Judgment J.R. Chopra, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single judge of this Court dated 9.1989 whereby the learned single judge has maintained the award rendered by the Industrial Tribunal & Labour Court, Jodhpur dated 16.1989. 2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this special appeal briefly stated are: that the labourers of the petitioner-company went on strike on 112.1986 and with the intervention of the Labour Commissioner, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur the matter was settled and the strike was called off on 24.1987. On 24.1987, all the labourers of the petitioner company along with the office bearers of the respondent Union were taken back on duty. However, on the very next day, a chargesheet was served on Shri Jabarsingh, Bhanwarsingh, Ranidansingh, Kanti Prasad, Bhoor Singh, and Markandey on 24.1987. A reply was filed by the aforesaid labourers and it was prayed that they should be allowed to be defended by the Trade Union Leaders Shri Iqbal Singh and Shri Gopikishan. This prayer was rejected by the Management of the petitioner company and, therefore, the aforesaid six labourers refused to participate in the enquiry and the enquiry proceeded ex parte. The services of these six labourers were terminated. 3. An industrial dispute was raised and it was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by an order of the appropriate Government dated 17.3.1988. This industrial dispute was raised by the respondent-Union on behalf of aforesaid six labourers. Both the parties filed their claims. The termination was challenged on two grounds; firstly, that in not allowing the respondent-Union’s workers to represent the cases of the aforesaid six labourers by Trade Union leaders Shri Iqbal Singh and Shri Gopikishan, who were not employees of the petitioner company, the principles of natural justice have been violated and, secondly that no interim relief was granted to the aforesaid six labourers and, therefore, their termination was wrong. So far as the question of interim relief is concerned, that ground was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal. However, it was held that refusal to grant permission to the respondent Union to represent the cases of the aforesaid six labourers by Trade Union leaders Shri Iqbal Singh and Shri Gopikishan is violative of the principles of natural justice and hence, the enquiry cannot be held to be sustainable. However, it was held that refusal to grant permission to the respondent Union to represent the cases of the aforesaid six labourers by Trade Union leaders Shri Iqbal Singh and Shri Gopikishan is violative of the principles of natural justice and hence, the enquiry cannot be held to be sustainable. The Tribunal set aside the order of the domestic enquiry and directed that the petitioner-company should produce the documents and affidavits to establish the charges against the labourers before the Court. It was against this order that the petitioner company filed a writ petition before this Court and that writ petition came to be dismissed and hence this special appeal. 4. In this case, the respondent Union is represented by Shri Mohan Poonamiya, President of the Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, to which, the respondent Union is affiliated. 5. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that Shri Mohan Poonamiya has no right to represent the respondent Union. He has submitted that as per s. 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, it is only an Advocate who can represent a party in the Court. According to him, Shri Mohan Poonamiya, President Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, Jaipur is not an advocate, whose name is entered in the State Roll of the Bar Council of Rajasthan and, therefore, he cannot represent the case of the respondent Union. 6. On theother hand, it was submitted by Shri Mohan Poonamiya that it is open to a person who is party to a proceeding to get himself represented by a non- advocate in a particular instance or case. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Harishankar vs. Girdharj AIR 1978 SC-1019 wherein it was observed in Para 4 as under:-“A private person, who is not an advocate, has no right to barge into Court and claim to argue for a party. He must get the prior permission of the Court, for which the motion must come from the party himself” It was further observed as follows: “It is open to a person, who is party to a proceeding to get himself represented by a non-advocate in a particular instance or case”. He must get the prior permission of the Court, for which the motion must come from the party himself” It was further observed as follows: “It is open to a person, who is party to a proceeding to get himself represented by a non-advocate in a particular instance or case”. It was submitted by Shri Mohan Poonamiya that in this case, the respondent-Union is representing the cases of labourers and the respondent-Union is affiliated to the Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, Jaipur and, therefore, its President is very much interested in a dispute relating to the labourers, who are the members of its affiliated Union. Moreover, he has submitted that Section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961 authorises the Court to permit any person, who is not enrolled as an Advocate to appear before it in a particular case. In this case, Shri Mohan Poonamiya, President, Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, Jaipur has already filed an application under Section 32 of the Advocates Act to seek such permission in the instant case and the respondent-Union is affiliated with the Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, Jaipur and, therefore, Shri Mohan Poonamiya, President, Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, Jaipur can very well be permitted to represent the respondent-Union for an effective decision of the matter in dispute. Thus, Shri Mohan Poonamiya, President Rajasthan Trade Union Centre, Jaipur is permitted to appear and argue the case on behalf of Respondent No. 1. 7. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel for the appellant stands disposed of accordingly. 8. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appellant M/s. Derby Textiles Limited, Jodhpur has promulgated its own Standing Orders which have been certified by a competent authority. The copy of the Standing Orders has been filed alongwith the certificate that has been issued by the Certifying Officer i.e., Joint Labour Commissioner (Head Quarters), Jaipur. The aforesaid order of the Certifying Officer bearing No. F. 7(40) S. O/Shraml83 dated 6.1984 clearly shows that the appellant M/s. Derby Textiles Limited, Jodhpur applied for certificate of draft Standing Orders and those draft Standing Orders were sent to Derby Textiles Sramik Congress, a union of workers by the aforesaid name working in that organisation. Both the parties were called for hearing on various dates and the objections filed by the Union were taken into consideration. Both the parties were called for hearing on various dates and the objections filed by the Union were taken into consideration. However, on 13.1984, the representatives of the Union have stated that they have no objection and suggestions to make in the draft Standing Orders received by them and it was agreed by both the parties that the draft Standing Orders may be certified keeping in view the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Accordingly, those Standing Orders were certified. 9. Section 4 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) provides that Standing Orders shall be certifiable under this Act if (a) provision is made therein for every matter set out in the Schedule which is applicable to the Industrial Establishment; and (b) the Standing Orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this Act; and it shall be the function of the Certifying Officer or appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer under Section 5(2) may file an appeal to the appellate authority under Section6 of the Act. Such Standing Orders finally certified under the Act cannot be changed without the agreement between the employer and the workmen as per Section 10 of the Act. Section 13(2) of the Act lays down that an employer who does and act in contravention of the Standing Orders finally certified under this Act for this industrial establishment shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees and in the case of a continuing offence with a further fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees for every day after the first during which the offence continues. Thus, the contravention of the Standing Orders certified by the competent authority has been made punishable under Section 13 of the Act. 10. It was argued by Mr. M.R. Singhvi the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that the scheme and object of the Act clearly show that it was not intended by the legislature that different sets of conditions should duty to employees depending on whether a workman was employed before the Standing Orders were certified or after and if the intention was otherwise, it would lead to industrial unrest and not industrial peace, the latter being the principal object of the legislation. He has further submitted that after the amendment of the law in 1956, the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority are duty-bound to examine the question of fairness of the Standing Orders and there can be no justification now not to give effect to the principle of uniformity of conditions of the service, which is clearly contemplated by the provisions of the Act. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. T.N. Chatterjee & Ors.: (1972) 2 LU 9 wherein it was observed as follows:-“The scheme and object of the Act clearly show that it was not intended by the legislature that different sets of conditions should apply to employees depending on whether a workman was employed before the Standing Orders were certified or after. If the intention was otherwise, it would lead to industrial unrest and not industrial peace, the latter being the principal object of the legislation. After the amendment of the law in 1956 the certifying officer and the appellate authority are duty bound to examine the question of fairness of the Standing Orders and there can be no justification now not to give effect to the principle of uniformity of conditions of service which is clearly contemplated by the provisions of the Act”. This authority decides two points: firstly that the Standing Orders acquire the statutory character, which bind all workmen whether they joined the Organisation prior to the certifying of the Standing Orders and thereafter and, secondly that once the Standing Orders are certified by the competent authority, it will be presumed that these Standing Orders are fair and reasonable because it is the duty of the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonable of the provisions of the Standing Orders. 11. While placing reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in W.I. Match Cd. vs. Rameshwar, 1971 LIC 1447, it was argued by Mr. Singhvi that after the Standing Orders were certified, they acquire the statutory force and hence, they become statutory terms of employment between the industrial employer and his employees. In this respect, Mr. Singhvi further placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in W.I. Match Co. vs. Rameshwar, 1971 LIC 1447, it was argued by Mr. Singhvi that after the Standing Orders were certified, they acquire the statutory force and hence, they become statutory terms of employment between the industrial employer and his employees. In this respect, Mr. Singhvi further placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in W.I. Match Co. vs. Workmen, 1973 SCC (L & 5) - 531 (which appears to be appellate judgment of I. Match Co’s case 1971 LIC 1447, wherein it has been observed that as long as the Standing Order is in force, it is binding on the company as well as the workmen. To uphold the special agreement would mean giving a go-by to the Act’s principle of three party participation in the settlement of terms of employment So the inconsistent part of the special agreement is ineffective