PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) THE judgment and order dated 9/08/1990 of the learned Joint Civil Judge (J. D.), Anand, in Execution Application (Darkhast) no. 58 of 1981 is under challenge in this revision under Sec. 115 of the code of Civil Procedure. ( 2 ) SHORTLY stated the facts are : by registered sale-deed dated 23/05/1951 the deceased father of the respondent sold suit land (Survey No. 202 admeasuring about 4 Acres 16 Gunthas out of 18 Acres 25 Gunthas situated in village Vadol Taluka anand) for the consideration of Rs. 7,000. 00 in favour of the deceased father of the petitioners. There was a contemporaneous agreement to reconvey the suit land for the enforcement of which Civil Suit No. 281 of 1965 came to be filed by the respondents predecessor in title against the petitioners predecessor in title. It appears that there were proceedings under Sec. 85 (A) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 during the pendency of this suit and there is a chequered history with regard to such proceedings and further developments concerning such proceedings. However, they are not relevant in so far as the present petition is concerned. It would be sufficient to state that on 9/11/1978 the parties to Civil Suit No. 281 of 1965 entered into compromise, by which the respondent was required to pay Rs. 7,000. 00 to the petitioners on or before 7/07/1979 and the petitioners were required to execute a registered sale-deed and to hand over the possession of the suit land to the respondent. On the basis of such a compromise, Civil Court passed decree in the said Suit No. 281 of 1965. The present respondent filed Execution Application No. 51 of 1978 for the execution of the said decree. It is the petitioners say that during the pendency of the said Darkhast proceedings the petitioners raised plea of tenancy on the basis of fresh agreement arrived at before the Mamlatdar on 1/07/1978. As stated above, that part of proceedings has also no relevance so far as the present revision application is concerned. It would therefore not be necessary to refer to them. As stated above. the respondent filed the present Execution Application being Darkhast No. 58 of 1981 for executing the decree in question. The petitioners appeared in that Execution Application and contested the application. It would therefore not be necessary to refer to them. As stated above. the respondent filed the present Execution Application being Darkhast No. 58 of 1981 for executing the decree in question. The petitioners appeared in that Execution Application and contested the application. The matter was heard on evidence and the learned joint Civil Judge (J. D.), Anand passed the impugned order allowing the execution by directing the petitioners to withdraw the amount of Rs. 7,000/ - deposited by the respondent in the Court and execute a sale-deed in terms of the decree Exh. 75 within a period of 10 days from the date of the order of the learned Civil Judge and convey the property accordingly free of encumbrances. It is this order of the trial Court which has been challenged by the petitioners in this revision application. ( 3 ) THE short question which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners is that when time was fixed in the decree itself for making payment of Rs. 7,000. 00 and when that part of the decree was not complied with by the decree holder, the decree stood exhausted and ceased to be executable, with the result that the trial Court did not have jurisdiction to execute the decree. In support of this question, the learned Advocate for the petitioners relied upon various authorities, which are being presently dealt with. However, it has to be borne in mind that Sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to extend period earlier fixed or granted by the Court even though the period originally fixed or granted might have expired. It is not in dispute that in the present case during the tendency of the execution application, an appropriate application was moved by the respondent for making payment in the Court, of the amount of Rs. 7,000. 00 in terms of the decree under execution. This can be seen from the application Exh. 47 dated 19/02/1986 and the order passed below it. It can further be seen from the application Exh. 50 dated 21/03/1988 that the respondent deposited Rs. 7,000. 00 as per the order passed by the Court, and there is nothing on the record to show that that order has been carried higher up or that that order has been reversed or varied. It can further be seen from the application Exh. 50 dated 21/03/1988 that the respondent deposited Rs. 7,000. 00 as per the order passed by the Court, and there is nothing on the record to show that that order has been carried higher up or that that order has been reversed or varied. As a matter of fact, after that order was passed the proceeding of the Darkhast had further been taken up and the matter was heard on evidence bearing in mind the provisions contained in Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 4 ) REVERTING to the question posed by Mr. S. R. Shah learned Advocate for the petitioners, it would be appropriate at this stage to consider the submissions made by him in support of that question. Mr. Shah first relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhujangrao Ganapathi v. Sheshrao Rajarao, reported in AIR 1974 bombay 104. In the case before the Bombay High Court, the decree provided that the suit was to stand dismissed if payment was not made within the time fixed. In the context of such a self-contained clause in a decree, it was held that that was a clause which was a self-operative final decree and the provision contained in Sec. 