PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) IT would therefore, be appropriate to deal with the main question which has been sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. A. J. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the appellate Court erred in granting interim mandatory injunction application Exh. 37 in a suit filed by the petitioner. According to his submission neither the trial Court nor the appellate Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application Exh. 37 and to grant the relief of interim mandatory injunction against the petitioner in petitioners suit. In support of his submission, he first drew my attention to the decision of this Court in the case of Ramshree Mahavir v. Girdharilal Bliolanath Agarwal. reported in (1970) xi GLR 1971 The question that was raised there was whether a person in actual and exclusive possession of a premises could be allowed to be dispossessed forcibly by another person claiming that he had the legal right to the possession of the premises and that the person in actual possession had none. While answering the question, this Court held as under : the question however, is whether one can circumvent the procedure established toy law and take recourse to physical violence and dispossess the person in possession by use of force. In a civilization where the rule of law obtains, it is difficult to envisage a Court of law upholding any such right in favour of a person who claims right to dispossess by use of force without recourse to due process of law. If this were to be permitted there would be a breach of peace every day and there would be a violent conflict between persons claiming individual rights. There is no manner of doubt in my mind that no such right can be claimed by the defendant regardless of the question whether or not the plaintiff himself has any right to remain in possession. . Once it is established by the plaintiff that he is in exclusive possession and it is admitted by the defendant that he is in such possession, an injunction restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff by force must issue as a matter of course. . Once it is established by the plaintiff that he is in exclusive possession and it is admitted by the defendant that he is in such possession, an injunction restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff by force must issue as a matter of course. More readily, if the defendant persists in asserting the claim that he has a right to take the law in his own hands and forcibly dispossess the plaintiff as has been done in the present case. " ( 3 ) IT is important to note from the aforesaid passage that what is highlighted is "use of physical violence". In the instant case, the respondent. Its have approached the Court by filing interim mandatory injection application and therefore, they have taken recourse to the Court of law. The result is that it cannot be said that respondents had taken recourse to violence or force. ( 4 ) MR. Patel also drew my attention to the similar decision of this Court reported in the case of Ranjankumar Vamanrao Nandker v. Sarvajanik Hindu dharamashala reported in 1985 GLH (U. J-56) 47, where also this "court relying upon the aforesaid decision held that the plaintiffs possession "could not be disturbed except in accordance with law. ( 5 ) IN Nandan pictures Ltd. v. Art Pictures Ltd. and Ors,, reported in AIR 1956 Calcutta 428, it was held that a mandatory injunction could be granted on an interlocutory application only to restore the status quo and not to establish a new state of things, differing from the state which existed at the dates order of mandatory nature could hardly be granted ad-Interim. The Calcutta High court there was concerned with the order of the trial Court directing the appellant to hand over the prints of the films and relevant publicity materials to the Indian cinema by 11-00 Oclock of 13th March last. In the fact of that case it was held that basis on which ad-interim injunction of a mandatory character was usually granted under the approved practice was lacking and hence the said order granting, a mandatory injunction was not maintainable. Apart from The fact that even the calcutta High Court observed that in appropriate cases interim-mandatory injunction could be granted, The decision can have hardly any;application to the facts of the present case. Apart from The fact that even the calcutta High Court observed that in appropriate cases interim-mandatory injunction could be granted, The decision can have hardly any;application to the facts of the present case. ( 6 ) LASTLY a recent authority of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Ram mahale v. Mrs. Bhobha Venkat Rao, reported in 1989 (3) JT 489 has been relied upon. In a suit for possession where the plaintiff was dispossessed without recourse to law on the ground that her licence was terminated, the trial Court held that the defendant No. 3 there had really unlawfully obtained possession of the premises behind the plaintiffs back. The trial Court passed a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff and the defendants No. 3s appeal -before the High Court was dismissed. In the background of such facts, the Supreme Court observed in paras 8 and 9 as under : "8 It is a well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property he cannot be dispossessed by The owner of the property except by recourse of law If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yushwant Singh v. Rno jagdlsh Singh and Ors: 1968 (2) SCR 201 at pp. 208-210. This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well-known passage from the leading Privy council case of Mhiiiapur Zamlndwy Company Limited v, Naresh Narayan Roy (51 IA 293 at p. 299), where it has been observed (p. 208):"in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession, they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. " 9. This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Ratan and Ors. v. Stale of uttar Pradesh. 1977 (2) SCR 232 . The Division Bench comprising of three learned judges held that a true owner has every right to dispo-ssess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances. In such circumstances. the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. " ( 7 ) IT has, therefore, to be seen whether in a given case a defendant could move the Court in the plaintiffs suit itself for an appropriate relief against plaintiff. ( 8 ) IN the above connection an authority of the Supreme Court in case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, reported in AIR 1990 sc 867 , was cited on behalf of the respondents. The appellant there filed a suit against vendors, i. e. , his brothers wife and her sons under Sec. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was filed on the ground that the suit property was a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family, that there had not been any division of the said property at any time, that the appellant-plaintiff and his deceased brother during his lifetime were for convenience occupying different portions, the plaintiff occupying the first floor while the deceased brother was occupying the ground floor. After the death of brother his wife and sons continued to be in occupation of that portion which was in the occupation of brother. In the circumstances the vendee, a stranger to the family had no right to have joint possession or common enjoyment of the property along with the plaintiff on the basis of the purchase of the undivided share. On this ground the appellant-plaintiff claimed the suit property. He had also claimed the interim injunction restraining the vendors from parting with possession of the said property or any part thereof and/or any part of portion thereof and a similar injunction restraining the vendee from entering into or taking possession and/or remaining in possession or enjoyment of the suit property or part thereof. The facts further revealed that a transaction of sale was hurriedly executed in a hush-hush manner keeping the entire transaction secret from the appellant-plaintiff. The purchasers were also inducted in the premises in a manner which clearly suggested that the vendors were attempting to forestall the situation and to gain an undue advantage in a hurried and clandestine manner defeating the appellants attempt to go to Court for appropriate relief. The purchasers were also inducted in the premises in a manner which clearly suggested that the vendors were attempting to forestall the situation and to gain an undue advantage in a hurried and clandestine manner defeating the appellants attempt to go to Court for appropriate relief. Under such circumstances the Supreme Court held that the respondents could not be permitted to take advantage of their own acts and defeat the claim of the appellant in the suit and it was found just and necessary that direction should go to the respondents to undo what they have done with knowledge of the appellants rights to compel the purchaser to deny joint possession. It was further held that refusal to grant an interim mandatory injunction would do irreparable injury to the appellant and that the balance of convenience was also in favour of the appellant for the grant of such injunction. ( 9 ) IT was submitted by Mr. Patel that the authority would not be applicable to the case in hand. However what is important to note is that the interim mandatory direction can be issued if facts and circumstances of particular case would warrant for issuance of such directions. The trial Court is vested with such a jurisdiction. According to Mr. Patel, in this case possession was handed over to the petitioners and there was bona fide dispute about the payment of petitioners bills. It is important to note that there is no registered document under which the petitioner should claim any right over any of the plots or tenements. Even the agreement between the respondent No. 1- society and the petitioner with regard to the construction of the tenement was not placed on the record of the case. The facts and circumstances noticed by the appellate Court indicate that it was in a very suspicious manner that the watchman was inducted in one of the tenements by the petitioner in a very recent past soon before the filing of the suit in question. ( 10 ) MR. Lakhani learned Advocate for the respondents referred to the decision of Travankor-Cochin High Court in the case of B. F. Varghese v. Joseph Thomas AIR 1957 Travankor-Cochin 286. The provisions of order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were required to be considered by the Travankor-Cochin High Court. ( 10 ) MR. Lakhani learned Advocate for the respondents referred to the decision of Travankor-Cochin High Court in the case of B. F. Varghese v. Joseph Thomas AIR 1957 Travankor-Cochin 286. The provisions of order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were required to be considered by the Travankor-Cochin High Court. It has been held that the courts have power to grant mandatory injunction on interlocutory application. If inherent powers of the Court can be exercised in exceptional circumstances on behalf of the plaintiff there is no reason not to extend the same jurisdiction in similar circumstances on behalf of the defendant. ( 11 ) IN Baban v. Mahadu, AIR 1989 Bombay 247 a Nagpur Bench of Bombay high Court has held that the Civil Court can issue at interlocutory stage a mandatory injunction so as to restore the status quo anterior to the date of institution of a suit. Following observations appearing in para 2 of the citation may be noted :"injunctions are a form of equitable relief and they have to be adjusted or moulded in aid of equity and justice to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Jurisdiction is thus undoubted even under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. Even if it cannot be granted under the said Rules, Sec. 151 is the source of such jurisdiction. I see no reason to lay down an absolute proposition and forge unnecessary and unjustified fetters on the power of the equity Courts to grant appropriate relief even in a well deserving case and reduce its position only to a willing but helpless spectator - a situation not warranted by our equity jurisprudence. " ( 12 ) IT can thus be seen that it cannot be said that the Court has no jurisdiction at all to grant an interim mandatory relief in favour of a defendant upon such defendants interlocutory application in the plaintiffs suit in an appropriate case, howsoever rare such a case may be. 19. In this case also the facts are found to be of exceptional nature. The defendants would be entitled to interim injunction of mandatory nature against the plaintiff-petitioner. 19. In this case also the facts are found to be of exceptional nature. The defendants would be entitled to interim injunction of mandatory nature against the plaintiff-petitioner. Having gone through the judgment of the appellate Court, I find that the appellate Court has neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor exercised jurisdiction not vested in it while confirming the trial Courts order and while granting the defendants (respondents) application for interim mandatory direction. .