and unenforceable. It was further observed as follows: “The terms of employment specified in the Standing Order would prevail over the corresponding terms, in the service in existence on the enforcement of the Standing Order. While the Standing Orders are in force, it is not permissible to the employer to seek statutory modification of them so that there may be one set of Standing Orders for some employees and another set for the rest of the employees”. In Sudhir Chandra Sarkar vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.,: 1984 (2) LU 223 it was held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that certified Standing Orders become statutory conditions of service and any other rules framed by a company for the employees get incorporated in the statutory conditions of service. If any provision of such rules read with Standing Orders confer absolute and unfettered discretion on the employer to allow or disallow rightful claim of employees, that would be unfair and unreasonable as also arbitrary and subject to test of Article 14. It was further observed as follows:-“The Standing Orders Act endeavoured the imposition of a statutory contract of service between two parties unequal to negotiate, on the footing of equality. The Standing Orders certified under the Act become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the employer and his employee and they govern the relationship between the parties. It was further observed as follows:-“The Standing Orders Act endeavoured the imposition of a statutory contract of service between two parties unequal to negotiate, on the footing of equality. The Standing Orders certified under the Act become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the employer and his employee and they govern the relationship between the parties. A fact of collective bargaining is that any settlement arrived at between the parties would be treated as incorporated in the contract of service of each employee governed by the settlement. A presumption of more or less systematic translation of the results of collective bargaining into individual contracts is created where these results are in practice operative and effective in controlling the terms on which employment takes place. As such Certified Standing Orders which statutorily prescribe the conditions of service shall be deemed to be incorporated in the contract of employment of each employee with his employer”. A Division Bench of this Court in S. Ghosh & Ors. vs. Dulla ( AIR 1967 Raj. 145 ) has held that the Standing Orders framed in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act had the force of law. 12. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid authorities that the Standing Orders are binding on the employer as well as employees and the Standing Orders certified under the Act become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the employer and his employees and they govern the relationship between the parties. In this case, the Standing Orders do exist and they have been certified by the Certifying Officer. 13. Sub-clause (i) of Clause 29 of the Standing Orders of M/s. Derby Textiles Limited, Jodhpur reads as follows:- “29. Procedure for dealing with cases for misconduct: (i) If a misconduct or misconducts are alleged against a workman, the management, before taking any action against him held an enquiry by any Officer appointed for the purpose. He shall be given a chargesheet, clearly setting forth the charges or allegations against him and requiring him to explain. He will be informed in writing about the appointment of Enquiry Officer and time and place for the enquiry. Subsequent dates if required for enquiry will be fixed by the Enquiry Officer. Workman will be given full opportunity to explain his conduct and produce his defence before the Enquiry Officer. He will be informed in writing about the appointment of Enquiry Officer and time and place for the enquiry. Subsequent dates if required for enquiry will be fixed by the Enquiry Officer. Workman will be given full opportunity to explain his conduct and produce his defence before the Enquiry Officer. He will be allowed to seek assistance of any co-worker of his choice. Workman will not be allowed to seek assistance of any legal practitioner before the Enquiry Officer. Similarly, the Presenting Officer from the management side will not be a legal practitioner. The Enquiry Officer shall record the proceedings of the enquiry and in the enquiry report, a concise summary of the evidence and pleas of both the parties and finally the findings shall be recorded”. 14. Itwas contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that as per Clause 29 of the Standing Orders, a workman can seek assistance of any co-worker of his choice but no workman can be allowed to seek assistance of legal practioner before the Enquiry Officer. According to him, even the Presenting Officer from the management side cannot be a legal practitioner. It was further submitted that the aforesaid six labourers against whom enquiries were initiated requested that they should be assisted by Shri Iqbalsingh and Shri Gopikishan, Trade Union leaders, who are not employees of the appellant-Organisation. Even they are not Office- bearers of the respondent-Union. According to Mr. Singhvi, Trade Union Leaders Shri Iqbalsingh and Shri Gopikishan are outsiders and, therefore, as per Clause 29 of the Standing Orders the appellant was perfectly justified in refusing to provide assistance of outsiders i.e., Shri Iqbalsingh and Gopikishan to the aforesaid six labourers, against whom enquiries were initiated. It was also contended by Mr. Singhvi that Shri Iqbalsingh and Shri Gopikishan are not Office-bearers of the respondent-Union. Moreover, they are not employees of the petitioner-Organisation and, therefore, seeking assistance of such persons was not contemplated by Clause 29 of the Standing Orders, which has a binding force not only on the management of the appellant-Organisation but also on the workmen and hence, the management of the appellant-Organisation was perfectly justified in refusing to provide assistance of Trade Union leaders Shri Iqbalsingh and Shri Gopikishan to the aforesaid six labourers. It is nobody’s case that Clause 29 of the Standing Orders is unreasonable and unjust. It is nobody’s case that Clause 29 of the Standing Orders is unreasonable and unjust. It was submitted that no declaration has been sought that Clause 29 of the Standing Orders should be declared to be unjust, unfair and unreasonable and till Clause 29 of the Standing Orders is declared to be unjust, unfair and unreasonable, the workmen and the management of the appellant-Organisation are bound by these Standing Orders because these Standing Orders have statutory binding force. 