Judgment A.A. CAZI, J.:---This suit is for (a) a decree for ordering the defendants to specifically perform their obligation under the contract by executing conveyance in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property more particularly described in the schedule annexed to the plaint with clear and unencumbered title; (aa) alternatively, if it is found that the defendants are unable to convey the suit property with clear and unencumbered title, decree for specific performance plus decree for Rs. 1 crore as compensation for not conveying clear and marketable title; (ab) a decree ordering defendants Nos. 4 to 6 to construct on the suit plot a building consisting of 60 tenements with 36790 sq. ft. built up area as per plan submitted and approved by the Bombay Municipal Corporation; (ac) alternatively, if specific performance of the agreement cannot be granted, a decree against defendants Nos. 4 to 6 ordering them to refund to the plaintiffs the consideration of Rs. 14,24,440/- together with interest thereon at the rate 20% per annum from 18-11-1983 till the date of the suit and further interest at the same rate or such rate as the Court deems fit and proper from the date of the suit till payment; and (b) in the alternative to prayer (a), if the plaintiffs are not entitled to the specific performance, a decree ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs damages of Rs. 8 crores or such sum as may be determined on inquiry in that behalf with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the suit till payment. 2. In the prayer clause (a) there is a reference "Schedule annexed to the plaint", but undisputedly what is meant thereby is the scheduled at page 42 of the plaint. The property described there is land plus structures standing thereon being Plot Nos. 703, admeasuring 4500 sq. yds. equal to 3763 sq. meters situate at Andheri (East) in the registration district and sub-district of Bombay City and Bombay Suburban now Greater Bombay. 3. The plaintiffs' case is as follows : On 23rd April, 1970 there was an agreement under which defendants Nos. 1 to 3 agreed to sell the suit property to defendants Nos. 4 to 6 for a certain price and this was subject to Court sanction being obtained in respect of the minor vendors. 3. The plaintiffs' case is as follows : On 23rd April, 1970 there was an agreement under which defendants Nos. 1 to 3 agreed to sell the suit property to defendants Nos. 4 to 6 for a certain price and this was subject to Court sanction being obtained in respect of the minor vendors. On 23rd April, 1970 possession of the suit property was given by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 to defendants Nos. 4 to 6 and a Power of Attorney was also given. In March 1975 the promoters of the plaintiff-Society (which was then a proposed society) were J.L. Joshi and B.S. Salvi. On 30th April, 1975 the then promoters of the plaintiff-society agreed to purchase the to-be-constructed residential flats on the suit land at Rs. 100/- per sq. ft. and a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was paid and a balance of 10% was to be deposited with the attorneys of the defendants M/s. Ayer Co. Defendants Nos. 4 to 6 made no efforts to remove the unauthorised occupants. On the contrary defendants Nos. 4 to 6 issued notice dated 26th April, 1979 terminating the agreement dated 30th April, 1975. The original promoters then assigned their rights under the agreement to (1) Smt. V.V. Petkar, (2) Shri R.D. Tamankar and (3) Shri Jumani. On 26th July, 1980 there were two agreement copies of which are at Exhibits 'D' and 'D-1' to the plaint. Exhibit 'D' to the plaint is an agreement between defendants Nos. 4 to 6 on the one hand referred to therein as 'the vendors' and (1) Mrs. V.V. Pethker, (2) P.D. Tamhankar and (3) Smt. K.K. Bhandari, on the other referred to therein as 'the purchasers'. In that agreement it was stated that there were 30 hutments on the said land; that the vendors withdraw the notice dated 26th April, 1979 and confirmed that the agreement dated 30th April, 1975 was valid and subsisting; that the vendors would proceed to construct alternative accommodation in a portion shown in the plan annexed thereto and to shift all the hutments; that the total built up area for the purchasers would be 36790 sq. ft. and total tenements would be 60 which would be constructed by the vendors for the purchasers; that the price would be 60 which would be constructed by the vendors for the purchasers; that the price would be Rs. 125/- per sq. ft. ft. and total tenements would be 60 which would be constructed by the vendors for the purchasers; that the price would be 60 which would be constructed by the vendors for the purchasers; that the price would be Rs. 125/- per sq. ft. of the built up area; that within four days from the date of the execution of that agreement, the vendors would produce all the documents in their possession to the purchaser' advocate for investigation of title of the suit property "and the purchasers shall accept that said title within 2 months from the date hereof. If the purchasers do not accept the title, then this agreement as well as the agreement dated 30th April 1975 shall stand cancelled and the vendors shall refund to the purchasers the amount received by them without interest and each party will pay its own costs"; that 20% of the total purchase price would be deemed to be treated as the cost of the plot and on payment of such amount the plaintiff-society was entitled to get the conveyance deed of the said plot in its favour and that this condition was required to be incorporated in the agreement since the members of the plaintiff-society were to get the loans from their employer viz., Bombay Municipal Corporation, only after getting conveyance deed in favour of the society. Defendants No. 4 to 6 took no steps to evict the unauthorised occupants Smt. Ambubai Charat filed Suit No. 557 of 1981 in the City Civil Court, Bombay, against defendants Nos. 4 to 6 for an injunction restraining defendants Nos. 4 to 6 from disturbing her possession in respect of the suit land. In January, 1983, defendant Nos. 4, for the first time, informed the plaintiffs regarding the interim injunction passed in Suit No. 557 of 1981. There was a further modification in the agreement and the rate of price was Rs. 175/- per sq. ft. In April 1983, defendants Nos. 4 to 6 to started construction of the building and the plaintiffs paid Rs. 13,24,440/- to defendants Nos. 4 to 6. This was the 20% of the total cost. This was paid in November 1983. The plaintiffs then called upon defendants Nos. 4 to 6 convey the suit land. There was further correspondence between the parties. Defendants Nos. 4 to 6 however did not convey the suit land to the plaintiff-society. 