JUDGMENT - SALDANHA M.F., J.:---This criminal writ petition preferred by the petitioner-wife is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, Dhule, in Criminal Revision Application No. 1 of 1984 decided on 14-5-1986. 'The Petitioner's husband, against whom the learned trial Magistrate had made an order for the payment of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 223 of 1981 through his order dated 19-11-1983, had gone in revision on a pure point of law. The issue involved in this criminal writ petition is one of considerable interest as also of legal consequences in so far as it raises one or two subsidiary points of some significance. I am, therefore, summarising below the points that are thrown up for decision in this criminal writ petition, which are as follows:- A) As between an order for maintenance this is passed under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an order that is made by a Civil Court in Matrimonial proceedings under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, whether the order of the Criminal Court should prevail or whether the order in question stands eclipsed and merges in the order passed by the Civil Court? B) Whether it is open to a party to continue with proceedings filed under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to obtain an order in those proceedings after the passing of an order for maintenance by the competent Civil Court? C) Would the Criminal Court be entitled to validly exercise jurisdiction in such a case; and D) Whether it is open to a Magistrate, acting under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to independently quantify the monthly maintenance payable if this issue has not been decided by the Civil Court on merits? 2. A few facts need to be stated as also the relevant dates which are of immense significance. The petitioner-wife applied to the learned trial Magistrate under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for payment of maintenance to her as early as on 14-9-1981. This proceeding was pending before the learned trial Magistrate as respondent No. 1 husband had contested his liability to pay the maintenance. Respondent No. 1 husband thereafter moved the Matrimonial Court by way of Hindu Marriage Petition No. 76 of 1981, which petition came to be decreed on 30-4-1983. This proceeding was pending before the learned trial Magistrate as respondent No. 1 husband had contested his liability to pay the maintenance. Respondent No. 1 husband thereafter moved the Matrimonial Court by way of Hindu Marriage Petition No. 76 of 1981, which petition came to be decreed on 30-4-1983. The record indicates that prior to the institution of this petition, respondent No. 1 husband had obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and, therefore, the final orders on his Matrimonial petition were more or less a matter of routine in so far as decree for divorce came to be granted on the ground that there had been no resumption of cohabitation after the passing of the earlier decree. One angle of immense significance as far as this part of the proceeding is concerned is that since the passing of the order for divorce virtually took place under these circumstances it appears that no evidence of any type was led before the Civil Court in respect of the consequential order regarding payment of maintenance to the petitioner-wife, who was the respondent in that proceeding, and that the Civil Court on an ad hoc basis made the order to the effect that she would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 60/- per month. This order came to be passed on 30-4-1983. 3. The proceedings under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continued before the learned trial Magistrate. Certain evidence was led before him and the question with regard to his jurisdiction to make an order for maintenance after the passing of the decree by the Civil Court was seriously contested. The learned trial Magistrate, however, took note of one factor alone, namely, that even though an order for maintenance had been made by the Civil Court that this was not an order on merits in so far as no evidence had been led before the Civil Court and the issue had not been agitated and decided after an examination of the material produced by the two parties. Consequently, the learned trial Magistrate proceeded to hold that he had jurisdiction to examine the issue and to decide it and he made an order dated 19-11-1983 fixing the quantum of maintenance at Rs. 150/- per month. 4. Consequently, the learned trial Magistrate proceeded to hold that he had jurisdiction to examine the issue and to decide it and he made an order dated 19-11-1983 fixing the quantum of maintenance at Rs. 150/- per month. 4. The learned Sessions Judge, in a well-considered order, has examined the law on the point as also the material placed before the trial Court and has, in the first instance, held that it is true with regard to the quantum of Rs. 150/- per month that has been fixed by the learned trial Magistrate on the basis of the material placed before that Court that the award in question was fully justified and that this order is faultless. The learned Sessions Judge also upheld the contention that the issue regarding maintenance had not been decided on merits by the Civil Court on 30-4-1983. However, the learned Sessions Judge took the view that the order for payment of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month would be a valid, correct and enforceable order for the period from 14-9-1981, i.e. the date of application, upto the date of the passing of the order of the Civil Court and that the same was liable to be confirmed; that after this date, the order of the Civil Court providing for payment at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month would prevail. Effectively, the learned Sessions Judge has taken the view that since the order of the Civil Court would prevail and, consequently, that the order of the learned trial Magistrate would require to be amended for the subsequent period. 