15. While relying on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd vs. Brojo Nath: 1986 (2) LU 171 it was contended by Shri Mohan Poonamiya that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between the parties who are not equal in bargaining power. This is not a case of contract between the two parties, who are unequal in bargaining power. In this case, the Standing Orders have been certified with the intervention of the State Government and thus, it is a tripartite contract. As stated above the respondent-Union did not take any objection before the Certifying Officer that these Standing Orders are in any way unreasonable or unjuState Even in reply to the writ petition, it was not argued that Clause 29 of the Standing Orders is in any way unreasonable, unfair and unjust and, therefore, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd.‘s case (Supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. 16. Reliance was also placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. (1985) 1 LU 267. In that case Standing Order No. 32 nowhere obligated the General Manager of a plant belonging to Hindustan Steel Ltd. to record reasons for dispensing with the inquiry as prescribed by S.O. 31. On the contrary, the language of S.O. 32 enjoined a duty upon the General Manager to record reasons for his satisfaction why ft was inexpedient or against the interest of the security of the State to continue to employ the workman. Reasons for dispensing with the inquiry and reasons for not continuing to employ the workman stand wholly apart from each other. Reasons for dispensing with the inquiry and reasons for not continuing to employ the workman stand wholly apart from each other. In those facts, it was field:-“that a Standing Order which confers arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic power to dismiss an employee by merely stating that it is inexpedient or against the interest of the security to continue to employ the workman are violative of the basic requirement of natural justice inasmuch as the General Manager can impose penalty of such a drastic nature as to affect the livelihood and put a stigma on the character of the workman without recording reasons why disciplinary inquiry is dispensed with and what was the misconduct alleged against the employee. Hindustan Steel Ltd. to recast S.O. 32 and to bring it in tune with the philosophy of the Constitution”. 17. In this case, no arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic powers have been given to the Enquiry Officer by Clause 29 of the Standing Orders. What is contemplated is that a workman, who is a party to the misconduct can have assistance of a co-worker of his choice and he cannot take assistance of any legal practitioner. Even the management of the appellant-Organisation has been restrained from taking assistance of any legal practitioner in the enquiry. Thus, Clause 29 of the Standing Orders does not confer any drastic powers on the Enquiry Officer because the procedure that has been prescribed clearly embodies in it the principles of natural justice i.e., audi alteram partem. The chargesheet has to be served and an Enquiry Officer has to be appointed. Even, the place of enquiry has to be fixed and the workman is provided an opportunity to explain his conduct. The proceedings have to be recorded and evidence has also to be taken. Finally, findings have to be recorded after affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Thus, the procedure appears to be fair and reasonable. 18. Itwas next contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that these Standing Orders nave been overlooked by the Tribunal on the ground that there is no prohibition to permit the labourers to avail the assistance ot the outsiders. Thus, the procedure appears to be fair and reasonable. 18. Itwas next contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that these Standing Orders nave been overlooked by the Tribunal on the ground that there is no prohibition to permit the labourers to avail the assistance ot the outsiders. He has submitted that the learned single Judge has also overlooked the binding force of these Standing Orders on the ground that the objectivity in the domestic enquiry is very important and the attitude of the management to stand to the technicalities that the certified Standing Orders bind the delinquent and the management cannot be looked upon with favour, if there is a failure of justice and, therefore, in this background it has held that the course adopted by the Tribunal cannot be said to be wrong. The learned single Judge has considered several authorities cited before him by Mr. Singhvi as also by Mr. Mohan Poonamiya. After considering the decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court in N. Kalindi vs. T. Locomotive & Engineering Co. : 1962 (2) LU 426; Dunlop Rubber Co. vs. Their Workmen: 1964 (2) LU 426; C.L. Subramaniam vs. Collector of Customs 1972 1 LU 465; Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay vs. D.R. Nadkarni 1983 SCC (L & S ) -61; Brooke Bond India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Subba Roman 1961 II LU 417, the learned single Judge has held:-“In this background we have to consider as to whether the employees received a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves or not. The salient features which stand out in this case are that the Enquiry Officer, who was an employee of the Management was a police personnel, who was legally trained and there was no prosecutor appointed on behalf of