13,24,440/- to defendants Nos. 4 to 6. This was the 20% of the total cost. This was paid in November 1983. The plaintiffs then called upon defendants Nos. 4 to 6 convey the suit land. There was further correspondence between the parties. Defendants Nos. 4 to 6 however did not convey the suit land to the plaintiff-society. The plaintiff-society was always ready and willing from time to time to perform their part of the contract and paid 20% of the total cost price and thereby had completed their part of the contract. By subsequent correspondence the defendants agreed to execute conveyance deed, got the rate embanced to Rs. 150/- per sq. ft. with balance of F.G.I. being retained by them. The plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract even regarding the second stage. 4. The defence of the defendants is as follows : There is non-joinder of parties. There is mis-joinder of causes of action. The plaintiffs have spilt up the agreements into two parts and have sought specific performance of only one part and the plaintiffs cannot get relief by splitting the agreements in this manner. The suit is barred by limitation. It is denied that the plaintiff-society is registered. The rights of the plaintiffs are governed by the agreements Exhibits 'D' and 'D-1' dated 26th July 1980 and not by the earlier agreements mentioned in the plaint. It is not admitted that the plaintiff-society acquired all rights under the said agreement. In any case the promoters are necessary parties. The suit by Smt. Ambubai Bharat is against defendant No. 4 only. Because of the injunction passed in that suit it became necessary to alter the plans of the proposed building on the suit land but the plaintiffs are not agreeable to that and, therefore, defendant No. 4 could not continue without altering the plans. Defendant No. 4 informed the plaintiffs from time to time regarding Ambubai's suit. The plaintiffs have themselves terminated the agreement. They therefore, cannot claim any specific performance. At the request of the purchasers under the said agreements the 4th defendant paid Rs. 1,00,000/- which has not yet been returned. Therefore, there was breach on the part of the purchasers. The plaintiffs have not yet accepted the title of the defendants and this is a breach of the term of the agreement and, therefore, the agreement stands terminated. Defendants Nos. 1,00,000/- which has not yet been returned. Therefore, there was breach on the part of the purchasers. The plaintiffs have not yet accepted the title of the defendants and this is a breach of the term of the agreement and, therefore, the agreement stands terminated. Defendants Nos. 4 to 6 are ready and willing to refund to the plaintiffs their amounts. The suit contract cannot be specifically performed because it runs into minute and numerous details. The plaintiffs have violated the terms of the contract. The plaintiffs are not ready and willing to perform their obligation under the contract. The amended claim is barred by limitation. They deny damages. The plaintiffs have not confirmed the agreement dated 26th July 1980 and hence the plaintiffs cannot make any claim under the said agreement. The valuation is disputed. 5. The issues are as follows : 1. Whether the suit is framed is misconceived and not maintainable as mentioned in para 1 of the Written Statement ? 2. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action as mentioned in para 1 of the Written Statement ? 3. Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action ? 4. Whether the price of land was deemed to be 20 per cent of the purchase price as alleged in para 14 of the plaint ? 5. Whether the plaintiffs have spilt the agreement for sale in two parts and sought for specific performance of only one part as started in para 2 of the Written Statement ? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of a portion of the agreement as claimed in the plaint ? 7. Whether the suit is barred by the law of limitation ? 8. Whether the plaintiffs society is duly registered as alleged ? 9. Whether the rights of the parties are now governed by two agreements dated 26th July 1980 mentioned in the plaint as contended in para 3 of the Written Statement ? 10. Whether the promoters of the plaintiffs society are necessary parties to the suit ? 11. Whether the plaintiff society has acquired all rights under the two agreements as alleged in para 15 of the plaint ? 12. Whether the agreements mentioned in the plaint are a nullity and cannot be enforced ? 13. 10. Whether the promoters of the plaintiffs society are necessary parties to the suit ? 11. Whether the plaintiff society has acquired all rights under the two agreements as alleged in para 15 of the plaint ? 12. Whether the agreements mentioned in the plaint are a nullity and cannot be enforced ? 13. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to file this suit as stated in para 6 of the Written Statement ? 14. Whether the suit is bad-for non-joinder of necessary parties ? 15. Whether the plaintiffs have committed breach of the agreement in suit as stated in para 11 of the Written Statement ? 16. Whether the defendants 4 to 6 have become entitled to rescind the agreement as stated in para 11 of the Written Statement ? 17. The agreement in suit being a package deal agreements whether the plaintiffs are entitled to separate the various terms and seek specific performance of the separate part ignoring the other part as stated in para 12 of the Written Statement ? 18. Whether the plaintiffs themselves have terminated and cancelled the agreement and if so whether they are entitled to specific performance or any other relief is this suit as stated in para 13 of the Written Statement ? 19. Whether the 4th defendant has paid to the three promoters of the plaintiffs Rs. 1,00,000/- as mentioned in para 15 of the Written Statement ? 20. Whether the plaintiffs have committed a breach of the agreement by reason of the not returning said amount as mentioned in para 15 of the Written Statement ? 