5. Mr. Karlekar, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner-wife, has submitted that this Court will have to interfere with the order of the learned Sessions Judge because the present case presents exceptional and unusual facts and that, consequently, even if the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge is correct on general principles of law that on these facts an exception is permissible and would be within the ambit of the relevant provisions. To this extent, Mr. Karlekar submitted that even if the learned Sessions Judge was right in enunciating the proposition that the Matrimonial Court, being a Court of competent jurisdiction, is the forum that will finally decide and adjudicate issues relating to maintenance, that in the present case admittedly the Court has not decided that issue on merits. Mr. To this extent, Mr. Karlekar submitted that even if the learned Sessions Judge was right in enunciating the proposition that the Matrimonial Court, being a Court of competent jurisdiction, is the forum that will finally decide and adjudicate issues relating to maintenance, that in the present case admittedly the Court has not decided that issue on merits. Mr. Karlekar, therefore, submits that artificially, the petitioner was in the same position as a defendant-wife whose case has not been decided by a Civil Court and, therefore, the learned trial Magistrate was fully justified and wholly correct in having continued with the application pending before him and in having decided it. He, therefore, submitted that in this view of the matter, the order of the learned trial Magistrate would have to continue at least until such time as the petitioner approaches the Civil Court and gets the order dated 30-4-1983 modified in the changed circumstances. Mr. Karlekar has placed strong reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ramesh Chandar v. Veena Kaushal)1, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1807, wherein Krishna Iyer, J., dealing with this issue, has made the following observations:- "Broadly stated and as an abstract proposition, it is valid to assert, that a final determination of a civil right by a Civil Court must prevail against a like decision by a Criminal Court. But this principle has no application to a case where pending proceedings under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, a Civil Court passed an interim order of maintenance of the wife in proceedings for divorce by the husband. The reasons are (1) the direction by the Civil Court is not a final determination under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act but an order pendente lite under section 24, Hindu Marriage Act and (2) the amount does not include the claim for maintenance of the children although the order does advert to the fact that the wife had their custody. The Magistrate was not in error in ignoring the Civil Court's order and had jurisdiction to award a higher maintenance for the wife and children." Dealing further with the scope of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is often-times, and wrongly, regarded as a cursory, inconsequential and stop-gap arrangement which is not to be taken too seriously, the learned Judge had this to say: "Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39. There is no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by courts are not petrified print but wibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in packing out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause-the cause of the derelicts." 6. The Supreme Court very rightly used the word "derelicts" in the context of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the applicants in these cases are most often the unfortunate victims of neglect who have neither occasion nor desire to break up the matrimonial home and, consequently, are virtually at the receiving end as far as the suffering is concerned, but not as far as the support to which their status entitles them. To this extent, as observed by Oliwer Wendell Holmes, 'It is sometimes more important to emphasize the obvious than to elucidate the obscure'. Such applicants may never feel the need to approach a matrimonial Court for dissolution of the marriage and incidental reliefs, such as maintenance, etc. The access to the Magistrate's Court being immensely easier and the recovery process through this Court being surer, the legislature considered it necessary to incorporate this provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure and such provision must, of necessity, therefore, be invested with its due status. Whether the orders passed in these proceedings are to be subjudged or totally eclipsed by the orders passed by the Matrimonial Court is not really the issue in the present case. Whether the orders passed in these proceedings are to be subjudged or totally eclipsed by the orders passed by the Matrimonial Court is not really the issue in the present case. Undoubtedly, where the Civil Court adjudicates the entire dispute, the order passed in the proceedings under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gets superseded, but on the exceptional facts of the present case, it is necessary to decide the validity of the order passed by the learned Magistrate after the Civil Court had decided the matter. It is slightly different from applying the general proposition that the final determination of the civil right by a Civil Court must prevail against a like decision by a Criminal Court. 