Judgment :- The above revision petitions are dealt with in common, since they common property and have been dealt with at all relevant points of time in common. 2. The petitioner herein has filed two suits, O.S.Nos.6070 and 6071 of 1971 on the City Civil Court, Madras, O.S.No.6070 of 1971 was filed for a declaration that defendant (Pandurangan) was a tenant under the plaintiff, in respect of the suit land recovery of possession of the same from the defendants and also for recovery of a sum of towards arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and also for future O.S.No.6071 of 1971 was filed for a declaration that the first defendant (Parthasarathy Govindasamy) was a tenant under the plaintiff of the suit land and also for recovery Rs.430 being the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and for recovery future damages at Re.1 per day from 1.6.1971. It is not necessary at this stage to dwell the details of the claims of parties on merits. Suffice it to state that on 22.3.1974 O.S.No.6070 of 1971 was decreed with a declaration that the first defendant was under the plaintiff of the plaint schedule land marked in red colour in the plan recovery of possession of the same from the defendants and (b) O.S.No.6071 of 1971 also decreed granting a declaration that the first defendant was a tenant under the of the plaint schedule land marked in red colour in the plan and for recovery of possession the same from the defendants. In both the suits, the decrees also granted mesne past and future. As against the same, the respective first defendants filed A.S.Nos.18 of 1975 and by a judgment and decree dated 18.9.1976, the appeals came to be dismissed. It appears that the second appeals filed thereafter also failed and were rejected. 3. While matters stood thus, it appears that a declaration was made under Sec.3 Tamil Nadu Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971 declaring the suit as a slum area. When execution petitions were filed to execute the decrees in the year objections were raised that the decree are not executable in view of the said notification having regard to the provisions contained in Sec.29 of the said Act, which inhibited dispossession unless the decree-holder obtained the permission of the prescribed under the Act as notified by the Government. When execution petitions were filed to execute the decrees in the year objections were raised that the decree are not executable in view of the said notification having regard to the provisions contained in Sec.29 of the said Act, which inhibited dispossession unless the decree-holder obtained the permission of the prescribed under the Act as notified by the Government. The objections were overruled execution of the decree was ordered to go on further. The first defendant in each of the filed C.R.P.Nos.309 and 334 of 1979 before this Court and a Division Bench of this Court, its decision made on 17.10.1979,set aside the order of the executing Court directing delivery of the property holding at the same time that “It is however, made clear that the respondent can levy execution of the decree obtained by him after obtaining the requisite permission the prescribed authority as required under Sec.29. With these observations, both the revision petitions are allowed. No costs.” 4. While so, W.P.No.1230 of 1982 was filed in this Court by One Naziruddin, Muthavalli the Diwan Sahib Burial Ground, the owner of the property, impleading the State of Nadu and the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board as respondents praying for issue of a writ of Certiorari to call for and quash the proceedings in G.O.Ms.No.378, Housing, dated 2.11.1972, in so far as the petitioner was concerned. It may be noticed that this the notification which made the provisions of the Slum Clearance set applicable to the and rendered the decrees inexecutable without obtaining the permission of the prescribed authority, originally by an order dated 8.6.1982, the Court passed an order as follows: “It is ordered that interim suspension granted by the order of this Court, dated 19.2.1982 and made herein is hereby made absolute and that the operation of the notification G.O.Ms.No.378, Housing, dated 2.11.1972 on the file of the 1st respondent do continue be suspended pending W.P.No.1230 of 1982 on the file of this Court.” Taking advantage of the said orders, E.P.Nos.948 of 1982 in O.S.No.6071 of 1971 and of 1982 in O.S.No.6070 of 1971 were filed for effecting delivery of possession in execution the decrees in O.S.Nos.6070 and 6071 of 1971. The first respondent in the execution applications filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the petitioners on several grounds. The Court below, by its common order dated 27.4.1983, dismissed the execution petitions. The first respondent in the execution applications filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the petitioners on several grounds. The Court below, by its common order dated 27.4.1983, dismissed the execution petitions. In substance, the view taken by the Court below was that in view of the earlier orders in C.R.P.Nos.309 and 334 of 1979 (since reported in 93 L.W. 143), without complying with the provisions of Sec.29 of the Slum Clearance Act by obtaining the permission of prescribed authority, file decrees could not be executed and possession recovered and Court below also reserved the right of the possession of the same from the defendants and also for recovery of a sum of towards arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and also for future damages. O.S.No.6071 of 1971 was filed for a declaration that the first defendant (Parthasarathy Govindasamy) was a tenant under the plaintiff of the suit land and also for recovery Rs.430 being the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and for recovery future damages at Re.1 per day from 1.6.1971. It is not necessary at this stage to dwell the details of the claims of parties on merits. Suffice it to state that on 22.3.1974 O.S.No.6070 of 1971 was decreed with a declaration that the first defendant was a under the plaintiff of the plaint schedule land marked in red colour in the plan and recovery of possession of the same from the defendants and (b) O.S.No.6071 of 1971 also decreed granting a declaration that the first defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff of the plaint schedule land marked in red colour in the plan and for recovery of possession the same from the defendants. In both the suits, the decrees also granted mesne past and future. As against the same, the respective first defendants filed A.S.Nos.18 and of 1975 and by a judgment and decree dated 18.9.1976, the appeals came to be dismissed. It appears that the second appeals filed thereafter also failed and were rejected. 3. While matters stood thus, it appears that a declaration was made under Sec.3 Tamil Nadu Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971 declaring the suit as a slum area. It appears that the second appeals filed thereafter also failed and were rejected. 3. While matters stood thus, it appears that a declaration was made under Sec.3 Tamil Nadu Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971 declaring the suit as a slum area. When execution petitions were filed to execute the decrees in the year objections were raised that the decree are not executable in view of the said notification having regard to the provisions contained in Sec.29 of the said Act, which inhibited dispossession unless the decree-holder obtained the permission of the prescribed under the Act as notified by the Government. The objections were overruled execution of the decree was ordered to go on further. The first defendant in each of the filed C.R.P.Nos.309 and 334 of 1979 before this Court and a Division Bench of this Court, its decision made on 17.10.1979,set aside the order of the executing Court directing of the property holding at the same time that “ It is however, made clear that the respondent can levy execution of the decree obtained by him after obtaining the requisite permission the prescribed authority as required under Sec.29. With these observations, both revision petitions are allowed. No costs.” 4. While so, W.P.No.1230 of 1982 was filed in this Court by One Naziruddin, Muthavalli the Diwan Sahib Burial Ground, the owner of the property, impleading the State of Nadu and the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board as respondents praying issue of a writ of Certiorari to call for and quash the proceedings in G.O.Ms.No.378, dated 2.11.1972, in so far as the petitioner was concerned. It may be noticed that the notification which made the provisions of the Slum Clearance set applicable to the and rendered the decrees inexecutable without obtaining the permission of the prescribed authority, originally by an order dated 8.6.1982, the Court passed an order as follows: “ It is ordered that interim suspension granted by the order of this Court, dated 19.2.1982 and made herein is hereby made absolute and that the operation of the notification G.O.Ms.No.378, Housing, dated 2.11.1972 on the file of the 1st respondent do continue be suspended pending W.P.No.1230 of 1982 on the file of this Court. ” Taking advantage of the said orders, E.P.Nos.948 of 1982 in O.S.No.6071 of 1971 and of 1982 in O.S.No.6070 of 1971 were filed for effecting delivery of possession in execution the decrees in O.S.Nos.6070 and 6071 of 1971. The first respondent in the execution applications filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the petitioners on grounds. The Court below, by its common order dated 27.4.1983, dismissed the execution petitions. In substance, the view taken by the Court below was that in view of the orders in C.R.P.Nos.309 and 334 of 1979 (since reported in 93 L.W. 143), without complying with the provisions of Sec.29 of the Slum Clearance Act by obtaining the permission prescribed authority, file decrees could not be executed and possession recovered Court below also reserved the right of the petitioner to comply with the requirement of Sec.29 and proceed thereafter. Aggrieved, petitioner has filed C.R.P.No.2642 of 1984 against E.P.No.948 of 1982 in O.S.No.6071 1971 and C.R.P.No.2643 of 1984 against E.P.No.949 of 1982 in O.S.No.6070 of 1971. 5. For purpose of completion of the facts and subsequent developments, it is necessary point out also that the main writ petition No.1230 of 1982 itself came up for final disposal before a learned single Judge of this Court and by an order dated 17.9.1988, S.Ramalingam, J., allowed the writ petition and thereby quashed the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.378, Housing dated 2.11.1972. The learned Judge of course gave liberty to the Government follow the prescribed statutory procedure and proceed afresh, if so desired. There is no claim before this court at this stage that any such notification came to be issued afresh or that order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.1230 of 1982 has been superseded in manner known to law. 6. Mr.N.Kannadasan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the order of the court below cannot be sustained, in that, it has ignored the legal consequences of an order of stay granted by the High Court which has