaint against him. He maintained that about 54 persons were falsely implicated by the persons concerned in connection with that offence. As regards C.R. No. 128 of 1987, he contended that he had not threatened a woman, by name Mainabai, and that he had not asked her to withdraw her complaint against him. He contended that he was a Director of Shendurni Ginning and Pressing Co-operative Society, since 1983 or there about, and further that he was working as a successful Police Patil of the village during the said period. He pointed out also that he was the Chairman of the Milk Dairy in 1985 and that he had been a Director of the said Dairy even on the date of filing of the written statement in the externment proceeding. According to him, he was a respectable person and he had not provided any cause for serving upon him a notice for externment. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate appears to have recorded some evidence thereafter and had found favour with the case of externment made out against the petitioner. Therefore, under the impugned order dated 6-5-1988, the petitioner was directed to remove himself outside the limits of Jalgaon, Dhule, Nasik, Aurangabad and Buldhana Districts and not to return to the said Districts for a period of two years. He was also directed to report, during the said period, his place of residence to the Officer in-charge of the nearest Police Station once in a month. Some other restrictions also were imposed on the petitioner. Having felt aggrieved by this order, the petitioner had preferred an appeal dated 13-5-1988 to the Government of Maharashtra. The said appeal was heard and disposed of in course of time and under an order dated 13-5-1988, the appeal was allowed in part. The externment order in so far as it related to Jalgaon District was confirmed, but the same was set aside in respect of the four other Districts. It was against this order, that the petitioner had sought relief in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989, in this Court. This writ petition was filed on 15-5-1989 and the same was put up for order on 15-5-1989. Rule was granted on that day with a further direction that the matter should be kept for final hearing on 7-6-1989. The interim stay to the externment order was, however, not granted in view of the aforesaid order passed by this Court. 3. This writ petition was filed on 15-5-1989 and the same was put up for order on 15-5-1989. Rule was granted on that day with a further direction that the matter should be kept for final hearing on 7-6-1989. The interim stay to the externment order was, however, not granted in view of the aforesaid order passed by this Court. 3. The matter probably did not reach for hearing on 7-6-1989. An application bearing No. 375 of 1989 was preferred in the said writ petition, under which the petitioner had sought the permission of the Court to enter his village Kalamsare for participating in the election of the Gram Panchayat, which was scheduled to be held on 26th June, 1989. The Court had granted permission to that effect upto 27-6-1989 "only to enable the petitioner to participate in the said election of that village only" with liberty to the other side to move in case of necessity. Thereafter, the petitioner had applied for a similar leave for some other purpose for the period of seven days from 10-8-1989 in Application No. 467 of 1989 and this Court had granted that permission under an order dated 10-8-1989. A third application for similar leave for some other reason, bearing Criminal Application No. 744 of 1989 was preferred for some similar reason, seeking leave to enter the village on 24-1-1989 and 25-11-1989. The same was also granted by this Court. Afterwards, in Civil Application No. 311 of 1991, this Court had granted leave to the petitioner for a period from 10-4-1991 to 14-4-1991. Again, in civil Application No. 435 of 1991, similar permission was granted for the period from 18-5-1991 to 25-5-1991. Finally, in Civil Application No. 465 of 1991, similar leave was granted for the period 11-6-1991 to 15-6-1991. 4. So far as the Government was concerned, pending the appeal preferred to it, the Government had stayed the operation of the impugned externment order till the decision of the appeal under an order dated 30th May, 1988. As already stated above, the said appeal was disposed of under an order dated 4-5-1989. Therefore, the aforesaid stay order (vide Exh. E in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989) was in operation till 4-5-1989. As already stated above, the said appeal was disposed of under an order dated 4-5-1989. Therefore, the aforesaid stay order (vide Exh. E in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989) was in operation till 4-5-1989. After the disposal of the said appeal, the petitioner had preferred an application dated 22-12-1989, seeking certain relief against the externment order and under order dated 29th December, 1989 (vide pages 13 and 14 in Writ Petition No. 52 of 1991), the Government was pleased to allow the petitioner to enter his village, subject to certain conditions for maintenance of law and order, for a period of six months from the date of the order. The petitioner was, in course of time, elected as a Sarpanch of the village and, therefore, the petitioner had moved the Government under an application dated 20th June, 1990 for certain relaxation in the operation of the said externment order. Under an order dated 27th June, 1990 (vide pages 15 and 16 in Writ Petition No. 52 of 1991), the Government was again pleased to allow the petitioner to enter and live in his village for a period of six months from the date of that order. However, the aforesaid orders were immediately withdrawn under an order dated 1st September, 1990 (vide pages 17 and 18 in Cri. Writ Petition No. 52 of 1991) and the petitioner was then allowed to enter and live in his village from 1st of every month to the 10th of every month, with effect from the date of that order. The said orders also were subject to certain conditions imposed upon the petitioner for maintenance of law and order. Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1989 preferred by one Govind Onkar Nikam and Criminal Application No. 781 of 1990 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 arise out of the aforesaid orders granting relief to the respondent in the said proceedings, namely the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989. In Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990, it is prayed that the orders dated 29-12-1989 and any order passes subsequent thereto by respondents Nos. In Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990, it is prayed that the orders dated 29-12-1989 and any order passes subsequent thereto by respondents Nos. 2 3, (Chief Minister and Section Officer in the Home Department) granting leave, be quashed and set aside, and that respondent No. 1 (the State of Maharashtra) be directed to pass a fresh externment order against respondent No. 4 (the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989). A direction was also sought in the said proceeding, that the State of Maharashtra and the Chief Minister should be directed to remove respondent No. 4 (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989) from the District of Jalgaon forthwith. In Writ Petition no. 52 of 1991, the prayer was that the orders dated 29th December, 1989, 20th June, 1990 and 1st June, 1990 i.e. the above mentioned three orders of the Government granting leave, should be quashed, and that the State of Maharashtra should be directed to issue a fresh externment order against the original writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989. In the body of the said petition, it was also contended that though the original petitioner was externed for a period of two years, he had managed to stay in the village for the larger party of the said period and that, therefore, the period for which he had stayed in the village should be ordered to be excluded from the period of externment and that, this point being a new point for the decision of this Court, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench. In Contempt Application No. 781 of 1990, it was contended that though this Court had refused to pass any stay order in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 to the operation of the externment order, the State of Maharashtra, the Chief Minister and the Section Officer in the Home Department (respondent Nos. 1 to 3), had time and again passed orders for allowing the original petitioner in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989, to enter and stay in the village, and that thereby the said respondents had committed abuse of process of law and committed Contempt of Court. It was prayed that an action for Contempt of Court be taken against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the said proceeding i.e., the Chief Minister and the Section Officer. 5. It was prayed that an action for Contempt of Court be taken against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the said proceeding i.e., the Chief Minister and the Section Officer. 5. Though the show cause notice dated 21-1-1988 was issued by one M. Sengupta, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Chalisgaon Division, Jalgaon and though the impugned externment order dated 6-5-1988 was passed by one Mitalisen Gavaie, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chalisgaon Division, Jalgaon, the affidavit-in-reply in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 was filed by one Vandana Mukesh Khullar, who was as Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chalisgaon Division, on 5-6-1989. Referring to the record of the criminal cases and proceedings which were registered against the original petitioner, it was stated in the affidavit-in-reply that the externment order in question was justified on the facts and circumstances of the case. It was also stated in the affidavit-in-reply that on account of such illegal activities on the part of the original petitioner, he was suspended from his office of Police Patil and was finally discontinued from service with effect from 16-6-1988. It was contended, further, that in spite of being Police Patil, he had directly and indirectly himself in a number of criminal cases and had participated in the village policits and, had, further created the tension in the said village. It was admitted that in the appeal, the Government had modified the said order. The avernment that there was no application of mind while decising the original externment proceeding or the appeal preferred to the Government were denied. 6. The original petitioner had filed his rejoinder in the said petition an exception to the filing of the affidavit-inreply by an authority other than the authority who had passed the impugned externment order and the order in appeal. It was his contention in the re-joinder that an office bearer of the Republican Party, Branch Jalgaon, had written a letter dated 8-10- 1983 to the Collector of District Jalgaon, after satisfying himself that the avernments made by the local persons of scheduled castes against him in some other applications were not proved. According to him, this was a circumstance to show that the members of the Harijan community were in the habit of harassing in the Government Officers, and particularly the Police Patil, by making nasty allegations against them. According to him, this was a circumstance to show that the members of the Harijan community were in the habit of harassing in the Government Officers, and particularly the Police Patil, by making nasty allegations against them. He denied that the offence, which was alleged to have been committed in connection with Crime No. 54 of 1987 was committed at his instance by anybody. He contended that he had not committed any offence falling under the Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code and that the apprehension expressed in the externment notice was not substantiated by the facts on record. Relying upon a judgment delivered by this Court on 17-11-1989 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 244 of 1989, it was contended that the facts and circumstances of the case would show that the present externment proceeding was launched against him on account of political rivalry. Reference was made to other proceedings initiated in this Court by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990. It was contended that all the proceedings show the malicious attitude of the petitioner. 