21. Whether the plaintiffs did not approve the title by reason of which the agreements stand cancelled as stated in para 16 of the Written Statement ? 22. Whether the agreements aforesaid stand cancelled ? 23. Whether the contract in suit is such for the non-performance of which compensation in money is adequate relief ? 24. Whether the contract in suit involves performance of continuous acts and minute details which the Hon'ble Court cannot supervise and if so whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief as stated in para 19 of the Written Statement ? 25. Whether the plaintiffs have performed and have been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract ? 26. To what reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled ? 27. Generally. 28. 25. Whether the plaintiffs have performed and have been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract ? 26. To what reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled ? 27. Generally. 28. Whether the plaint discloses no cause of action in respect of the claim for damages ? 29. Whether the claim for damages is barred by law of limitation ? 30. Whether the claim for damages is misconceived and not maintainable ? 31. Whether in the absence of particulars of alleged damages the plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages as stated in para 3 of the additional Written Statement ? 32. Whether the plaintiffs have suffered any damages and if so what amount ? 33. Whether the two agreements dated the 26th day of July 1980 are a nullity as stated in para 4 of the additional Written Statement and given rise to no cause of action to the plaintiffs ? 34. To what damages, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled and against which defendants ? 35. Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action in respect of the reliefs claimed by virtue of second-amendment to the plaint by order dated, 25-7-1990 ? 36. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation in respect of the reliefs as per second amendment to the plaint ? 37. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages for the reasons mentioned in para 3 of the second additional Written Statement ? 38. Whether the plaintiffs were or they are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract regarding construction work ? 39. Whether the reliefs claimed under second amendment to the plaint are barred by reason of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure ? 40. What amount the plaintiffs have paid to the defendants 4 to 6 ? 41. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to take into account or claim credit for the amounts paid by the promoters of the plaintiffs ? 42. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to refund of any amount ? 43. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to interest at 20 per cent per annum or at any other rate ? 44. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief for the reason stated in para 8 of the second additional Written Statement of the defendants ? 45. 42. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to refund of any amount ? 43. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to interest at 20 per cent per annum or at any other rate ? 44. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief for the reason stated in para 8 of the second additional Written Statement of the defendants ? 45. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction ? 46. Whether proper Court fees are paid by the plaintiffs ? 47. To what reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 48. General. 6. My answers are : 1. No. 2. No. 3. Yes. 4. No. 5. In view of the amendment of the plaint this issue does not survive. 6. In view of the amendment of the plaint this issue does not survive. 7. No. 8. Yes. 9. The rights of the parties are governed by the agreement contained in the correspondence commencing from the letter dated 29th January 1983. 10. No. 11. Does not survive in view of my answer to Issue No. 9. 12. Does not survive in view of my answer to Issue No. 9. 13. No. 14. No. 15. No. 16. Does not survive in view of the amendment of the plaint. 17. Does not survive in view of the amendment of the plaint. 18. The plaintiffs by purporting to terminate the agreement have shown their unwillingness to perform their part of contract and therefore have rendered themselves disentitled to specific performance or damages. 19. Yes. 20. The plaintiffs have returned the said amount. 21. No. 22. No as per answer to Issue No. 21. 23. No. 24. No. 25. No. 26. The plaintiffs are entitled to refund from defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the amount of Rs. 13,24,440/- with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit till payment. 27. As per order below. 28. No. 29. No. 30. Yes. 31. Does not survive. 32. Does not survive. 33. Does not survive in view of my answer to Issue No. 9. 34. Nil. 35. Does not survive. 36. No. 37. Does not survive. 38. This issue is already answered by my answer to Issue No. 18. 39. No. 40. Rs. 13,24,440/- towards the purchase price being 20% of the purchase price of Rs. 66,22,200/- and Rs. 33. Does not survive in view of my answer to Issue No. 9. 34. Nil. 35. Does not survive. 36. No. 37. Does not survive. 38. This issue is already answered by my answer to Issue No. 18. 39. No. 40. Rs. 13,24,440/- towards the purchase price being 20% of the purchase price of Rs. 66,22,200/- and Rs. 1,00,000/- as refund as discussed. 41. Yes. 42. yes. 43. This issue is already answered by my answer to Issue No. 26. 44. No. 45. No. 46. Yes. 47. Already answered. 48. As per order below with no order as to costs. REASONS. 