JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:—This Civil Revision is directed against the Order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mapusa, dated 16-3-1990, in Execution Application No. 45/87/A, whereby the objections raised by the petitioners/judgment-debtors (hereinafter called 'the petitioners') in the execution proceedings filed by the respondents/decree-holders (hereinafter called 'the respondents') to seek the enforcement of the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 19-6-1964 were negativated and dismissed. 2. In a suit filed by the respondents against the late parents of the petitioners in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, still during the pendency of the Portuguese law, being Accao Ordinaria No. 12 of 1963, for the recovery of the amount loaned to them by the erstwhile Banco Nacional Ultramarino by deed dated 17-12-1956 (Escritura do abertura de credito a conta corrente) a decree was secured by the respondents in the following terms: "As a result, the suit succeeds. The defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amount of Rs. 50,633.54 with 1/4% commission and interest at 4% till the date of closing of the account delay interest at 6% and other charges referred to in Clause 10 of the contract. Cost by the defendants." 3. It appears that soon after execution proceedings were instituted by the respondents in Panaji Court due to non-timely payment of the decretal amount which were subsequently transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mapusa. At this stage a series of objections raised by the petitioners against the said execution did not meet with success and the petitioners were directed to effect the immediate payment of their dues. The last order dated 4-3-1989 while rejecting the petitioners' prayer kept, however, a door open for them to show that the calculation of the amounts arrived at and claimed by the respondents in the execution were not in accordance with the judgment and decree dated 19-8-1964. But the learned Judge once again refused to entertain any plea of the petitioners in this regard. 4. Shri Lotlikar's the learned Counsel for the petitioners, main contention is that, according to Clause (2) of the deed dated 17-12-1956, the respondents can neither charge any compound interest of the amount due in terms of the decree nor claim interest for more than 5 years from the date the loan was advanced to them. 4. Shri Lotlikar's the learned Counsel for the petitioners, main contention is that, according to Clause (2) of the deed dated 17-12-1956, the respondents can neither charge any compound interest of the amount due in terms of the decree nor claim interest for more than 5 years from the date the loan was advanced to them. Shri Lotlikar relied on Article 1642, of the Portuguese Civil Code which provides that no interest for more than 5 years or compound interest is admissible except if by a fresh contract it has been agreed on the capitalisation of the interests which are thus becoming the principal debts. Shri Lotlikar argued that no compound interest can be charged even by an order of the Court while the fresh contract is to be executed only after the decree was passed. In this respect Shri Lotlikar urged that from the suit decree itself it is clear that what was ordered to be paid towards interest along with the decretal amount is interest at the rate of 4% and 6% only besides surcharges in terms of Clause 10 of the agreement. Shri Lotlikar made it clear that even if the contract had provided for compound interest this was not permissible any more after the decree was passed. In fact, no interest could be availed of by the respondents beyond the terms of the decree. It was further submitted that there is a sort of restriction put on the respondents for a period of 5 years beyond which it was not possible to claim interest in terms of Article 1642 of the Portuguese Civil Code which interest in turn is to be calculated from the date of the disbursement of the loan, that is to say, from the date the interest started falling due. Shri Lotlikar contended that the finding of the executing Judge that Article 1642 of the Portuguese Civil Code has been repealed by the Limitation Act and with that the rule of 5 years interest had also gone does not appear to be correct. Admittedly the loan was disbursed much before the Act came into force on 1-4-1964, sometime in the year 1956-57 (the deed is dated 17-12-1956), and the law applicable at that time and also when the suit for declaration and recovery was filed was the prevailing Portuguese law. Admittedly the loan was disbursed much before the Act came into force on 1-4-1964, sometime in the year 1956-57 (the deed is dated 17-12-1956), and the law applicable at that time and also when the suit for declaration and recovery was filed was the prevailing Portuguese law. Shri Lotlikar then submitted that a subsequent change of law could not bring more onerous obligations on the petitioners than the ones existing at the time of the transaction. The new law (Limitation Act) cannot be thus applied retrospectively to the proceedings. Shri Lotlikar further submitted that Article 1642 providing for a maximum period of 5 years of interest is a piece of substantive law which is putting a restriction on the respondents' right. It is not a procedural law and as such the Limitation Act could not repeal such provision. 