Haji Ghafoor Bukhsh v. State of U. P — 1991 DIGILAW 286 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J. - The common feature in the above noted writ petitions is that they impugn the method of considering motion of no-confidence as contained under Section 87-A of the U. P. Municipalises Act, in its application to the Presidents of such municipal boards which have a population of less than one lac inhabitants. 2. Besides some other, the main ground is that such a motion cannot be considered by the members of the board as the President is elected by the electorate directly, and the board is much smaller a body to consider the motion of no-confidence. According to the petitioners, it is undemocratic as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as unequals are treated as equals. Section 87-A is contended to be arbitrary too, as no guide-lines are provided. The other relief is in respect of amendment made in subsections (13) and (14) of Section 87-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act, by means of Ordinance No. 2 of 19SiO and Ordinance No. 8 of 1990, by which period of two years has been reduced to one year for the purpose of receiving notice of motion of no-confidence. Before the said amendment, notice of motion of no-confidence could not be received within two years of the assumption of the office of President. It was also contended that in view of proviso to Section 47-A, no motion of no-confidence is envisaged against Presidents of city municipalities. Another contention is that since the person who is ousted can again get elected in the vacancy caused, the provision has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The contentions raised are refuted by the opposite parties saying that the matter is governed by the statute and question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution does not arise nor that of any principle of democracy. 3. Writ Petition No. 3518/90 Lalji Tiwari v. State of U.P. and others, and Writ Petition No. 9855/90 Iqbal Ahmad Qureshi v. State of U. P. and others, mainly make a prayer to quash the amendment. 3. Writ Petition No. 3518/90 Lalji Tiwari v. State of U.P. and others, and Writ Petition No. 9855/90 Iqbal Ahmad Qureshi v. State of U. P. and others, mainly make a prayer to quash the amendment. In Writ Petition No. 6091/90 Haji Ghafoor Buksh v. State and others, Writ Petition No. 2832/90 M.L. Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareli and others, and Writ Petition No. 7879/90 Haji Maula Bux Ansari v. State of U.P. and others, a prayer for declaring Section 87-A of the U.P. Municipalities Act as ultra vires has been made. In the alternative, it has been prayed in some of the writ petitions that the said provision may be held to be not applicable in case of Presidents directly elected by the electorate. 4. Before we deal with the points raised by the petitioner it would be better to have a look of the relevant provision of the U. P. Municipalities Act which may require reference here and there during the course of discussion. They are as follows. 5. Section 3 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) lays down as under : "3. Declaration and definition of Municipalities and Cities. - (I) The State Government may by notification - (a) declare any local area to be a municipality ; (b) declare any municipality having a population of less than 1,00,000 inhabitants to be a city ; (c) define the limits of any municipality ; (d) ..................... 6. From the above provision it is clear that there may be such municipalities which may be declared a city depending upon the population of the area, say if it is less than one lac. 7. Section 43 of the Act provides for the election of the President of Municipal Board. It reads as under : - "43. Election of President. - (1) As soon as may after the election of members of the Board of a city other than a city declared as such under Section 3, is completed at a general election, the members shall elect a President of such Board in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote and the voting at such election shall be by secret ballot. Explanation.................. Explanation.................. (2) The President of a Board other than a Board referred to in subsection (1) shall be elected by the electors in the municipality : Provided....................." 8. According to sub-section (2) of Section 43, election of President in respect of a city declared as such under Section 3 of the Act shall be elected by the electors whereas in other municipalities, President shall be elected by the members of the Board in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. 9. Section 87-A of the Act provides the procedure for consideration of motion of no-confidence against a President. Relevant sub-sections of Section 87-A of the Act read as follows "87-A, Motion of non-confidence against President. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a motion expressing non-confidence in the President shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down below. (2) Written notice of intention to make a motion of no-confidence in its President signed by such numbers of the Board as constitute no less than one half of the total number of members of the Board together with a copy of the motion which it is proposed to make shall be delivered in person together by and two of the members signing the notion to the District Magistrate. (3) The District Magistrate shall then convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion to be held at the office of the board, on the date and at the time appointed by him which shall not be earlier than thirty and not later than thirty-five days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him. He shall send by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting, a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefor, to every member of the board at his place of residence and shall at the same time cause such notice to be published in such manner as he may deem fit. Thereupon every member shall be deemed to have received the notice. (7) As soon as the meeting convened under this section has commenced, the judicial officer shall read to the board the motion for the consideration of which it has been convened and declare it to be open for discussion. Thereupon every member shall be deemed to have received the notice. (7) As soon as the meeting convened under this section has commenced, the judicial officer shall read to the board the motion for the consideration of which it has been convened and declare it to be open for discussion. (12) The motion shall be deemed to have been carried only when it has been passed by a majority of more than one-half of the total number of members of the Board. (14) No notice of a motion of no-confidence under this section shall be received within two years of the assumption of office by a President. 10. From the above provisions, it is clear that the motion of confidence against the President is considered by the members of the board even where the President has been directly elected for the municipal boards declared as city under Section 3 of the Act. The consequences flowing from carrying out motion of no-confidence are provided under Section 47-A of the Act. 11. We have heard Sri V.B. Upadhyay, Sri K.N. Tripathi, Sri A. Mannan and Sri S.M.K. Chowdhry on behalf of the different petitioners and Sri Umesh Chandra, the learned Advocate General and Sri H. P. Srivastava, Advocate, for the State and the opposite parties. 