7. In the affidavit-in-reply filed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 by Shri A.L. Patil, the Assistant Secretary to the Government, Home Department, Government of Maharashtra, the aforesaid facts were stated and it was contended that under an order dated 29-12-1989, the Government had granted permission to the original writ petitioner to re-enter and stay in the village "on certain genuine grounds, such as the implementation of the scheme of development of village". It was denied that the respondent had never lived outside the village despite the externment order. It was, next, contended that the original externment order had become effective on 4th May, 1991, had operated for a period of two years as envisaged by the externment order and that after the expiry of the said period of two years, the original petitioner was legally entitled to live in the District thereafter. The Grampanchayat elections of the village of the original petitioner, it was contended, were held in June 1989 and that in view of the election of the original petitioner to the Grampanchayat and to the post of Sarpanch, the Government had granted the permission to him to enter the village. The Grampanchayat elections of the village of the original petitioner, it was contended, were held in June 1989 and that in view of the election of the original petitioner to the Grampanchayat and to the post of Sarpanch, the Government had granted the permission to him to enter the village. It was then, contended that the aforesaid orders were passed by the Government in exercise of the powers of the Government under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act and that there was no bar in exercising the aforesaid statutory powers for the Government in the suitable case of the present petitioner. It was denied that the permission were granted with mala fide. It was contended that they were granted with bona fide and without any intention to commit Contempt of Court. It was contended that the order dated 27-12-1989 and 29-6-1990 were perfectly legal, valid and within the compass of the powers of the Government. 8. No separate reply was filed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 52 of 1991, because the notice therein do not appear to have been served on the respondents. 9. In Contempt Petition No. 781 of 1990, the affidavit-in-reply was filed on behalf of the Government by the Assistant Secretary to the Government, contending that no Contempt of Court was committed by the Government and that if at all the Court were to come to the conclusion that some Contempt of Court was committed, the respondent desired to tender their unconditional apology before the Court. The facts referred to above were reiterated in support of the contention that in the circumstances of the case, no Contempt of the Court was committed by the Government or any official of it. 10. The first and the foremose contention urged on behalf of the original petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No. 32 of 1989 was that the externment order dated 6-5-1988, which was for a period of two years had been exhausted with effect from 6-5-1990 and that, therefore, the aforesaid writ petition and the consequent proceeding arising therefrom had become infructuous. 10. The first and the foremose contention urged on behalf of the original petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No. 32 of 1989 was that the externment order dated 6-5-1988, which was for a period of two years had been exhausted with effect from 6-5-1990 and that, therefore, the aforesaid writ petition and the consequent proceeding arising therefrom had become infructuous. The exception to this submission taken by the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 was that in-as-much-as the impugned order was stayed during the pendency of the appeal, and in-as-much-as several leaves were obtained by the original externee from the Court and from the Government for entering into the village and staying therein, the aforesaid period for which the leaves were granted from time to time, had to be excluded from the period of two years, which was envisaged by the impugned externment order and that, therefore, it could hardly be said that the Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 had become infructuous. It was submitted that when the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 was seeking a specific relief in respect of the leave orders passed by the Government and the consequences flowing there from, the Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 could hardly be disposed of on the ground that the same had become infructions. In reply to this contention, the learned Advocate for the externee submitted that in all three years and 1 month were already over since the initial order was passed on 6-5-1988 and that, therefore, even if the periods, which, according to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991, were to be excluded, the period of two years which was contemplated by the original externment order, was over. It was also submitted that in the matter of (Sharad Chandanlal Jaiswal v. The State of Maharashtra)1, Criminal Writ Petition No. 184 of 1989, decided on 21st February, 1991, reported in 1991(4) Bom.C.R. 233 , it was emphasized that restrictions on personal liberty are to be reasonable one and that they are to be construed very strictly. It was also submitted that in the matter of (Sharad Chandanlal Jaiswal v. The State of Maharashtra)1, Criminal Writ Petition No. 184 of 1989, decided on 21st February, 1991, reported in 1991(4) Bom.C.R. 233 , it was emphasized that restrictions on personal liberty are to be reasonable one and that they are to be construed very strictly. It was pointed out that it was held in that case, that there was no provision in section 58 or any where else in the Bombay Police Act providing