Judgement ORDER :- The petitioner has moved the writ application challenging the two notices addressed to respondent No.6, Chandra Nath Banik, and one to the owner or occupier of premises Nos. 26 and 26/ 7, Hindusthan Park (now 26, Hindusthan Park). The two notices issued to the respondent No.6 are dated 14th July, 1978 and 28th August, 1978 issued by the District Building Surveyor, Dist. No.IX(B) and the Deputy City Architect, respectively, while the last notice is dated 1st September, 1978 signed by several officials including the City Architect and the Deputy Commissioner (A). The notice dated 14th July, 1978 issued by the D.B.S. directed the respondent No.6 that the impugned structure (i.e. the 9th and 10th storeys = 8th and 9th floors) of the said premises shown in the sketch map be demolished by the respondent No.6 failing which the demolition would be undertaken by the Corporation. The notice dated 28th August, 1978 by the Deputy City Architect fixed the date of demolition on 22nd September, 1978. The notice dated 1st September, 1978 under Section 557 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was issued under the signature of several officers including the Deputy Commissioner(A) directing the owner or occupier of the said premises that the D.B.S. and B.I. have been empowered by the Commissioner to enter into the aforesaid premises on 22nd September, 1978 at the specified hour to carry out the demolition of unauthorised construction on 9th and 10th storeys of the building as directed by the Deputy Commissioner(P) by his order dated 30th June, 1978 under S.414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he is a tenant in respect of the 9th and 10th floors (actually it should be 8th and 9th floors or 9th and 10th storeys as appears from the Corporation record) of premises No.26 and 26/7, Hindusthan Park (now 26, Hindusthan Park, Calcutta) since 1963. He came to learn sometime in 1978 that the Corporation authorities would demolish the portion under his occupation in terms of an order dated 30th June, 1978 passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Thereafter he narrated the incident as indicated hereinbefore and stated that the notice was addressed to respondent No.6 and not to him. He came to learn sometime in 1978 that the Corporation authorities would demolish the portion under his occupation in terms of an order dated 30th June, 1978 passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Thereafter he narrated the incident as indicated hereinbefore and stated that the notice was addressed to respondent No.6 and not to him. His case is that the Corporation never did issue any notice to him to show cause or give any opportunity of hearing as to why the premises should not be demolished. He has a right to get an opportunity to place his case before the authorities otherwise there cannot be any substantial compliance of Sections 414 and 557 of the Act of 1951. It is admitted in the petition that the Corporation did start a proceeding against the respondent No.6. It is further stated in the petition that the respondent No.6 sometime in 1967 by a registered deed relinquished his right, title and interest in the said property and dedicated it to Sri Iswar Radhagobinda Jew with one Sm. Nirmala Banik as Shebait. 3. Mr. Habibullah, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, in his submission stated that as an occupier of the 9th and 10th storeys of the premises in question he has the locus standi to come before this Court for the redress of his grievances. There is nothing in the statute that a person must be recorded or bona fide occupier. In this connection he has cited a decision reported in AIR 1982 Cal 314 (Ram Awatar Agarwal v. Corporation of Calcutta). According to the learned Advocate, an occupier has the full right and locus standi to be heard if he is affected in any way keeping in view of the principles of natural justice and in this connection he cited, a decision of my own in the case of Maula Bux v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1990) 1 Cal LJ 124 : AIR 1990 Cal 318 : 1990 Cal LT 174 : (1990) 1 Cal 2 HN 233. Mr. Habibullahs further argument is that under Section 414 of the said Act no action can be taken under Section 557 of the Act because an occupier is not only entitled to a notice under Section 414 of the Act but also a notice under Section 557 of the Act. Mr. Habibullahs further argument is that under Section 414 of the said Act no action can be taken under Section 557 of the Act because an occupier is not only entitled to a notice under Section 414 of the Act but also a notice under Section 557 of the Act. He repeated the contention once again in another way by submitting that if Section 414(l) and (3) of the Act debars notice to an occupier then the statute itself is violative of natural justice because a statute which forbids or excludes from giving hearing to persons to be affected by an order of demolition is bad in law. A person who has been denied hearing by the authorities cannot be asked to vacate or give up his interest however limited it might be. He has referred to the aforesaid decision in the case of Ram Awatar Agarwalla (supra) and quoted Their Lordships that where local Board is the only authority that can make such an order, its act must be judicial act, and the party to be affected should have a notice given to him. The denial of notice is discriminatory and the Corporation has no leg to stand on the plea that an occupier is not entitled to any notice under Section 414 of the Act and as in this case no such notice has been served upon the petitioner, the order of demolition is wholly bad. He further took a point that the merger of the two notices addressed to the owner or occupier of the said premises dated 1st September, 1978 is also defective. 