Judgment :- RATNAM J. These tax case references relating to the same assessee, though for different assessment years are dealt with together as a common important question of law relating to the allowance of depreciation on certain type of machinery arises for consideration. It will be convenient, however, to refer to the facts and the questions arising for decision in each of these references The assessee in T. C. Nos. 1188 to 1190 of 1980 is a company and the relevant assessment years are 1972-73 to 1974-75. In the course of the assessment proceedings for those assessment years, the assessee had claimed 30% depreciation on drills and rigs owned and used by it in its business which was initially allowed. Later, in the course of audit, it came to light that excess depreciation on the machinery had been allowed and that led to the reopening of the assessments. In the course of the reassessment proceedings, the assessee maintained that it was entitled to depreciation at 30%, which however, was not accepted by the Income-tax Officer, who limited the rate of allowable depreciation to 10%, as against 30%, originally claimed and allowed. On appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the allowance of depreciation at 10% against 30% claimed by the assessee, following his earlier order in I. T. A. No. 254/76-77 passed in respect of the same assessee for the assessment year 1971-72, which forms the subject-matter of the second question referred in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980. On further appeal by the assessee before the Tribunal, it purported to follow its earlier decision in I. T. A. No. 1096/Mad/77-78, which again is the subject-matter of the second question referred in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980, to hold that the assessee is entitled to depreciation on the machinery at the rate of 30%, under item III-D(4) in the table of rates of admissible depreciation, occurring in Part of Appendix I to the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). Under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), at the instance of the Revenue, the following common question of law, for the assessment years 1972-73 to 1974-75, has been referred to this court for its opinion "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in allowing depreciation at 30% in respect of drills and rigs used by the assessee against 10% allowed by the Income-tax Officer ?" * In T. C. No. 1391 of 1980, the assessee is the same company, as in T. C. Nos. 1188 to 1190 of 1980, though the assessment year relevant to this reference is 1971-72. In completing the assessment, the Income-tax Officer originally allowed depreciation on building and drilling machines, as claimed by the assessee. On the audit party pointing out that excess depreciation had been allowed, the assessment was reopened. Even in the course of the reassessment proceedings, the assessee claimed that depreciation on building and drilling machines should be allowed as before. The Income-tax Officer, however, took the view that the assessee had not secured title to the building during the relevant accounting year and withdrew the depreciation allowed earlier. In regard to the claim for depreciation on drilling machines, the Income-tax Officer took into account the fact that the machinery used by the assessee was not of the type contemplated and falling under item 111-D(4) in the table of rates of admissible depreciation and allowed depreciation at the general rate of 10% and the excess relief granted was worked out and recouped in the reassessment. The appeal by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed affirming the view taken by the Income-tax Officer. On further appeal to the Tribunal, it followed its earlier decision in I. T. A. No. 998/Mds/76-77 (C Bench) with reference to the depreciation relating to the building and upheld the claim of the assessee. Considering the claim of the assessee for depreciation in respect of drilling machines, the Tribunal took the view that the drilling rigs would constitute "earth moving machinery" of the nature contemplated under item III-D(4) in the table of rates of admissible depreciation in Part I of Appendix I to the Rules and held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation at 30% and directed the reworking of the depreciation accordingly. At the instance of the Revenue, under section 256(1) of the Act, the following two questions of law have been referred to this court, for its opinion "( 1 ) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that, as per the provisions of section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, the title over the property transferred by Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. passed on to the assessee on November 1, 1970, and not on the date of registration in 1975 and, accordingly, the assessee was entitled to depreciation ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the drilling machines used by the assessee should be treated as earth-moving machinery, falling under entry 4 of item III-D of Part I of Appendix I of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and, therefore, entitled to depreciation at 30 % ?" * We now proceed to consider the first question referred in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980. We find from para 2 of the order of the Tribunal that it had upheld the claim of the assessee for depreciation on building on the strength of an order of the Tribunal in I. T. A. No. 998/Mds/76-77 (C. Bench) in the assessee's case in respect of the assessment year 1973-74. That decision of the Tribunal formed the subject-matter of a reference in CIT v. Tamil Nadu Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. 