38. This takes me to the contention relating to the consent of the respondent with regard to the speeches made by the leaders in the said two meetings and also in the meetings held on 8th February 1990 and 15th February 1990. Mr. Sathe submitted that as far as the first meeting of 29th January 1990, is concerned, she had attended the said meeting, but it cannot be said that she was responsible for calling or inviting the leaders in the said meeting. As far as the second meeting is concerned, according to the evidence of the respondent, she was there only for some time and that, therefore, it cannot be said that all the statements that were made in the said meeting, would be binding on her. This latter contention cannot be accepted inasmuch as, in the written-statement she has not stated that she was there only for some time in the said meeting held on 24th February 1990. She could not also explain in the witness-box as to whose speeches she had heard when she attended the meeting on 24th February 1990. She conveniently says that she does not remember who were speaking when she was there and at what point of time she left the meeting. I am not satisfied with these answers. Mr. Vashi has rightly said that if she was unhappy with the speeches made on 29th January 1990 by the leaders of the alliance and if these speeches were against the Constitution or the manifesto of the B.J.P., why did she attend the meeting on 24th February, 1990. I am not satisfied with these answers. Mr. Vashi has rightly said that if she was unhappy with the speeches made on 29th January 1990 by the leaders of the alliance and if these speeches were against the Constitution or the manifesto of the B.J.P., why did she attend the meeting on 24th February, 1990. The very fact she attended the meeting on 24th February, 1990 knowing full well what the leaders had uttered earlier and knowing full well that was the last campaign public meeting before the election, would indicate that she was equally eager to attend the meeting as that would further her prospects in the election. She depended on these public meetings very much. I cannot understand how by saying that she was there for some time, she could wriggle out of the situation. Either she agrees or disagrees with what the leaders had spoken. By remaining there for some time, it cannot be said that she agrees in part and disagrees with regard to the other. Therefore, I must necessarily held that she knew full well as to what these leaders would canvass and such canvassing and appealing to the voters was very much relevant and necessary for furthering the prospects of all the candidates of the alliance, including herself. It is well known that in an election campaign, more than the street corner meetings addressed by the respective candidates, the public meetings addressed by All India leaders and addressed by the giants of the party, assume considerable importance and very often become the determining factor in the election prospects. These meetings are not held causally, as the respondent wants to suggest. 39. Mr. Sathe relied on number of cases to show as to how consent should be established by the petitioner before the respondent is held guilty of any corrupt practice. In the case of (Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez)1, reported in A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 1201, we have the following Head Note: "To establish corrupt practice, by an agent other than election agent, avoiding the election, the consent on the part of the returned candidate to the commission of corrupt practice must be proved. There is no doubt that the consent need not be directly proved. There is no doubt that the consent need not be directly proved. The principle of law is settled that consent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence but the circumstances must point unerringly to the conclusion and must not admit of any other explanation. Although the trial of an election petition is made in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been laid down that a corrupt practice must be proved in the same way as a criminal charge is proved. In other words, the election petitioner must exclude every hypothesis except that of guilt on the returned candidate or his election agent. A consistent course of conduct in the canvass of the candidate may raise a presumption of consent. But mere knowledge of or connivance at the corrupt practice is not enough to infer corrupt practice. Similarly the similarities of ideas or even of words cannot be pressed into service to show consent." In this case, the election of George Fernandez was challenged. One Mr. Atre who was running a newspaper had supported Mr. Gorge Fernandez. In that connection, there was a meeting at Shivaji Park, in which Mr. Fernandez spoke. It was alleged that there was similarity of language between the speech of Mr. Fernandez given at Shivaji Park and the material that appeared in the "Maratha", which came in the Column "George Fernandez Election Front". The contention was that what was published in these column in favour of Mr. Fernandez was to the knowledge of Mr. Fernandez and that therefore, Mr. Atre had made a common cause with Mr. Fernandez for promoting his election campaign and that, therefore, in law he becomes an agent of Mr. Fernandez and he should become liable. In was in this context, the Court set out the above mentioned principles. Therefore, whether there is consent or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is, therefore, necessary that the petitioner must prove that the respondent had consented to the propaganda, but that consent need not be express. It can be inferred from facts and circumstances. As stated herein, the petitioner must exclude every hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the returned candidate or his election agent. The only explanation with regard to there utterances made by the B.J.P. Shiv Sena alliance leaders is that is contrary to the B.J.P.'s own constitution and the manifesto. It can be inferred from facts and circumstances. As stated herein, the petitioner must exclude every hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the returned candidate or his election agent. The only explanation with regard to there utterances made by the B.J.P. Shiv Sena alliance leaders is that is contrary to the B.J.P.'s own constitution and the manifesto. If that contention is not maintainable, as mentioned above, and since the statements were all made in her own presence in both the meetings, it can as well be said that the statements were all made with her consent. Her conduct in attending the meeting on 29th January 1990, coupled with the fact that she had knowledge of what was said in the said meeting and yet again, she attending the meeting on 24th February 1990 makes the said conduct consistent with what she has been canvassing and appealing and that would naturally raise a presumption of consent. 