4. His further contention is that the Commissioner is the only authority to pass any order for demolition and the power under Section 414(3) of the Act of 1951 cannot be delegated. He concluded by pointing out Section 414(4) of the Act which says that no action should be taken under this section in respect of any erection, alteration, addition or other work executed more than 12 years before the issue of the notice under subsection (1). The substance of his submission is that as an occupier he has a right of hearing by the Corporation authorities and that right cannot be taken away and any action for demolition taken by the Corporation would be wholly illegal and bad in law and the Corporation must be restrained from taking any such steps. 5. The substance of his submission is that as an occupier he has a right of hearing by the Corporation authorities and that right cannot be taken away and any action for demolition taken by the Corporation would be wholly illegal and bad in law and the Corporation must be restrained from taking any such steps. 5. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the Corporation authorities, during his reply to Mr. Habibullah clarified the points raised by him and answered the queries made by the Court. 6. First of all, let me come to the main defence of the petitioner of being an occupier of the 9th and 10th storeys of the premises in question. Under Section 5(51) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 "Occupier" includes "any person for the time being paying, or liable to pay, to the owner the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building in respect of which the word is used or for damages on account of the occupation of such land or building, and also a rent-free tenant: Provided that an owner living in or otherwise using his own land or building shall be deemed to be the occupier thereof". (The definition of "Occupier" is the same in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 as in the Act of 1951). The argument of Mr. Habibullah that under this definition he is an occupier because apart from what has been stated in sub-section (51) other persons occupying any premises in any capacity also come in within this definition as it contains the word includes. In my opinion, his interpretation is incorrect because this is a comprehensive definition of an occupier under the Act of 1951 and includes means the person or persons who have been mentioned in this particular sub-section and the definition of the occupier cannot travel beyond this subsection. The petitioner simply stated in the writ petition that he is an occupier of the 9th and 10th storeys but the writ petition did not contain any annexures showing any rent receipts of the respondent No.6 under whom he was a tenant since 1963, nor he could produce any other document by which his occupation could be taken as legal and he could exert any such right. But subsequently he improved his position by filing a supplementary affidavit which was affirmed on 3rd June, 1991 when the matter was in the process of hearing. The supplementary affidavit has been termed by the petitioner as "supplementary affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the petitioner Sankar Dutta" which appears somewhat strange to me. Anyhow in this supplementary affidavit he has annexed xerox copies of the documents including two rent receipts issued by the Collector on behalf of Sri Sri Iswar Radhagobinda Jew in respect of 9th and 10th floors of the premises Nos.26 and 26/7, Hindusthan Park, Calcutta-29, for the months of May to August (without year) at the rate of Rs. 800/- per month issued on 6th September, 1974 and another for the months of September to December (again without any year) for the same monthly rent issued on 4th December, 1974. The most objectionable thing is the mentioning of the 9th and 10th floors in the rent bill because when the notice under Section 416 of the Act was served on 1st March, 1976 that was in respect of 8th and 9th floors i.e. 9th and 10th storeys and the question of 9th and 10th floors i.e. 10th and 11th storeys does not at all arise. These rent receipts cannot be relied upon. Further when the petitioner was aware when filing the writ petition that the premises in question changed hand in 1967 then why he made only respondent No.6, Chandra Nath Banik, as one of the respondents and why did he not include the