7. Mr. Karlekar submits that even in the above judgment, Krishna Iyer, J., has made an exception by specifically pointing out that as between the order of a Civil Court and a Criminal Court in maintenance proceedings, undoubtedly, the order of the Civil Court would prevail except in certain circumstances and that the present case clearly comes within the exceptions that have been carved out. 8. Mr. Kothari, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that what was pointed out by Mr. Karlekar cannot be accepted because the law on the point as laid down in several decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court now stands crystallised and very clearly indicates that as between the two forums, the Matrimonial Court is the Court of competent jurisdiction, that is to say, the Court which is entitled to decide these issues and the decision of that Court will, consequently, prevail. Mr. Kothari has relied on a decision of this Court in the case of (Baburao v. Kusum Baburao)2, 1980 Mh.L.J. 871, wherein Puranik, J., while deciding a case wherein after the Civil Court had dismissed the petition under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act the party had moved the learned Magistrate under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the same and identical grounds, the Court disqualified the wife from so doing on the grounds of principle of res judicata. Mr. Kothari, therefore, submitted that this principle would apply to the present case and the order of the learned trial Magistrate will, therefore, have to be disregarded in so far as it was hit by the earlier order of the Civil Court between the same parties. Mr. Kothari, therefore, submitted that this principle would apply to the present case and the order of the learned trial Magistrate will, therefore, have to be disregarded in so far as it was hit by the earlier order of the Civil Court between the same parties. This submission, however, is not wholly tenable for the reason that the decision in question is distinguishable, firstly, because the Civil Court in that case had decided the issue on merits, which was not the case here, and secondly, because it is not on the same set of facts that the two proceedings have been agitated. 9. Mr. Raghuwanshi, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, husband, has, in the first instance, submitted that it is a well-settled principle of law for which it is unnecessary to burden this judgment with references to decisions, that the proceedings under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are of a summary nature and are essentially designed to provide a wife, who has no means of support, with a speedy remedy to obtain relief which Mr. Raghuwanshi has rightly described as virtually interim relief pending a final adjudication of the matter by the Matrimonial Court. He submits that in a situation of matrimonial breakdown where the wife requires a stop-gap arrangement, that the relief which is of a transitory nature can and must be provided under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but that this jurisdiction is always subordinate to that of the Matrimonial Court and is necessarily limited, and if it is a question of deciding as in a case of the present type as to which of the two orders will prevail, that undisputedly the order of the Civil Court must hold sway. Mr. Raghuwanshi has relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of (Ravendra Kaur v. Achant Swarup)3, A.I.R. 1966 All. 133, wherein the Allahabad High Court, while deciding the ambit and scope of sections 488 and 489 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is to say, the new section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has held that the Magistrate while awarding maintenance is required to take into account the order passed by a Civil Court. 133, wherein the Allahabad High Court, while deciding the ambit and scope of sections 488 and 489 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is to say, the new section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has held that the Magistrate while awarding maintenance is required to take into account the order passed by a Civil Court. He, therefore, submits that the legislature itself has incorporated the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure from which the principle can be culled out that the proceedings before the learned trial Magistrate must be regarded as being subordinate and not either parallel or superior to the proceedings before the Matrimonial Court. Mr. Raghuwanshi has also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (M/s. Karamchand v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1244, wherein the Supreme Court was deciding the short question as to whether the decision of the Civil Court was binding on the Criminal Court in a prosecution under the Essential Commodities Act, and in that decision, the Supreme Court held that on the facts of that case the decision was binding. To reinforce this submission. Mr. Raghuwanshi relied on a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of (Ashish v. D.C. Tawari)5, 1970 Cri.L.J. 670, wherein the Delhi High Court has observed that the maintenance proceedings before the Magistrate, being relatively summary, cannot be equated with the orders passed in the civil suit for maintenance. These orders, being tentative, are subject to the final determination of the rights of the parties by the Civil Court and are also liable to be varied with the change in circumstances. 10. What emerges from the decisions cited by Mr. Raghuwanshi and from the propositions laid down in the aforesaid judgments has been reiterated, in passing by the Supreme Court in the course of a short order recently delivered in the case of (Inderjitkaur v. Union of India and others)6, 1990(1) S.C.C. 344 . In that proceeding, where the constitutional validity of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been challenged on the ground that section 125 unreasonably limits the maintenance to Rs. In that proceeding, where the constitutional validity of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been challenged on the ground that section 125 unreasonably limits the maintenance to Rs. 500/- for an individual, the Supreme Court observed that section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a speedy remedy against starvation of the civil liabilities of the parties, that the order made thereunder is tentative and that it is subject to the final determination of the rights by the Civil Court. 