1987 (163) ITR 61, 1984 (41) CTR 223, 1985 (20) TAXMAN 16 , 1987 (41) CTR(Mad) 233 (Mad). On a consideration of the facts as well as the scope and applicability of section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, a Division Bench to which one of us (Ratnam J.) was a party held that the assessee was not the legal owner of the building during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1973-74 and was, therefore, not entitled to depreciation in respect of the building in that year and further that the Tribunal was in error when it made available to the assessee the benefit of depreciation, as claimed by it, in respect of the building not owned by it, though used by it, during the relevant accounting year. The same considerations and reasoning would apply as it is undisputed that there is no change either in the factual or in the legal position in respect of the assessment year in question. We, therefore, answer the first question referred in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980 in the negative and in favour of the RevenueThat takes us on to a consideration of the common question in T. C. Nos. 1188 to 1190 of 1980 and the second question in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980, earlier set out. The machinery owned and used by the assessee during the relevant assessment years for drilling borewells for agricultural purposes was drilling machinery. Initially, in the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee claimed and secured depreciation at the rate of 30% on the footing that the drilling machinery owned and used by the assessee in drilling borewells fell within entry 4 in item III-D in the table of rates of admissible depreciation under Part I of Appendix I to the Rules. However, later, when it was pointed out by the audit that excess depreciation had been allowed, in the reassessment proceedings, the depreciation was confined to 10%, i.e., the ordinary rate. It is not in dispute that, if the drilling machinery owned and used by the assessee does not fall within entry 4 in item III-D of the table of rates of admissible depreciation, then, the depreciation properly allowable is only 10%. Therefore, the claim of the assessee for higher depreciation at 30% would depend upon whether the machinery owned and used by the assessee is of the nature contemplated by entry 4 in item 111-D referred to above and used for purposes indicated therein. It would be appropriate at this stage to make a reference to the relevant entry, which reads as follows "III. D.-(4) Earth moving machinery employed in heavy construction works, such as dams, tunnels, canals, etc. (N. E. S. A.)" * From the words occurring in the aforesaid entry, it is seen that the words employed not only describe the machinery as "earth-moving machinery", but also clearly indicate the nature of the user of the "earthmoving machinery" as those used or employed in heavy construction works such as dams, tunnels, canals. (N. E. S. A.)" * From the words occurring in the aforesaid entry, it is seen that the words employed not only describe the machinery as "earth-moving machinery", but also clearly indicate the nature of the user of the "earthmoving machinery" as those used or employed in heavy construction works such as dams, tunnels, canals. Any machinery employed for removing earth from a place, be it on the surface of the earth or by burrowing hole into the bowels of the earth, would fall within the expression "earthmoving machinery". That, however, is not the only requirement to be fulfilled in order to fall within the entry. What has been further contemplated is earth-moving machinery of the kind used or employed in the excavation of earth in large quantities and on a massive scale, as is necessary in the case of construction of works like dams, tunnels, canals, etc. To interpret the entry as taking in not only "earth-moving machinery" for purposes of excavating earth in large and massive quantities as in the construction of dams, canals and tunnels, but also for small operations in earth-moving generally may lead to startling results. Even a spade used for breaking the ground and turning the soil and excavating earth on a small scale, could, in that sense, be included within the scope of earth-moving machinery. That such earth-moving contraptions were not in contemplation at all in the entry referred to above is clearly brought out by the words employed with reference to the user of the earth-moving machinery, viz., in heavy construction works such as dams, tunnels, canals, etc. In other words, the machinery, in order to fall within the entry, should not only be, earth-moving machinery, but of such a nature as is used or employed in heavy construction works, such as dams, tunnels, canals, etc. By the use of drilling machinery owned and used by the assessee, it may be that earth was moved, if not at the surface of the earth, at least from out of the bowels of the earth, in the process of drilling borewells for agricultural purposes. Even so, the drilling machinery cannot, by any means, be considered to be of such a nature as is employed or used in heavy construction works such as dams, tunnels, canals. Even so, the drilling machinery cannot, by any means, be considered to be of such a nature as is employed or used in heavy construction works such as dams, tunnels, canals. Where drilling tools or drilling machines are contemplated as eligible for higher depreciation (30%), a specific provision has been made, as could be seen from entry 7 with reference to drilling tools of mineral oil concerns. This also indicates that the drilling machinery used by the assessee for drilling borewells has not been contemplated at all as qualifying for higher depreciation. In order, therefore, to fall within the entry referred to earlier, the earth-moving machinery must be of such a nature as is ordinarily employed in heavy construction works, where there is need for excavation of earth in very large quantities for the purpose of building dams, tunnels, canals, etc. To satisfy the requirements of the entry referred to earlier, it would not be sufficient, if the drilling machinery fell within the description of "earth-moving machinery", but it would also be necessary that it should be of such nature and kind as is employed in the construction of works involving the excavation of earth in large quantities like dams, tunnels, canals and, as in this case, the drilling machinery owned and used by the assessee had been used only for the purpose of digging borewells, it follows that though, in sense, the drilling machinery may be called "earth-moving machinery", such machinery cannot be regarded as of such a nature as employed in heavy construction works, as contemplated by the entryA brief reference to the reasoning of the Tribunal to conclude that the machinery in this case would fall within entry III-D(4) may now be made. In T. C. No. 1391 of 1980, the Tribunal, in the course of its order, had given three reasons to hold that the drilling machinery would fall within the entry extracted earlier. The first is that the machinery was built by the heavy machine-building plant of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi. The fact that the machinery had been fabricated by the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. has no relevance whatever in considering the question whether the drilling machinery of the assessee would fall within