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 did not apply to such a decree. It was observed that failure on the part of the party to carry out the terms of the decree would automatically result in the dismissal of the suit. It can thus be seen that the decree itself provided for the consequence of the non-compliance of the condition. Reference was made to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Mahanth Ram v. Gangadas, AIR 1961 SC 882 where the Supreme Court took the view that sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowered the Court to deal with the events that might arise subsequent to an order, for the purpose of enlarging time for payment even though such time was fixed peremptorily. The observations of the Supreme Court in that case came to be reproduced by the Bombay High Court. They read :"such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decree apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigant might put themselves in order and avoid delay. The observations of the Supreme Court in that case came to be reproduced by the Bombay High Court. They read :"such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decree apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigant might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. " ( 5 ) IN the present case the relevant clause in the decree is clause 1 and broadly translated into English, the clause would read :"as per the compromise arrived at between the plaintiff Shri Dhirajlal Bharati and the defendants in the Court of Mamlatdar, the plaintiff should pay Rs. 7,000/ - (Rupees Seven thousand only by 7th July, 197s) and the defendants should execute a registered sale-deed and hand over physical possession of the suit land in its present original condition in the presence of Panchas on the same day. "in the case before the Bombay High Court not only the time was fixed, but the consequence of non-performance of the obligation within the prescribed time was stated to be the dismissal of the suit. In the present case the decree is absolutely silent about what would be the consequence of non-compliance of the obligation of payment of Rs. 7,000. 00 and simultaneous execution of the sale-deed and delivery of the possession. Shortly stated, there is no condition appearing in the decree in this case which would put an end to the execution thereof. Besides, clause 6 provides that the defendants (the petitioners) were required to assume the liability such as debts or encumbrances and were to hand over the possession of the suit land free from encumbrances. Apart from the nature of the consent decree, the parties led evidence before the trial Court about whether the parties were ready and willing to perform their part of the obligation as per the decree. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not enter into the appreciation of the evidence. Suffice it to say that the trial Court has recorded the evidence of the parties and on having heard the parties, came to the conclusion that the respondent was ready and willing to pay the amount of Rs. 7,000. 00as per the decree. ( 6 ) MR. Suffice it to say that the trial Court has recorded the evidence of the parties and on having heard the parties, came to the conclusion that the respondent was ready and willing to pay the amount of Rs. 7,000. 00as per the decree. ( 6 ) MR. Shah then referred to a Supreme Court decision in the case of jai Narain v. Kedar Nath, reported in AIR 1956 SC 359 . The Supreme Court has ruled in that case that when a decree imposes obligations on both sides, which are so conditional that performance by one is conditional on performance by the other, execution will not be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offers to perform his side but, when objection is raised, satisfies the executing Court that he is in a position to do so. Any other, rule would have the effect of varying the condition of the decree : a thing that the executing Court cannot do. ( 7 ) IN that case the Supreme Court was concerned with the decree imposing reciprocal and interlinked obligations on both sides. The relevant portion of the decree reads :"it is declared that upon payment and or tender to the defendants-appellants jai Narayan, Ram Lundia and Madan Lal Jhunjhunwala of the sum of rs. 2,45,000-00. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are entitled to 250 shares belonging to the said defendants in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Ltd , and 5 annas share belonging to them in the Marwadi Brothers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and to all dividends and profits in respect thereof with effect from 1/2/1941. . . "next clause in the decree there, was with regard to the execution of the appropriate deeds is favour of the decree holder. In that case ultimately one of the defendants applied for execution of the decree and one of the plaintiffs mr. Kedarnath Khetan objected to the execution inter alia on the ground that the defendants were not in a position to implement the conditions imposed on them by the decree because the Marwadi Brothers firm was dissolved by agreement between the parties. In the background of such facts the Supreme court held as stated above. Kedarnath Khetan objected to the execution inter alia on the ground that the defendants were not in a position to implement the conditions imposed on them by the decree because the Marwadi Brothers firm was dissolved by agreement between the parties. In the background of such facts the Supreme court held as stated above. It would further be seen from the facts of the case before the Supreme Court that by happening of certain events the decree was rendered infructuous and in executable, as even if Rs 2,45,000/- were deposited, it was not possible for the Court to execute the reciprocal part of the decree, namely, to execute an appropriate deed of releasing 5 annas share in the firm of Marwadi Brothers. The authority would not be applicable to the present case. ( 8 ) THE authority contained in the case of K. Simrathmall v. Nanjalingiah, air 1963 SC 1182 was referred to on behalf of the