12. We may take up the first ground of challenge; according to which motion of no-confidence against the President of a city municipality declared as such under Section 3 of the Act, cannot be considered by the members of the board, for the simple reason that such Presidents are not elected by the members of the board like that of other municipal boards, but they are directly elected by the electorate ; therefore, no-confidence can be expressed only by the electorate. The board is much smaller a body which cannot be vested with the rights and powers to oust a President elected by a larger body, namely, the whole electorate, by passing a motion of no-confidence. It is submitted that such a provision violates the basic democratic principles. Where a smaller body is empowered to undo what a larger number of members of the electoral school have done, it is nothing but an undemocratic process. It has also been submitted that the Preamble of the Constitution of India declares India to be a Democratic Republic. It is submitted that such a provision violates the basic democratic principles. Where a smaller body is empowered to undo what a larger number of members of the electoral school have done, it is nothing but an undemocratic process. It has also been submitted that the Preamble of the Constitution of India declares India to be a Democratic Republic. Any law which deviates from the tenets of the democracy, is invalid and void. On behalf of the petitioners, it has been pointed out that earlier, the Presidents of the municipal boards used to be elected only by the members of the board. Later on it was provided that Presidents of city municipalities shall be elected by the electors directly. Therefore, earlier, the provision was for consideration of motion of no-confidence by the members of the Board but after the amendment providing for direct election, no corresponding amendment for considering the motion of no-confidence has been made, hence this discrepancy remains there. It is submitted that it would only be a normal and general proposition that an elected person can be ousted by only those who had elected him. A few chosen cannot be given authority or power to impose their will upon the electors. In this connection reliance has been placed upon the dissenting judgment given in the case reported in AIR 1990 SC 1023 , - Gajanan Narain Patil and others v. Dattatraya Woman Patil and others, Specific reference has been made to the observations made in Para 18 of the judgment which reads as follows : - "18. Election in a democracy have been conceived as an instrument of selecting the best qualitatively superior and politically valuable. Who should be entitled to reverse the selection ? Those who elect or any other numbers increased by any methodology or law adding representatives and nominees not entitled to participate in selection. If the value of elective process has to have primacy then those worthy of choice should not be permitted to be sequeezed out by those who are precluded from leadership or electing the leader. This basic concept does not stand altered or modified either by any provision in the Act or Rules. If the value of elective process has to have primacy then those worthy of choice should not be permitted to be sequeezed out by those who are precluded from leadership or electing the leader. This basic concept does not stand altered or modified either by any provision in the Act or Rules. Literal construction of expression `entitled to sit and vote' if it results in negation of democratic process or is against logic and is fraught with danger of removal of an elected representative by nominees of financial institutions or Government then it has to be avoided." 13. In this connection, another passage has been quoted from a decision reported in 1962 ALJ 113, L.N. Misra v. Municipal Board and others, wherein a passage from Halsbury Laws of England has been quoted which reads as under : - "Where a person if appointed to and holds an office at the will of the corporation, he may be removed from it at the will of the corporation which may be signified by mere declaration thereof by the competent authority though in some case, it must be under the corporate seal." 14. So far as the case of Gajanan Narayan Patil (supra), is concerned, it may be observed that majority of the Hon'ble Judges did not concur with the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. M. Sahai and it was held that even though nominated and opted member had no right to participate and vote in the meeting held to elects the President and the Vice-President, yet they can sit, participate and vote in the special meeting, convened for the purposes of considering the question of no-confidence against the President or the Vice-President. This was so held, for the reason that the statute had barred them from voting, only in the meeting held for electing a President or/ice-President. According to the majority view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it did not violate any principle of democracy and in such mailers what prevails is the statute. The Learned Advocate-General, has referred to the submission made by the learned Counsel in the above noted case, to the effect that such a right to participate in special meeting and to vote was statutory right flowing from the provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-Laws and it had nothing to do with the democracy. The Learned Advocate-General, has referred to the submission made by the learned Counsel in the above noted case, to the effect that such a right to participate in special meeting and to vote was statutory right flowing from the provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-Laws and it had nothing to do with the democracy. He also placed reliance upon the observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court quoted in Para II of the judgment which reads as follows : - "The right to stand as a candidate and contest the election is not a common law right. It is a special right created by statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute. The Fundamental Rights Chapter has no bearing on a right like this created by statute. The appellants have no fundamental right to be elected Members of Parliament. If they want that, they must observe the rules." AIR 1954 SC 686 at page 688. 15. Learned Advocate General has then placed reliance upon a case reported in AIR 1982 SC 983 , Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Bhoshal and others, and specifically referred to para 8, relevant part of which reads as follows : - "A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common Law Right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation." Case of Arun Kumar Bose v. Mohammad Furkan Ansari reported in AIR 1983 SC 1311 has also been referred to, where the case of Jyoti Basu (supra) has been relied upon. 16. So far as the proposition quoted from the Halsbury's Laws of England in case of L. I. Misra (supra) is concerned. It may be observed that it was in a different context. The Court in the said case was considering the question as to whether a motion of no-confidence can or or cannot be brought against an authority, if the same was not specifically provided for under the statute. In this connection, the proposition laid down in the Halsbury's Laws of England was quoted. The Court in the said case was considering the question as to whether a motion of no-confidence can or or cannot be brought against an authority, if the same was not specifically provided for under the statute. In this connection, the proposition laid down in the Halsbury's Laws of England was quoted. That is a general principle that where a t person is appointed to and holds an office at the will of the corporation, he may be removed from it at the will of the corporation. It does not say )in what manner the will of the corporation must be expressed at the time of ouster of the office-holder. It more relates to the power of the corporation, rather than the mode in which it can be done. In any case, the Court fell back upon the provisions of the statute rather than on the principle laid down in the Halsbury's Laws of England, observing that the office of the Vice-President is not at the will of the municipal board. It was observed that the municipal board is a creature of the statute and it can have only such powers as are conferred upon it by the statute and for this proposition, placed reliance upon a case reported in AIR 1952 SC 362 , Smt. Hira Deri and others v. District Board, Shahjahanpur. This case, therefore, goes to support the contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties. 17. The learnd Advocate General, in reply to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the principles of democracy have to be complied with and a statute has to be judged in context with such principles, has submitted that the Constitution nowhere makes any provision for setting up a local body for self-governance. Local bodies are purely creation of statute. Creation of local bodies is not referable to any constitutional provision, much less, Chapter relating to fundamental rights. On the other hand, we find that in Part-IV containing Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 40 provides for organisation of village Panchayats. Article 4u reads as follows "40. Organisation of village Panchayats. - The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government." There is no such