S. D. JHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal by the landlord-plaintiff, who was successful before the trial court but failed before the first appellate court, was by order dated 11-9-1985 admitted for final hearing on the following substantial question of law :-"whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the court below erred in law in holding that the provisions of Section 12 (1) (n) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, were not attracted in the instant case? ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for eviction from open plot described in para 1 of the plaint on ground that he was in arrears of rent, had committed nuisance by breaking lavatory and bath room and 3ft. wall constructed on the plot and the plot was required by the plaintiff bona fide for construction of a tin shed for making furniture under it, grounds under clauses (a), (c) and (n) of Section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the 'act' ). The defendant in his written-statement resisted the plaintiff's claim on the ground that his claim for erecting a tin shed for making furniture was not bona fide as the plaintiff in the City of Indore itself had a commercial shop doing furniture business and just near the place where he had his shop there was a plot which is convenient to the plaintiff. The suit plot is in backward area of the Indore city and was not suitable for doing furniture business, Other allegations were also denied. The defendant took up some other pleas which are not relevant for the purpose of the present appeal. ( 3 ) THE trial court by judgment and decree dated 11-9-1984 found that the plaintiff bona fide and in fact requires the suit plot for construction of a tin shed to run furniture business and that he was not possessed of any other suitable alternative accommodation in the city of Indore. He found that other allegations not made out. He decreed the claim for eviction against the defendant for ground under clause (n) under S. 12 (1) of the Act (landlord requires accommodation which is open plot for constructing a house on it ). He found that other allegations not made out. He decreed the claim for eviction against the defendant for ground under clause (n) under S. 12 (1) of the Act (landlord requires accommodation which is open plot for constructing a house on it ). In appeal by the tenant the first appellate court Additional Judge to the court of District Judge, Indore by judgment and decree dated 25-4-1983 held that erection of a shed cannot be said to fulfil the requirement of construction of house or building within the meaning of clause (n) of S. 12 (1) of the Act. He also drew support from clause (f) of S, 12 (1) of the Act and held that the suit plot is not required bona fide by the plaintiff for opening furniture factory and there is other suitable plot in his possession. He accordingly allowed the appeal filed by the tenant-defendant and dismissed the suit hence the present appeal. ( 4 ) AT the hearing of the appeal Shri S. R. Verma, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord explained the pleadings in the case and ingredients of S. 12 (1) (n) of the Act. He submitted that the first appellate court was in error in drawing support from clause (f) of S. 12 (1) of the Act and holding that requirement regarding open land i. e. the suit plot of the plaintiff was not bona fide. He emphasized that bona fides or not being possessed of alternative accommodation are not ingredients of clause (n) of the Act. He further submitted that construction of a shed for making furniture underneath would be constructing a house for the purpose of clause (n) and therefore the first appellate court was in error in reversing the judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff and dismissing the suit. He prayed for allowing the appeal and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. In his submission Shri S. R. Verma relied on the following decisions S. Bootasingh v. Jamna Prasad (1963 MPLJSN 134); Ramabai v. Ahmad (1984 MPWN Note No. 487); Bharat Petroleum Copr. He prayed for allowing the appeal and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. In his submission Shri S. R. Verma relied on the following decisions S. Bootasingh v. Jamna Prasad (1963 MPLJSN 134); Ramabai v. Ahmad (1984 MPWN Note No. 487); Bharat Petroleum Copr. Ltd. v. Ajit Singh (1984 MPWN Note No. 497); Prabhudayal v. Smt. Savitri Devi ( 1972 MPLJ 904 ); Sushiladevi v. Mandalal (1986 MPRCJ Note 84); Abdul Gani v. Shri Jabalpur Kutch Gujar Kshatriyasamaj, Jabalpur (1981 MPRCJ N. 44) Smt. Dulari Bai v. Smt. Mariambi (1984 MPRCJ Note 89) Aziz Khan v. Fatmabai (1984 M PRCJN 82) and Dholan Das v. Mangaldas (1982 (II) MPW 170 ). ( 5 ) CONTROVERTING Shri Verma's submissions, Shri B. N. Bharaniya, learned advocate representing the defendant-respondent while not disputing that the suit plot is open land and the accommodation within the meaning of the Act submitted that the expression 'house' used in clause (n) has to be given a restricted meaning. He submitted that the expression 'house' means a residential house and would not cover tin shed proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff. In his submissions he relied on observations made in Prabhudayal v. Smt. Savitri Devi ( 1972 MPLJ 904 ). ( 6 ) CLAUSE (n) of S. 12 (1) of the Act reads as under :- sec. 12 : Restriction on eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only namely :- xx xx xx xx xx xx (n) in the case of accommodation which is open land, that the landlord required it for constructing a house on it; a bare reading of the clause would show that bona fide requirement is not an ingredient of the clause as is the case with other clauses of the Section like clauses (e) or (f ). This view would find support from Prabhudayal v. Smt. Savitri Devi (supra) :- Which held. "in order to interpret the force of the word 'requires' it is not merely necessary to look to the normal meaning of the word in English language but also to see the context in which it has been used. This view would find support from Prabhudayal v. Smt. Savitri Devi (supra) :- Which held. "in order to interpret the force of the word 'requires' it is not merely necessary to look to the normal meaning of the word in English language but also to see the context in which it has been used. In Section 12 there are other provisions which depend upon the need of the landlord. For instance, clause (e) requires that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord, in clause (f) the provision is 'that the accomodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord' and in clause (h) again the provision is 'that the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building'. But in clause (n), which is relevant to his case, the Legislature merely provides 'that the landlord requires it'. It is further important to note that sub-sec. (5) of S. 12 makes it quite clear that the