Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J.: This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in Contempt Application No.15 of 1991. That contempt application has sphere of factual data behind it. The 5th respondent, hereinafter referred to as management, is the petitioner in W.P.No.618 of 1990 with which alone we are concerned herein. That writ petition is directed against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, I.D.No.23 of 1984 in so far as it directed reinstatement of the workmen. Pending the petition, when stay was asked for by the management, the learned single Judge of this directed payment to the workmen full wages last drawn by them under Sec.17 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The order of the single Judge has been confirmed by a Bench of this Court, to which one of us Sundaram, J.) had been a party. Since there was non-compliance with the orders with to payment Of the full wages as per Sec.17-B of the Act, the workmen filed Contempt Application No.158 of 1990 against the management. The learned single Judge of this in that contempt application found the management guilty of contempt and punished imposing a fine of Rs.2,000. The learned single Judge postponed execution of the imposition or fine for a period of two weeks, giving a further chance to the management compliance with the order of the court, flouted. However, the management Contempt Appeal No.8 of 1990 and that was dismissed by the First Bench of this Finding no compliance with the order of the court, the workmen filed Contempt Application No.15 of 1991 putting forth the following prayer: "For the aforesaid reasons it is prayed that this Honourable court may be pleased to the respondents 1-5 for the wilful disobedience of the common orders of this Hon’ble W.M.P.Nos.929, 3567, 3568, 4243, 4244, 4867 and 4868 of 1990 and may be pleased strike off W.P.No.618 of 1990 from the records of this Honourable court and sequester the properties of the respondents set out in Schedule ‘ A ’ of this application and issue such further or appropriate directions or orders as this Honourable court may deem fit and proper facts and circumstances of the case, award exemplary costs and render justice." In this contempt application, apart from the management, its officers were also made respondents. The learned single judge, dealt with this Contempt Application No.15 of and found no warrant to countenance the prayer projected therein and giving liberty workmen to move the Labour court to obtain the reliefs granted by this Court, dismissed As already noted, this Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the single judge. 2. We heard Mr.V.Prakash, learned counsel for the workmen represented by their Union. present contempt application has got three limbs. The first limb asks for punishing respondents for disobedience of the orders of court. The 5th respondent herein, management, has been already punished for contempt as noted above for the disobedience. It will not be in order, on facts, for the workmen to complain once again of disobedience independently against the individual officers of the management. Apart from the fact that individual Officers as such were not parties to the orders of court, they could not be staled have had any separate and independent volition of theirs in the matter. Realising position, Mr.V.Prakash confined his submissions, asking us either to strike off W.P.No.618 1990 or sequester the properties as asked for in the latter two limbs of present contempt application. In support of his submission to strike off.W.P.No.618 of 1990, learned placed reliance on the following pronouncements: Hackinson v. Hackinson, (1952)2 All E.R. 567 and Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. The Magistrate, A.I.R. 1977 All. 198. In the first pronouncement, on a petition by the wife for dissolution of her marriage, a nisi was granted and it was directed that the child of the marriage should remain in custody of his mother, but that he should not be removed out of the jurisdiction without sanction of the court. On the decree being made absolute, the mother re-married without the sanction of the court she removed the child to Australia. On a summon by father, an order was made directing the mother to return the child within the jurisdiction, and on appeal by the mother against the order, the father objected that as she was contempt, she was not entitled to be heard. On a summon by father, an order was made directing the mother to return the child within the jurisdiction, and on appeal by the mother against the order, the father objected that as she was contempt, she was not entitled to be heard. The decision in that case has gone to following effect: "It was the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, an order was made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until it discharged, and disobedience of such an order would, as a general rule, result in the disobeying it being in contempt and punishable by committal or attachment and application to the court by him not being entertained until he had purged his contempt; where an order related to a child the court would be adamant on its due observance, for an order was made in the interests of the welfare of the child, and the court would tolerate any interference with or disregard of its decisions on those matters, and least would permit disobedience of an order that a child should not be removed outside jurisdiction; in the present case the mother was not entitled to prosecute or be heard support of her appeal until she had taken the first and essential step towards purging contempt of returning the child within the jurisdiction." The guidelines as to when the court should, in its discretion, refuse to hear a party to a has been spoken to by Denning, L.J. in the following terms: "It is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will only when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective of securing his compliance." 3. In the second pronouncement in Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. The District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1977 All. 198, this rule was adverted to by a Bench of the High Court of Allahabad on the facts of the case dealt with by the Bench, there was a decline to strike down the writ petition. In the second pronouncement in Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. The District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1977 All. 198, this rule was adverted to by a Bench of the High Court of Allahabad on the facts of the case dealt with by the Bench, there was a decline to strike down the writ petition. The rule that should form the guideline for the court in such matters is will refuse to hear a party to a cause if there is a warrant and justification there grave considerations of public policy. Such a step will be taken only when the contempt impedes the course of justice, and there is no other effective means of securing compliance with the order of the court. Applying this rule to the facts of this case, we persuaded to hold that there is no other effective means of securing compliance with order of this Court. We should not be understood to have for a moment commended action on the part of the management in not obeying the order of this Court. management as such has been already punished for contempt. Now we are on the question as to whether we should strike off the very writ petition itself. The considerations which should weigh with the court do not impel us on the facts of this case to resort extreme course of striking off the very writ petition. It is not possible for us to say contempt itself has impeded the course of justice. Further, it is not as if the workmen left without any remedy to secure compliance with the order passed by this Court. 4. Mr.V.Prakash, learned counsel for the workmen, submits that the reliance placed by learned single judge on the pronouncement of the Bench of this Court in R.T.Ramayya Servai v. R.Sama Ayyar, (1946)2 M.L.J. 200 : 1.L.R. 1947 Mad. 397, is not a proper This submission of the learned counsel for the workmen is not without substance. In case dealt with by the Bench, the lower court proceeded to strike off the defence invoking the power under O.11, Rule 21 and Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and decreed suit; and on appeal the Bench of this Court found that there was no scope for bringing case within the ambit of O.11, Rule 21 of the Code. The Bench also opined that it will in order to invoke Sec.151 of the Code. The Bench also opined that it will in order to invoke Sec.151 of the Code. But, our accepting this submission of the learned counsel for the workmen does not improve the position for the workmen, and alter approach to the main question. We have not found a warrant to say that considerations of public policy justify us to take the extreme course of striking off the writ petition. Though the conduct of the management is not to be commended, with to non-compliance with the order of this Court, we cannot straightaway characterize position as one impeding the course of justice. Furthermore, it is not as if there is no effective means of securing compliance with the order of this Court. As found by the learned single judge, there is scope for the workmen to resort to the process under the Act. On facts and circumstances of the case, we have also not found a warrant to straightaway sequester the properties of the respondents. In view of our analysis of the position as above, we are not persuaded to interfere in this Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.