that the period for which an order under sections 55, 56, 57 and 57-A was stayed by the State Government, or by the High Court, or by the Supreme Court, shall be excluded while counting the period for which the externee will have to be remove himself from the areas from which he has been externed and that, therefore, in the absence of such a provision, an order passed under the aforesaid Chapter of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, would cease to have effect on the day on which the period specified in the order commencing from the date when the person was directed to remove himself from the locality, was over, and further that, in no case could it be revived after that period. He submitted that it was no that this Court had not decided the point in question and that, therefore, the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990, the same deserved to be referred to a larger Bench was not sustainable. 11. The point whether or not the period for which a stay has been granted by the Government to the externment order or by the High Court or by the Supreme Court is thus, already decided by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. On a careful study of that judgment, I see no reasons for taking any different view or for referring the matter to a larger Bench for decision. On a careful study of that judgment, I see no reasons for taking any different view or for referring the matter to a larger Bench for decision. The only new factual aspect that was pressed in this matter, in the present case, as distinguished from the facts which were before the Court in the aforesaid ruling, was that in the present case the Government had exercised powers under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act for the purposes of granting, at least twice, leave on certain conditions to the externee to enter in the locality from which the petitioner was externed; despite the decision adverse to the externee recorded by the Government in the appeal against impugned externment order. But in principle, there was nothing new in the point involved. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate for the externee, the preventive action which was contemplated by an externment order had to be construed strictly, in so far as it purported to impose certain restrictions to the externee. If the aforesaid order, as in the present case, was explicit enough on the point of date from which the order was to become effective, and also on the date on which the order was to exhaust itself, there was hardly and reason to think that on account of subsequent orders, which did not explicitly direct that the externment period shall be deemed to have been extended on account of the subsequent orders, the period of externment would stand extended. Secondly, though the Government had stayed, during the pendency of the appeal, the operation of the original externment order which was impugned before the Government, and though the Government had allowed the appeal of the externee in part, a circumstance indicating that thereby there was an application of mind while deciding the appeal, the Appellate Authority in the Government had not chosen to change the date of operation of the original of externment, much less the date on which the force of that order was to be over. Thirdly, as it was rightly held in the aforesaid ruling relied upon by the learned Advocate for the externee, there was no provision in the Bombay Police Act, which could enable the Court to exclude from the period contemplated by the externment order, the period for which the operation of the said order had been stayed or permissions for re-entry have been granted to the externee in exercise of the powers of the Government under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act. In the absence of such provisions, it would certainly not be permissible to this Court to exercise powers so as to allow the extension of the period of externment by excluding in terms, the period for which the externee was allowed to enter the area from which he was externed during the period of externment, as envisaged by the original externment order. 12. It was then contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 that the exercise of powers by the Government under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act was a mala fide exercise of the power and that, therefore, the aforesaid orders deserved to be set aside and quashed. It is difficult to subscribe to this contention, because there is nothing apparent from the record in this case that the Government had acted mala fide in granting leaves, more than once, to the original externee for entering into the area from which the externee stood externed. The learned Advocate submitted that the petitioner had been involving himself in atrocities and terrorist activities so as to terrorise the members of the scheduled community in the village, and that they had been making repeated applications to the Authorities to the effect that the externee should be removed from his village during the period of his externment. Our attention was invited to the affidavits, dated 27-9-1990, filed by Rajaram Tuke, Bhagwat Kadu Choudhari and Subhash Sitaram Choudhary (pages 18-A, 36 to 41 in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990), in which it was clearly averred that the exteree had been indulging in activities which amounted to terrorise the members of the Harijan community in the village. Our attention was invited to the affidavits, dated 27-9-1990, filed by Rajaram Tuke, Bhagwat Kadu Choudhari and Subhash Sitaram Choudhary (pages 18-A, 36 to 41 in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990), in which it was clearly averred that the exteree had been indulging in activities which amounted to terrorise the members of the Harijan community in the village. The learned Government Pleader and the Advocate for the externee then pointed out counter affidavits filed by Trimbak Nikam, Deochand Nikam, and Ramkrishna Nikam (on pages 61 to 65 in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989), in which the aforesaid avernments were contradicted. Thus, when the question of fact itself was in dispute in the writ petition, it could hardly be said that the action of the Government in granting leave to the writ petition was mala fide. Secondly, when the High Court itself had granted several leaves to the externee to enter the area from which he was externed, for the purpose of contesting the election and when the consequence, the externee had got himself elected only as a Member of the Grampanchayat, but also as the Sarpanch of the village, there was hardly any reason to suppose that after the election of the extenee as the Sarpanch, the Government had acted with mala fide in allowing the externee to enter the area in question for the purposes of discharging his duties as a Sarpanch. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Act of Government in granting the leave to the original externee was a mala fide Act and that the permissions granted by the Government in exercise of statutory powers under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act were granted with mala fides. Indeed, the powers conferred on the Government under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act were independent powers by themselves and there appears no legal bar in exercising those powers, irrespective of the question whether or not the order in question has been stayed by the High Court or the Supreme Court, or otherwise. It needs to be noted here that out of the two orders passed by the Government granting leave to the petitioner to enter the village, one was passed on 20-6-1990 and the same was modified on 27-6-1990, i.e., after the expiry of a period of two years from the date of the initial order of externment, namely 6-5-1988. It needs to be noted here that out of the two orders passed by the Government granting leave to the petitioner to enter the village, one was passed on 20-6-1990 and the same was modified on 27-6-1990, i.e., after the expiry of a period of two years from the date of the initial order of externment, namely 6-5-1988. When the stand of the Government even in the writ petition was that the period contemplated by the externment order had expired after the laps of two rears from the date of the externment order (6-5-1988), indeed, there was hardly any question of the Government granting a permission to the externment in exercise of powers conferred under section 63 of the Bombay Police Act. It was only by way of abundant caution that the petitioner appears to have applied for such a permission and the Government appears to have granted such a permission. Under such circumstances, the exercise of discretion in favour of the petitioner by the Government in connection with the orders dated 20-6-1990 and 27-6-1990 could hardly be said to be mala fide exercise of discretion. 13. The learned Advocate for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 then submitted that the decision given by Chapalgaonkar, J., in Sharadchand Chandanlal Jaiswal v. State of Maharashtra and others, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 184 of 1989 : 1991(4) Bom.C.R. 233 , (referred to above) was a decision given on a different set of facts. It was pointed out that in that case, also, the externee was said to have committed several offences and it was alleged that the witnesses were not coming forth to give evidence against the externee on account of fear of injury to their person and property, and that the externment order also was passed on the basis of those avernments. It was also submitted that as in the present case, the State Government had dismissed the appeal filed by the externee in part, by limiting the extent of externment order to one District alone, instead of many more as per the initial externment order. But, it was submitted, the distinguishing factor was that when the matter had come up before the High Court in a writ petition, interim stay was granted by the High Court, staying the externment order with imposition of such conditions on the externee. But, it was submitted, the distinguishing factor was that when the matter had come up before the High Court in a writ petition, interim stay was granted by the High Court, staying the externment order with imposition of such conditions on the externee. It was on account of that stay order, that the externment order had remained suspended till the disposal of the petition and, by that time, the term of externment as contemplated in the initial order had expired. It was submitted by the learned Advocate Shri Salve that it was only because of the stay granted by the High Court, that the externment order had remained suspendced and that therfore, a view was taken that the externment order had exhausted itself after the lapse of the period of externment contemplated by the original order. He submitted that in the present case, the Court had not granted any stay and that the externment order had virtually not operated even after the dismissal of the appeal of extenee, because of the leaves granted by the Government at lease and to some extent by the leaves granted by the Court. According to him, the periods of leaves granted by the Government will have to be excluded from the total term of two years of externment, which was envisaged by the initial externment order. It was pointed out that in the case which was decided by Writ Petition No. 184 of 1989, the Government had not passed any order granting any leave. Both of the aforesaid distinguishing points hardly appear to be relevant to the questions, whether or not, the externment order gets exhausted after the expiry of the period envisaged by it irrespective of the intervening circumstances; whether or not, the period of leave could be lawfully excluded when granted either by the Court or by the State and further, whether or not, the direction could be given on that count to the Government to pass a fresh order of externment against the externee. As already discussed above, there is no provision in the Bombay Police Act or elsewhere, which could allow the exclusion of the period or which could be construed to mean that the period of leave (whether granted by the Government or by the Court) should be considered for the purposes of extending the term of the externment as envisaged in the order of externment, and further, that on that count, the Court could give a direction to the Government to pass a fresh externment order against the externee. In the absence of any statutory provision, it is not possible to hold that the period of externment could be extended by the Court beyond the term for which the externment order was passed by the Authority. It is also not possible to hold that the period of leave, whether granted by the Government or by the Court or the period during which the externment order had remained suspended on account of the stay granted by the Court, could be excluded from the term of externment, which were envisaged by the initial order. The submission made by Shri Salve, in this respect, could hardly be legally sustained. 