JUDGMENT 1. This Original petition is to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or other appropriate order or direction for quashing Ext. P-1 order and Ext. P-7 proceedings and also for other reliefs. 2. The 2nd Petitioner is a society represented by its President. The society is engaged in the collection and distribution of milk. By Ext. P-1 order dated 6th December 1990 the first respondent Joint Registrar compulsorily amended the bye law of the society under S.12 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act. 1969 (for short 'the Act'). According to the petitioners Ext. P-1 order and Ext. P-7 proceedings leading to the same are vitiated since the first respondent did not adhere to the mandatory provisions in S.12(5) and (6) of the Act, The first respondent issued Ext. P-2 notice dated 29th December 1988 calling upon the petitioner to take steps for amending the bye laws of the society, as stated therein limiting its area of operation. By Ext. P-3 resolution the Committee refused to carry out the amendment. Thereupon the first respondent issued Ext. P-4 show cause notice calling upon them to show cause why the amendment should not be carried out. The committee thereafter passed Ext. P-5 resolution expressing that the amendment cannot be implemented as the same is detrimental to the society. Thereafter the first respondent issued Ext. P-7 proceedings amending the bye laws by invoking sub-section (6) of S.12 of the Act. 3. According to the petitioners Exts. P-1 and P-7 are vitiated since the first respondent Joint Registrar did not make any prior consultation with the Financing Bank and Circle Cooperative Union. It is the case of the petitioner that no effective opportunity was given to the Society for making their representation against the proposed amendment. In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent maintained that the consultation under S.12 of the Act is only directory and not mandatory. It is also contended by the first respondent that effective opportunity was given and first respondent only after satisfying that for the purpose of altering the area, the amendment of the bye laws of the society is necessary and desirable took steps for making the amendment. 4. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Government Pleader to the effect that the O.P. is not maintainable as an appeal is provided for under S.83 (j) of the Act. Ext. 4. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Government Pleader to the effect that the O.P. is not maintainable as an appeal is provided for under S.83 (j) of the Act. Ext. P-1 order is dated 6th December 1990 and the O.P. was filed on 11th January 1991. The period within which an appeal could be filed under S.83 (2) is 60 days. It will be noted that the O.P. was filed before the expiry of the said period. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since by this time, the period for filing the appeal has already expired, the O. P. cannot be dismissed on the ground that alternate remedy of appeal was available. Reliance was placed on the decision in Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer AIR 1971 S.C. 33 in support of the said argument. There the matter arose under the Income Tax Act. There was provision for challenging an order under S.35 of the said Act by revision before the Commissioner of Income Tax. Without filing a revision, O.P. was filed and was entertained by the High Court. It was contended that O.P. was not maintainable because revision was provided for. Adverting to the same the Supreme Court said in Para.12: "But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by S.33-A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income Tax Officer under S.35, but was not moved, the High Court could be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits." Applying the principles in the said decision now the O.P. cannot be dismissed holding that there is alternate remedy particularly when the remedy of appeal is now barred by limitation. 4 As noted the case of the petitioner is that the reason stated for the amendment is not sufficient. Ext. R-1 (a) is the office copy of the notice under R.10 (1) of the Cooperative Societies Rules. Though the petitioner has produced Ext. 4 As noted the case of the petitioner is that the reason stated for the amendment is not sufficient. Ext. R-1 (a) is the office copy of the notice under R.10 (1) of the Cooperative Societies Rules. Though the petitioner has produced Ext. P-2, the same does not contain column No. 5. In column No. 5 of Ext. R-1 (a) the reason stated is, in the area that is taken out from the area of operation of the society, Anand Model Milk Cooperative Societies are to be established. Para.4, 5 and 6 of the counter affidavit state that the Government has taken a policy decision to have Flood II Programme and has got approval from the Government of India to organise Anand Pattern Milk Producers Cooperative Societies; and the steps taken are also stated in the said paragraphs. Pursuant to the same, according to the respondents from the vast area under the society certain area was taken out, so that Anand Model Societies could be started. In the reply affidavit, the stand taken by the petitioners in Para.11 is that the said reason is not a sufficient reason. In the light of the policy decision taken by the Government to implement Anand Pattern Milk Producers Cooperative Societies, it cannot be said that, that would not constitute a sufficient reason within the meaning of S.12(5) of the Act. Therefore, the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners then pointed out that the consultation with the financing bank and the Circle Cooperative union should precede the issuing of Ext. P-2. There was no consultation with the financing bank and the consultation with Circle Cooperative Union, according to the first respondent as per Para.11 of the counter affidavit was only on 27th February 1989. Therefore, according to the learned counsel the said consultation itself was after Ext. P-2 dated 29th December 1988. Learned counsel relied on Ext. P-6 decision of the Division Bench of this court in writ Appeal No. 652/1987 in support of his contention that the consultation should precede the taking of steps. In Para.2 of the decision in Ext. P-6 it is stated: "............ P-2 dated 29th December 1988. Learned counsel relied on Ext. P-6 decision of the Division Bench of this court in writ Appeal No. 652/1987 in support of his contention that the consultation should precede the taking of steps. In Para.2 of the decision in Ext. P-6 it is stated: "............ It is therefore clear that steps can be initiated for amending the bye laws by the Registrar for achieving the two objectives only on his being satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to take such steps. But before such steps are taken, it is required to consult the financial Banks if any to which the society is affiliated as also the Circle Cooperative Union. It is only after satisfying these conditions that the Registrar can call upon the Society to lake steps for the amendment of the bye laws.. ..." In view of the said statement of law by the Division Bench the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that, there can now be no doubt that such steps for consultation should have preceded in issuing Ext. P-2 notice. 6. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand maintained that the said condition in S.12 (5) of the Act is only directory and therefore the breach of the same cannot result in vitiating the steps taken by the first respondent. Reliance was made by the learned counsel on the decision in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal AIR 1957 SC 913. There question for consideration was whether consultation with the Public Service Commission under Art.320 of the constitution was mandatory. Their Lordships held that the provisions under Art.320(3)(c) are not mandatory and non compliance with those provisions would not afford cause of action. It will be noted that the said conclusion was reached because of the proviso to Art.320 of the Constitution which enabled the President or the Governor as the case may be to make regulations specifying the matters in which either" generally or in any particular class of cases of in particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a Public Service Commission to be consulted. The Supreme Court herd that if the provision under Art.320 of the Constitution is mandatory in character, the constitution could not have left it to the discretion of the Head of the executive Government to make regulations to the contrary. The Supreme Court herd that if the provision under Art.320 of the Constitution is mandatory in character, the constitution could not have left it to the discretion of the Head of the executive Government to make regulations to the contrary. There is no such indication in S.12(5) of the Act to infer that the same is not mandatory. There fore the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. On the other hand in the decision in Janardhanan v. Joint Registrar 1990 (1) KLT 530 interpreting S.12, this court held: "The power or authority must be exercised according to the mode provided and contemplated by the statutory provision. It is also well established that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Even if there be no negative words, that shall not be done in any other way. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden." In view of the above, it -is not possible for the first respondent Joint Registrar to exercise power under S.12(5) of the Act without complying with the conditions therein. 7. The respondents have got a case that the society is not affiliated with any bank. The petitioner produced along with the reply affidavit Ext. P-9 share certificate issued by the Quilon District Cooperative Bank Ltd. According to the respondents the same would not show that the society is affiliated with the said bank. As per S.12(5) of the Act the consultation should be with the financing bank, if any, to which the society is affiliated with and the Circle Cooperative Union. The contention of the 1st respondent is that the society is not affiliated with the Quilon District Cooperative Bank. S.2(j) defines, the financing bank as a cooperative society having as its members only other cooperative societies and the main object of which is to raise money and lend the sum to its members. In the Websters New International Dictionary "affiliate" is stated to mean "to connect or associate one's self; followed by with". In the light of the definition of financing bank under S.2(j), and Ext. P-9 there can be little doubt that the 2nd petitioner society is affiliated with the Quilon District Cooperative Bank Ltd. Therefore, the society, in view of Ext. In the Websters New International Dictionary "affiliate" is stated to mean "to connect or associate one's self; followed by with". In the light of the definition of financing bank under S.2(j), and Ext. P-9 there can be little doubt that the 2nd petitioner society is affiliated with the Quilon District Cooperative Bank Ltd. Therefore, the society, in view of Ext. P-9, is affiliated with the Quilon District Cooperative Bank Ltd. Since, there is no consultation with the bank and since the consultation with the Circle Cooperative Union was after issuing Ext. P-2, Ext. P-1 order and Ext. P-7 proceedings are liable to be quashed. In view of the said discussion, Ext. P-1 order and Ext. P-7 proceedings are quashed. The O.P. is allowed as indicated above.