constitutional provision under any part or the Chapter, about the local bodies. Article 4u reads as follows "40. Organisation of village Panchayats. - The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government." There is no such constitutional provision under any part or the Chapter, about the local bodies. Therefore, the contention that the procedure prescribed under the statute, namely, under Section 87-A of the Act providing for consideration of motion of no-confidence by members of the board in respect of the President elected directly as well, offends or violates the Preamble of the Constitution, is not tenable. On behalf of the opposite parties, reliance his also been placed upon a case reported in - AIR 1990 Rajasthan 68, Nathmal v. The State and others. In this case, a situation similar to the present case had arisen there. Section 19 of the Panchayat Act was challenged on the ground that it provides for passing of vote of no-confidence against Sarpanch and Upsarpanch by th of the total members of the Panchayat Council. It was submitted that the Sarpanch is elected by consent of the Panchayat Circle and not by Panches, hence such a provision could not be made empowering a different body to pass a vote of confidence. The argument was that it is violative of principles of democracy. The submission was repelled, by holding that those who had to consider the question of no-confidence are the representatives of the electors from their respective wards and are equally representatives of selection of the general electors of the wards except the nominated members and vote of no-confidence can be passed by th total members of the Panchayat. No question of violation of principles of democracy arises. In the present case also, except for a few nominated members, it has been submitted by the learned Advocate General, all other members are representatives of the electorate. These elected persons represent the will of the electors. It has been reiterated that for such matters, only the provisions of the statute would prevail. 18. It has been submitted that the main purpose of enacting the Act, namely, the U. P. Municipalities Act was to provide for the proper and effective management of the needs of the local inhabitants. These elected persons represent the will of the electors. It has been reiterated that for such matters, only the provisions of the statute would prevail. 18. It has been submitted that the main purpose of enacting the Act, namely, the U. P. Municipalities Act was to provide for the proper and effective management of the needs of the local inhabitants. For creation, constitution and proper working of the local bodies, statutory provisions have been made keeping in view the fact as to in what manner best results can be achieved for the purpose it was created. Most of the members of the board, except a few, are those who are elected by the inhabitants or the electorate directly. These elected members represent the electorate. The President has certain powers and duties to discharge. Section 52 of the Act empowers the board to ask for the report etc. from the President. It may require the President to furnish any return, statement, estimate or other information pertaining to the administration of the municipality. The board may also call for a report or explanation on any such matter or copy of any record, correspondence or plan or any other document. Under sub-section (2) of Section 52, the President shall have to comply with every requisition. The President, according to the learned counsel for the opposite parties, is thus answerable to the board in discharge of his functions and powers. Therefore, it was thought proper in fitness of things, that the board should have the power to consider the motion of no-confidence, as the board keeps a close watch over the working of the President and it is in a position to know about what is happening in the municipality. The statutory provisions have been made keeping in view the efficient functioning of the board and not for establishing any pure democratic set up. It is true that while so enacting the statute, the process of direct election has been adopted for selecting the members of the board and the President and to that extent, democratic principles have been adopted but it cannot be said that the statute cannot provide any other indirect method to express no-confidence if in the wisdom of the Legislature that was more appropriate, specially when there is no constitutional mandate to enact any particular kind of law on the subject. 19. 19. Sri H.P. Srivastava, Counsel for one of the opposite parties has placed reliance upon certain decisions including one reported in 1982 U. P. Local Bodies and Educational Cases 158 - Nagendra Nath Singh v. State of V.P. The submission made in that case was that the amendment of Section 6 of the Kshetra Samitis Act providing for nomination of members, destroyed the democratic character of Kshetra Samitis and the amendment was against the basic feature of the Constitution. The Court repelled the contention relying upon the case of Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2299 and quoted certain observations from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that ordinary laws cannot be tested against the vague concept of democracy. It can be tested only with respect to the principle of democracy actually incorporated in the Constitution. The learned Counsel has also submitted that the question of basic features is relevant for the purposes of constitutional amendment. In this connection he has also placed reliance upon a case reported in AIR 1981 SC 234 - Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji and others v. Union of India and others. In the same context, learned Counsel has also placed reliance upon Indira Nehru Gandhi's case (supra). The submission is that the provision of Section 87-A of the Act cannot be tested or held to be ultra vires to basic structure or features of the Constitution or the Preamble of the Constitution as submitted "or any principle of democracy". 20. We find that the submissions made by the learned Advocate General are in consonance with the majority view taken in the case of Gajanan Narayan Patil (supra) as well as other decisions discussed above. The petitioners have faked to show, in what manner any basic principle of democracy has been violated or that there could not be any statutory provision otherwise, where statutory provisions have to prevail. In the case of Gajanan Narayan Patil (supra), the persons who were not that elected members, but were nominated and co-opted, were also allowed to participate in the meeting convened for considering motion of no-confidence, in view of statutory provisions, though they had not participated in electing the President. In the present case as well, the motion of no-confidence is to be considered by the elected representatives of the electors barring a few members who may be nominated members. In the present case as well, the motion of no-confidence is to be considered by the elected representatives of the electors barring a few members who may be nominated members. Since, so is the statutory provision, which has to prevail in such matters, we find no substance in the plea raised by the petitioners. 