Judgment Satyeshwar Roy, J. 1. Defendant is the appellant. The respondents filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from a building on the ground of default in paying rent from September, 1977 to December, 1977. Prayer was also made for a decree for arrears of rent. Both the courts below have accepted the case of the respondents. 2. The facts are not in dispute. The appellant was inducted as a tenant by Smt. T. M. Mitra. She filed an application under Sec.12 (3) of the bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (the Act) for eviction of the appellant. Ultimately, the matter came up to this Court in civil Revision No.6 of 1973 (R ). On 2-11-1983 it was compromised on the terms that the appellant would pay the arrears of rent amounting to rs.3,200/- and that Mrs. Mitra would accept the appellant as a month to month tenant and the latter would contiuue to remain in possession of the building so long he went on paying arrears and current rents and that if he defaulted for one month, the revision application would stand automatically dismissed. 3. There was an alleged default in paying rent by the appellant and the order passed in the application under Sec.12 (3) was executed against the appellant. Again the matter was brought to this Court by the appellant in civil Revision No.1961 of 1979 (R ). Before that Mrs. Mitra had died leaving behind the respondents as her heirs. The civil revision application filed by the appellant was allowed by holding that the application under section 12 (3) was not maintainable. The special leave petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 4. The respondents thereafter filed a suit for eviction of the appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent for the period mentioned above. The appeal had been listed for hearing before a learned Single Judge. The only question urged before him was that as the period for which the appellant was alleged to have defaulted in paying the rent was with regard to a period more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, the relief for eviction on the ground of such default of payment of rent was not available to the respondents. The learned Single Judge ordered that the case be listed for hearing before a larger Bench. 5. The learned Single Judge ordered that the case be listed for hearing before a larger Bench. 5. I have already noticed that the period for which the appellant defaulted in paying the rent was September, 1977 to December, 1977. The suit was filed on 28-1-1983. Admittedly, the appellant committed default in paying rent for the period which had taken place more than three years before institution of the suit. The substantial question of law which was agitated for hearing by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and which arose in this appeal was :- "whether a landlord can file a suit for eviction of the tenant from a building on the ground of default in payment of rent by the latter to the former for the period which was more than three years prior to the institution of the suit". 6. According to Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, no decree for eviction could have been passed against the appellant as the period of default being more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, whereas Mr. Mitter learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the law of limitation has no application. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties relied on a number of decisions which I will - discuss at appropriate places. This decision relied upon by Mr. Debi prasad supporting his contention is a Bench decision of this Court in bhairolal Agarwala V/s. Samir Baran Ghosh, 1964 BLJR 59. This was followed by a learned single Judge in Sri Nand Gopal Prasad Mostt. Prem Lata Devi, 1985 PLJR 923. The respondents prayed for decree against the appellant on the ground covered by Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act, which is similar to the 1947 Act and 1977 Act. Sec.11 (1) (d) reads as follows :- 11. This was followed by a learned single Judge in Sri Nand Gopal Prasad Mostt. Prem Lata Devi, 1985 PLJR 923. The respondents prayed for decree against the appellant on the ground covered by Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act, which is similar to the 1947 Act and 1977 Act. Sec.11 (1) (d) reads as follows :- 11. Eviction of tenants.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Sec.18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree -passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds:- (d) where the amount of two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Sec.16". 7 It was submitted by Mr. Debi Prasad that the decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent can only be passed if the default is within regard to two months rent lawfully payable and as in this case the rent for the period for which the default is alleged to have been committed was not lawfully payable by the appellant to the defendant, being for a period more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, the Court below ought not to have decreed the suit. The plea is bar of limitation. We have therefore to see first what is meant by lawfully payable. 8. The word lawful implies that is authorised, sanctioned or at any rate not forbidden by law. (Blacks Law Dictionary)The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word lawful is allowed by law, rightful : and the word lawfully is an adverb of the word lawful, which is an adjective. An action shall be lawful if it is not unlawful i. e. , not forbidden by law or which does not defect provision of any law. The word lawfully in Sec.11 (1) (d) is followed by the word payable. An action shall be lawful if it is not unlawful i. e. , not forbidden by law or which does not defect provision of any law. The word lawfully in Sec.11 (1) (d) is followed by the word payable. The rent which is payable by the tenant must be lawful. In other words, it must not be a rent which is not payable because payment of it is forbidden by law, or payment of which will defeat provision of any law. Sec.4 of the Act, which again is similar to 1947 and 1982 Acts, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the agreement or law to the contrary, it shall not be lawful for any landlord to increase or claim any increase in the rent which is payable for the time being in respect of any building except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It will thus be seen that a landlord cannot at his sweetwill increase rent for the time being payable for a building. The increase in rent can be by following the procedures prescribed in the Act. If the rent is increased without following the procedures prescribed in the Act, such an increase of rent shall not be lawful increase. Consequently, the rent that a tenant shall be required to pay because of unlawful increase of rent by the landlord shall not be a rent lawfully payable within the meaning of Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act. It is interesting to notice that the words are lawfully payable and not lawfully recoverable. If recovery of an amount has become barred by limitation, it cannot be recovered by process of law : but such an amount does not become unlawful on the expiry of the period of limitation, ln Bombay Dyeing and manufacturing Company Ltd. V/s. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 : the supreme Court observed that under the law a debt subsists, notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by limitation. From this legal proposition, there has been no deviation in any decision of the Supreme Court. 9. At this stage, it is necessary to notice New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram and another, AIR 1976 SC 1637 : relied upon by Mr. Debi prasad. That case arose oat of an application under Sec.7 of the Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 for recovery of arrear rent. 9. At this stage, it is necessary to notice New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram and another, AIR 1976 SC 1637 : relied upon by Mr. Debi prasad. That case arose oat of an application under Sec.7 of the Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 for recovery of arrear rent. The stand taken in defence was that as the amount was barred by limitation, the application for recovery having been filed for more than three years when it became payable. The Supreme Court referred to Sec.7 and noticed that the provision is for recovery of arrears of rent payable. It was observed by the Supreme Court that Sec.7 of that Act only provided special procedure for recovery of rent and it does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the word payable in Sec.7 in the context in which it occurs means legally recoverable that is rent which was not barred by limitation. Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act has nothing to do with the recovery of rent and the word payable in this clause cannot be interpreted in the manner done in Delhi Municipal Committee. 10. Mr. Mitter relied on some observations in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Sri Ramchandraji Virajman Mandir, AIR 1978 SC 287 , and submitted that the law of limitation might have barred the remedy of the respondents to recover the rent for the period which was beyond three years prior to the institution of the suit, but that cannot be a ground for defeating their claim for decree for eviction. In Khadi Gram Udyog Trust, (supra) the interpretation of the words entire amount of rent due in Sec.20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, J 972 was involved. According to the tenant, the rent which had become barred by limitation and therefore not recoverable could not be included within the words entire amount of rent due and the tenant was not liable to deposit the i barred rent. The principle of law laid down in Bombay Dyeing and manufacturing Company Limited, (supra) was relied upon. In view of the language in that section that "entire amount of rent due" was payable, it was held that Limitation Act shall have no application. The observation in Ram Nandan Sharma V/s. Mt. The principle of law laid down in Bombay Dyeing and manufacturing Company Limited, (supra) was relied upon. In view of the language in that section that "entire amount of rent due" was payable, it was held that Limitation Act shall have no application. The observation in Ram Nandan Sharma V/s. Mt. Maya Devi and others, AIR 1975 Patna 283 : that "the Limitation Act with regard to personal action bars the remedy without extinguishing the right" was approved. It is thus clear that in a given case it may be said that the amount was not lawfully recoverable through process of court being barred by limitation, but it will not mean that the amount has become unlawful or not lawfully payable. It is elementary that law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt. A barred debt may be a good consideration for fresh contract. 11. It is necessary here to notice Bhairolal Agarwala, (supra) case. In that case, the suit was filed for eviction of the tenant on the ground of default of payment of rent since September, 1954. The suit was filed on 3-4-1956. There was no dispute that the arrears alleged by the landlord in that suit was within three years from the date of institution of the suit. It was held in that case that the words lawfully payable in Sec.11 (1) (d)contemplates that "the rent had not become time-barred or the rent claimed was otherwise not illegal on the date of institution of the suit. Hence, in my opinion, any default for two months or more within three years of the date of institution of the suit will be a ground for eviction urder Clause (d)". From the facts of the case noticed above, it is clear that the interpretation of the words lawfully payable did not arise in that case. Any observation in this regard must be held to be, with respect, obiter dictum. 12. Further, it will appear from the observation of the Bench in bhairolal Agarwala quoted above that it was of the opinion that a time barred rent which was otherwise illegal were one and the same thing. Tne notice of the Bench was drawn to Sec.4 of the Act which 1 have noticed earlier. In Sri Nand Gopal Prasad V/s. Mostt. Further, it will appear from the observation of the Bench in bhairolal Agarwala quoted above that it was of the opinion that a time barred rent which was otherwise illegal were one and the same thing. Tne notice of the Bench was drawn to Sec.4 of the Act which 1 have noticed earlier. In Sri Nand Gopal Prasad V/s. Mostt. Premlata Devi, (supra), a learned single judge without going into the question whether in Bhairolal Agarwala (supra), the Bench was required to go into that question, but noticing that the period of default in that case was not barred by limitation, held he was bound by that judgment. For the reasons aforesaid, interpretation of lawfully payable in Bhairolal (supra) is not a binding precedent on us. 13. Mr. Debi Prasad also relied on Ghanshyamdas Gupta V/s. Debilal, AIR 1990 (1) SCC 465 : in support of his case. In that case, the building was situate in a cantonment area. The Bihar Rent Act had no application when the tenant defaulted in payment of rent. After the Act was extended to that Area, the suit was filed by the landlord. It was held that as the default had occurred before Ihe Bihar Rent Act was made applicable to the cantonment area, neither Sec.11 (1) (d) nor Sec.13 (of 1947 Act) the latter provides for remittance of rent in case of refusal by the land lord, was available to the parties when the default occurred. Under these facts, it was held by the Supreme Court that the suit for eviction on the ground of default in paying the rent for the period when the Bihar Rent Act did not apply to the area was not maintainable. This case is of no assistance to us. 14. For the interpretation given above to the words lawfully payable in Sec.11 (1) (d), it must be held that the courts below have rightly granted the decree for eviction of the appellant. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with cost. Appeal dismissed.