direct bearing on matter in issue. That apart, it was contended that this Court ultimately allowed W.P.No.1230 of 1982 thereby quashing the notification in question as an inevitable consequences of which the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act ceased to have application any longer and no more governed the rights of parties in relation to the property in question. That apart, it was contended that this Court ultimately allowed W.P.No.1230 of 1982 thereby quashing the notification in question as an inevitable consequences of which the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act ceased to have application any longer and no more governed the rights of parties in relation to the property in question. Consequently, according to the learned counsel, having regard to the subsequent event which requires to be taken into account in order to render effective justice as well as to avoid multiplicity of future proceedings, the order of the Court below requires to be set aside and the Court below should be ordered to proceed with the execution. In controverting the plea of absence knowledge on the part of the respondents, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the pendency of the proceedings have been disclosed with sufficient details in the Court below and the pretended ignorance cannot in any manner help the respondents to get over the legal effect of the order passed in the writ petition. 7. On behalf of the respondents, Mr.P.Venkata-chalapathy, learned counsel submitted that (a) it is not open to the petitioner to ignore the effect of the judgment rendered in L.W.143, binding between the parties: (b) the decision of this Court in W.P.No.1230 of 1982 cannot be pressed into service as a subsequent event since the decision rendered therein not between the parties to the present proceedings; (c) the decision in question cannot considered to be a subsequent event in the pending revision proceedings by taking parties by surprise; (d) in any event having regard to the ratio of the decision reported A.I.R. 1954 Travancore Cochin 526, the point in question cannot be taken into account in pending revision and that the points raised do not fall within the scope of Sec.115,C.P.C. 8. I shall now refer to the various case laws referred to by the counsel on either side before taking up for consideration the points raised for determination in the above proceedings Pasupuleti v. Motor Traders, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409, the Supreme Court had an occasion consider the question as to whether it can mould reliefs in an appeal by taking into account the facts subsequent to the institution of proceedings. The Apex Court expressed the view that for making the right or remedy, claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases, must take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of proceedings of course observing the rules of fairness to both sides. In Dosabai v. Muthirdas, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1334, the apex Court held that while it is true that events and changes the law occurring during the pendency of an appeal require to be taken into consideration order to do complete justice between parties and emphasised the necessity to mould decree so as to accord with the changed statutory situation, at the same time, the Court observed that the right obtained by a party under a decree cannot be allowed to be defeated by delay in the disposal of the appeal against the decree, if it is possible to save the decree by moulding it to conform to the statutes subsequently coming into force. 9. In M.M.Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma,A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1113: (1981)3 S.C.C. 36 , apex Court once again considered the question regarding the taking into account of the subsequent events, and after referring to the case law on the subject, held as follows: “ To sum up, there was a proper and regular application to meet with the requirements O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C. for additional evidence inviting the Court ’ s attention to a subsequent event of vital importance cutting at the root of the plaintiffs right to continue the Coupled with it, there was evidence in the form of a certified copy of the decree showing the plaintiffs, even if they had some shade of title to commences action, they having interest in the property and the property having become one of exclusive ownership person not a party to the proceedings, were not more entitled to continue the proceedings for their own benefit.” In Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711: (1981)3 S.C.C. 103 , Court once again emphasised the necessity as well as justification for taking into account subsequent events to mould the trial Court ’ s decree. 10. 10. In Suryaprakash Gupta v. The Madras Piece Goods Merchants Charitable Trust, 132, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of a Government Order issued under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 executability of a civil Court ’ s decree for eviction. That was a case in which on the date the suit for eviction was filed before the civil Court, the building under consideration outside the scope of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The decreed on the basis of a compromise between the parties. But by the time proceedings came to be initiated to execute the decree, by virtue of an amendment introduced by the Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1964 the building came within the subject the Rent Control Act. The execution petition came to be rejected on the ground decree became inexecutable by virtue of the amended provision of law. Subsequent the Government passed G.O.Ms.No.l998,Home, dated 12.8.1974,inexer-cise of its under Sec.29 of the Rent Control Act, exempting the buildings owned by Charitable without reference to any religion. Thereupon, execution proceedings were instituted afresh. In that context, the Division Bench held that the moment the building in question exempted from the provisions of the Act, the decree, which continued to exist, became executable and, therefore, the proceedings instituted for executing the decree was not justifiable but maintainable. 