14. In view of the points discussed above, it is not possible to hold that the orders passed by State Government on 29th December, 1989, and 20th June, 1990, as modified subsequently by the order dated 27-6-1990, were null and void and bad in law. It is also not possible to hold that on account of the leaves granted by the Government under the said orders, the period of externment of the externee petitioner should be extended beyond the term of two years from 6-5-1988 i.e., the date of the initial externment order. The prayers made in this context in Writ Petition Nos. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 deserve to be rejected. 15. As regards the reliefs sought in the abovesaid petitions for a direction to the Government that the fresh externment orders should be passed against the externee petitioner, it is to be noted that the externment orders against any independent citizen of India could be made under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act and not otherwise. The provisions contained in section 55 to 77-A of the Bombay Police Act specify the circumstances under which the Authorities of the State Government can pass such orders. The provisions contained in section 55 to 77-A of the Bombay Police Act specify the circumstances under which the Authorities of the State Government can pass such orders. The Court have been, so far, very scrupulous in ensuring that the conditions contained in the aforesaid legal provisions are complied with strictly, and that liberty of a citizen is not curtailed on account of the externment orders which are in excess or beyond the scope of the aforesaid provisions contained in law. It was contended by Shri Salve, the learned Counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991, that the activities of the externee in the village during the period of leaves and after the passage of the externment order also amounted to terror to the members of Harijan community. But the question whether or not, the activities of the externee at such a point of time were such, as would be covered by the aforesaid provisions contained in section 55 to 57-A of the Bombay Police Act, would be, again, a question of fact to be decided by the authorities competent to decide it by virtue of the provisions contained in the Bombay Police Act. It would certainly be not open to the Court to exercise that jurisdiction, much less in a writ petition of the present nature. Under these circumstances the prayer of a direction in this context as sought by the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 deserves to be rejected. 16. It is then contended that though the High Court had not passed in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 any orders for staying the operation of the externment order, which was confirmed by the Government in appeal, the Government had passed orders dated 29-12-1989 and 20-6-1990 (as modified by an order dated 27-6-1990), and had thereby committed contempt of this Court. As a matter of fact, it needs to be stated that when the stay was not granted by the Court to the operation of the externment order, the externment order had virtually continued to operate. Again, the Government had exercised the powers for granting relief to leave in exercise of the statutory powers conferred upon it by section 63 of the Bombay Police Act. Again, the Government had exercised the powers for granting relief to leave in exercise of the statutory powers conferred upon it by section 63 of the Bombay Police Act. That was a provision which was independent of the proceeding for externment and the continuation thereof before the Appellate Authority or before the High Court in writ petition. Again, during the pendency of the aforesaid proceeding, the Government had already removed the externee from the post of Police Patil with effect from 16-6-1988 an had shown its firmness in the matter of the action taken against the externee. The orders dated 20-12-1989 had been passed only when the externee was allowed by the Court to participate in the Grampanchayat elections and was ultimately elected as Sarpanch of the village. The modified orders dated 27-6-1990 came to be passed for the purposes of facilitating the externee to discharge his duties as a Sarpanch. It was, therefore, contended by the learned Government Pleader that the aforesaid orders could hardly be said to be mala fide or passed deliberately for the purposes of holding the Court proceeding, or the Court order, in contempt. It was, therefore, submitted that none of the respondents in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989 and 52 of 1991 was guilty of Contempt of Court. There is a great deal of substance in this contetion and the submission is well supported by judicial decisions also. 17. In (Tukaram G. Gaokar v. Shukla and others)2, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1050, it was observed: "To constitute Contempt of Court, there must be involved some Act done or writing published calculated by bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower his authority or something calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice of the lawful process of the Courts". Again, in the same ruling as well as in (Jang Bahadur v. Baij Nath Tiwari)3, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 