petitioners. Observations appearing at page 1186 were read. That was a case where the Supreme Court was concerned with Sec. 58 of the Transfer or Property Act while dealing with two separate documents, one of a sale and another of an agreement to execute reconveyance, on the same day. It was held that the transaction did not amount to mortgage by conditional sale and since one of the conditions in the deed of conveyance was not performed by the original vendor, relief against forfeiture could not be granted. The decision would not be helpful to the petitioners as it did not deal with the executability of a decree. ( 9 ) MR. Shah then submitted a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Kartik Chandra Bera v. Bhusan Chandra Guria, reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 52. In that case the title suit of the plaintiff was adjourned by a compromise petition to another date for passing of decree in terms of solemnama. On a bare look at the terms of solemnama, it can be seen that the time was made the essence of the contract by stating such term in the compromise entered into between the parties. Under such circumstances it was held that equitable consideration of substantial compliance of the contract within stipulated time could not prevail. Therefore, the plaintiff there was held not entitled to any relief. Under such circumstances it was held that equitable consideration of substantial compliance of the contract within stipulated time could not prevail. Therefore, the plaintiff there was held not entitled to any relief. In the present case the decree no where speaks about the time fixed in the above mentioned clause or any of the other clauses as time being the essence of the contract. ( 10 ) IT is the submission of Mr. Shah that since the suit was compromised deposite the fact that there were pending disputes with regard to the tenancy proceedings pending before the Mamlatdar and that there was a strong defence of limitation against the plaintiffs suit, the time fixed under the decree was impliedly contemplated to be essence of the compromise decree and neither of the parties could have been relieved from the performance of the respective obligations within the time fixed. If the submission made by Mr. Shah is accepted, it would amount to going behind the decree, which is precisely not permissible under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 11 ) REFERENCE may be made to a Supreme Court decision in the case of Periyakkal v. Dakshyani, reported in AIR 1983 SC 423, where it has been held that Court has power to extend time, which was fixed by a consent decree. As stated above, in the present case as per order below Exh. 47 the amount of Rs. 7,000. 00 was deposited vide Exh. 50. Therefore, even assuming that the order below Exh. 47 is to be examined in that light, it has to be found that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction vested in it and its order was within the ambit of its power. ( 12 ) THE respondent cited authorities in the case of Prithi Nath v. Suraj ahir, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1041 , Murari Lal v. Dev Karan, reported in air 1965 SC 225 and Indira Kaur v. Sheolal Kapoor, reported in AIR 1988 sc 1074 . The first one deals with usufructuary mortgage where a payment of mortgage money was already made by the mortgagor and it was held that a new right to get his (mortgagers) demands enforced through the Court had then arisen as a result of the provision contained in Sec. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first one deals with usufructuary mortgage where a payment of mortgage money was already made by the mortgagor and it was held that a new right to get his (mortgagers) demands enforced through the Court had then arisen as a result of the provision contained in Sec. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to demand the mortgagee to do certain things on payment of the mortgage money is different from enforcing the demands subsequent to the payment of money. The second authority deals with law concerning clog on the right of redemption and the last one deals with what was the real nature of the transaction. All the three authorities would not be relevant so far as the question which has been raised by Mr. Shah is concerned. Mr. Bharati then referred to an authority contained in the case of Bhagwat Saran Singh v. Mithila Saran Singh, reported in AIR 1953 Patna 158. The head note reads :"where a party is by an order of the Court required to deposit a certain amount in Court under a compromise and a time limit is prescribed for it, in case the time expires, but, on account of the absence of a provision in the petition of compromise, or in the order of the Court as to the effect of the non-payment the order has not operated automatically, then the Court has seisin of the matter and can under Sec. 148 extend the time for making the deposit. "as stated above, even as per the Supreme Court decision in the case of Periyakkal (supra) Court has power to extend time fixed by Consent decree ( 13 ) ON a true construction of the concerned decree it cannot be said that either the time fixed by the parties was an essence of the contract or the decree stood exhausted upon its non-compliance within the prescribed time. ( 14 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the trial Court has not exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no illegality committed by the trial Court in passing the order in question. The result is that this revision shall have to be dismissed. ( 15 ) THE revision is dismissed. Interim relief which was granted and extended till further orders stands vacated. The result is that this revision shall have to be dismissed. ( 15 ) THE revision is dismissed. Interim relief which was granted and extended till further orders stands vacated. R and P is directed to be returned to the trial Court. No order as to cost. .