11. In Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 817, the Supreme Court considering the question of introducing a new fact by means of an amendment petition held that the premises which was not of 10 years old on the date of the suit and, therefore, was exempted from the operation of the Rent Act, can be held to be governed by the Act on account of subsequent lapse of time and such a fact can be brought on record irrespective of the period of limitation provided therefore. 12. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409, and submitted that the Court was exercising powers under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act and not under Sec.115, C.P.C. Placing reliance upon the decision reported (in Rameshwar v.JotRam,A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 49, was contended that where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in law and it is made applicable at any stage. This case, which is based upon a well-accepted principle that vested cannot be divested except where there is specific intention of law so expressed in terms have no relevance or application to the case on hand. Here, the question is whether there still exists any impediment in executing the decree of the competent civil Court is rendered inexecutable except with the permission of the prescribed authority by virtue Sec.29 of the Slum Clearance Act as a consequence of the notification issued thereunder. Where the said notification itself has been set at naught and nullified, the impediment been once and for all cleared end the decision in 93 L. W. 143, which equally reserved right of the plaintiff to secure permission and proceed further, if so permitted, does not the respondents to preserve the notification notwithstanding the indisputable fact that same has been set aside by a competent Court. 13. The decision in Managing Director (M.I.G.) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Hyderabad Prasad Tarway, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 76: (1972)3 S.C.C. 195 : (1972)1 Lab.L.J. 170: Lab.I.C. 407, has been next referred to. That was a case where pending a challenge order of suspension pending enquiry interim orders of stay sought for was refused trial Court but granted on appeal by the appellate Court. That was a case where pending a challenge order of suspension pending enquiry interim orders of stay sought for was refused trial Court but granted on appeal by the appellate Court. When such an interlocutory was challenged the Apex Court held that so long as the first appellate Court had jurisdiction in the matter the interlocutory order passed, be it in accordance with or not in accordance with law, does not call for interference in exercise of powers under Sec.115, C.P.C. There no comparison between the case decided by the Supreme Court and the present case this Court can, on the facts and circumstances of the case, interfere in exercise of its under Sec.115, C.P.C. In Pappathi Ammal v. Sivagannam, A.I.R. 1954 Travancore 526, a Full Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court expressed the view that sitting revision the Court is concerned with the correctness of the order when it was passed. view is to be confined to the peculiar type of the case under consideration before that and it cannot be said as an invariable proposition of law that in no case can the subsequent event be taken into account in a revision petition to mould the relief. If such were to ratio of the said decision, it will be running counter to the several decisions of the Apex as well as this Court referred to above and consequently cannot be of any assistance respondents in this case. It has since been repeatedly held that it is not only for any jurisdiction but also for such exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity as well the rectification of any error of the Court below occasioning failure of justice or irreparable injury, the powers under Sec.115, C.P.C. can be resorted to. That being position, the objection raised on behalf of the respondents does not carry much weight significance and I am not persuaded to sustain the same. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the order of this in finally disposing of W.P.No.1230 of 1982 cannot be pressed into service or relied against the respondents, inasmuch as none of the respondents or their predecessor interest were parties to the said judgment. In other words, learned counsel submitted cannot be said to be a judgment in rem so as to bind the whole world. In other words, learned counsel submitted cannot be said to be a judgment in rem so as to bind the whole world. It is the plea learned counsel that at best it is a judgment in personam and, therefore, it may be between parties thereto and not otherwise. No doubt the general principle is res inter Judicata Nullur inter alios prejudicium pacit (A matter adjudicated upon between one persons does not in any way prejudice another set of persons). But having regard scheme of