BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of dismissal order passed against him by the Dean of Government Dental College and Hospital, Ahmedabad, dated 29-11-1975, by invoking the aids of the provisions of Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) A resume of the material facts leading to the rise of the present petition, may be stated, at this juncture. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was working as a Nayak (Head Peon), at the Government dental College and Hospital, at Ahmedabad, when departmental inquiry was initiated against him by the Dean of the aforesaid College. A charge-sheet was served on the petitioner, on 14-8-1975. The substance of the chargesheet was that : (1) He behaved in an indecent manner with Class IV Female Employees of the Dental College and talks irresponsibly to the said female employees with bad intention. (2) The appellant instigates the Class IV employees of the Institution to behave against discipline and instigates them against the Head of the Institution. ( 4 ) UPON the charge-sheet being served, the petitioner filed his reply, on 18-8-1975. The Dean of the Government Dantal College and Hospital, ahmedabad, was pleased to appoint one Dr. K. Bhargava, Professor of prosthetics, Crowd and Bridge, on 27-8-1975, as an Inquiry Officer. ( 5 ) THE Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and examined various witnesses. On completion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report to the Dean, on 11-11-1975. As per the report of the Inquiry Officer, the petitioner was found guilty of both the charges, as aforesaid. ( 6 ) CONSEQUENTLY, a show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner by the Dean, on 12-11-1975, and the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from the service. The petitioner was supplied a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer, After hearing the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority, i. e. . Dean of the Government Dental College and hospital, Ahmedabad, was pleased to accept the report of the Inquiry Officer and passed the dismissal order, on 29-11-1975. ( 7 ) THE petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, preferred an appeal before the Director of Medical Education and Research, on 22- 12-1978, which was rejected by him, on 21-7-1976. Dean of the Government Dental College and hospital, Ahmedabad, was pleased to accept the report of the Inquiry Officer and passed the dismissal order, on 29-11-1975. ( 7 ) THE petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, preferred an appeal before the Director of Medical Education and Research, on 22- 12-1978, which was rejected by him, on 21-7-1976. The petitioner could have filed a further appeal to the Government under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Gujarat Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. However, the petitioner, for the reasons not known from the record, did not file any appeal to the Government, but, apparently, opted to file a suit in the Civil Court. Therefore, he served the respondents with a notice under Sec. 80 of the Civil procedure Code, 1908, on 14-12-1976, and thereafter the petitioner filed Civil suit in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, on 20-4-1977, and also prayed for permission to sue in forma pauperis by filing an Application No. 204 of 1977 on the same day. ( 8 ) THE City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, had passed an order directing to issue notices to the defendants and the Government Pleader, on 9-5-1977, but the petitioner did not pay the process fees. Therefore, the application to sue in forma pauperis come to be dismissed for nonpayment of process fees, on 22-8-1977. ( 9 ) LATER on, the petitioner applied for restoration of the application, on 15-12-1978. The learned City Civil Judge was pleased to restore the application to sue in forma pauperis, on 3-5-1979 directing the petitioner to pay requisite court-fees on the next day, that is on 4-5-1979. ( 10 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the petitioner moved the Court, on 13-7-1979 and requested the Court to permit him to take recourse to the remedy before the gujarat Civil Service Tribunal, as it was then constituted. It was requested by the petitioner that the suit, may be, transferred to the Tribunal or he may be allowed to withdraw the suit, with permission to file the suit before the tribunal. Unfortunately, an unusual order came to be passed by the learned city Civil Judge, Ahmedabad, below Ex. 1, as under :"mr. G. M. Pandya, the learned Advocate for the applicant has stated before me that the applicant wants to take proper proceedings before the competent service Tribunal and, therefore, he does not want to proceed with this application. Unfortunately, an unusual order came to be passed by the learned city Civil Judge, Ahmedabad, below Ex. 1, as under :"mr. G. M. Pandya, the learned Advocate for the applicant has stated before me that the applicant wants to take proper proceedings before the competent service Tribunal and, therefore, he does not want to proceed with this application. The applicant has also given application Exh. 11 for the same The application is, therefore, dismissed for want of prosecution with no order as to costs. " ( 11 ) IT could be seen from the said order that the petitioner had stated before the learned City Civil Judge that he wanted to pursue the matter and take appropriate proceedings before the Service Tribunal, at gandhinagar, and, therefore, he did not want to proceed with the application for permission to sue in forma pauperis. ( 12 ) THEREAFTER the petitioner filed Appeal No. 499 of 1979, before the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, at Gandhinagar, on 27-7-1979, against the impugned dismissal order. Alongwith the said appeal, the petitioner had also filed an application for condonation of delay. The appeal was admitted, subject to the question of limitation. The petitioner had, inter alia, contended that when the suit was filed alongwith the application for permission to sue in forma pauperis, the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal was not constituted. Therefore he had pursued the concurrent remedy before the Civil Court. The course of action followed by the petitioner was that instead of filing appeal before the State Government, he chose to challenge the order of dismissal, by filing Civil Suit and the petitioner carried on with the suit upto 13-7-1979. Thus, there was a delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. ( 13 ) ON appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case, the bench of the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, was pleased to dismiss the appeal, on 2-8-1980, holding that the appeal was time-barred and there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. ( 14 ) BEING aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the petitioner challenged its legality and validity by filing this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 15 ) DURING the pendency of this petition, amendment was permitted by this Court, challenging the legality and validity of the dismissal order passed by the respondents against the petitioner. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 15 ) DURING the pendency of this petition, amendment was permitted by this Court, challenging the legality and validity of the dismissal order passed by the respondents against the petitioner. Thus, initially, the challenge was against the judgment and order of the Services Tribunal but later on the legality and validity of the impugned dismissal order was also challenged. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has raised several contentions challenging the legality and validity of the impugned dismissal order. His first contention is that the petitioner was not afforded sufficient opportunity in the departmental proceedings and, therefore, there was grave miscarriage of justice. In that it is further contended that for non-observance of the principles of natural justice, the inquiry proceedings are vitiated. ( 17 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions ; (1) That the Services Tribunal has committed a, serious, illegality in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation. (2) That the impugned dismissal order is vitiated for non-observance of the mandatory provisions of relevant Rules and non-compliance of principles of natural justice. (3) In the alternative, the quantum of penalty is excessive and harsh in the circumstances of the case. Re: Contention No. 1 : ( 18 ) IN so far as the first contention is concerned, there appears to be much weight and force therein. It appears that the Services Tribunal, while deciding the Appeal No. 499 of 1979, on 2-8-1980, has committed a, serious, error in dismissing the appeal on the technical ground of limitation. The Tribunal committed a grave and patent error in finding that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is true that petitioner went to Tribunal after lapes of nearly three years from the date of the impugned order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Tribunal thought that the petitioner himself allowed the period of limitation to lapse even before pursuing the remedy in the Civil Court. It may be mentioned that the petitioner had rushed to the Civil Court challenging the legality and validity of the impugned dismissal order passed against him by the Disciplinary Authority and carried on with the said forum, upto 13-7-1979. Of course, the Services Tribunal came to be constituted, on 15-2-1977. It may be mentioned that the petitioner had rushed to the Civil Court challenging the legality and validity of the impugned dismissal order passed against him by the Disciplinary Authority and carried on with the said forum, upto 13-7-1979. Of course, the Services Tribunal came to be constituted, on 15-2-1977. ( 19 ) NEEDLESS to mention that the petitioner had two option to challenge the impugned order of dismissal; either to file suit in the Civil Court or to file an appeal before the Government. The petitioner initially exercised the first option and instituted a suit, as aforesaid. However, in the meantime, it was found expedient to take the proceedings to the Tribunal. Therefore, on 13-7-1979, the petitioner gave an application to the Court to the effect that after filing of the suit the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal has been set up and, therefore, the suit should proceed before the Tribunal and the petitioner requested that the suit may be returned to him for presenting it before the tribunal, or he may be allowed to withdraw the suit with permission to present it before the Tribunal. But, unfortunately, the learned City Civil Judge passed an order to the effect that the petitioner is not willing to proceed with the application and, therefore, the application to sue in forma pauperis came to be dismissed. The learned City Civil Judge observed that the same is dismissed for want of prosecution, with no order as to costs. Such an order was not sought. The order itself is not legal. What was requested by the petitioner by giving an application, Ex. 11, was to return the plaint to him for presentation before the Tribunal or he sought permission to withdraw the suit for filing it baton; the Tribunal. This aspect was not, properly, examined by the Tribunal. ( 20 ) NO doubt, there was a delay of around three years in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. However, it cannot be said, even for a moment, that there was no sufficient ground for condonation of delay. With due respect, the Tribunal committed a, serious, error in refusing to condone the delay in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. A person who was, bona fide, pursuing remedy before another forum, cannot be said to be negligent or indifferent of his remedy. With due respect, the Tribunal committed a, serious, error in refusing to condone the delay in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. A person who was, bona fide, pursuing remedy before another forum, cannot be said to be negligent or indifferent of his remedy. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay and the Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay as prayed for and ought to have decided the appeal of the petitioner, on merits. But the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner before it. In the opinion of this Court, the order passed by the tribunal is illegal. . ( 21 ) THE next question that would arise is as to whether the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal for adjudication of the appeal on merits. Ordinarily, this course would be adopted. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would not be proper, at this stage, for this Court to remand, the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication of the appeal. This is a very old matter. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation, on 2- 8-1980. The impugned order of dismissal came to be passed, on 29-11-1975. The contraversy relates to an order which is as old as one and half decades. More so, all the merits against the entire impugned dismissal order, dated 29-11-1975, are raised in this petition. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the dispute in the petition being more than one and half decades old it would be neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to remand the matter to the Tribunal for fresh decision. Hence, this Court, in this writ petition, is examining the merits of the entire impugned dismissal order. Re : Contention No. 2 : ( 22 ) IN so far as the second contention is concerned, it may be mentioned that the delinquent is, ordinarily, entitled to the assistance of a friend or a legal counsel by the Advocate in departmental proceedings. The petitioner is a Class IV employee, who was facing serious charges in a departmental proceeding. It is contended that assistance of a lawyer or a friend had been denied to the petitioner. The petitioner is a Class IV employee, who was facing serious charges in a departmental proceeding. It is contended that assistance of a lawyer or a friend had been denied to the petitioner. It is specifically pleaded in the petition that the petitioner is an ignorant person as far as inquiry and other aspects of the departmental proceedings are concerned and non-affording of opportunity to engage either a lawyer or a friend, vitiates the inquiry. It is, therefore, submitted that it cannot be said that the trial was conducted in a fair manner and the petitioner was afforded an adequate opportunity to show cause against the charges in question. This specific averment in the petition is replied, in para 29, of the affidavit-in-reply. It is, contended that looking to the circumstances of the inquiry and departmental proceedings, it was not found necessary to allow him to engage either a lawyer or a representative of any union. Thus, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner, being the delinquent, was not afforded the opportunity to have the services of a lawyer or a representative of any union. The respondents have not been able to say as to why the petitioner was not allowed to engage either a lawyer or a representative of any union. It is only stated that looking to the circumstances of inquiry and departmental proceedings, it was not found necessary. It is not only vague but incomplete assertion. What are the circumstances which necessitated the department to refuse the services of a lawyer or friend, are not enumerated or explained. Even at the time of hearing, on pointed question put to the learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents, no explanation could be tendered. ( 23 ) IN fact, it can safely be concluded that the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges levelled against him, which is a condition precedent for passing any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, as per the mandate of Art. 311 (2) of the constitution of India. ( 24 ) IT is very clear from the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution that no person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without giving an opportunity of being heard in respect of any charges. ( 24 ) IT is very clear from the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution that no person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without giving an opportunity of being heard in respect of any charges. This constitutional mandate to provide reasonable opportunity of being heard is violated and, therefore, there is a breach of mandatory provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that there was a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner in the aforesaid departmental proceedings. ( 25 ) APART from the constitutional provisions of Art. 311, there is a statutory provision in the Rules governing the departmental proceedings. Rule 9 (5) (c) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971, is important to be considered at this juncture. Rule 9 (5) (c) of the Rules reads as under:"9. (5) (c) The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person hereinafter referred to as the Presenting Officer to present the case in support of the charge before itself if it itself is to inquire into the charges or before the Inquiry Authority. The government servant may present his case with the assistance of any other Government servant approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the person approved by the Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. " ( 26 ) IT is very clear from the aforesaid provision that the Disciplinary authority can nominate any person as a Presenting Officer to present the case in support of the charge before itself or before the Inquiry Authority. The Disciplinary Authority, in the present case, had appointed an Inquiry officer, who was a highly qualified person. Dr. K. Bhargava, who was the Professor of Prosthetics, Crown and Bridge. It may also be mentioned that the Dean of the Government Dental College and Hospital had also appointed a Presenting Officer and there is no dispute about this aspect. The Government servant is entitled to be represented or assisted by any government servant approved by the Disciplinary Authority. The government servant can also engage a legal practitioner for his