21. We next take up the ground about violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, Presidents of two types of municipalities could not be treated in the same way in the matter of no-confidence motion. It is submitted that the municipalities have been classified into two classes ; one class of municipalities is that which are declared under clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 3 of the Act i.e., to say, city municipalities having population of less than one lac inhabitants, and the other class consists of municipalities having population of one lac or more. According to Section 43(1) of the Act, President of a municipal board, having a population of more than one lac shall be elected by the members of the board in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. Under sub-section (2) of Section 43, President of city municipal board having a population of less than one lac, shall be elected by the electors directly. Thus the mode and manner of election of Presidents of two classes of municipal boards is different. Further to show that the Presidents of two classes of municipal boards stand on different footing, our attention has been drawn to proviso to Section 43 which says that in case a member is elected as President also, in a municipal board having a population of less than one lac, he ceases to be a member but no such consequence flows in respect of a President of a municipal board who is elected by the members of the board. This difference is of no consequence. It has then been pointed out that under Section 35 of the Act, different authorities have been prescribed for passing orders in respect of two classes of municipal boards in case of default. In one case, it is the State Government and in the other, the prescribed authority. This difference is of no consequence. It has then been pointed out that under Section 35 of the Act, different authorities have been prescribed for passing orders in respect of two classes of municipal boards in case of default. In one case, it is the State Government and in the other, the prescribed authority. On the basis of above provisions, it has been submitted that when municipal boards stand classified into two classes and where different procedure is provided for election of the Presidents, one procedure or no-confidence motion could not be provided. The Presidents of the two classes of municipal boards cannot be equated ; they form different classes. The unequals, therefore, are being treated as equals and it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, a number of cases have been relied upon. They are : - (i) AIR 1973 SC 106 , Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others. (ii) AIR 1969 SC 378 , State of Kerala v. Haji K. Kutty Neha and others. (iii) (1990) 2 SCC 715 , Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra and others. (iv) 1990 ALR 506, Smt. Mohr a Bai and others v. Municipal Board and another. (v) AIR 1985 SC 1133 , Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India and others. (vi) AIR 1974 SC 497 , M. Match Works v. Assistant Collector Central Excise. 22. In the case of Bennett Coleman (supra), our attention has been specifically drawn to Paras 65 and 69 of the judgment. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the policy of the Government to limit all papers at 10 pages level, is arbitrary and it tends to treat unequals as equals and discriminates against those who by virtue of their efficiency, standard and service and because of their All-India stature acquired a higher page level in 1957. Their lordships further observed that the advertisement which is one of the main source of income, was also affected by cutting down the page level. In Para 66 it was further observed that not only those newspapers were deprived of their economic viability but their freedom of expression was also restricted by reason of the compulsive reduction of page level entailing reduction of circulation and denuding the area of coverage for news and views. 23. In Para 66 it was further observed that not only those newspapers were deprived of their economic viability but their freedom of expression was also restricted by reason of the compulsive reduction of page level entailing reduction of circulation and denuding the area of coverage for news and views. 23. In the case of State of Kerala v. Haji K. Kutti Naha (supra) the taxing provision was struck down as violative of Article 14 because no reasonable classification was made in imposing tax on different classes of buildings but merely on the basis of floor area. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, "where objects, persons or transactions essentially dissimilar are treated by the imposition of a uniform tax, discrimination may result, for, in our views, refusal to make a rational classification may itself in some cases operate as denial of equality. 24. In the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association (supra), the question for consideration was about fixation of seniority on regularisation of services. It was held in that context that in case an appointment is made on stop-gap arrangement without considering the of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules, the experience of such appointee cannot be equated with the experience of regular appointee. If that is so done, it would be treating unequals as equals, which would violate equality clause. 25. Similarly in the case of Smt. Mohra Bai (supra), leavy of tax by the municipal board on the trade of dyeing and printing at a flat rate of Rs. 100 per annum per factory was quashed, as flat rate tax was fixed without taxing into account the size of the factories and strength of the labour etc. 26. In the case of Dr. P. Nalia Thampy Terah (supra). Paras 19 and 20 have been specifically relied upon on the point of treating unequals as equals. We, however, find no such observation in the said papers. On the other hand, it is observed that it is not for the Court to lay down policies in matters pertaining to elections. The Court cannot negate a law on the ground that it does not approve of the policy which underlies it. However, it was observed that the election laws are subject to statutory limitations, relying upon the case of Jyoti Basu (supra). 27. The Court cannot negate a law on the ground that it does not approve of the policy which underlies it. However, it was observed that the election laws are subject to statutory limitations, relying upon the case of Jyoti Basu (supra). 27. Yet another case relied upon is reported in AIR 1974 SC 497 , M/s. Murthy Match Works and others v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise and others. Our attention has specifically been drawn to Para 16, where the observation made, was that one fact of the equal protection clause' is that while similar things must be treated similarly, dissimilar things should not be treated similarly. In this case, in the matter of levy of central excise, match factories of C and D classes were treated alike. The Court, however^ had upheld the validity of the provision. 28. So far as the principle laid down in the cases cited above is concerned, there can hardly be any doubt. It may, however, be observed that the above proposition cannot be applied as a straight jacket formula. Even if it is assumed in some cases, as in the present one, that there is some dissimilarity, it is not always necessary that different sets of law must always be provided for each of the categories. For certain purposes, only one set of law may cover both the classes of persons or things without offending the law of equality. We find support for this proposition from the case of M. Match Works (supra). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, "The Court cannot strike down a law because it has not made the classification which commends to the court as proper. Nor can the legislative power be said to have been unconstitutionally exercised because within the class a sub-classification was reasonable but has not been made." In the case of State of Kerala v. Haji K. Kutti (supra), it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in some cases, refusal to make rational classification may itself operate as denial of equality. It is clear from the above observation that in some cases, it may not result in discrimination. It may be seen as to whether Presidents of two classes of municipalities constitute two distinct classes for purposes of present controversy. It is clear from the above observation that in some cases, it may not result in discrimination. It may be seen as to whether Presidents of two classes of municipalities constitute two distinct classes for purposes of present controversy. Learned Advocate General, in this connection, has drawn our attention to Section 50 of the Act which provides about the functions of the board that are discharged by the Presidents. It reads as follows : - "50. Functions of a board that must be discharged by the President. - The following powers, duties and functions of a board may be exercised, and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the board and subject to the provisions of Sections 53 and 53-A not otherwise, namely - (a) the powers vested in the President by Sections 70, 74 and the provisos to Sections 75 and 76 to appoint, punish or dismiss .servants of the board; (b) the determination, in accordance with any regulation in this behalf, of questions arising in respect of the service, transfer, leave, pay, privileges and allowances of servants of the board ; (bb) general supervision over all officers and works of the board ; (c) the submission to the Prescribed Authority under Section 32, of statements, accounts, reports or copies of documents, and under sub-sections (4) and 15) of Section 94 and sub-section (1) of Section 108 of copies of resolutions passed by the board or by a committee of the board ; (d) such of the powers, duties and functions referred to in the third column of schedule I as are delegated by the board under Section 112 to the President; and (e) all other duties, powers and functions of a board with the exception of - (i) where there is an executive officer, those vested in an executive officer, by Section 60 and where there is a medical officer of health, those vested in the medical officer of health by Section 60-A, (ii) those specified in the second column of schedule I, and (iii) those delegated by the board under Section 112." 