the provisions contained in Secs.40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, Courts often considered the efficacy as well as the relevance of judgments not inter partes cases. It has been often held that the law attributes an unerring verity to the substantive opposed to the judicial portions of the record. All Judgments are conclusive of their existence as distinguished from their truth; so every judgment is conclusive evidence for or against persons whether parties, privies or strangers of its legal effect as distinguished from accuracy of the decision rendered. If the object was merely to prove the existence judgment, its date or legal consequences, the production of the record or a certified the said judgment is conclusive evidence of the facts against the whole world, the being that a judgment as a public transaction of solemn nature must be presumed faithfully recorded. 15. In Ramji Ratanji v.Manohar, (1959)62 Bom L.R. 322, a Division Bench of the High Court had an occasion to consider the matter at length and Raju, J. speaking Bench, declared the position as hereunder: "A judgment in another suit which is not inter partes may be evidence for certain purposes, namely, to prove the fact of the judgment; to show who the parties to the suit were; to what was the subject-matter of the suit; to show what was decided or declared judgment; to show what documents had been filed by the parties in the proceedings; establish the transaction referred to in the judgment; as evidence to show the conduct parties or particular instances of the exercise of a right or assertion of title (vide: Prasad Singh v. Must. of Munshi Nath Prasad, (1956) S.C.R. 1, 6), or to identify property; or to show how property had been previously dealt with; to establish a particular transaction in which a right is asserted and the name the person, if any, who is declared in the judgment as entitled to possession; but judgment is not evidence to establish the truth of the matters decided in that judgment. State of Bihar v. Radhakrishan Singh, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 684: (1983)3 S.C.C. 118 , Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the position and declared the law in the following terms: “A judgment in rem, e.g. judgments or orders passed in admiralty, probate proceedings would always be admissible irrespective of whether they are inter partes or not. A judgment which is not inter partes is inadmissible in evidence except for the limited purpose of as to who the parties were and what was the decree passed and the properties which the subject matter of the suit. The recitals in a judgment like findings given in appreciation evidence made or arguments or generalogy referred in the judgment would be inadmissible in a case where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were parties.” supplied] The said view was expressed in respect of matters relating to a decision rendered in civil proceedings. 16. So far as the decision rendered on a writ petition is concerned, a Division Bench Orissa High Court in a decision reported in Bhupen-dra Kumar v. State of Orissa, 1960 Ori. 46, had an occasion to directly consider the extent of the binding nature relevancy of such a judgment. The Court ultimately came to the following conclusion: “(13). A judgment of a superior court or record like a High Court has effect on two classes persons. Firstly, as between the parties to the judgment and their privies it is binding conclusive unless reversed by a superior court of appeal or amended by the Court according to law. Moreover, the original cause of action on the basis of which the commenced, is merged in the judgment and its place is taken by the rights created between the parties by virtue of the judgment (See Halsbury, Third petition, Vol.22 pages 780 781). Moreover, the original cause of action on the basis of which the commenced, is merged in the judgment and its place is taken by the rights created between the parties by virtue of the judgment (See Halsbury, Third petition, Vol.22 pages 780 781). But as regards persons, who are not parties to the judgment, it becomes a valuable precedent on any disputed point of law, not merely as a guide but as an authority followed by all courts or co-ordinate or inferior jurisdiction administering the same until it is overruled by a Court of superior jurisdiction or by a validly enacted statute. pointed out in Halsbwy, Third Edition, Volume 22 at page 796, ” the enunciation of the or principle on which the question before a Court has been decided, is alone binding precedent. This underlying principle is often termed the ‘ratio decidendi’ , that is to general reasons given for the decision or the general grounds on which it is based, detached or abstracted from the specific peculiarities of a particular case which gives rise decision. The correct decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the matter of the decision which alone has the force of law. “Thus, this Court’s judgment in Bhupendra Kumar Bose v. The State, O.J.C. No.72 (Orissa), is binding as between the parties, namely, the petitioner Sri Bhupandra Kumar on the one hand and the State of Orissa and the elected Councillors of Cuttack Municipality on the other and new rights as between them were created by the judgment itself. irrespective of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. But the judgment is also an authority be followed by all Courts in Orissa on the disputed points of law decided therein if and they arise in any pending or future litigation.” It was further held by the said Court as hereunder: “(14) A half-hearted attempt