5. There is considerable merit in these submissions of Shri Lotlikar but at the same time I am afraid that some of his basic propositions cannot be accepted. First of all, as rightly pointed out by Shri Kakodkar, the learned Counsel for the respondent, Clause (2) in the contract dated 17-12-1956 expressly permits capitalization of interest every quarterly. Hence Article 1642 does not come into play in this case, at least as far as the compound interest is concerned, and therefore the aforesaid Clause should remain unaffected by that provision. Further there is a special law enabling the Bank to charge compound interest on the loans disbursed. It is Decree No. 39221, dated 25-5-1953, where it is so provided in its Article 55. A similar provision has been incorporated also in Article 32 of the "Estatutes do Banco Nacional Ultramarino". As such interest is to be always calculated in terms of Clause (2) of the contract bearing in mind the provisions of Article 55 of the aforesaid Decree and Article 32 of the Statutes of the Bank. This interest is to be construed always as a compound interest because Clause (2) which expressly so provides says that every 3 months the interest accrued shall be capitalized on the fourth month, which means that from that fourth month following the concerned quarterly the interest charged will become a compound interest. This interest is to be construed always as a compound interest because Clause (2) which expressly so provides says that every 3 months the interest accrued shall be capitalized on the fourth month, which means that from that fourth month following the concerned quarterly the interest charged will become a compound interest. It follows therefore that Shri Lotlikar's submission that no compound interest is available to the respondents falls flat not only in view of the second part of Article 1642 of the Portuguese Civil Code but also on account of the express stipulation of this type of interest in the very agreement executed by the predecessors of the petitioners with the respondents Bank. 6. The next submission of Shri Lotlikar that no compound interest can be charged even by an order of the Court does not appear also sound. Similarly Shri Lotlikar's interpretation of the words 'new contract' in Article 1642 and his understanding that it means that a fresh agreement for the purpose should be entered into by the parties only after the passing of the decree is again manifestly wrong and totally lacking any real basis. What in fact the law says is only that the capitalization of interest shall be stipulated in a different or separate contract. But irrespective of all these submissions of Shri Lotlikar the fact remains that in the instant case the decree itself, although sketchy, speaks of payment of commission and contractual interest of 4% along with the decretal amount till the closing of the account and further payment of the delayed interest of 6% together with surcharges in terms of Clause (10). Shri Lotlikar argues and rightly that both the respondents as well as the petitioners are ultimately bound by the terms of the decree and cannot travel beyond that. This being the case and considering that the decree has been passed in the precise terms of the contract as admittedly it has to be shaped according to its clauses the subsequent interest accrued should continue to be charged in terms of Clause 2. This being the case and considering that the decree has been passed in the precise terms of the contract as admittedly it has to be shaped according to its clauses the subsequent interest accrued should continue to be charged in terms of Clause 2. In other words the interest should continue to be capitalized every quarterly at the same rate of 4% since 18-12-1961, that is to say, the date on which the principal sum became due consequent upon the fact that the account became inoperative, till the date the petitioners were served with summons in Suit No. 12 of 1963 filed by the respondents seeking for coercive recovery of the loan amount and, thereafter, at the rate of 6% which is the rate of delayed interest also provided in the contract till the final and full satisfaction by the petitioners of their dues. This is, as I see it, the only meaningful interpretation of the decree based on valid and settled provision of law and there is no need to seek the help of any other considerations or legal enactments to this effect. Hence it is to be held that when there is a valid and binding contract the parties are supposed to strictly adhere to it form its very beginning till the end. If a Loan was secured by the petitioners or their predecessors under certain contractual obligations with regard to its reimbursement as well as to the interest payable it is only fair and proper that such obligations should prevail and continue to be faithfully honoured by them till the ultimate and final re-payment of the whole debt irrespective of what the subsequent law may prescribed with this regard. In the instant