defence, subject to the permission of the Disciplinary Authority. The Government servant is entitled to be represented or assisted by any government servant approved by the Disciplinary Authority. The government servant can also engage a legal practitioner for his defence, subject to the permission of the Disciplinary Authority. As observed hereinbefore, the respondents have simply stated in para 19 of the affidavitin- reply that looking to the circumstances of the inquiry and departmental proceedings, it was not found necessary to allow the petitioner to engage either a lawyer or a representative of any union. The respondents have not explained and clarified the circumstances influenced them for not finding it necessary to permit the petitioner to engage a lawyer or representative for his defence. These circumstances, unequivocally, go to show that the delinquent in the proceedings/the petitioner, herein, was not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard, for his defence against the serious charges which are held proved and which, in fact, culminated into his dismissal from the services. ( 27 ) THAT is not all. It is also pleaded in para 3 (23) of the petition that it ought to be appreciated that during the inquiry all the witnesses were present together so that what one was saying could be heard by the others. Relying on it, it is contended that there was non-application of mind on the part of the Inquiry Officer and alternatively the Inquiry Officer had deliberately not referred this vital aspect in his report which would vitiate the trial. ( 28 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that witnesses were examined at a time. The averments made in para 3 (23) of the petition are not, specifically, denied in the affidavit in reply. It is, no doubt, true that a strict-standard of examination of witnesses before the Court may not apply in a domestic inquiry. However, this is a circumstance which is required to be borne in mind while considering the totality of the circumstances emerging from the record. The petitioner, who is a Class IV servant, was not allowed to engage a lawyer or a friend to defend his case. Not only that, the Department examined some of the witnesses who were not cited or named; or some of the witnesses who were examined by the Department, their names were not intimated or communicated or were not known to the petitioner, being the delinquent in that inquiry. Not only that, the Department examined some of the witnesses who were not cited or named; or some of the witnesses who were examined by the Department, their names were not intimated or communicated or were not known to the petitioner, being the delinquent in that inquiry. This specific averment made in para 3 (37) of the petition is also not denied. Nine witnesses were examined but some of them were not cited or named earlier. ( 29 ) THEREFORE, following points, undoubtedly, emerge which have material bearing on the merits of the present petition : 1. The petitioner is a Class IV servant. 2. The petitioner was facing serious charges, which has resulted into his dismissal. 3. The petitioner was not allowed to engage a lawyer or to have services of a representative or best friend. 4. Nine witnesses were examined by the Department, out of which, some were not stated and not communicated to the delinquent/petitioner herein. 5. All the witnesses were examined together in presence of each other, which is not denied. 6. Inquiry was conducted by a competent senior officer, Dr. K. Bhargava. 7. An experienced Inquiry Officer was assisted by a Presenting Officer, ( 30 ) A spectrum emerging from the aforesaid seven aspects would lead, undoubtedly, to only one conclusion that there was total callousness and indifference on the part of the Disciplinary Authority and Inquiry Officer in the conduct of departmental proceedings and it is not only contrary to principles of natural justice but is in flagrant violation of the provisions of Rule 9 (5) (c) of the Rules and Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the impugned dismissal order cannot be allowed to stand as it is not only erroneous but is, totally, illegal. ( 31 ) IT was, half-heartedly, contended on behalf of the respondent, by the learned A. G. P. that the delinquent had not specifically requested to permit him to engage a lawyer or to have assistance of the best friend. Prima facie, this contention may appear to be attractive, but not sustainable, in view of the clear reply, in para 19 of the affidavit in reply. Had there been no any such request, the reply would have been that the petitioner had never desired or had never requested to engage either a lawyer or a representative of his own choice. Prima facie, this contention may appear to be attractive, but not sustainable, in view of the clear reply, in para 19 of the affidavit in reply. Had there been no any such request, the reply would have been that the petitioner had never desired or had never requested to engage either a lawyer or a representative of his own choice. On the contrary, the averment in para 19 of the affidavit in reply goes to show that it was not found necessary to allow the petitioner to engage either a lawyer or a representative of any union in the circumstances of the inquiry and departmental proceedings. Such an averment in para 19 of the affidavit-in-reply runs counter to the contention advanced at this stage in this petition. Therefore, it cannot be sustained. ( 32 ) APART from that it would not be proper for a State to raise a plea that a Government servant or a delinquent, who is a Class IV servant had not asked for the service of a lawyer or had not requested for the assistance of a representative to defend him in the departmental proceedings. The State, much less, a welfare State, cannot contend that the delinquent had to ask for legal services or he had to request for a representative or best friend. This runs counter to the provisions of Rule 9 (5) (c) of the Rules. It leaves no any manner of doubt that it is the right of the Government servant to present his case with the assistance of any Government servant, approved by the disciplinary