JUDGMENT 1. This Original Petition filed seeking the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing Ext. P-5 order passed by the 2nd respondent. 2. Petitioner is a Manager of an aided school and 3rd respondent is the Headmaster of the said school. In the staff fixation order for the year 1987-88 three divisions were sanctioned for standard VI. It appears chat complaints were raised by the staff of the school and President of the Parent Teacher Association against the 3rd respondent alleging that irregularities were committed by the Headmaster in admitting certain students before staff fixation and removing such students from the register later. Enquiry was conducted by the D. E. O., Palai on these allegations and he submitted a report on 7th March 1988 which revealed a prima facie case against the 3rd respondent. In the circumstances, the 2nd respondent directed the petitioner as per Ext. P-1 order dated 28th October 1988 to take disciplinary proceedings against the 3rd respondent. On receipt of this, petitioner placed the 3rd respondent under suspension. Ext. P-2 memo of charges was framed. The Deputy Director of Education, Kottayam was appointed as Enquiry Officer and a detailed enquiry was conducted and he submitted a report to the, Manager on 11th April 1989 finding that many of the charges were proved. Thereupon, the petitioner sent a notice to the 3rd respondent directing him to show cause why punishment of compulsory retirement should not be imposed on him. Previous permission was required to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement in view of the provisions contained in R.74 of Chapter XIV A of the K. E. R. He applied to the 2nd respondent to accord necessary sanction for the proposed punishment. His request to accord sanction for the proposed punishment was allowed by the Deputy Director of Education by order dated 30th June 1990. Meanwhile, the petitioner received explanation to the notice issued by him proposing the punishment of compulsory retirement. The petitioner considered the explanation. He was not satisfied with the explanation and passed an order imposing punishment of compulsory retirement. The said order is Ext. P-3. On 25th July 1990, the petitioner received a notice from 2nd respondent regarding hearing of appeal against Ext. P-3 order. According to the petitioner, he did not get the memorandum of appeal but on his complaint Ext. P-4 memorandum was furnished to him. The said order is Ext. P-3. On 25th July 1990, the petitioner received a notice from 2nd respondent regarding hearing of appeal against Ext. P-3 order. According to the petitioner, he did not get the memorandum of appeal but on his complaint Ext. P-4 memorandum was furnished to him. Ultimately, by Ext. P-5 order dated 12th November 1990, the 2nd respondent set aside Ext. P-3 order holding that the punishment was excessive, though he found that charges levelled against the third respondent were proved. 3. In this Original Petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the order Ext. P-5 on the following grounds: (1) The Deputy Director of Education was exercising the powers of the 2nd respondent as a delegated authority in disposing of the petition under R.74 Chapter XIV A and therefore no appeal would lie to the 2nd respondent against the order according sanction. Though this point was specifically raised before the 2nd respondent he has failed to consider this point. (2) The 2nd respondent affirmed the finding that charges were proved. But, still the 2nd respondent set aside the order" of punishment and left the matter there. This is clearly illegal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that having confirmed the finding that the charges were proved the 2nd respondent acted illegally in setting aside the order imposing penalty of compulsory retirement and leaving the matter there without making any order as to the lesser punishment or making a direction to the petitioner to dispose of the matter afresh. 5. Chapter XIV A, R.88 deals with the width and scope of the powers of the Appellate Authority. Sub-rule (2) of R.88 deals with factors that have to be taken into consideration in disposing of appeals. It reads as follows: "88. Consideration of appeals: * * * (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.65, the appellate authority shall consider. Sub-rule (2) of R.88 deals with factors that have to be taken into consideration in disposing of appeals. It reads as follows: "88. Consideration of appeals: * * * (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.65, the appellate authority shall consider. , (a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient grounds for taking action; (c) Whether procedure prescribed in these Rules have been complied with and if not whether such non compliance has resulted in violation of any of the principles of natural justice; (d) Whether the findings are justified; and (e) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or; inadequate and pass orders (i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case; Provided that (i) the appellate authority shall not impose any enhanced penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which made the order appealed against is competent to impose. (ii) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty provided that such representations shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry." The above provision would clearly indicate that if the appellate authority finds that the charges are proved but considers that punishment is excessive it is obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to impose lesser punishment or to remit to the disciplinary authority to consider the question of punishment afresh. In the instant case, the appellate authority has not acted in accordance with R.88 of Chapter XIV A and for that reason alone the impugned order is liable to be set aside. I, accordingly set aside the order Ext. P-5 and remit back the matter to the 2nd respondent for fresh consideration. 6. As indicated earlier, the learned counsel for petitioner has raised a contention that since the Deputy Director of Education is only a delegated authority no appeal would lie to the 2nd respondent. He raised that contention also before the Appellate Authority, but that contention has not been disposed of by the 2nd respondent. 6. As indicated earlier, the learned counsel for petitioner has raised a contention that since the Deputy Director of Education is only a delegated authority no appeal would lie to the 2nd respondent. He raised that contention also before the Appellate Authority, but that contention has not been disposed of by the 2nd respondent. I, therefore, direct the 2nd respondent to dispose of that question also and if he finds that the contention raised by the petitioner in this regard is sustainable to forward the appeal to the 1st respondent for passing appropriate orders in accordance with law. The 2nd respondent will dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of judgment. In case, the 2nd respondent forward the appeal to the Government on the ground of want of jurisdiction, the Government may dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in R.88 of Chapter XIV A expeditiously. Original Petition is disposed of as above. The parties will bear their respective costs.