29. Section 51 provides additional duties of the President, which reads as under : - "51. Additional duties of the President. Section 51 provides additional duties of the President, which reads as under : - "51. Additional duties of the President. -It shall also be the duty and power of the President - (a) unless provided otherwise by this Act or prevented by reason- able cause, (i) to convene and preside at all meetings of the board, (ii) .... (iii) otherwise to control in accordance with any regulation made in this behalf the transaction of business at all meetings of the board ; (b) to watch over the financial and superintend the executive administration of the board and bring to the notice of the board and defect therein ; and (c) to perform such other duties as are required of, or imposed on, him by or under this or any other Act." 30. Under Section 52 of the Act, Board is empowered to require the President to furnish information or statement or estimate etc. Sections 53 and 53-A of the Act provide for delegation by the President of certain powers. Section 13-D of the Act provides for the disqualifications. A perusal of Sections 43-AA and 13-D of the Act indicate that qualifications and disqualifications for the Presidents of the Boards are prescribed therein, without drawing any distinction about the class of municipal boards. Challenge to election of President by means of election petition is provided under Section 43-B of the Act without drawing any distinction about the class of municipal boards. As a matter of fact, so far the matters pertaining to the Presidents are concerned, our attention has not been drawn to any provision containing two different provisions regarding their status etc. in two different classes of municipal boards. The main factors by which inequality can be determined are the status, powers, duties, functions and control over office. In respect of t,he above factors we don't find any distinction, hence in our view it cannot be successfully argued on behalf of the petitioners that Presidents of two classes of municipal boards are unequals in any manner, nor merely on the basis of different method applied for their election to the office of President, it can be said that they are unequals. In discharge of their functions and duties, they are subjected to the same degree of control and supervision. We are, therefore, unable to find any force in the contention that unequals are being treated as equals. In discharge of their functions and duties, they are subjected to the same degree of control and supervision. We are, therefore, unable to find any force in the contention that unequals are being treated as equals. In this connection, our attention has also been drawn by the learned Advocate General to a case reported in Manilal (Manibhai) Gopalji Desai v. The Union of India, AIR 1960 Bom. 83 . The judgment of the Division Bench in the above case was delivered by Mr. Justice Madholkar of Bombay High Court, as then he was. On the basis of the said decision, it has been submitted, as discussed earlier as well, that right to vote or to be elected in the institutions created by the statute, is governed by the provisions of the statute alone, creating the institution and no question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution arises in such matters. Reservation of seats in the Bar Council, was challenged in the above noted case, on the ground of arbitrariness and discrimination, that various interests were unequally represented. It was held that the representation of various interests was provided by the statute, creating the institution. It was not a constitutionally guaranteed right but a franchise dependent upon the law and that it could be asserted only to the extent and subject to the conditions specified in the statute creating it. Article 14 of the Constitution was held to be not attracted in such matters. 31. In the back-ground of the law discussed in the earlier part of the judgment, it is clear that it could validly be provided in the statute that a motion of no-confidence would be considered by the members of the board even in respect of a President elected directly by the electorate. In these matters, a provision contained in the statute will be binding and legally hold good. The board consists of elected members. Members of the Legislature, as provided under Section 9 of the Act, are ex-officer members of the board. There would be two nominated members, one each, from amongst the women and the Safai Mazdoors, if no such person turns up as an elected member of the board. The number of elected members may range between 10 to 40. A body which is so composed, partakes the character of a representative body of the electorate. There would be two nominated members, one each, from amongst the women and the Safai Mazdoors, if no such person turns up as an elected member of the board. The number of elected members may range between 10 to 40. A body which is so composed, partakes the character of a representative body of the electorate. No grievance can thus be raised, if such a body is entrusted with the power of considering the motion of no-confidence against one who is directly elected by the electorate. No principle of democracy can be said to be violated, nor it can be so tested against the democratic principles as already discussed in the earlier part of this judgment. The Legislature is free to make such a provision if the need and expediency so requires. If such a provision can legally be made, it cannot be challenged solely on the ground that similar procedure is applicable also to the Presidents who have been elected by the members of the board. Those cases, which have been relied upon on behalf of the petitioners on the point of treating unequals as equals and which relate to levy of taxes etc. or grant of newsprint to small and big newspapers alike, would not be applicable to such matters, as in hand. There is no law in our land providing for recall of an elected person. Though elected by a larger body, the smaller body which considers the motion of no confidence, essentially has the character of a X representative body of the same electorate. We find no illegality in the provisions of Section 87-A of the Act while providing the same procedure, namely for consideration of motion of no-confidence by members of the board even for those Presidents, who have been directly elected by the electorate. The pleas in that regard, raised by the petitioners, fail. 32. Section 87-A of the Act has also been impugned on the ground that it provides no guide-line as to under what circumstances and for what reasons a motion of no-confidence can be moved. The submission is that in absence of any guide-line, there are also chances of misuse of the provisions resulting into removal of an elected office-bearer of the institution. According to the learned counsel, there must be provisions to guide as to how, when and why a motion of no-confidence, be brought against a President. The submission is that in absence of any guide-line, there are also chances of misuse of the provisions resulting into removal of an elected office-bearer of the institution. According to the learned counsel, there must be provisions to guide as to how, when and why a motion of no-confidence, be brought against a President. In the absence of any such guide-line, the provision is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon a case reported in Sri Gopinath v. Director General Doordarshan and others, 1989 ALJ 1002, specifically to the observations made in paras 18 and 19 of the judgment, where the question of validity of the provisions providing for uncanalised powers has been considered. 