present owner Sri Sri Iswar Radhagobinda Jew through Shebait as a party-respondent. If the statement is correct, then this has been done deliberately. A person who comes to the Court not with clean hands does not deserve any relief. It is submitted by the petitioner himself that the proceeding has been initiated against the respondent No.6 and nowhere he says in paragraph 13 that the proceeding has not been initiated against the present owner to whom the premises was dedicated sometime in 1967. He has annexed some communications and electricity bills from the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Limited as well as some other documents. But these documents do not bring him within the purview of the definition of occupier as stated in the Act of 1951. 7. He has annexed some communications and electricity bills from the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Limited as well as some other documents. But these documents do not bring him within the purview of the definition of occupier as stated in the Act of 1951. 7. The defence taken by the petitioner that the Commissioner of the Corporation has no authority to delegate power and the power under Sec. 414(3) of the Act cannot be delegated is not correct in view of Sec. 416A of the Act and under this section the term "Commissioner" includes a Deputy Commissioner as defined therein and as such the power can definitely be delegated by the Commissioner to a Deputy Commissioner. This is very logical because the Commissioner alone could not be in a position to tackle all the civic problems of the city of Calcutta single-handed and such delegation is quite obvious and necessary. 8. On the point of limitation this case is not hit by Sec. 414(4) of the Act of 1951. Sub-section (4) makes clear that no action can be taken in respect of any erection, alteration, addition or other work executed more than twelve years, ago before the issue of notice under sub-section (1) of Section 14. Here the fact is otherwise, the notices were issued immediately when the unauthorised constructions were made as appears from the Corporation papers as well as the Deputy Commissioners order dated 14th July, 1978. 9. Now I come to the Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1982 Cal 314 (supra) which was very forcefully cited by Mr. Habibullah, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. Banerjee for the Corporation also relied on the same judgment. One and the same bullet is applied by both the parties and it is to be seen to whom it hits. Their Lordships has very categorically stated in this judgment as under (at p. 326 of AIR) :- "The appellants who are the occupiers of the building in question and having no connection whatsoever with the construction of the building have no right to claim an opportunity of being heard against the demolition orders of the building. They are only entitled to a reasonable time to shift to some other place............ They are only entitled to a reasonable time to shift to some other place............ This really means that the occupier is given a reasonable time to vacate the unauthorised structure." This Division Bench decision of our High Court makes clear the point that an occupier who has nothing to do with the construction has no right to stall the demolition of an unauthorised construction, but he deserves only time from the Court to shift from the unauthorised construction. The question of locus standi as enunciated in the case of Maula Bux ( AIR 1990 Cal 318 ) (supra) cannot be invoked in this particular case. There the question was altogether different and locus standi to move the writ petition was discussed in that background. Here the Division Bench as referred to above has specifically outlined the right of an occupier and his duty to vacate the unauthorised structure after getting a reasonable time from the Court. It must be borne in mind that the respondent No.6 did not contest the rule which was made ready on 4th June, 1982 and Sri Iswar Radhagibinda Jew was not made a party at all by the petitioner in this writ petition. It is only submitted that the property has been dedicated to the deity and the Shebait is in charge which fact he knew for a number of years. This statement of the petitioner cannot be relied on at all as the very rent receipts appear highly objectionable. Even if the petitioner is a tenant, he is an occupier and the right of an occupier has already been discussed hereinbefore. 10. In that view of the matter, I discharge the Rule. There will be no order as to costs. The petitioner is allowed time till 31st August, 1991 to vacate the premises under his occupation at Nos.26 and 26/7, Hindusthan Park (now premises No.26, Hindusthan Park), Calcutta. The authorities of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation shall be at liberty to execute the demolition work of the unauthorised portions of the said premises immediately on the expiry of this period. 11. Let xerox copies of this judgment be made available to the parties on usual undertaking and upon compliance of the necessary formalities. Rule discharged.