was show that the aforesaid observations in Halsbury apply to” Judgments’ where the rights property are involved and not to judgments of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution fact, the learned Advocate General went to the extent of saying that the petitioner no rights whatsoever by virtue of the decision in O.J.C.No.72 of 1958 (Orissa). But 740 of Halsbury (cited above) it was pointed out that the term ‘judgment’ or ‘order’ in its widest sense may be said to include decision given by a Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties proceeding properly before it, and at page 741 it was further pointed out that judgments orders considered in that title were those of the Queen’s Bench and Chancery Division High Court and orders of the Court of Appeal." I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Bombay High Court and Orissa High Court in the decisions referred to above. In the light of the statement referred to above, I am not persuaded to countenance the plea on behalf of the respondents that the order in W.P.No.1230 of 1982 cannot be pressed into service in the present Having regard to what has been stated above, in my view, the judgment can be relied both as a precedent and also as a document to show that this court in a instituted challenging the Government Order, which has been the basis of the defence of the respondents in the Court below, came to set aside the order Government and consequently the said order no longer survives to enure to the respondents the benefits of the Slum Clearance Act. Consequently, the court is not only entitled into account the said judgment but also has to decide the case having regard to consequences flowing from the said judgment. 17. Coming to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the have to be accepted and allowed. Having regard to the emphatic statement of law by the Supreme Court, the decision in W.P.No.1230 of 1982 becomes relevant and to be taken into account for the purpose of noticing the vital and essential G.O.Ms.No.378, Housing, dated 2.11.1972 stood abrogated and does not any longer the property in question the coverage or protection of the provisions of the Slum Act, including the one contained in Sec.29 of the said Act, since the notification issued Government covers other properties also, the order in the writ petition has to be restricted to the petitioner meaning thereby properties in respect of which the sought relief. It is also to be noticed that the said writ petition seems to have been the petitioner therein, as the Muthavalli of the Burial Ground in question. It is also to be noticed that the said writ petition seems to have been the petitioner therein, as the Muthavalli of the Burial Ground in question. Not only regarding the pendency of the writ petition was brought to the notice of the respondents even in the court below, but before, the hearing of the case, the copy of the order in petition was also furnished to the counsel for the respondents and sufficient opportunity accorded to the respondents to meat the situation after it was informed that the would place reliance upon the said decision of this Court, in furtherance of their claim revision petitions before me. Therefore, it could not be said that any real or prejudice has been caused to the respondents in meeting the case projected before the time of hearing. The fact that there was an abortive attempt on the part of Board also to evict the respondents does not undermine the decrees obtained petitioner or their executability. As noticed supra, the only impediment which stood way of the execution of the decree was Sec.29 of the Slum Clearance Act, contemplated the obtaining of a prior permission from the prescribed authority. contingency which was necessitated by the issue of a notification in G.O.Ms.No.378, Housing, dated 2.11.1972, ceased the moment the High court granted orders of the said notification. That part, after the writ petition has been finally disposed of notification itself was struck down, the question of obtaining any prior permission aries, since the authorities under the said Act themselves lost their control or contemplated under Sec.29 of the Act on account of the supervening fact Government’s notification itself has since been struck down. The reasoning of below that notwithstanding the orders of this Court which suspended the operation notification of the Government, the execution proceedings cannot be pursued except the permission under Sec.29 of the Act and such a consequence was the result decision of this Court in 93 L. W. 143, itself is neither correct in law nor appropriate wholly unsustainable. By virtue of the supervening fact, the obtaining of prior under Sec.29 of the Slum Clearance Act became unnecessary and rendered superfluous. By virtue of the supervening fact, the obtaining of prior under Sec.29 of the Slum Clearance Act became unnecessary and rendered superfluous. that as it may, now that the writ petition challenging the notification itself has since been allowed the notification has been abrogated, there is no obstacle whatsoever in pursuing execution proceedings on account of Sec.29 or any other provisions of the Slum Act. The orders of the Court below, therefore, require to be set aside. 18. For what has been stated above, the objections on behalf of the respondents merit my acceptance and the orders of the Court below are set aside and the Court directed to restore the execution petitions to its file and proceed further in accordance law. The civil revision petitions consequently shall stand allowed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.