40. Mr. Sathe relied on the case of (Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh)2, reported in A.I.R. 1985 Supreme Court 89 to say that consent must be strictly proved. There is no dispute about this proposition. But it is well settled that it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. 41. Mr. Sathe also relied on the case of (Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi)3, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 1253 for the purpose of showing that consent has to be pleaded and proved and in the present case, according to Mr. Sathe, no such consent has been pleaded or proved. I am unable to accept this statements of Mr. Sathe inasmuch as consent has been pleaded in the petition and has also been established by various facts as referred to in the foregoing paragraphs. 42. He also drew my attention to the case of (Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh)4, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 3 again for the same proposition. The consent can be explicit or implicit depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. 43. The next case cited by Mr. Sathe is the case of (Jagdev Singh Sidhani v. Pratap Singh Daulata)5, reported in A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 183. Ram Singh)4, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 3 again for the same proposition. The consent can be explicit or implicit depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. 43. The next case cited by Mr. Sathe is the case of (Jagdev Singh Sidhani v. Pratap Singh Daulata)5, reported in A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 183. He relied on the general observations contained in para 12 of the above case to say how corrupt practice should be proved i.e. not by mere preponderance or propositions but by cogent and reliable evidence beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case since the meetings are admitted and her presence is admitted and the speeches are proved, the only limited question is whether from all the facts and circumstances it can be reasonably inferred that the respondent had consented to what the leaders had said in these meetings. I cannot understand as to what infirmity is there if it can be said that the facts and circumstances clearly indicate that the respondent was a consenting party to what was going on in these public meetings as her own party leaders along with the leaders of Shiv Sena were appealing to the voters to vote on the basis of Hindutva, which was to ensure her prospects in the election. 44. The last is the case of (S. Harcharan Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh)6, reported in AI.R. 1985 Supreme Court 236. Here again, there is no different proposition with regard to the element of consent required to be proved by the petitioner. 45. Mr. Vashi, in turn, cited the case of (Ram Sharan Yadav v. Thakur Maneshwar Nath Singh)7, reported in A.I.R. 1985 Supreme Court 24 for the purpose of showing that consent can be inferred on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. So also in the case of (Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra)8, reported in A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 1217 wherein the appellant had knowledge of the commission of corrupt practices by his men and such acts were repeated regularly on certain days, the Court was right inferring that the appellant must have consented to that Mr. Vashi submitted that the respondent had knowledge of what the leaders spoke in the meeting held on 29th January 1990. Vashi submitted that the respondent had knowledge of what the leaders spoke in the meeting held on 29th January 1990. Despite that knowledge, she again attended the meeting on 24th February, 1990 and, therefore, in these circumstances, together with all other facts and circumstances as mentioned above, the Court can legitimately draw an inference that she had consented to what the leaders spoke in these two public meetings. 46. This takes me to the next contention of Mr. Sathe. His submission is that the speeches of Bal Thackeray, Pramod Mahajan and other leaders were given outside the constituency in question and, therefore, the same cannot be considered. He relies on the observations quoted above in the Election Petition No. 10 of 1990. His contention is that only such of the appeals as are made within the constituency can constitute corrupt practice but not the appeals made outside the constituency. 47. As regards the observations in the Election Petition No. 10 of 1990, the question raised herein has not been directly canvassed. Moreover, having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case, it was not necessary for me to consider these contentions because the extracts of the speeches of Bal Thackeray had been incorporated in the video cassette and the video cassette had been displayed in several booths and places within the constituency. The respondent, in that case, had also accepted whatever Bal Thackeray had stated. But these things do not indicate that I had laid down any such proposition that the appeal for the votes made outside the constituency cannot be considered at all. 48. It is common knowledge that leaders of major parties and All India parties go round the country for their election campaign. These days they do speak in Door Darshan and Akashwani and a definite time slot is allotted to each of the major parties. The media of press gives wide publicity to the speeches given by the leaders, at different places. The political parties also arrange public meetings wherein members of the public from Chowpatty for the City of Bombay as a whole. How do we consider these speeches? Are we do ignore them, even though the appeals amount to corrupt practice? Or are we to restrict them to the particular constituency in which the meeting is held even though the appeal is for all the voters even outside the constituency? 49. How do we consider these speeches? Are we do ignore them, even though the appeals amount to corrupt practice? Or are we to restrict them to the particular constituency in which the meeting is held even though the appeal is for all the voters even outside the constituency? 