the management. Thus, he was prosecutor as well as Judge in the present case. The workmen were pitted against a legally trained person who was presiding as the Enquiry Officer and as an employee of the Management as well as the Public Prosecutor. It becomes very difficult for a poor workman to defend himself against such a legally trained person. Therefore, the whole matter has to be viewed in this context as to whether the workmen have received a reasonable opportunity or not. It becomes very difficult for a poor workman to defend himself against such a legally trained person. Therefore, the whole matter has to be viewed in this context as to whether the workmen have received a reasonable opportunity or not. From these facts it is clear that the workmen’s request for being represented by a person of his choice from outside the establishment cannot be said to be unreasonable. As matter of fact, looking to the present context it would have been in the fitness of things if the management has permitted the employees to be represented by a person to whom the employees wanted to be represented. The fairness in the domestic enquiry should be that justice should not only be done but it should have appeared to be done is applicable with all fairness. It should not lose sight of the fact that the workmen were pitted against the management and the Enquiry Officer is normally an employee of the management. Therefore, he has to face a basic bias in favour of the management. Thus, it was all the more necessary that while conducting the domestic enquiry, the Management should not normally turn down the reasonable request of the employee to be represented by his co-worker or a worker from other establishment who can objectively against the delinquent”. The gist of the aforesaid discussion made by the learned single Judge is that reasonable opportunity to defend their cases should be provided to the workman and it was in this background that the decision of the learned Tribunal was upheld by the learned single Judge. 19. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Standing Orders are framed on the basis of a tripartite contract, in which the State Government also acts as a mediator between the employer and the employees or their Unions and the Certifying Officer also the appellate authority are duty bound to see that Standing Orders are certified only when they are reasonable and fair. According to him, there is a presumption that once the Standing Orders are certified, these Standing Orders have to be treated as fair and reasonable. Mr. According to him, there is a presumption that once the Standing Orders are certified, these Standing Orders have to be treated as fair and reasonable. Mr. Singhvi has submitted that when these Standing Orders were circulated to the respondent-Union, no objection was raised that these Standing Orders are unfair and unreasonable and, therefore, these Standing Orders acquire the character of statutory binding contracts on the management of the appellant-Organisation as also the labourers and as such they cannot be easily brushed aside. They can only be overlooked if the Court feels that they are unfair or unreasonable. 20. We have already observed above that it is nobody’s case that these Standing Orders are unfair and unreasonable. The Clause 29 of the Standing Orders prescribes a particular procedure for making enquiries against the delinquent workman. In statutes, conferring powers to be exercised on certain conditions, the conditions prescribed are normally held to be mandatory and a power inconsistent with those conditions is impliedly negatived. If an affirmative statute which is introductive of a new law directs a thing to be done in a certain way, that thing shall not, even if there be no negative words, be done in any other way. It is not at all necessary that the statutes must have provided specifically the exclusion of the assistance of outsiders to the delinquent workmen before the Enquiry Officer. When the Statute has specifically provided the assistance of a co-worker to the delinquent workmen before the Enquiry Officer of their own choice then by necessary implication, the assistance of any outsider is prohibited. This is what has been stated by the learned Author Justice G.P. Singh, Former Chief Justice, M.P. High Court in his treatise Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Fourth Edition 1988, at page 232.: 21. This is what has been stated by the learned Author Justice G.P. Singh, Former Chief Justice, M.P. High Court in his treatise Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Fourth Edition 1988, at page 232.: 21. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC-358, while relying on the principles laid down in Taylor vs. Taylor 1876 1 Ch.D-426, which were followed by their lordships of the Privy Council in Nazir Abmed vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 have held that the principle that where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, one thing must be done in that way or not at all and that the other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden applies to Judicial Officers making a record under Section 164 and the quasi-judicial authorities and it can safely be extended to the domestic enquiries as well. This very principle has been reiterated by their lordships of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in A.K. Roy vs. Union of India: AIR 1982 (SC) 710 . It was, therefore, contended by Mr. Singhvi that the use of negative language is not at all necessary and, therefore, the view taken by the learned Tribunal that as the outsider s assistance to workman before the Enquiry Officer has not been specifically excluded in Clause 29 of the Standing Orders, it has to be presumed that such assistance can be provided to a workman, cannot be sustained. If it was the intention of the legislature to provide for the outside assistance, it should have provided for it in the Standing Orders. He has submitted that the Courts cannot supply the concept which is not contained in the Standing Orders. According to him, the Courts are not usually to legislate but they are only to interpret t