30, it was held that a parallel proceeding (such as a proceeding under the Customs Act in Gaonkar's case or a parallel enquiry in the other case) during the pendency of a proceeding before the Court in the absence of a stay order from the Court, did not amount to Contempt of the Court. In (Jiwani Kumari Parekh v. Satyabrata Chakravorty)4, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 326 it was laid down that in order to constitute a Contempt of Court, the action of the alleged contemner must amount to a deliberate dis-obedience of the order of the Court and if it is was not so, it could not amount to a contempt. Going a step further, it was held in (Tapan Kumar v. Sri heromoni)5, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 281, it was held that where the High Court had restrained a party from interfering with the possession of the writ petitioners in respect of a disputed land, and the Government official had done something contrary to the said order of the Court, in the absence of circumstance to show that the Government official had acted wilfully in that regard, the said official was entitled to a benefit of doubt and he was not guilty of Contempt of Court. As already discussed above, in the present case, the Government had passed the leave orders when there was no order to the contrary in that respect passed by the Court and the aforesaid orders could not be said, in the circumstances of the present case to be amounting to mala fide exercise of the discretion vested in the Government. Again, the aforesaid orders could hardly constitute the Contempt of Court as per the requirements laid down in Gaonkar's case. Therefore, it is not possible to uphold the contention of Shri Salve, that the Government or the Chief Minister or the Officer of the Government (respondents No. 1 to 3 in the Writ Petition No. 250 of 90 and in the contempt petitions) had really committed any Contempt of Court. 18. This discussion would dispose of Writ Petition Nos. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 and Criminal Application No. 781 of 1990 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989. All of them deserve to be rejected out-right. They are accordingly ordered to be dismissed. 19. The externees' contentions as regards the extenment order were again manifold. 18. This discussion would dispose of Writ Petition Nos. 250 of 1990 and 52 of 1991 and Criminal Application No. 781 of 1990 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989. All of them deserve to be rejected out-right. They are accordingly ordered to be dismissed. 19. The externees' contentions as regards the extenment order were again manifold. It was submitted that the externment order was defective, because --- i) the avernments regarding the Harijan community in paragraphs No. 1 and 1-A in the externement order were not covered by the show cause notice dated 21-1-1988 given to the externee prior to the passing of the externment order; ii) it was averred in the notice that the witnesses were not prepared to come forward to give evidence against the externee in criminal launched against him, but the particulars thereof were not stated any where in the notice and the notice was vague in its nature, as also the finding recorded is the externment order; iii)(a) out of the prosecutions referred to in the show cause notice as well as externment order, three were petty proceedings not fallings not falling within the ambit of Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code or the abetment of offences referred to in those chapters; (b) the only case which was falling within that restriction was of the offence involved in C.R. No. 54 of 1987, and a solitary case of that type in which there were about 54 persons involved, could hardly amount to an adequate ground for the authority to hold that the petitioner deserved to be externed. iv) It was submitted that the authority, who has issued the notice and the authority who had decided the externment proceeding had to satisfied subjectively that there were adequate grounds against the petitioner for externment. Inspite of the said requirement of law, non of those two Officers had filed any affidavit-in-reply in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the aforesaid authority was not duly proved. Inspite of the said requirement of law, non of those two Officers had filed any affidavit-in-reply in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the aforesaid authority was not duly proved. It was also contended that the authority in question should have appreciated that, on the facts and circumstances which had come on record in the externment proceeding in the so called evidence recorded by the authority, the involvement of the externment in the said externment proceeding was a result of the political and communal rivalry prevailing in the village and the consequent animus against him. The learned Advocate for the externee petitioner streneously urged the aforesaid points. The force of the aforesaid points could hardly be lost sight of, but as it is found from the discussion above that the Writ Petition No. 132 of 1990 had become infructuous on account of the externment order exhausting itself during the period of two years, it is not necessary to go into the details thereof. Therefore, Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 also will have to be dismissed on the ground that the same had become infructuous. Accordingly, the following order ........... O R D E R 1) Criminal Writ Petition No. 132 of 1989 The petition has become infructuous on account of expiry of the term of two years of externment during the pendency of this proceeding. Hence dismissed. Rule discharged. 2) Criminal Writ Petition No. 250 of 1990 The writ petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. 3) Criminal Writ Petition No. 52 of 1991 Writ petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. 4) Criminal Appln. No. 781 of 1990 in Cri. W.P. No. 132 of 1990 The application is summarily dismissed. The copies of the operative part of the order be furnished to the Advocates of the parties immediately. Petitions dismissed. -----