33. On behalf of the State, it has been submitted that in the matters pertaining to no-confidence, no reasons, cause or charges are necessary to be imputed. It is a question of political will and mere expression of loss of confidence may be enough for bringing a motion of non-confidence. It is different from impeachment of an elected holder of an office or a case of removal. Whatever may be the reason of a motion of no confidence, it need not form part of the motion. Motion of no-confidence, it is submitted, is not even a motion of censure. Therefore, guide-line cannot be prescribed providing for the circumstances under which such a motion can be brought. The question of providing guide-lines arises where such an action is taken for the reason of some particular kind of misconduct or charges ; then some enumeration may be required to be there to indicate in what kind or misconduct, charges or lapses, an elected holder of an office is to be ousted but in cases where it is not necessary that there must be some such kind of a thing against a person holding a particular office, a mere provision for bringing about a motion of no-confidence is enough without any further requirement of guide-line or canalization of action. In this connection, the learned Advocate General has-placed reliance upon a case reported in (1974) 2 SCC 706 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patal v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others. In this connection, the learned Advocate General has-placed reliance upon a case reported in (1974) 2 SCC 706 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patal v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others. He has specifically drawn our attention to para 19 where it has been held that the essential connotation of a no-confidence motion is that the party against whom such motion is passed has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite majority of members. It is not necessary to mention the lapses, charges of misconduct on the part of party against whom it is moved. It is further observed that there is no legal bar to the passing of a motion of no-confidence against an authority in the absence of any charge of impropriety or lapse. It is further observed that even though a ground may be mentioned when passing a motion of no-confidence, the existence of a ground is not a prerequisite of a motion of no-confidence. Their lordships of the Supreme Court have also drawn distinction between the motion of no-confidence and the motion of censure. In the motion of censure, it may be necessary to mention about the omission or lapse on the part of the party against whom it is moved but the same is not necessary for a motion of no-confidence. Even when grounds are mentioned in the notice and read out in the House, they do not form part of no-confidence motion. It may be mentioned here that the above noted case related to no-confidence motion brought against the President of a municipal board under Section 36 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act winch did not contain any provision to specify any ground for passing a motion of no-confidence against the President. We, therefore, find no force in this contention. 34. The next submission is that in view of the proviso to Section 47-A of the Act, no motion of non-confidence is envisaged in respect of the President elected directly. Section 47-A of the Act provides for the consequences of passing of motion of no-confidence. It reads as follows : - "47-A. Resignation of President on vote of non-confidence. 34. The next submission is that in view of the proviso to Section 47-A of the Act, no motion of non-confidence is envisaged in respect of the President elected directly. Section 47-A of the Act provides for the consequences of passing of motion of no-confidence. It reads as follows : - "47-A. Resignation of President on vote of non-confidence. - (1) If a motion of non-confidence in the President has been passed by the board and communicated to the President in accordance with the provisions of Section 87-A, the President shall - - (a) within three days of the receipt of such communication, either resign his office or represent to the State Government to supersede the board stating, his reasons therefor ; and (b) unless he resigns under clause (a), cease to hold office of President on the expiry of three days after the date of receipt of such communication, and thereupon a casual vacancy shall be deemed to have occurred in the office of the President within the meaning of Section 44-A : Provided that if a representation has been made in accordance with clause (a) the board shall not elect a President until an order has been made by the State Government under sub-section (3). (3) If a representation has been made in accordance with sub-section (If, the State Government may after considering the same either supersede the board for such period, not exceeding the reminder of the terms of the board, as may be specified, or reject the representation . (6) If the State Government supersedes the board under sub-section (3) the consequences mentioned in Section 31 shall follow as if there had been a supersession under Section 30." 35. It has been argued that the proviso to Section 47-A (1) places an embargo only upon the Board not to elect a President until the State Government passes an order on the representation of the out going President. It has been argued that the proviso to Section 47-A (1) places an embargo only upon the Board not to elect a President until the State Government passes an order on the representation of the out going President. No such embargo has been placed upon the electorate, i.e. to say in cases where the President of a municipal board, having a population of more than one lac, has been elected and voted out by the members of the board by means of a notion of no-confidence, the vacancy caused on passing of no-confidence motion is not to be filled up until decision of the representation, but in case of President elected directly by the electorate in the municipalities having a population of less than one lac, no such embargo has been placed upon the electorate, not to fill up the vacancy. Hence in such cases, vacancy can be filled up even before decision on the representation is taken. Sri V.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in this case, proviso to Section 47-A provides the key to interpret the section contained in Section 87-A (If of the Act. In this connection, he has drawn our attention to Section 43 (If of the Act which provides for election of President by the members of the board other than a city declared under Section 3 of the Act and it is submitted that if after the word "President" in sub section (If of Section 87-A of the Act, the words "elected under Section 43 (If" are added, the provisions of `Proviso to Section 47-A' and Section 87-A'would stand harmonized. The argument is that in that event, it will be clear that a motion of no-confidence can be brought against a President elected under Section 43 (1) as filling up of vacancy is barred under the proviso to Section 47-A by the board until decision of representation. In case the words "elected under Section 43 (1)" are not read as added after the word "President" in Section 87-A (1), there would be in consistency. Therefore, it is necessary to harmonise and for that purpose, it is necessary to read down the provision as mentioned above. It has been submitted that in such circumstances, reading down is permissible. In case the words "elected under Section 43 (1)" are not read as added after the word "President" in Section 87-A (1), there would be in consistency. Therefore, it is necessary to harmonise and for that purpose, it is necessary to read down the provision as mentioned above. It has been submitted that in such circumstances, reading down is permissible. He has placed reliance upon G. P. Singh On Interpretation of Statutes", III Edition, page 157, for the proposition that proviso, in certain cases may provide a guide for inter preparing the main provision, if the same is not clear. He has next pi iced reliance upon the book of Jagdish Swaroop `Legislative Interpretation' 1989 Edition, page 361 for the same proposition. Again reliance has been placed upon a decision of this Court, given in Writ Petition No. 20328 of 1986 Deokinandan Agrawal's case, dated 15-3-1988 by Bench consisting of Hon. Mr, Justice B. N. Sapru and Hon. Mr. Justice Anshuman Singh. Paras 13, 14 and 15 have been specifically referred to for the proposition that provisions can be read down