authority. Why the petitioner, herein, was not allowed to even get the assistance of a friend or any other Government servant is not, specifically, explained. In fact, it is a right of the delinquent. Even the delinquent has a right to engage a lawyer when the department is represented by an experienced and qualified Presenting Officer and an experienced Inquiry officer. It is a settled proposition of law that in the circumstances as in the present case, refusal to engage a lawyer or to have assistance of best friend, for defence in the departmental proceedings, is nothing but a denial of reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of such serious charges, as contemplated under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. It is a settled proposition of law that in the circumstances as in the present case, refusal to engage a lawyer or to have assistance of best friend, for defence in the departmental proceedings, is nothing but a denial of reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of such serious charges, as contemplated under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. In fact, the State should have inquired from the delinquent as to whether he was desirous of engaging a lawyer or any representative or best friend of his choice. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, if the Government declines to avail of the opportunity, as requested by the Disciplinary Authority, it would be open for the authority to proceed with the inquiry. But if the delinquent is not informed of his right and an overall view of the inquiry wherein serious charges are levelled against him and that too in an inquiry where experienced person is appointed as an Inquiry Officer assisted by an able officer like the Presenting Officer. So, four things are very material. The delinquent who is a Class IV servant, who, obviously, would be not informed or aware about his right to engage a lawyer or to have the assistance of a representative or best friend, must be asked by the Disciplinary Authority on this point. Obviously, he would not know the technical Rules of the inquiry. He would not be aware of the provisions of the Rules governing the departmental inquiry. The principle deducible from the provisions contained in Rule 9 (5) (c) of the Rules, upon its true interpretation, is that where the department is represented by a Presenting Officer, it would be the duty of the Government, more particularly where the delinquent Government servant is a Class IV servant, whose educational qualification is such as it would lead to an inference that he may not be, fully, equipped and aware of the technical Rules meant for holding inquiry, that he is informed of his right. He would not be, obviously, know that he would be entitled to be defended by another Government servant of his choice. If the Government servant declines to avail of the opportunity, the Inquiry Officer may proceed with the departmental inquiry. He would not be, obviously, know that he would be entitled to be defended by another Government servant of his choice. If the Government servant declines to avail of the opportunity, the Inquiry Officer may proceed with the departmental inquiry. But if the delinquent is not informed of his right and an overall view of the inquiry, wherein, serious charges are levelled against the delinquent, who is a Class IV servant would be at a comparative disadvantage situation when the Disciplinary Authority represented by the Presenting Officer, in such a situation, in absence of anyone assisting the delinquent who is belonging to a echelons of service would, unless it is shown that he had not suffered any prejudice, vitiates the inquiry. In reality, justice and fair play demand that where in a disciplinary proceeding, the department is represented by a Presenting Officer and delinquent is a Class IV servant, who is facing serious charges, it would not be expedient but incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority, while making appointment of a Presenting Officer, to inform the delinquent of his right to take the help and assistance of another Government servant before the commencement of inquiry. At least the Inquiry Officer must inquire from the delinquent whether he would like to engage anyone from the department to defend him when the delinquent is belonging to a lower echelon of service (Class IV employee in the present case ). He would further be informed that he is entitled under the relevant Rules to seek assistance of another government servant belonging to the department to represent him. If, after this information is conveyed to the delinquent, he still choose to proceed with the inquiry without obtaining assistance, then in that case, grievance which is raised in this petition, now, cannot be of any avail as there would be compliance with the rule. It is, also, a right of the delinquent to engage a legal practitioner, more so, when serious charges are levelled against him and the department is represented by an experienced and trained Presenting Officer. This is the minimum requirement of natural justice, which must proceed the disciplinary proceedings, ( 33 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances enumerated hereinbefore, it is explicitly established that the delinquent, who is a Class IV servant and who faced serious charges, was not afforded an opportunity of being heard in respect of those serious charges. This is the minimum requirement of natural justice, which must proceed the disciplinary proceedings, ( 33 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances enumerated hereinbefore, it is explicitly established that the delinquent, who is a Class IV servant and who faced serious charges, was not afforded an opportunity of being heard in respect of those serious charges. Therefore, there was breach of the mandatory provisions of Art. 311 (2) and also there is flagrant violation of Rule 9 (5) (c) of the Rules. Consequently, the inquiry proceedings and resultant penalty order shall stand vitiated. ( 34 ) ONCE the inquiry is held to be vitiated on a technical ground, on non-compliance of principles of natural justice