case it is seen that not only the law which was prevailing at the time the obligations were contracted by the petitioners' ancestors was enabling the Bank to charge compound interest but also the very contract executed by the parties expressly provided for such type of interest and the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, on 19th August, 1965, has clearly shaped the relief sought for by the respondents in terms of the clauses and conditions of the said contract. The petitioners are therefore not expected to run away either from the terms of the decree as well as from the obligations assumed by their predecessors in terms of the contract till the complete and full reimbursement of their debt. This is required to be done not only in view of what the law which is to be applied provides and which cannot be differently construed but also from the obligations to which they are bound apart from the exigencies arising out from principles of justice and morality which are also very much lively flowing in this case. It is therefore in this context that I am inclined to partly agree with Shri Kakodkar that Article 1642 of the Portuguese Civil Code applies only to contractual debts and not to the decretal ones. Shri Kakodkar has vehemently canvassed that only when there is an agreement then the law of Article 1642 comes into play and that the 5 years period spoken of in the wordings of the said provision cannot affect the force of a decree which is thus to be executed in its letter and spirit. And there is no doubt that it is so. The argument of Shri Kakodkar draws also eloquent support from the very circumstance that Article 1642 is included in the Chapter related to the contract of 'Usura' (contract of usury) which by itself strongly points out to the fact that its applicability is to operate within the bounds of contractual dealings only. Shri Kakodkar is justified when he urges that one cannot be exonerated from Clause 2 whether the respondents are to pay their dues either directly or consequent upon an order passed by the Court and being the decree in accordance with the clauses of the agreement interest must continue to be calculated, as in the past, every 3 months while on the fourth month the interest accrued should be capitalized. In other words there is no scope to say that the decree has exempted the petitioners from strictly effecting the payment of the interest accrued in the precise terms of Clause 2 of the contract. If we have to think differently and Shri Kakodkar is wise when he says so this would mean that in that case the Court's decree were to create a new contract. 7. If we have to think differently and Shri Kakodkar is wise when he says so this would mean that in that case the Court's decree were to create a new contract. 7. On the other hand there is no difficulty in accepting Shri Lotlikar's contention that the Limitation Act has not repealed Article 1642 of the Portuguese Civil Code. But we are unable to agree with him when he argues that the said provision debars the respondents from charging interest for more than 5 years. We have already held that the said Article 1642 is not attracted in the instant case so far as the compound interest is concerned in view of Clause 2 of the contract and the special provisions both in the Decree No. 39221 and the Statutes of the Bank. 8. Further the interpretation sought to be given by Shri Lotlikar to the expression 'closing of the accounts' does not sound to us as being well conceived. We find difficult to accept that the said expression means that the payment of the outstanding balance shown in the last account became due and in position to be demanded for that matter by the creditor. There is no doubt that the word 'closing of account' has something to say with the fact that the account became inoperative and blocked as on 18-12-1961 and the petitioners were not allowed any more to draw any monies from it. But this does not signify that the account became dead to the effect that interest on the balance amount ceased to be accrued in terms of the contract, namely, its Clause 2. Indeed the liability of the petitioners to pay interest as per the terms of the loan agreement is to be deemed as having remained unchanged till such time the outstanding balance is entirely cleared and repaid by them. Shri Kakodkar's submissions in this regard are perfectly valid and I endorse them as good. 9. Shri Lotlikar urges that the obligations entered by the petitioners by virtue of the agreement should not be held as interminable even after the decree and places reliance on the provision of section 34 of the C.P.C. A reference to this section 34 shows that it provides for a reasonable rate of interest to be fixed by the trial Judge during the pendency of the suit. Shri Lotlikar argues that according to the C.P.C. in a suit for recovery of money the rate of interest even in case of a contract is always under the control of the Court after the institution of the suit whether the creditor is a private party or a Bank. As such in view of the aforesaid provision Shri Lotlikar contends that interest charged after and during the pendency of the suit could be less than the interest agreed by