49. Normally, a candidate appeals to his voters within his constituency. But in the case of leaders of political parties, they are concerned not only with their own constituency, but also with all the other constituencies wherein their candidates contest the election. Therefore, it is legitimate to presume that such public meetings are held at different places mainly for promoting the prospects of success for their party candidates. The test is not the place; the test is the contents of the appeal made to the voters. If the leaders make an appeal to the public at large, and the appeal is violative of section 123 of Act, 1951, it must necessarily affect all the candidates who have depended on such appeal to better their chances of success. Otherwise it would lead to anomalous situation wherein the candidates have to read within the law, the leaders would be free to appeal with no-holders-barred. That, I think, is antithetic to any concept of rule of law which is the foundation of all democracy. 50. In law, a leader who makes such an appeal, is the agent of the candidates. He is not an election agent, but he is the other agent who speaks on behalf of his candidates. Mr. Vashi, in this connection, drew my attention to certain cases. Firstly, he relied on the case of (Mani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury)9, reported in A.I.R. 1959 Assam 200 wherein we have the following passage: "(4) The expression "agent" has been defined in Explanation (1) to section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act). It includes an election agent, a polling agent and any person, who is held to have acted as an agent in accordance with the election with consent of the candidate. For the purpose of the Act, the expression "agent" has a much wider connotation than it is ordinarily understood to have under the law of contract. It includes an election agent, a polling agent and any person, who is held to have acted as an agent in accordance with the election with consent of the candidate. For the purpose of the Act, the expression "agent" has a much wider connotation than it is ordinarily understood to have under the law of contract. Anybody, who sets in furtherance of the prospects of the candidates's election may be said to be an agent of the candidate concerned, provided he does so with the consent of the candidate. This consent may not be necessarily an gathered and implied from the circumstances of the case. Under the Act, an "agent" includes not only a person, who has been specifically engaged by the candidate or his election agent to work for him in the election, but also a person, who does in fact work for him and whose services have been accepted by the candidates. Thus an association of persons or a society or a political party and its prominent members, who set up the candidate, spencer his cause and work to promote his election, may be aptly called the "agent" of the candidate for officious intermeddler in the election or a mere volunteer, then of course the candidate cannot be said to have any responsibility for his action, even though the person may have acted for the candidate's benefit and with a view to advance his interest in the election." 51. This finds support in the case of (Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Radha Krushna Biswas Roy)10, reported in A.I.R. 1959 Orissa 188. The third case is the case of (Inder Lall Yugal Kishore v. Lal Singh Mukund Singh)11, reported in A.I.R. 1961 Rajasthan, 122, where, again, the observations in the above Assam case are followed. Mr. Vashi then drew my attention to a Division Bench case of our own High Court, being the case of (Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. Shripat Amrit Dange)12, reported in A.I.R. 1960 Bombay 249, wherein we have the following observations: "In the case of elections, as we have already seen, the expression "agent" has to be given a wider interpretation and in our judgment, therefore, the Tribunal's view that Mr. Atre was not an agent of Messrs. Dange and Manay with regard to election propaganda is not correct." In this case, Mr. Atre was carrying on propaganda in favour of M/s. Dange and Manay. Atre was not an agent of Messrs. Dange and Manay with regard to election propaganda is not correct." In this case, Mr. Atre was carrying on propaganda in favour of M/s. Dange and Manay. He was a member of the Samiti, of which Mr. Dange was the Chairman. And the Court held that being a member of a candidate's election committee it has been held to be consistent evidence of agency. Mr. Vashi submits that if it can be said that the leaders who are incharge of election campaign do propaganda which would fall within the scope of section 123 of the Act, 1951, then, of course, it could be said that the consent in such case by the candidate is implicit. Therefore, if the facts and circumstances clearly indicate that the candidate has consented to what the leader has said, it becomes binding on the candidate. 52. Thus, in a sense, the sins of the leaders do visit upon a smaller fry, like the respondent, the party candidate, and they have to thank themselves for this situation. That is exactly what has happened in the present case. Pramod Mahajan is admittedly an All India leader of B.J.P. Bal Thackeray and Pramod Mahajan have addressed these two meetings containing appeals which are hit by section 123(3) and 123(3A) of the Act, 1951. The respondent was present in both the meetings. I have also said that her consent can be safely inferred. Mr. Sathe admitted that there is nothing to say that she had called such meetings or that they had addressed the meeting at her instance. In my view it is not necessary. The meetings were definitely the joint meetings of the alliance called by the leaders themselves. All the candidates have attended such meetings of the alliance called by the leaders themselves. All the candidates have attended such meetings, all for making the B.J.P - Shiv Sena alliance victorious. That was the appeal in terms. Certainly the respondent cannot be heard to say that she has nothing to do with the meeting. 53. Mr. Sathe's last contention is that there is no evidence to hold that the appeals made in these meetings have been conveyed to the voters in her Constituency. Mr. Sathe emphasised the fact that in Election Petition No. 10 of 1990. Certainly the respondent cannot be heard to say that she has nothing to do with the meeting. 