in certain circumstances. For the same proposition, reliance has also been placed upon a case reported in (1979) 2 SCC 249 , Commissioner of Sales-tax M.P. v. Radha Krishna and others. It has been observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court that sometimes to uphold the validity of the provision it may be necessary to apply rule of reading down a section. Possibly there cannot be any dispute on the proposition that in certain circumstances, where there is ambiguity in main provision, help can be taken from the proviso to elicit the real meaning and purport of the main provision or for upholding its validity. But a question arises whether in this case any such vagueness exists in the main provision or such a necessity arises to read down the provision contained in Section 87-A (1) of the Act. In our opinion, no such exigency exists in the present case, nor there is any vagueness in the main provision contained in Section 87-A (1) of the Act. It is very clear that according to the given procedure, a vote of no-confidence can be brought against a President of the Municipal Board. In our opinion, no such exigency exists in the present case, nor there is any vagueness in the main provision contained in Section 87-A (1) of the Act. It is very clear that according to the given procedure, a vote of no-confidence can be brought against a President of the Municipal Board. There is no ambiguity in regard to the fact that motion can be brought against both the Presidents, elected by the board and those who are directly elected by the electorate. We feel that the provision is so clear that there seems to be no scope to say that the provision is vague or need any interpretation. The proviso to Section 47-A (1) which is in regard to filling up of the vacancy caused by passing of no-confidence motion, can in no way provide a key for interpreting the provisions of Section 87-A (1) of the Act which hardly suffers Iron any vagueness, In our view, if at all, it can be argued that there may be some omission, in the proviso to Section 47-A, where nothing is provided for not filling up the vacancy during the pendency of the representation, in case of a President who is directly elected. Any clarification, if necessary, would only be required in regard to the proviso and not in regard to the provisions contained in Section 87-A (1) of the Act. Again, if the argument is accepted for reading down Section 87-A (1) of the Act, that may perhaps render the provision vulnerable to attack being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as in that event, in respect of Presidents of the municipalities having a population of less than one lac, there would be no provision for no-confidence while it would apply to the Presidents of other municipalities. There would be no valid reason to interpret the said provision in this manner. This omission in the provision, if at all, would not in any manner invalidate the provisions contained in Section 87-A fl) so as to make it necessary to read down the said provision of Section 87-A (1) of the Act. Apart from this, there may be many reasons for not making any specific provision in respect of non-fulfilment of the vacancy caused, pending representation in respect of a municipal board where the President has been directly elected. Apart from this, there may be many reasons for not making any specific provision in respect of non-fulfilment of the vacancy caused, pending representation in respect of a municipal board where the President has been directly elected. One of the possible reasons, according to Sri Umesh Chandra, learned Advocate General, may be that the election of the President by the members of the board can be held immediately after passing of the motion of no-confidence. There may be a very short-time between passing of no confidence motion and electing the President to fill up that vacancy. Therefore, this safeguard has been provided that in those cases, where representation has been made, the vacancy may not be filled up by the members of the board. On the other hand so far as the election of President in cases of municipalities where the President is directly elected, a different procedure will have to be followed including publication of notification for the election in accordance with the U. P. Municipalities (Conduct of Election of President and Election Petition) Order, 1954. It may have been thought that during the time, which is taken to hold an election in such municipalities, representations may be decided. It could not be shown on behalf of the petitioners that looking to all provisions of the Act, it is intended not to oust a President by moving a motion of no-confidence, in respect of the municipalities where he is directly elected by the electorate. On the other hand, the intention of the Legislature is quite clear by virtue of Section 87-A (1) which makes no distinction and provides for motion of no-confidence against the Presidents of municipal boards. The consequences about their ceasing to be the President or resignation etc. are also the same as contained under Section 47-A. Both can make representations. Simply because in respect of one, there is no embargo to fill up the vacancy during the pendency of the representation, we feel, it cannot lead to read down the provision contained in Section 87-A by adding something which does not appear to be so intended, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Act. The main provision need not be read down, if the provision is otherwise clear and its validity is not under cloud or for the purposes of explaining some omission, if at all, in the proviso of another section of the Act. The main provision need not be read down, if the provision is otherwise clear and its validity is not under cloud or for the purposes of explaining some omission, if at all, in the proviso of another section of the Act. We, therefore, repel this contention as well advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 36. It has next been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the provision of no-confidence has no nexus with the purpose to be achieved by passing of such a motion, as a President against whom such a motion has been passed, is not debarred from seeking election of office of President again at the time of filling up of the vacancy. It would further serve no purpose in view of the fact that while the members of the board may remain the same. Again a person may succeed against whom such members had expressed no-confidence. The result would be that again a motion of no-confidence may be moved. Learned Advocate General has submitted that the Legislature in its wisdom did not think it necessary to debar a person in whom no-confidence is expressed from seeking re-election for the simple reason that there may be different reasons for losing confidence. It cannot be equated with removal on charges. No-confidence may not necessarily be accompanied by mis-conduct or any other charge on the part of the President. Therefore, passing of no-confidence motion was rightly not held to be a disqualification for seeking re-election. It has further been submitted that vacancy is to be filled up in three months. Thereafter a motion of no-confidence cannot be brought against the President within one year of his assumption of office. Therefore, the submission that motion of no-confidence shall again be resorted to, immediately after re-election is not tenable. If the members of the board again elect the same person, it is a matter of their choice. If they re-elect, it makes no difference that the same President would again be there with the same set of members. Similarly if a directly elected President returns, there would be no-confidence motion atleast for one year, may be in certain cases there is improvement in the situation. Therefore, absence of a provision disqualifying such a person for re-election is of no consequence. This point raised by the petitioners also has no merit and the same is repelled. 37. Similarly if a directly elected President returns, there would be no-confidence motion atleast for one year, may be in certain cases there is improvement in the situation. Therefore, absence of a provision disqualifying such a person for re-election is of no consequence. This point raised by the petitioners also has no merit and the same is repelled. 