the parties. This submission of Shri Lotlikar is not going to impress me or take his case any further. It is an admitted position that the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to this case which is solely regulated by the provisions of the prevailing Portuguese law and this by itself settles the issue. There is no dispute that section 34 prescribes that where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit. But its proviso also enables the Court in case of a commercial transaction to grant interest at the rate of more than 6% which, however, should not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate the rate at which monies are lent or advanced by Nationalised Banks in relation to commercial transactions. Further in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, at page 258, it has been expressly stated that it is in the power of the Court to allow compound interest from the date of the institution of the suit and that where compound interest was charged during the course of the dealings between the parties the Bombay High Court awarded compound interest from the date of suit. 10. The next submission of Shri Lotlikar that the respondents are not entitled to charge interest for more than 5 years from the date the loan was advanced is also not likely to merit acceptance having regard to the nature of the contract and more specifically to its Clause 2. 10. The next submission of Shri Lotlikar that the respondents are not entitled to charge interest for more than 5 years from the date the loan was advanced is also not likely to merit acceptance having regard to the nature of the contract and more specifically to its Clause 2. It is the contention of Shri Lotlikar that the 5 years period referred to in Article 1642 is to be calculated from the date the interest falls due and any decree on that matter is immaterial. Shri Lotlikar states that the decree cannot enlarge the right or extend the period of limitation. We have seen however that Articles 1642 is not applicable to the instant case wherein a decree was already passed by the Court quantifying the liability of the petitioners towards the principal amount due by them to the respondents which decree has become res judicata. It is therefore, evident that irrespective of the fact that the decree is based on a contract, the ultimate responsibility of the petitioners at present for the repayment of their dues is not arising out of the aforesaid contract but instead from the very decree passed by the Civil Court. Here is case of a decretal debt rather than of a contractual debt. In this view of the matter Article 1642 is not even applicable to cases of contractual debts when a party comes to Court to enforce the terms of the contract either on account of non-payment or failure on the part of the debtor to comply with his obligations and successfully gets a judicial declaration with regard to the amount due. In this case it is obvious that the rule of 5 years cannot also be attracted because otherwise if there was a delay in the adjudication of the suit without any fault of the respondents they would be deprived from getting throughout the benefit of the interest in the meantime accrued during that period on the principal amount. In this case it is obvious that the rule of 5 years cannot also be attracted because otherwise if there was a delay in the adjudication of the suit without any fault of the respondents they would be deprived from getting throughout the benefit of the interest in the meantime accrued during that period on the principal amount. We should not overlook also that in the instant case the suit had to be filed because the petitioners have defaulted in complying with their commitments towards the reimbursement of the loan amount which was due for payment and being so since the suit was instituted by the respondents within time they should not be made to suffer on account of any delay in the adjudication of the same suit nor the petitioners should be allowed to take undue advantage from their own fault. To be noted also that the loan amount is being charged an almost token interest of hardly 4% being the delayed interest also calculated at the paltry rate of 6% and since 1961 till today almost thirty years have passed and it appears that upto now the petitioners have not even bothered to clear their liabilities towards the respondents at least with regard to the principal amount due. The equities of the case also do not favour the petitioners in their apparent quest to run away from their obligations and avoid an effective repayment of their debts to the respondents. We therefore have no hesitation in holding that the rule of 5 years interest prescribed in Article 1642 of the Portuguese Civil Code is not applicable to decree in question. 