Aramachine & Lakri Vikreta Sangh Nagour v. State of Rajasthan
1991-03-26
A.K.MATHUR, K.C.AGRAWAL
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
Honble K.C. AGRAWAL, C.J.—This writ petition challenges the validity of the Rajasthan Forest Produce (Establishment and Regulation of Saw Mills) Rules, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1983) framed by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 41 and 42 of the Rajasthan Forest; Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner is an Association of Aara Machinery and Lakri Vikreta Sangh and all those who are engaged in this business in the district of Nagour are its members. The Association looks after the interest of its members. 3. In exercise of power conferred by Sections 41 and 42 of the Act, the State Government made the rules to provide for the establishment and regulation of saw mills. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1983 is as under:- "(i) No person or authority shall, after the commecement of these Rules, establish any new saw mill except under and in accordance with a permit granted under Rule 4. (ii) No owner of a Saw Milk:-fa) in respect of which a licence has been granted under Rule 7, shall carry sawing operation in that mill after the licence has ceased to be valid, (b) In respect of which the licence has been cancelled or suspended under Rule 7 shall carry on sawing operation or suspension, as the case may be, during the period for which the licence has been suspended. (iii) To give effect to provisions of this clause the licensing officer shall take such steps which he thinks necessary in this regard, including sealing of saw mill witty or without its accessories to stop sawing operation. (iv) No saw mill owner shall receive any timber from any customer for sawing on hire unless he furnishes a certificate of rightful ownership issued by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of a Tehsildar, or any officer authorised in this behalf. For the purpose of meeting the requirement contained in this clause, the following certificates of origins shall be considered as certificate of rightful ownership- (a) transif pass, issued by the Forest Deptt. (b) permission issued by Collector to the land holder under the provisions of Land Revenue Act or Tenancy Act. (c) certificate from Gram Panchayat for limber obtained from the trees standing in the land holding of Gram Panchayats; for felling for which the permission of the Collector is not required.
(b) permission issued by Collector to the land holder under the provisions of Land Revenue Act or Tenancy Act. (c) certificate from Gram Panchayat for limber obtained from the trees standing in the land holding of Gram Panchayats; for felling for which the permission of the Collector is not required. (d) certificate from any competent authority if the timber which has been brought for sawing belongs to a Govt. Department, or a public sector undertaking. (v) It shall be the duty of the saw mill-owner to inform the nearest officer of the Forest or Police Department about any timber brought by any customer without any legal permit. (vi) No owner of saw mill;- (a) shall without the previous permission of the Government, change the location of the whole or any part of Saw mill in respect of which a permit has been granted under Rule 4; (b) shall, after the commencement of these rules; effect any expansion or production of diversification of capacity of the saw mill except with the previous permission of the licensing officer." 4. Rule 4 provides that any person, who is interested for the grant of permit for the establishment of a new timber saw mill, may make an application for the grant of the same in the prescribed proforma. Rule 6 lays down the fee which would be necessary for the purposes of fee and security. Under rule 9, the customers getting their timber sawn at the saw mill are bound to furnish to the saw mill owner a certificate mentioned in clause (iv) of Rule 3 regarding rightful ownership of the timber brought for sawing. By rule 10, the power of inspection for ascertaining the position or examining the working of any saw mill has been conferred on forest officers or the licensing officers in this behalf. 5. The petitioner has claimed that the rules are beyond Sections 41 and 42 of the Act and, therefore, they are invalid. The petitioner also claimed that the rules framed by the State Government impose unreasonable restrictions on the trade and profession of the petitioner and they are in contravention of Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. 6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, justification for the rules has been made.
The petitioner also claimed that the rules framed by the State Government impose unreasonable restrictions on the trade and profession of the petitioner and they are in contravention of Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. 6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, justification for the rules has been made. It has been averred that illicit felling of trees was leading to deforestation of waste land, forest land and agriculutral land of the State, particularly those situated in the desert region. Most of the illicit felling was on account of saw mills where the timber for sawing purpose is sold and easily converted. It was for this reason that the State Govt. thought that running of saw mills was required to be controlled and regulated. These rules controlled the transit of timber and other forest produce to put a check at a point of saw mill. 7. The validity of the aforesaid rules has been challenged mainly on the following grounds- (i) Establishment of saw mill for general business, (ii) Establishment of saw mill exclusively for private use in timber business; and (iii) Rule 2 of the Rajasthan Forest (Produce Transit) Rules, 1957 is challenged which prohibits movement of forest produce without obtaining transit pass from the Forest Officer. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the grounds stated above, contended that the conditions laid down for sawing the timber are unreasonable and they infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner to carry on the trade and business, which is guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 9. Apart from challenging the validity of the aforesaid Rules, the petitioner has also challenged the validity of rule 2 of Rajasthan Forest (Produce Transit) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Transit Rules). By this rule) the movement of timber has been regulated. This runs as under:- "No forest produce shall be moved into or from or within any area in the State of Rajasthan except as hereinafter provided without a pass issued by a forest officer or person duly authorised by or under these rules or otherwise than in accordance with the condition of such pass or by any route or to any destination other than the route and destination specified in such pass; Provided that no pass shall be required for the removal of any forest produce—" 10.
Rules of 1983 regulate and control the transit of timber and other forest produce. This was framed with an object to put a check at the point of saw mills where timber is taken. The rules require that a saw mill owner cannot accept or buy the timber from any person, who does not have a permit or certi-ficate issued by the officer empowered to do so. These rules are also made to achieve the object of Art. 51-A of the Constitution, which was inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. The relevant portion of Art. 51-A is quoted below: "It shall be the duty of every citizen of India- (a) ------------ (b)-------------- (c) ---------- (d)---------- (e)—-- (f)---------- (g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures; 11. Article 51-A appears to be in pursuance of the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore (1):- "It is a fallacy to think that under our constitution there are only rights . and no duties. The provisions in Part IV enable the Legislatures to impose various duties on the citizens. The mandate of our constitution is to build a welfare society and that object may be achieved to the extent the Directive Principles are implemented by legislation." 12. Having regard to Art. 51 A (g), the Honble Supreme Court issued directions to the State cases to keep Art. 51A (g) in view. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that to run an industry or business of saw mill, every person is required to obtain a licence under Rule 4, which places unreasonable restrictions on the right of a person desiring to instal a saw mill. Such a requirement does not serve the objects sought to be achieved by the Rules of 1983. In support of his submission, the learned counsel cited a number of case laws and vehemently argued that the rules framed by the State Govt. under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act being against the provisions of law, the same are ultra vires. 14. We are, however, unable to find any substance in the aforesaid sub-mission of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act being against the provisions of law, the same are ultra vires. 14. We are, however, unable to find any substance in the aforesaid sub-mission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The object behind regulating the saw mills and its activities is to prevent illicit felling of trees on account of which ecological problems and many others had croppsd up. Felling of trees is likely to be controlled by regulating the trade of timber cutting by the saw mill owners. The State Government will have the power to prosecute a person who does it without obtaining prior permission. The case of the petitioner that there is absolute bar to the cutting of timber is not correct. This can be found from the conditions as enumerated in Rule 24 (H) of Rajasthan Tenancy Government (Amendment) Rules, 1977, which are quoted below:- "(i) If it will help any work of construction by and on behalf of the village community, or (ii) If such removal is necessary for the extension of cultivation or other agricultural activities of the tenant, or (iii) If it will mitigate any real existing grievance of the tenant, or (iv) If the existing trees are dried up and their removal is in the interest of plantation of new trees, or (v) In the case of fruit trees, if such trees have become overmature and rot and deterioration having set in, or (vi) If such trees are so dense that they affect the fertility of the soil or otherwise cause damage to the soil or standing crops, if there be any." 15. Any customer who brings goods to the saw mills for cutting, has to show that the felling of the trees took place under the permission of the authorities and for this purpose, he will have to obtain the necessary certificate from the authority concerned. In our opinian, the Govt. have put a check on the felling of indiscriminately trees, which is necessary for effectually implementing the rules. 16.
In our opinian, the Govt. have put a check on the felling of indiscriminately trees, which is necessary for effectually implementing the rules. 16. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding infringement of the right guaranteed under Art. 19 (a) (g) of the Constitution is concerned, the freedom given by Art. 39 (1) (g) means that every citizen has the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to the restriction as may be required in the public interest. Requirement of obtaining permission cannot mean unreasonable restriction in the enjoyment of a right for carrying on a trade or business by a person. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner next urged that the Transit Rules hit Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. We are not inclined to accept this submission as well. The freedom under both Articles 19 (1) (g) and 301 is subject to certain restrictions imposed by the State which must be reasonable and not arbitrary or excessive. These regulatory measures do not constitute restrictions under either provision. There is a violation of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 301 only where a legislative or executive act operates to restrict trade, commerce or intercourse, directly and immediately, as distinct from creating some indirect or inconsequential impediment which may be regarded as remote. It follows that regulatory or compensatory measures cannot be regarded as violative of the freedom (see State of Madras v. Nataraja (2), Lakshaman v. State of M.P. (3) & Krishnan vs. State of T.N. (4). So long, a rule or regulation is regulatory, it will not offend against the freedom guaranteed by Art. 301. The same tests, which are applicable to determine reasonableness under Art. 19 (6) are also applicable to determine reasonableness under Art. 304 (b). An imposition of restriction requiring a person to obtain a permission from the proper authority for cutting trees, cannot be held to be unreasonable. Consequently, we are not satisfied that the Rules framed by the State Government in exercise of power conferred by Sections 41 and 42 of the Act, in any way, are in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited as many as 14 rulings of the Supreme Court and we have examined all those cases.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited as many as 14 rulings of the Supreme Court and we have examined all those cases. We are unable to uphold the submission that the timber Rules are invalid having exceeded the rule making power or are in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. They are well within the powers conferred under the Act. They do not transgress any of the powers of the Act. 19. Section 78 of the Act though incorporates that the rules shall be of the some effect as if they are contained in the Act, but this cannot be given any other construction than this that they shall for all purposes of construction be treated exactly as if they were in the Act. In other words, if validly made, the rules are to be given the same effect as the provisions of the Act. The true posi-tion is that the Rules and Regulations do not lose their character as rules and regulations, even though they are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act". They continue to be rules subordinate to the Act. No additional sanctity attaches to those which under the provisions of a statute are to have the effect "as if enacted in the Act." This clause goes no further than saving the intravires rules. The rules made in exercise of a delegated authority to that effect must be consistent with the statute under which they came to be made. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that the rules framed under an Act must be consistent with the Act and a forced or unnatural construction must not be put upon the lang-uage of the Act in order to bring it into conformity with the rule. 20. The test to apply in considering whether rules are within the powers of the rule making authority under the statute are: (1) whether the rules are reasonable and convenient for carrying the Act into full effect, (2) whether the rules relate to matters arising under the provisions of the Act, (3) whether they relate to matters not in the Act otherwise provided for and (4) whether they are consistent with the provisions of the Act. The basic law applicable for inter-pretation of the rules is whether it confers right or merely regulates procedure. 21.
The basic law applicable for inter-pretation of the rules is whether it confers right or merely regulates procedure. 21. After examination of the rules, we are satisfied that the power given covers the purported exercise of it and that no other provision in the Rajasthan Forest Act, 1953 is being infringed. 22. Another aspect of the controversy may now be considered and that is whether the rules challenged are prohibitive or regulatory. This controversy was considered by the Honble Supreme Court in the following cases. 23. In Automobiles Transport V. State of Rajasthan (5), the Honble Supreme Court held that if a provision is regulating, then it is valid but if it is prohibitive, then it is invalid. The relevant portion of the decision is quoted below:- "Restrictions obstruct the freedom whereas regulations, promote it. Police regulations, though they may specifically appear to restrict the freedom of movement in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good conditions of vehicles timings, rule of the road and similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions; for without it, the necessary lines of communications, such as road, waterways and airways cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one. So too, regulations providing for necessary services to enable the free movement of traffic, whether charged or not, cannot also be described as restrictions impeding the freedom." 24. In our view, the rules challenged by means of this petitioner, are not prohibitive but they are regulatory. 25. In State of Mysore v. Sanjeeviah (6), it was held by the Supreme Court that:- "Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated by the two provisos to R. 2 is not to be found in any of the clauses of Sub-s. (2) of S. 37. By sub-s. (1), the State Govt. is invested with the power to regulate transport of forest produce in transit by land or wafer. The power which the State Govt. may exercise is however, power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport.
By sub-s. (1), the State Govt. is invested with the power to regulate transport of forest produce in transit by land or wafer. The power which the State Govt. may exercise is however, power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport. Prima facie, a rule which totally prohibits the movement of forest produce during the period between sun set and sun rise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce. A rule regulating transport forest produce in its essence, permits, transport subject to certain conditions devised to promote transport; such a rule aims at making transport orderly so that it does not harm or endanger other persons, following a similar vocation or the public and enables transport to function for the public good." 26. Aforesaid two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court negative the challenge of rule 2 of Transit Rules. 27. The validity of the Transit Rules had been challenged before one of us in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1776 of 1985. The challenge was repelled by the judgment dated 1. 10. 1985. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in that case. 28. In view of what has been discussed above, we find no force in this writ petition and it is dismissed without any order as to costs.