RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant in this Miscellaneous Second appeal has called in question the legality and correctness of the Judgment and decree dated 17-6-1987 made by the Principal Civil Judge, Belgaum, in R. A. No. 1 of 1987 by which he reversed the Judgment and decree of the I Additional munsiff, Bclgaum, made in O. S. No. 401 of 1987 dismissing the suit as not maintainable. ( 2 ) THE learned Civil Judge declared by his order that the view taken by the learned Munsiff that the suit as brought was not maintainable in law, was incorrect and illegal. Accordingly, the learned Civil Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the Judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff holding that the suit as brought was maintainable and remanded the matter for consideration on the remaining issues. Hence, this second appeal. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case areas follows:- rcspondents 1 to 7 and the appellant herein are plaintiffs 1 to 7 and the defendant respectively. For the sake of convenience, the parties in this appeal are referred by the ranks assigned to them in the trial Court. ( 4 ) PLAINTIFFS 1 to 7 and others are the owners of certain shops situate within the Corporation of the City of Belgaum. The houses/shops held by them or owned by them are subject to assessment of property tax that can be levied by the defendant under the provisions of the Karnataka municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (the Act for short ). Under the Act, the property tax assessed earlier is subject to revision. Thus, the defendant having revised the property tax in respect of the properties held by the plaintiffs, passed an order enhancing the property tax. It is this order that was called in question in O. S. No. 401 of 1986 before the Additional Munsiff, Belgaum. The following prayer is made in the suit:-"the plaintiffs therefore pray that:- (a) It be declared that the revision of property tax made by the defendant- corporation is arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal and hence not binding on the plaintiffs-property owners of Belgaum. (b) The defendant-Corporation be restrained by a permanent injunction from recovering the enhanced property tax. (c) Costs of this proceeding be awarded. (d) Any other equitable relief which the court deems fit to grant be awarded. (b) The defendant-Corporation be restrained by a permanent injunction from recovering the enhanced property tax. (c) Costs of this proceeding be awarded. (d) Any other equitable relief which the court deems fit to grant be awarded. " ( 5 ) SINCE separate and individual revision of assessments was made in respect of each property, common suit in the representative capacity was filed. It is alleged that the suit filed in the representative capacity, as it is treated, is a public interest suit. However, notice having been issued by the learned Munsiff, the defendant-Corporation entered appearance and filed written statement controverting the averments of the plaint and specifically contending that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to declare the assessment as illegal or void, inasmuch as, having regard to the provisions of the Act, which is a self-contained Act, a machinery is provided to ventilate the grievances of an aggrieved by way of appeal - one before the Taxation Appeals committee and the other before the District court. ( 6 ) THE plaintiffs without resorting to seek remedies under that machinery, have filed the suit before the I Additional Munsiff, Belgaum. It was specifically pointed out there that the suit was implicdly barred under the Act. ( 7 ) ALONG with the suit, an application was also filed seeking an ad-interim order of temporary injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of C. P. C. That application was also opposed by the defendant-Corporation. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, having regard to the pleadings,the learned Munsiff raised the following issucs:- 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the revision of property tax on the basis of the revised rateable value is arbitrary, illegal under the Corporation Act? 2. Whether the plaintiff further proves that the notices issued by the defendant demanding the tax at 20% on the revised rateable value is illegal? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction sought for? additional issue: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable under Section 9, C. P. C? ( 9 ) THE learned Munsiff having considered a number of documents produced at Exs. P-1 to p-74 and having heard learned counsel on both sides on the additional issue, held that the suit was not maintainable under Section 9, C. P. C. and thereby he dismissed the suit. Whether the suit is maintainable under Section 9, C. P. C? ( 9 ) THE learned Munsiff having considered a number of documents produced at Exs. P-1 to p-74 and having heard learned counsel on both sides on the additional issue, held that the suit was not maintainable under Section 9, C. P. C. and thereby he dismissed the suit. ( 10 ) AGGRIEVED by the said order, the plaintiffs took up the matter in appeal before theprincipal Civil Judge, Belgaum, in R. A. No. 1 of 1987. The learned. Civil Judge having heard learned counsel on both sides, by an order dated 17-6-1987, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned munsiff holding that the suit was maintainable. He held as follows:"this appeal is allowed. The Judgment and decree dated 29-11-1986 passed by the trial court in O. S. No. 401 of 1986 on its file are set aside reversing its finding on the preliminary issue i. e. , the additional issue and holding that it has got the jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. Further, under Order 41, Rule 23, c. P. C. , the case is remanded to the trial court with a direction to readmit the suit in question under its original number in the register of Civil Suits and to dispose it of according to law, by recording its findings on issues Nos. 1 to 3 in the said suit, after affording an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence on their behalf, pertaining to the said issues, if they choose to do so. Since the appeal itself is disposed of on merits, I. A. No. I filed by the appellants before this Court does not survive; and, as such, it is disposed of accordingly. But, in the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to the costs of I. A. No. I and also of this appeal. " ( 11 ) AGGRIEVED by the said order, the defendant-Corporation has filed this appeal beforethis Court. ( 12 ) IN that