53. Mr. Sathe's last contention is that there is no evidence to hold that the appeals made in these meetings have been conveyed to the voters in her Constituency. Mr. Sathe emphasised the fact that in Election Petition No. 10 of 1990. I have given a finding that what was said in these meetings was conveyed through the papers and the video cassettes to the Constituency concerned and that is how the same constituted corrupt practice. However, in the present case there is no evidence of any video cassettes or audio cassettes having been displayed within the Constituency. Mr. Sathe submitted that there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the reports which appeared in the newspapers were read by the voters in the Constituency. He also submitted that there is no satisfactory evidence to hold that the voters from this Constituency had definitely attended these two meetings. I am afraid, all these submissions are misconceived. Firstly, there is no categorical denial about the fact that the proceedings of these meetings came to be reported in various newspapers. Secondly, the Court can legitimately presume that in a city like Bombay, newspapers, both in English and in regional languages have wide circulation and they are generally read by a large number of people. This is not a backward area, or a remote village. This is one of the most advanced cities in India, where people are generally well-informed. 54. But the more important question as posted by Mr. Vashi is why did the respondent attend the meeting at Girgaum Chowpatty. Her own evidence as also her categorical admission is that the meeting in Girgaum Chowpatty was held to introduce the 34 candidates who were contesting on the basis of the B.J.P. and Shiv Sena alliance in the City of Bombay. Mr. Vashi asked; "introduce to whom ?" It cannot be presumed that the respondent was to be introduced to the voters at Girgaum Chowpatty; it cannot be presumed that the respondent was to be introduced to the voters at Shivaji Park; it cannot be presumed that all the 34 candidates were to be introduced to the voters residing at the place where the meeting was held. Apparently, it was a public meeting where all the leaders had come, and the public were invited. Apparently, it was a public meeting where all the leaders had come, and the public were invited. Introduction of these candidates was obviously, to the respective voters of each Constituency where from these candidates were to contest. It is, in that sense, a direct appeal to the voters concerned, by these leaders for and on behalf of each of these respective candidates. So also in the meeting held at Shivaji Park. That was the last public meeting for all the Constituencies in the City of Bombay. That is why all the candidates met at Shivaji Park. Her own evidence shows that publicity in respect of this meeting was given. She admits that a news item had appeared in the newspaper. She also admits that the workers of her party knew that there was a public meeting on 24th February 1990. She admits that the workers might have attended the meeting. But she states that she told the workers not to bother about the meeting but to attend to their work. There is no reason as to why workers were not to attend this meeting. This explanation is an afterthought inasmuch as she has not given any satisfactory evidence as to why her workers were not to attend such an important public meeting to be addressed by the leaders of their respective parties. She also admits that generally when any public meeting is held, boards are put up in the Constituency informing the public that they should attend such meetings. She must give reasons as to why she could not act in conformity with this general practice. She says that no boards was put up in respect of the meeting held on 29th January 1990. But she does not remember whether she had put up any board in respect of the meeting held on 24th February 1990. In other words, she has not given any satisfactory explanation as to why the voters from her Constituency could not have attended these public meetings. 55. Mr. Sathe submitted that it is for the petitioner to prove that voters from the Matunga Constituency had definitely attended this public meeting. His submission is that since the petitioner could not say as to who were present in the public meeting, the inference could be that no member of the Matunga Constituency could have attended the said meeting. 55. Mr. Sathe submitted that it is for the petitioner to prove that voters from the Matunga Constituency had definitely attended this public meeting. His submission is that since the petitioner could not say as to who were present in the public meeting, the inference could be that no member of the Matunga Constituency could have attended the said meeting. It is well settled that while insisting on standard of strict proof, the Court should not extend or stretch this doctrine to such an extreme extent as to make it well-nigh impossible to prove an allegation of corrupt practice. Such an approach would defeat and frustrate the very laudable and sacrosanct object of the Act in maintaining purity of the electoral process. (See Harcharan Singh v. Sajjan Singh)13, A.I.R. 1985 Supreme Court 236, at page 250. 56. This takes me to the evidence relating to the two meetings held on 8th February 1990 and 15th February 1990. The evidence in respect of these two meetings is at Exhibits 'D' and 'E' respectively. Exhibit 'D' is the report from the Election Diary maintained by the Police in respect of the meeting held on 8th February, 1990. There is no challenge to this report. There is no denial about this meeting in the written statement. The leaders who spoke in this meeting included Shiv Sena workers as also the B.J.P. leaders. Amongst them, Vidyadhar Gokhale (a Shiv Sena M.P.) and Jayawantiben Mehta ( a B.J.P. M.P.) were prominent. This again shows that the campaign had been carried on jointly and it supports the theory of Mr. Vashi that there was, in fact, such an alliance operating in every constituency. Apart from all the leaders who spoke in this meeting, the respondent had also addressed the voters. She has not stated in her evidence as to what exactly she spoke in this meeting. She tried to take shelter on the plea that her memory has failed inasmuch as she did not remember as to what she spoke. But when she was asked whether she spoke about "Ayodhya Mandir-Masjid issue", she initially denied. But when she was shown the report Exhibit 'D', she admitted that she had spoken about "Ayodhya - Masjid" and about 'Hindutva'. She said that she must have spoken to the effect that 'Hindutva' should be equated with nationalism and appealed to elect B.J.P. - Shiv Sena candidates. 