and violation of statutory provisions, the ordinary course would be to leave it to the Disciplinary Authority for further inquiry proceedings. It could be left upon the Disciplinary Authority for further necessary actions if they so desire. This is one way of looking it. However, in exceptional cases, instead of leaving the matter to the departmental Authority, the Court could direct not to proceed with the inquiry. There are peculiar and special circumstances in the present petition which ought to be considered while deciding the further course. ( 35 ) ONCE the impugned dismissal order is quashed, ordinarily, the delinquent should be ordered to be reinstated. Once the reinstatement is ordered, ordinarily, full backwages should be ordered. No doubt, there may be exceptional circumstances wherein full backwages or part of it should be given or not, could be examined. Before deciding the aforesaid two aspects, i. e. , reinstatement with full or part backwages or whether further inquiry should be reserved or not, the learned Counsels for the parties were requested to offer their views. Learned Counsels for the petitioner, Mr. Raju, made a suggestion that if the future inquiry is closed or the further inquiry is not reserved, then 50% backwages and reinstatement will meet the ends of justice. No any suggestion was offered on behalf of the respondent-State despite the repeated request to its Counsel. The learned Assistant Government Pleader stated that there are no specific instructions from the Department concerned in this regard. ( 36 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the suggestion made by Mr. Raju, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is quite fair and reasonable. The learned Assistant Government Pleader stated that there are no specific instructions from the Department concerned in this regard. ( 36 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the suggestion made by Mr. Raju, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is quite fair and reasonable. The departmental inquiry is 15 years old. No doubt, since the impugned order of dismissal is quashed on a technical ground, a fresh inquiry on the same charges could be held. But in view of the peculiar and special circumstances of the present case, it would be neither advisable nor expedient to reserve the liberty to the department to embark upon further departmental proceedings. The departmental proceedings are more than 15 years old and if the liberty is reserved to the department, it may again entail long delay and lead to further far-reaching ramifications. The following circumstances are required to be borne in mind for deciding as to whether fresh inquiry should be directed or not: (1) The delinquent had undergone agony of departmental proceedings and same are inconclusive since more than 15 years. (2) The disciplinary proceedings were started in 1975. (3) The oral evidence consisted of nine witnesses, some of them might have retired, some of them might not be available. The witnesses who are available may not be able to support the department, fully, on account of loss of memories, etc. (4) A further phase of financial and mental agony is likely to entail to the delinquent, who is a Class IV servant. Undoubtedly, after a long period of more than 15 years, if further inquiry is held, in all probabilities, it is likely to operate as a hardship on the delinquent, who is out of job since the date of dismissal. (5) The petitioner has been deprived of his source of livelihood since more than 15 years. Further inquiry would, undoubtedly, entail mental agony and social stigma to the petitioner, and which yet may be fruitless for the Department in view of lapse of 15 years. Therefore, the question which requires to be examined, at this stage, is as to whether what final order should be passed in this petition, consequent upon the setting aside of the penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner. Therefore, the question which requires to be examined, at this stage, is as to whether what final order should be passed in this petition, consequent upon the setting aside of the penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner. Ordinarily, in such a situation, it would have been left to the Disciplinary authority to proceed with the inquiry and reconsider its merits, in accordance with the law. However, in the peculiar and special circumstances of the present case, it would not be a meaningful exercise and, therefore, not desirable to reserve the liberty for further departmental proceedings. ( 37 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just, fair and reasonable to accept the suggestion of the learned Counsel for the petitioner to reinstate the petitioner with 50% backwages from the date of dismissal till his reinstatement with a direction that there shall be no further departmental proceedings. ( 38 ) IN the result, it is directed that the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from the service, being not sustainable, the same is set aside. Consequently, the petitioner shall he reinstated by maintaining the continuity in service but he shall be entitled to only 1/2 of the backwages and other emoluments as would have been payable to him in the absence of the impugned order of dismissal from the services from the date of the impugned order of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. The direction for payment of 1/2 of the backwages and other consequential benefits is issued in view of the special and peculiar facts emerging from the record of the present case, which are enumerated hereinbefore. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service and shall be paid 1/2 of the backwages and other permissible allowances etc. from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement, as early as possible, but not beyond the period of eight weeks from today. In the facts of the present case, there shall be no further occasion to proceed with the departmental proceedings on the aforesaid charges. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no Order as to costs in the peculiar circumstances of the present case. .