the entry. The first is that the machinery was built by the heavy machine-building plant of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi. The fact that the machinery had been fabricated by the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. has no relevance whatever in considering the question whether the drilling machinery of the assessee would fall within the entry. We fail to see how the fabrication of the drilling machinery by the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. would make the machinery "earth-moving machinery employed in heavy construction works", as found in the entry. The second reason is that the machinery, viz., drilling machinery, is used for earth-moving. This may be so. However, even from the words in the entry, it is abundantly clear that every kind of "earthmoving machinery" is not at all within its contemplation. It has already been pointed out that the entry contemplates and takes in only "earthmoving machinery" used in excavation of earth in large quantities for purposes of construction of major works, like dams, canals, tunnels and the mere circumstance that the machinery could be utilised for "earthmoving", without being employed or capable of being used in heavy construction works of the nature referred to earlier, would not suffice to bring such machinery within the scope of the entry. The third reason given by the Tribunal is that the use of the word "etc."., towards the end of the entry indicates that machinery of similar nature would also be covered under that entry. The collocation of the words in the entry, particularly the word "etc." at the end, would appear to us to indicate that by the use of that word, what was contemplated was other construction works like dams, tunnels, canals and that had no reference whatever to machinery. In other words, after illustrating the nature of the heavy construction works like dams, tunnels, canals contemplated by the entry, the word "etc." has been used only to denote and take in other similar heavy construction works like what had already been enumerated and which had been omitted to be mentioned and that had no connection whatever with the machinery at all. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate the reasoning of the Tribunal that, by the use of the word "etc.", earth-moving machinery of similar nature had been contemplated. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate the reasoning of the Tribunal that, by the use of the word "etc.", earth-moving machinery of similar nature had been contemplated. We may, in this connection, usefully refer to the rule of construction to be adopted in such cases, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, 1989 AIR(SC) 1019, 1989 CrLR(SC) 221, 1989 (21) ECR 7, 1989 (39) ELT 498 , 1989 (1) JT 150 , 1989 (75) STC 75, 1989 (1) Scale 101 , 1989 (2) SCC 458, 1989 (1) SCR 214 , 1989 (1) UJ 369 , 1989 CRLR 221, 1989 (20) ECC 1, relied on by learned counsel for the Revenue. There, the question arose whether the process of "plain calendering" to which cotton fabric was subjected would not fall under "any other process" within the meaning of section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the "Central Excises Act" for short), which included bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing, or any other process or any one or more of those processes. The Appellate Tribunal did not accept the contention that though "calendering" might be a "process", it is not any "process" that satisfies the requirement of "any other process" occurring in section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises Act, and that only those processes that partake of the same common characteristic of and belong to the same genus as the processes such as bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing or organdie-processing occurring in section 2(f)(v) were alone contemplated and held that it was unnecessary for the process of "calendering" to be a "process" belonging to the same genus as those enumerated in section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises Act to take the cotton fabric out of the exemption and even if the process did not partake of the characteristic of other processes specifically enumerated, the cotton fabric would be taken out of the exemption. This interpretation of the Tribunal was found to be faulty and erroneous by the Supreme Court and it was pointed out that the words "any other process" in section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises Act, though they otherwise had wide import, must share the characteristic of being limited by one preceding expressions and that the principle underlying this approach to construction is that the subsequent general words were intended only to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. Ultimately, the Supreme Court pointed out that the words "any other process" must share one or other of the incidents of bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing, which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. Viewed in the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, it follows that the use of the word "etc.", in the entry referred to already, was certainly not intended to extend to earth-moving machinery which was totally different from that used in major construction works like dams, tunnels, canals and the addition of the subsequent word "etc." was intended to include accidental or inadvertent omissions in the construction work of the kind mentioned earlier, viz., dams, tunnels canals, and not to extend to earth-moving machinery. We are, therefore, unable to accept the reasoning of the Tribunal for holding that the drilling machinery owned and used by the assessee would fall within entry 4 of item III -D of Part I to Appendix I to the Rules enabling the assessee to claim depreciation at 30% and not at 10%, as allowed. Though learned counsel for the assessee placed strong reliance on the decision in CIT v. Super Drillers 1988 (174) ITR 640, 1988 (73) CTR 97, 1988 (38) TAXMAN 5 (AP), we find that that decision does not, in any manner, advance the case of the assessee, for the question had been approached by the court as one of fact. We, therefore, answer the common question referred in T. C. Nos. 1188 to 1190 of 1980 and the second question in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. We, therefore, answer the common question referred in T. C. Nos. 1188 to 1190 of 1980 and the second question in T. C. No. 1391 of 1980 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be, however, no order as to costs.