question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the viewtaken by the learned Civil Judge that the suit as brought by the plainliffs was maintainable, is justified. ( 13 ) MY answer is in the negative for the following reasons. ( 12 ) IN that question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the viewtaken by the learned Civil Judge that the suit as brought by the plainliffs was maintainable, is justified. ( 13 ) MY answer is in the negative for the following reasons. ( 14 ) AT the out-set, it has to be seen whether,as urged on behalf of the defendant-Corporation, the Act is a self-contained Act providing machinery to oust jurisdiction of the Civil Court either by express provision or by implication. Sections 103 and 104 of the Act provided for imposing among others property tax. Section 147 requires to read the rules and tables embodied in Schedule III as part of Chapter X. Section 103 of the Act is extracted hereunder with a view to understand the crux of the arguments. "103. Taxes which may be upposed.- subjcct to the general or special orders of Government, a Corporation shall,- (a) after observing the preliminary procedure required by Section 104, and (b) with the sanction of the Government and at rates not exceeding those specified in Schedules III, IV, V, VII and VIII levy any one or more of the following taxcs:- (i) a tax on buildings or lands or both situated within the city (hereinafter referred to as the property tax); ( 15 ) RULE 15 of the Taxation Rules in Part-I of Schedule III provides:"15. An assesscc who is dissatisfied with the assessment of any tax under this Act other than the property tax, may make an application in writing to the Commissioner for the revision of such assessment stating the grounds of his objection thereto. " ( 16 ) RULE 13 thereof provides for a general revision of tax to be taken into effect on the first day of the half year following that in which the notice under Rule 7 is published or in case where a special notice is required to be served on the owner or occupier of the property under the first proviso to that rule, on the first day of half year following that in which such special notice is served on the owner or occupier of the properly. ( 17 ) RULE 18 thereof provides:when an objector is dissatisfied with the order passed by the Commissioner under sub-rule (3) of Rule 17 he may within fifteen days from the date on which such order was sent by post appeal against it to a Committee called the Taxation Appeals Committee consisting of three members of the Corporation elected by it, the Chairman of which committee will also be elected. " ( 18 ) FOR purposes of the power to be exercised by the Appeal Committee, it is providedthereunder as:"the Taxation Appeals Committee shall have all the powers of a Standing Committee under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 74 shall apply to requisitions made by the taxation Appeals Committee as if it were a Standing Committee. "in other words, the power of a Standing committee for the purpose of summoning and examining the documents to appreciate the matter under appeal is also provided. ( 19 ) NOW under Rule 19, the Divisional Commissioner of the Revenue Division will have alsojurisdiction lo call for and examine the record of any proceeding relating to assessment of any tax under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and if he considers that any order or decision therein is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenues of the corporation, he may after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing lo be made such enquiry as he deems necessary pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify including an order enhancing the assessment of any tax. ( 20 ) IT is true that this power has been givento the Divisional Commissioner to revise any order or exercise that power suo motu in a case where the order made by the lower authority resulted in loss to the revenue. ( 21 ) RULE 20 is an important rule for the purpose of this case. It reads:"20. (a) An appeal shall lie to the District court having jurisdiction against any decision of the Taxation Appcals. ( 21 ) RULE 20 is an important rule for the purpose of this case. It reads:"20. (a) An appeal shall lie to the District court having jurisdiction against any decision of the Taxation Appcals. Committee constituted under Rule 18 or any order of the Divisional Commissioner under Rule 19 but no such appeal shall be heard by the said Court, unless the petition of appeal has been presented within thirty days from the date of such decision or order, as the case may be, and the tax has been paid within the said period. " ( 22 ) IN view of the language employed in that rule, it is clear that an appeal shall lie to the district Court having jurisdiction against any decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee constituted under Rule 18 or any order of the divisional Commissioner under Rule 19. 30 days limitation is provided to an aggrieved person to present an appeal before the District Court. ( 23 ) RULE 25 is again an important rule for consideration of this case. It reads:"25. Subject to any order of the District court or the Divisional Commissioner or the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee or the orders passed by the commissioner, as the assessment or demand of any tax shall be final. "therefore, in view of the language employed in Rule 25, it is clear that statute provides for a finality of the proceedings resulting in the order pronounced in an appeal by the district Court. The proviso found under Rule 25 also makes it clear that if. there is any mistake in the assessment, it can be rectified by reassessment. Be that as it may, for the purpose of this case, it is necessary to understand whether the statute provides for a finality of the litigation arising out of the assessment or revision of assessment. To reiterate, having regard to the language employed in Rule 25, I am of the opinion that this rule implicdly bars the suit in a Civil Court. To reiterate, having regard to the language employed in Rule 25, I am of the opinion that this rule implicdly bars the suit in a Civil Court. ( 24 ) IN Ram Swamp and Others v Shikarchand and Another, AIR 1966 SC 893 , dealing with similar question, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:"the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts lo deat with civil causes can be excluded by the legislalurc by special Acts which deal with special subjccl-mallcrs; but the statutory provision must expressly provide for such exclusion, or must necessarily and inevitably lead to that inference. The bar