11. Shri Lotlikar has invited our attention to a judgment delivered on 18th December, 1990 by my learned brother Kamat, J., in Civil Revision Application No. 84 of 1990 while dealing with an almost similar matter which is the subject of this petition. There also the essential controversy which was adjudicated was the question as to whether the petitioners were liable to pay compound interest on the decretal amount or the same should bear simple interest only. There also the essential controversy which was adjudicated was the question as to whether the petitioners were liable to pay compound interest on the decretal amount or the same should bear simple interest only. After a detailed discussion my learned brother passed a very elaborate order holding on facts that regard being had to the pleadings and the decree made by the trial Court it was not possible to read on the decree that there was any compounding of interest of the amount decreed in favour of the respondents. The Court further ruled that the account of the petitioners became dead and closed on 20th December, 1951, that is to say, on the day the same was rendered inoperative and blocked and from that date no further operations were possible in this account. Shri Kakodkar has submitted that this judgment should not be followed because the same was passed per in curiam, without considering the contract and the special law prevailing at the time of its execution. Shri Kakodkar also contended that on facts the said judgment was not attracted in our case or in the alternative the same was distinguishable and could not be taken as a precedent. Shri Kakodkar placed a word of caution and reminded that in this case the Court was just exercising revisional powers and such judgment need not be followed because, even assuming that the impugned order was illegal or wrong, that by itself would not constitute any jurisdictional error. Shri Kakodkar relied on a decision of Gujarat High Court in (Jagmohandas v. Jamnadas)1, A.I.R. 1965 Guj. 181 wherein while dealing with the powers of revision it has been observed that section 115 of C.P.C. vests a discretionary power in the High Court and the High Court was not bound to interfere in all cases in which it is found that the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. As such the Court held that no interference in revision was necessary. Shri Lotlikar, while attempting to meet with Shri Kakodkar's objections to the judgment, has urged that the same was passed in terms of the decree and clearly ruled that no compound interest was available to the respondents. In the said judgment the expression 'accounts closed' has also been correctly construed by the learned Judge. Shri Lotlikar, while attempting to meet with Shri Kakodkar's objections to the judgment, has urged that the same was passed in terms of the decree and clearly ruled that no compound interest was available to the respondents. In the said judgment the expression 'accounts closed' has also been correctly construed by the learned Judge. Therefore even assuming that the findings given in that judgment were wrong this could not make the judgment passed per in curiam unless it was shown that the same was delivered by overlooking any relevant law or binding authorities. I am in full agreement with Shri Lotlikar the judgment of my learned brother was not passed per in curiam since the judgment has considered all the relevant material placed before him and there is nothing to suggest that he delivered the judgment ignoring any authority or judicial pronouncement which might have adjudicated the subject-matter of the issues dealt with by him. 12. It follows therefore that this judgment could have been relied by this Court to enable us to come to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge while passing the impugned order had manifestly committed a jurisdictional error. Shri Lotlikar has submitted that this is a fit case for the Court to interfere, a case of injustice in the interpretation of the decree passed by the Civil Court which has ultimately allowed something which either the law or the decree itself could not have permitted. 13. The question of following the judgment of my learned brother should not be placed upon this type of considerations because this judgment, being a judgment of this High Court, although delivered by a Single Judge is, in my view, legally binding on me. Judicial discipline requires that the rulings of this Court when delivered in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction should be respected, observed and acted upon. However as it was already said above my view on the legal issues which arose for determination in this case, with due respect to my learned brother, seems to differ and as such being myself unable either to overlook that judgment of brother Kamat, J., the only option left is to get these questions to be adjudged by a larger Bench. In the circumstances I direct that the matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice with a request to refer it to a larger Bench for the purpose of adjudication of the following points of law: (1) Whether in terms of the decree dated 19th August, 1965 in "Accao Ordinaria" No. 12 of 1963 and Clause (2) of the contract dated 17-12-1955 the respondents were free to charge compound interest on the loan amount disbursed to the petitioners' predecessor-in-title? (2) Whether the respondents are entitled to charge interest on the principal amount for a period of more than 5 years from the date the loan was advanced and disbursed to the petitioners' predecessors-in-title? Order accordingly. *****