57. But when she was shown the report Exhibit 'D', she admitted that she had spoken about "Ayodhya - Masjid" and about 'Hindutva'. She said that she must have spoken to the effect that 'Hindutva' should be equated with nationalism and appealed to elect B.J.P. - Shiv Sena candidates. 57. In the meeting held on 15th February, 1990, again, we have the evidence from the Election Diary maintained by the Police, which is Exhibit 'E'. The report shows that again the leaders from both the parties had jointly addressed the meeting. There were Shiv Sena leaders and on behalf of B.J.P., Kirit Somaiya was the main speaker. Kirit Somaiya, in his speech, stated that blood in the body of every person is the blood of Hindutva and their victory in the Lok Sabha is not their victory but of the people as a whole and it is a victory in their fight for Hindutva. The respondent, in turn, had stated that she had appealed to the voters to elect Shiv Sena - B.J.P. alliance. 58. This was produced by Police Inspector Chaugule (P.W. 11). It is his evidence that by the time he attended the meeting, some of the speakers had already spoken and he was not present at that time. He stated that there was another officer Mr. Desai, who attended the meeting right from the beginning and report was thereafter made in the Election Diary. The report is in the hand-writing of Mr. Desai. Mr. Sathe submitted that Inspector Chaugule has no personal knowledge of what the speakers said before he came there and that, therefore, the report cannot be looked into. I find no substance in this contention inasmuch as in the written-statement there is no denial of the meeting or of the speakers who spoke in this meeting. The record has been made after the meeting was over. The record was made by Police Inspector Chaugule and S.I. Desai. In the absence of any other evidence, I can safely accept this evidence as contained in Exhibit 'E'. Here again, the respondent has not come with her statement as to what actually she spoke in this meeting. 59. At this stage, Mr. The record was made by Police Inspector Chaugule and S.I. Desai. In the absence of any other evidence, I can safely accept this evidence as contained in Exhibit 'E'. Here again, the respondent has not come with her statement as to what actually she spoke in this meeting. 59. At this stage, Mr. Sathe submitted that since I have already held that the leaders Bal Thackerary and Pramod Mahajan had made appeals which were violative of sections 123(3) and 123(3A) of Act, 1951, and since the leaders are other agents than election agent of the respondent, before I give any finding, I must issue notice under section 99 of Act, 1951. I have not been able to appreciate this submission of Mr. Sathe. Having come to the conclusion that the respondent has committed corrupt practices, may be because of the consent she had implicity given to the speeches given by her leaders, the Court need not wait till a notice under section 99 is issued. I can right now declare the respondent's election as void. It is after such declaration is made, if necessary, and if I have to name any individual person, other than the candidate or her election agent, it is for her to issue notice. It has nothing to do with any party's desire. I am also aware of the fact that the Supreme Court has emphasised the need to maintain purity in election process and, therefore, if anyone is found to have indulged in corrupt practices, it is proper that such a notice be given. Thereafter he must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, if he so desires and he has to be heard. But it is not mandatory that in every matter the Court should adopt proceedings under section 99 of the Act, 1951. 60. In the present case, I do not propose to issue any such notice as I do not intend to name them in these proceedings. I understand that as far as Bal Thackaray is concerned, there are already such notices pending against him, I am not aware whether any such notice is pending against Pramod Mahajan. 60. In the present case, I do not propose to issue any such notice as I do not intend to name them in these proceedings. I understand that as far as Bal Thackaray is concerned, there are already such notices pending against him, I am not aware whether any such notice is pending against Pramod Mahajan. But, I think, if one has regard for the time that is consumed in such electoral battles within the precincts of the Court, particularly at the cost of large number of other urgent matters pending in this Court, I would say that it is not expedient in the interest of justice to issue such notices. A pragmatic approach in all such matters is the paramount need of the hour. I would, therefore, say "thus far and no further" in matters of this type, in a situation like this, hoping that it is for the leaders to reflect upon what they have done, in their own conscience. It is a sad commentary on our electoral law, despite Court verdicts, election campaigns are carried on in a manner rendering the legal process socially irrelevant ; 61. I, therefore, answer the issues as follows : Issue No. 1 : In the affirmative as she has impliedly consented to what the leaders of the alliance had said. Issue No. 2 : Not necessary to answer. Issue No. 3 : Not necessary to answer. Issue No. 4 : In the affirmative for the same reason as in Issue No. 1. Issue No. 5 : Not necessary to answer. Issue No. 6 : Not necessary to answer. Issue No. 7 : In the negative. Issue No. 8 : In the negative. Issue No. 9 : In the negative. Issue No. 10 : See below. O R D E R Petition is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The respondent shall pay costs of the petition to the petitioner. The amount deposited by the petitioner be refunded to the petitioner. Prothonotary Senior Master to act on the minutes of the order. I further direct that a substance of this decision be forwarded to the Election Commission and to the Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and thereafter an authentic copy of my judgment be forwarded to the Election Commission. Order accordingly. -----