landlord will not be entitled to eject under clause (e) before the expiry of two months from the date of the order; for ejectment under clause (f) further conditions are laid down by sub-section (6); and for ejectment under clause (h) conditions are again provided under subsec. (7); but with regard to clause (n) there is no further provision restricting the right of the landlord to get possession. From this context it appears that the Legislature used the word 'requires' in the simple sense of 'wishes' or 'wants'. The reason appears to be to encourage new constructions for increasing residential accommodation. Restriction to the normal right of the owner to eject a tenant should not be read into the word except on clear expression of legislative intent. "the Clause (n) came up for consideration before another learned Single Judge of this Court in Saffar Sandow v. Laxman (Second Appeal No. 261 of 1966, decided on the 7/12/1968 ). Restriction to the normal right of the owner to eject a tenant should not be read into the word except on clear expression of legislative intent. "the Clause (n) came up for consideration before another learned Single Judge of this Court in Saffar Sandow v. Laxman (Second Appeal No. 261 of 1966, decided on the 7/12/1968 ). While dealing with the arguments regarding scope of clause (n) the learned Judge compared it with the other parts of S. 12 and approved of the earlier decision in the following passage :-"in the decision reported in S. Bootasingh v. Jamnaprasad 1963 MPLJ 134) it was held that the requirement of this clause would be satisfied if the landlord merely says that he wants to build a house on the open land" other decisions S. Bootasingh v. Jamnaprasad (supra), and Sushiladevi v. Madanlal (supra) and other cases relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant would support the above view. ( 7 ) THE question still surviving for consideration would be whether tin-shed for making furniture proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff-landlord can be said to be house within the meaning of clause (n) of S. (2 (1) of the Act. According to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 1976 Edition, 1980 reprint 'house'means a building for dwelling in, a building in general, a dwellingplace; an inn, a public house. According to Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary 9th Edition word 'house' inter alia would in its ordinary sense, include any building, irrespective of its user. Further it may be stated generally that the word 'house' is a structure of a permanent character. Again the weight of judicial opinion is conclusively in favour of the view that the word 'house' extends to a building which is used for business and should not be restricted to a mere dwelling house. The dictionary refers to meaning in Corpus Juris Secundum (Vo. 41, page 364) wherein it is said that in a legal sense, the word 'house' is more comprehensive, but it is not limited to a structure designed for human habitation, and may mean a building or shed intended or used as a habitation or shelter for animals of any kind (Emphasis supplied ). The observations in Prabhudayal v. Savitri Devi (supra) in para 4 of the judgment :"the reason appears to be to encourage new constructions for increasing residential accommodation. The observations in Prabhudayal v. Savitri Devi (supra) in para 4 of the judgment :"the reason appears to be to encourage new constructions for increasing residential accommodation. "is in the nature of obiter and in view of the dictionary meaning as aforesaid the meaning (Emphasis not supplied in original-Ed.) of the word 'house' cannot be read in restrictive sense so as to mean a building for dwelling in. It would also cover tin-shed proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff-appellant provided it is a permanent structure. ( 8 ) IN S. Bootasingh v. Jamunaprisad (supra) with reference to M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 Section 4 (i) corresponding to the present clause (n) it was held that requirement of clause (i) would be satisfied if the landlord merely says that he wants to build a house on the open land without further proving that he requires the house for any of his personal needs. It was further held that the intention of the landlord must be real intention and not mere desire to construct. Same view was taken in Prabhudayal v. Savitri Devi (supra) and Sushiladevi v. Madanlal (supra ). In these decisions it was held that court's satisfaction to that effect is necessary. In the instant case the trial court was satisfied that the plaintiff, in fact, wants to construct a tin-shed manufacturing furniture thereon. The first appellate Court imported the test under S. 12 (1) (f) of the Act which was not necessary, and held that tinshed would not be 'house' or 'a building' within the meaning of clause (n) of the Act. ( 9 ) IT has been held above that tin-shed proposed to be constructed in by plaintiff-appellant would be covered within expression 'house' used in clause (n) provided it is a permanent structure. There is nothing in the finding of the trial court or in that of the first appellate court showing that the tin-shed proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff-appellant would be a permanent structure. There is no material on record on the basis of which finding on this aspect could be recorded by this Court. The matter would, therefore, require to the first appellate court for recording a finding on the issue whether the tin-shed proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff-appellant would be a permanent structure? There is no material on record on the basis of which finding on this aspect could be recorded by this Court. The matter would, therefore, require to the first appellate court for recording a finding on the issue whether the tin-shed proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff-appellant would be a permanent structure? and then decide the appeal in accordance with the finding and in the light of discussion and observations made above. ( 10 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court set aside and the matter remanded to the first appellate court for recording finding on the issue whether the tin-shed proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff-appellant would be a permanent structure? Should the first appellate court come to a finding that it is a permanent structure, then it will proceed to pass decree for eviction against the defendant-appellant for ground under clause (n) of the Act. For the purpose either the first appellate court may itself record evidence and come to a finding or call for a finding from the trial court and then proceed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with the finding and in the light of discussion and observations made above. Parties shall bear costs of this appeal is incurred. The appeal is thus allowed by remand. Appeal allowed. .