Research › Browse › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 272 (KAR)

G. T. VENKATASWAMY REDDY v. COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OR THE CITY OF BANGALORE

1991-04-12

H.G.BALAKRISHNA

body1991
BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Writ Petition is directed against the impugned order of the 2nd respondent dated 20-12-1983 vide Annexure-E and the petitioner has sought for quashing of Anncxurc-e and also for a mandamus directing the respondents to issue the sanctioned plan in accordance with the blue print plan submitted by the petitioner on 13-5-1983 for the construction of the first floor at site No. 98/13, 9th Cross Road, Hombegowda Nagar (Wilson garden) Bangalorc-27. the petitioner has further sought for a direction to the respondents to forbear from interfering with the construction of the building (first floor) at the site aforementioned. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the owner of residential premises bearing No. 98/13, 9th Cross Road, wilson Garden, Bangalore, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed executed by one Sri B. S. Keshava Vittal on 18-5-1964, According to the petitioner on the date of purchase itself as could be seen from the schedule described in the sale deed, there was a dwelling house and that this dwelling house is not a new construction. the vendor of the petitioner is stated to have purchased the said property from one Smt, K. Nagarathnamma on 19-2-1951. ( 3 ) THE petitioner intended to construct a first floor on the said building and therefore he applied to the Corporation of the City of Bangalore for a licence along with the blue print plan of the proposed construction, a copy of the title deed, a foundation certificate, and an up-to-date tax paid receipt and other documents as contemplated under Section 299 of the Karnataka municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (for short 'the act' ). the application was made on 13-5-1983. It is pointed out that within thirty days after the date of receipt of the application made under section 299 of the Act, an order either granting or refusing permission for construction should have been passed under Section 301 of the Act. However, it is slated that no such order was passed either permitting or refusing to grant the licence. It is pointed out that within thirty days after the date of receipt of the application made under section 299 of the Act, an order either granting or refusing permission for construction should have been passed under Section 301 of the Act. However, it is slated that no such order was passed either permitting or refusing to grant the licence. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner since no order was passed by the Commissioner within the statutory period under Section 301 of the Act, the petitioner made an application under Section 302 of the Act before the Administrator of the corporation of the City of Bangalore, (since at the relevant point of time the Corporation had been superceded) under Section 303 read with 100 of the Act for the purpose of determination by a written order whether or not such approval or permission should be granted. It is alleged that even the Administrator also did not pass any order within one month from the date of receipt of the application of the petitioner, the date of application being 22-7-1983 and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to go ahead with the construction by taking advantage of the deemed permission. Further it is stated that the petitioner also wrote to the Administrator stating that licence is deemed to have been granted and therefore, the petitioner has commenced the construction. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, a notice was received by the petitioner to appear before the second respondent which is Appeal Committee for works of the corporation on 23-9-1983 for the consideration of the appeal in relation to the grant of licence sought by the petitioner. But the case was adjourned to 12-10-1983. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred an application before the second respondent stating that there is no appeal pending before the second respondent and that a formal order may be passed granting permission for the execution of the work since the petitioner has already acquired a right by deemed permission under Section 302 (2) of the Act. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred an application before the second respondent stating that there is no appeal pending before the second respondent and that a formal order may be passed granting permission for the execution of the work since the petitioner has already acquired a right by deemed permission under Section 302 (2) of the Act. ( 6 ) BY order dated 20-12-1983, the second respondent proceeded to impose penalty for the alleged excess construction of the existing building beyond the set-back as the petitioner Has not furnished the sanctioned plan of the existing building, ( 7 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner nor show cause notice served on him before the Appeal committee proceeded to pass an order levying penalty. At the same time it is also contended that the petitioner having purchased the existing building on 18-5-1964 and the construction of the building having taken place even before the purchase, it would not be possible for the petitioner to furnish the sanctioned plan granted to his vendor by the competent authority. ( 8 ) ON the other hand it is contended by the learned counsel for the Corporation that the petitioner was required to produce previous sac- tioned plan of the existing building for the purpose of considering his application for construction of the first floor and on his failure to do so, the provision of Section 302 of the Act are not attracted to the facts of this case. Again it is contended that because of the failure of the petitioner in complying with the endorsement dated 23-5-1981 calling upon him to furnish the sanctioned plan relating to the building that existed even prior to the purchase of the same by the petitioner, it is not open to the petitioner to avail himself of the right to deemed licence. In these circumstances, it is contended that the petitioner has put up the construction without permission and without licence and therefore, the imposition of penalty is fully justified. ( 9 ) IN the reply preferred by the petitioner to the statement of objections filed by the respondents the petitioner has denied the receipt of the endorsement which is relied upon by the Corporation and the petitioner has reiterated the points urged in the writ petition. ( 9 ) IN the reply preferred by the petitioner to the statement of objections filed by the respondents the petitioner has denied the receipt of the endorsement which is relied upon by the Corporation and the petitioner has reiterated the points urged in the writ petition. ( 10 ) THERE is no material placed before me by the Corporation to infer that the alleged endorsement was issued and served on the petitioner. Since the Corporation is totally relying on the endorsement which is supposed to have been issued to the petitioner on 23-5-1983, it is incumbent on the Corporation atleast to make available before the Court a copy of the endorsement and also satisfy the Court about the service of such an endorsement by producing the original records. A mere allegation that such endorsement was served on the petitioner cannot be accepted, there is not even a specific plea that on a particular date the endorsement was served on the petitioner. Hence, I am of the opinion that no such endorsement was served on the petitioner and therefore the foundation of the argument of the learned Counsel for the Corporation is destroyed on account of the non-service of the endorsement. ( 11 ) IT is true that the petitioner approached the competent authority for grant of permission and for grant of licence in accordance with the provisions of law as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. there is nothing on record to disbelieve the assertion of the petitioner that no action was taken either by the administrator or by the Corporation after its su- percession, on the application made by the petitioner and on account of inaction, by lapse of statutory period, the petitioner has acquired a right by virtue of deemed permission. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed any breach of statutory provision under the Act. therefore, I am of the opinion that the imposition of penalty and proceeding to recover penalty from the petitioner are not warranted in law. ( 12 ) IT is no doubt true that the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the plea that no opportunity of hearing was given to him before the order levying penalty was passed. therefore, I am of the opinion that the imposition of penalty and proceeding to recover penalty from the petitioner are not warranted in law. ( 12 ) IT is no doubt true that the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the plea that no opportunity of hearing was given to him before the order levying penalty was passed. Since the entire order appears to be without jurisdiction, 1 do not think it is necessary to send the case back to the competent authority in order to consider his application. the application was made as far back as in 1983 and we are now in 1991 and no useful purpose would be served by unnecessarily sending the case back to the competent authority particularly in view of the fact that the order passed is without jurisdiction. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons slated above, the petition is allowed and the impugned order under Annexure-E dated 20-12-1983 passed by the second respondent is quashed and the Corporation is directed to issue the sanctioned plan in accordance with the blue print plan submitted by the petitioner on 13-5-1983 for the construction of the first floor of the building on site No. 98/13,9th cross, Hombegowda Nagar, Bangalore-27. ( 14 ) WRIT petition is disposed of accordingly. --- *** --- .