37. Next, the petitioners have challenged the Ordinance by which an amendment was brought in sub-sections (13) and (14) of Section 87-A of the Act. First, such Ordinance was Ordinance No. 2 of 1990, known as the U. P. Urban Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment i Ordinance, 1990. promulgated by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, on February 15, 1990. The second Ordinance was U. P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1990, promulgated on April 12,1990. The Amending Act was the U. P. Urban Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1990 which received the assent of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh on July 24, 1990. Prior to the amendment of sub-section (14) of Section 87-A, it provided that no notice of motion of no-confidence could be received within two years of the assumption of the office by a President. Similar was the provision under sub-section (13) of Section 87-A where meeting for the purpose could not be held for want of the quorum. By amending the above noted sub-sections, the period of two years has been reduced to one year, i.e to say, now a notice to move a motion of no-confidence can be received after one year of assumption of the office by the President. 38. It has been submitted that after issue of the first Ordinance and before second Ordinance was promulgated, the Legislature had met but the Bill amending the said provision was not passed to make it an Act by the Legislature ; therefore, issue of second Ordinance was not valid. In this connection, reliance, on behalf of the petitioners, has been placed upon a case reported in - AIR 1987 SC 579 Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others. In this case, for the State of Bihar, it was a matter of routine where Ordinances were re-promulgated for number of times-viz, for twenty times, thirty time or more, for years together without getting them passed or disapproved by the Legislature. Naturally the Legislature met in between for a number of times. In this case, for the State of Bihar, it was a matter of routine where Ordinances were re-promulgated for number of times-viz, for twenty times, thirty time or more, for years together without getting them passed or disapproved by the Legislature. Naturally the Legislature met in between for a number of times. The Supreme Court deprecated this practice and observed that the power vested in the Executive to promulgate Ordinance is to be exercised in emergent situation so that public interest may not suffer by reason or inability of Legislature to make law. An Ordinance would cease to be operative on the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature if not passed or disapproved before that by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the legislative Council. It has a limited life. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that to make laws is a Legislative function vested in the Legislature. This power cannot be usurped by the Executive by adopting a methodology of re-promulgating Ordinances for years together without placing the same before the Legislature. The Government cannot by-pass the Legislature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thereafter made the following observations : - "Of course, there may be a situation where it may not be possible for the Government to introduce and push through in the Legislature a Bill containing the same provisions as in the Ordinance, because the Legislature may have too much legislative business in a particular Session or the time at the disposal of the Legislature in a particular Session may be short, and in that event, the Governor may legitimately find that it is necessary to re-promulgate the Ordinance. Where such is the case, re-promulgation of the Ordinance may not be open to attack. But, otherwise, it would be a colourable exercise of power on the part of the Executive to continue an Ordinance with substantially the same provisions beyond the period limited by the Constitution, by adopting the methodology or re-promulgation." From the above observation, it is clear that in certain circumstances, an Ordinance may have to be re-promulgated, but ordinarily such a methodology cannot be adopted. 39. Sri A. Mannan, on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6091 of 1990, has given some dates pertaining to the petitioner. The petitioner had taken oath of the office of President on 6-12-1988. 39. Sri A. Mannan, on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6091 of 1990, has given some dates pertaining to the petitioner. The petitioner had taken oath of the office of President on 6-12-1988. Notice of motion of no-confidence was given on 21-5-1990, and motion was passed on 2-7-1990. Ordinance No. 2 of 1990 was issued on 15-2-1990 reducing the period from two years to one year under sub-section (14) of Section 87-A of the Act for motion of no-confidence. That Ordinance lapsed and on lapse of that Ordinance, Ordinance No. 8 of 1990 was promulgated on 12-4-1990. It is submitted that the relevant date of giving of notice of no confidence motion falls during the period when Second Ordinance was in enforce. Since Second Ordinance could not be validly issued as the first one was allowed to lapse and was not made an Act of Legislature, therefore, the notice of motion of no-confidence received within two years of the assumption of the office by the petitioner was bad and all subsequent proceedings based on the said notice are also invalid. On behalf of the State, however, Sri Umesh Chandra, learned Advocate General has submitted that the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner loses all force, if it had any, firstly for the reason that the Ordinance has been replaced by an Act of Legislature and Secondly, for the reason that in the present case, a Bill was introduced but it could not be passed, hence the first Ordinance had lapsed. It was only once thereafter that the Ordinance was re-promulgated. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any colourable exercise of powers vested in the Executive to promulgate the Ordinance. We may, however, observe that it may not be necessary to go further into that matter in view of the submission made by the learned Advocate General that the U. P. Urban Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1990 namely. Act No. 190 1990 came into force on July 24, 1990. Under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amending Act, it was given retrospective effect while providing that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on February 15, 1990. ft has been rightly pointed out that the validity of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amending Act has not been challenged by the petitioners. Under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amending Act, it was given retrospective effect while providing that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on February 15, 1990. ft has been rightly pointed out that the validity of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Amending Act has not been challenged by the petitioners. No arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioners to show in what manner retrospective effect given to the amendment by Act No. 19 of 1990 is bad. Some arguments although, were advanced in respect of Section 12 of the Amending Act which is a provision repealing the Ordinance No. 8 of 1990 and saving anything done or any action taken under the amended provisions as amended by the Ordinance. In this regard, it has been submitted that the action taken or anything done by virtue of promulgation of Ordinance No. 8 of 1990 could not be validated as the said Ordinance could not be validly issued after the first Ordinance was allowed to lapse. In this connection, it would be suffice to observe that re-promulgation of Ordinance, only a second time, as in the present case, would not automatically result in invalidating the same. For once, there may be soma circumstances, due to which it may not have been possible to pass an Act. There is no dispute that notice of motion of no-confidence was received against the petitioner when second Ordinance was in force. As observed earlier, it is not necessary to go and probe into the matter any further as the Amending Act has been given retrospective effect which provision has not been challenged or impugned ; hence the petitioner cannot succeed on this ground, 40. In view of the discussion held above, we find no merit in the writ petitions and the same are dismissed. The orders of interim relief, if any, operating, stand discharged. 41. There would be no order as to costs.