11. Mr. Raghuwanshi has further drawn my attention to the provisions of section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act and has contended, very rightly to my mind, that the section itself provides for a review of an order of maintenance and that, therefore, the learned Sessions Judge was right in observing that if the petitioner-wife was in any manner aggrieved by the order of the Civil Court that it was open to her to move the Civil Court for variation of that order and to get the same modified. There was no bar of res judicata, nor is there any bar of limitation and, therefore, the petitioner would not be in any manner prejudiced if she approaches the Civil Court for reconsideration of the earlier order. 12. The submissions advanced by Mr. Raghuwanshi will have to be upheld as far as the principles of law are concerned in so far as the Civil Court, undoubtedly, acting in exercise of its matrimonial jurisdiction, is the Court of competent jurisdiction to finally determine the quantum of maintenance. There is no dispute about the fact that until it is done, it is always open to the aggrieved party to move the Criminal Court for an appropriate order under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the facts of the present case, it is also clear that the application before the learned Magistrate was moved by the petitioner-wife prior to the civil proceedings being instituted and, therefore, the application at the point of time was maintainable. Even though the principles that have been enunciated in the abovecited decisions and the submissions made by Mr. On the facts of the present case, it is also clear that the application before the learned Magistrate was moved by the petitioner-wife prior to the civil proceedings being instituted and, therefore, the application at the point of time was maintainable. Even though the principles that have been enunciated in the abovecited decisions and the submissions made by Mr. Raghuvanshi will have to be upheld, one cannot lose sight of the fact that all those decisions do very clearly specify that the order made under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will be valid, subsisting and enforceable order until the Civil Court finally decides the issue of maintenance. The term "finally adjudicates the rights of the parties", which is the principle that is called out, will have to be interpreted as meaning until the time when the Civil Court determines the issue on merits. Though normally a final order would be a reasoned order after evaluating the merits, on the unusual and peculiar facts of this case, the learned trial Magistrate was right in pointing out that the Civil Court, though it had passed an order for a decree for divorce, had not decided the issue of maintenance finally and conclusively on merits and to that extent the learned trial Magistrate was justified in deciding the application that was pending before him. The reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge who has upheld the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner-wife that the issue of maintenance had not been decided on merits before the Sessions Court and, that regardless of this fact, the order of the Civil Court will prevail appears to be faulty and to that extent will have to be interfered with. As far as the quantum is concerned, the revisional Court has very correctly come to the conclusion that the quantum of Rs. 150/- per month does not deserve to be interfered with. To this extent, the last part of the order of the learned Sessions Judge reducing the amount of maintenance that had earlier been awarded from Rs. 150/- per month to Rs. 60/- per month for the period after 30-4-1983 requires to be set aside and the order of the learned trial Magistrate will have to be confirmed to this extent. 13. As indicated by me earlier, the present case has presented a very unusual set of facts and a virtually exceptional situation. 150/- per month to Rs. 60/- per month for the period after 30-4-1983 requires to be set aside and the order of the learned trial Magistrate will have to be confirmed to this extent. 13. As indicated by me earlier, the present case has presented a very unusual set of facts and a virtually exceptional situation. In the light of the principles of law that stem from a reading of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the submissions advanced by Mr. Raghuvanshi, which I have upheld, certain corrective steps as far as the present case is concerned will undoubtedly, be necessary. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure supports the contention of Mr. Raghuvanshi that the order passed under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will require modification depending on the order that is passed by the Civil Court when the issue is finally determined. In the present case, therefore, the petitioner, if she is so advised, will have to apply to the Matrimonial Court for reconsideration of the order dated 30-4-1983 and for variation of that order on the basis of the material that is placed before the Court. The petitioner is granted a period of 3 (three) months within which to make the application, if she so desires, up to which point of time the order of the learned trial Magistrate shall continue. If the petitioner approaches the Civil Court, it shall be open to the Civil Court to make an appropriate ad interim or interim order. If the petitioner, for any reason, does not approach the Civil Court, the order of the learned trial Magistrate shall stand automatically vacated on the expiry of the period of 3 (three) months and from then onwards the earlier order of the Civil Court dated 30-4-1983 shall become effective. 14. In the light of the aforesaid observations, the Criminal Writ Petition is partially allowed and the Rule is made partially absolute accordingly. It is necessary for me to record, with a degree of appreciation, the admirable assistance rendered to the Court by the three Counsel who appeared in this matter, Mr. Karlekar, Mr. Raghuvanshi and Mr. Kothari, all of whom had done considerable research which is a quality that is otherwise becoming rare. Petition partly allowed. -----