created by the relevant provisions of the statute excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot operate in cases where the plea raised before the Civil Court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity. One of the points which is often treated as relevant in dealing with the question about the exclusion of Civil Courts' jurisdiction, is whether the special statute which, it is urged, excludes such jurisdiction, has used clear and unambiguous words indicating thai intention. Another tcsl which is applied isr docs the said slatute provide for an adcquale and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material provisions? Apply these two tests, it appears that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is excluded in relation to matters covered by the orders included within. the provisions of Seclion 3 (4) and Section 16. Where, however, a plea seeks to prove that the impugned order is a nullity in the true legal sense, that plea docs not come within the mischief of the bar created by Sections 3 (4) and 16. "their Lordships were dealing with Uttar pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. ( 25 ) SECTION 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:-"9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or implicdly barred. ( 25 ) SECTION 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:-"9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or implicdly barred. Explanation-I.- A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation-II.- For purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees arc attached to the office referred to in Explanation-I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place. " ( 26 ) THEREFORE, the question to be examinedis whether the Civil Suit is barred by express provision or by implication. As I have already pointed out, looking into the language employed in Rule 20 (a) read with Rule 25, it is made clear that though the bar is not by express term, it can be gathered that it is by implication the suit is barred. The test is whether the rule provides necessary machinery or remedy so as to enable the aggrieved person to resort to the remedy to ventilate his grievances. ( 27 ) THE Supreme Court had the occasionto deal with similar question in Dhulabai v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 . Dealing with the scope and the object sought to be achieved under Section 9, C. P. C. , Their lordships ruled as follows:"the following principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court may be laid down:- (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the Civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Acts have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Acts have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendmcnt becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts arc prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of ccrtiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality arc for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. " ( 28 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that having regard to the decision of thesupreme Court in Guntur Municipal Council v guntur Town Rate Payers' Association, AIR 1971 sc 353 , the defendant-Corporation was not right in revising the assessments beyond the fair rent. A Division Bench of the Supreme Court considcring the question arising under the Madras district Municipalities Act, 1920 held as follows:"under Section 82 (2) the test is what rent the premises can lawfully fetch if let out to a hypothetical tenant. The municipality is not free to assess any arbitrary annual value but has to look to and is bound by the fair or the standard rent which would be payable for particular premises under the Rent Control Act in force during the year of assessment. " ( 29 ) I may straightaway answer the contention urged for the plaintiffs pointing out that inthe above cass the point for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the quantum of assessment made in respect of immovable properly was not based upon the rent which the properly can lawfully fetch. No doubt, this is also the question urged in the suit by the plaintiffs. In the present case, the test is whether the quantum of assessment by way of revision is in accordance with the rules. But, it is not necessary, i think, to go into that aspect in this appeal because, as I have already observed, after the suit was dismissed on the question of maintainability, there is nothing for this Court to lest that aspect which was made clear by the Supreme Court in the above case. In other words, there is nothing for me to answer this question in this second appeal as I am answering only ihe question of maintainability of the suit. I may point out as well that in the light of the Supreme Court decision in Guntur Municipal Council's case, AIR 1971 SC 353 , it is open to the plaintiffs to make out a case about the correctness of the assessment before the proper forum. I may point out as well that in the light of the Supreme Court decision in Guntur Municipal Council's case, AIR 1971 SC 353 , it is open to the plaintiffs to make out a case about the correctness of the assessment before the proper forum. Suffice it to say, in the instant case, that in view of the law laid down by the supreme Court in Dhulabai's case, AIR 1969 SC 78 , referred to above, the view taken by the learned Munsiff that the suit was not maintainable is correct and justified. But, unfortunately, the learned Civil Judge has failed to apply his mind to the relevant questions to consider this aspect. On the other hand, he deviated from the relevant questions and provisions of law and referred lo the merils of the case as though the suit was maintamable and thus he reached the conclusion in reversal of the order of the learned Munsiff. The reasoning given by the learned Civil Judge is not only not tenable but cannot also be sustained. ( 30 ) WITHOUT expressing any opinion on the question whether the suit as brought by plaintiffs 1 to 7 in a representative capacity is maintainable and whether the quantum of assessment made by the defendant-Corporation by way of revision is correct, solely on the question of the maintainability of the suit under Section 9, C. P. C. , for the reasons slated above, I hold that the view taken by the learned Civil Judge cannol be sustained. ( 31 ) IN the result, I make the following:order this Miscellaneous Second Appeal is allowed. The Judgment and decree under appeal arc set aside and that of the learned Munsiff restored. In the circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .