JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. This first appeal is directed against a judgment and decree dated 10th August, 1988 passed by Sri Satyendra Singh, 4th Additional District Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj in Matrimonial Suit no. 5 of 1986 whereby and whereunder the said learned court dismissed an application for divorce filed by the appellant purported to be under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. The basic facts of the case are not in dispute. The parties to the lis were married on 28.6.1982 according to the Hindu rites at Daltonganj. The respondent no. 1 after her marriage with the appellant, stayed at the latter’s house for 15 days and, thereafter, came back to her father's house. The respondent no. 1 had been living in her husband's house but used to go to her parents place for short periods. On 15.2.83 respondent no.1 came to the appellant's house. However, on 25.2.83 respondent no. 2 allegedly without any just and reasonable cause lodged a Sanha at the police station alleging that his daughter was not being treated properly and that there was danger to her life. Upon the said information, the police came to the house of the appellant at Baralota and under threat and duress forcibly took respondent no. 1 from the appellant's house. 3. Allegedly, a registered notice was sent by the father of the appellant to respondent no. 2 which was received by him on 3.3.1983, but despite the same, he did not allow the respondent no. 1 to go to the appellant's place. It is also alleged that on 3.3.1983, the father of the appellant lodged an information with the police seeking his protection. It was further alleged that on 10.7.1983, the appellant and one Bhagat Ram went to the respondent no. 2's house for bringing back respondent no. 1, but she was not sent. Allegedly the father of the appellant again sent one Nand Kishore Ram on 24.3.87 to request respondent no.2 to send respondent no.1, but on the said occasion also respondent nos. 2 and 3 did not allow respondent no. 1, to come to the appellant's place. Allegedly after waiting for some time, the appellant's father wrote a letter dated 26.2.1985 to respondent no. 2 requesting him to perform Roksadi of respondent no.1. 4. Allegedly another notice• dated 11.6.1985 was sent by the father of the appellant on respondent no. 2 and 3 did not allow respondent no. 1, to come to the appellant's place. Allegedly after waiting for some time, the appellant's father wrote a letter dated 26.2.1985 to respondent no. 2 requesting him to perform Roksadi of respondent no.1. 4. Allegedly another notice• dated 11.6.1985 was sent by the father of the appellant on respondent no. 2 through his lawyer. The said notice was replied by respondent no. 2 to his lawyer by his letter dated 1.7.1985 wherein he had shown his willingness to perform Roksadi and asked the appellant to come to his house for the purpose. On 8.9.1985 allegedly the appellant along with one Bhagat Ram went to the house of respondent no. 2 for bringing respondent no. 1 back to his place, but respondent nos. 2 and 3 did not allow them to meet respondent no. 1 nor the Roksadi was performed. 5. The appellant has contended that the respondents in this way deprived him of the company of respondent no. 1. It is further contended that respondent no.1 had been working as a teacher in Shishu Kalyan Kendra Rajhara Koti since 3.2.1986 without the consent of the appellant. According to the appellant, the ladies in his house observe parda and they are not allowed to seek employment. It is, thus, the case of the appellant that the respondent no. 1 deserted him without any reasonable cause and as respondent no. 1 did not come back to the appellant's place for living a conjugal life, the same amounts to cruelty. 6. A written statement was filed by the respondents wherein inter alia it was alleged that on 20th August, 1982, respondent no. 2 received a message regarding the illness of respondent no. 1 and when he went to see her, he came to learn that his daughter had been turned out by her in-laws. She was found weeping and, thus, there was no alternative for him but to take her to his own house. It was alleged that respondent no. 1 narrated that her in-laws had told her to pressurise her 'parents to demand a motor-cycle and a sum of Rs. 5000/- in cash as the balance amount of dowry. According to respondent no. 2, he never promised to pay the said amount of Rs. 5000/by way of dowry to the appellant. 7. It was alleged that respondent no. 1 narrated that her in-laws had told her to pressurise her 'parents to demand a motor-cycle and a sum of Rs. 5000/- in cash as the balance amount of dowry. According to respondent no. 2, he never promised to pay the said amount of Rs. 5000/by way of dowry to the appellant. 7. Allegedly, a Sanha was lodged at Daltonganj Police Station on 29th August, 1982. It was further contended that at the end of September, 1982, the respondent no. 1 was taken by the appellant and his father in their house with promise to keep her comfortably. But respondents nos. 2 and 3 again received information that respondent no. 1 was being subjected to cruelty and ill-treatment by her in laws. ; whereafter respondent no. 2 went to the house of the appellant on 25.2.1983 but he was not allowed to see respondent no.1. Moreover, he was abused, rebuked, ill-treated by the appellant, his brother and parents. Respondent no. 2 made a complaint to the Mukhiya of the Panchayat who advised him to report the matter to the police and accordingly he informed the police. The police allegedly came to the house of the appellant and found respondent no. 1 locked inside a room and she had been weeping. As there had been apprehension of the safety of respondent no. 1, the police after recovering respondent no. 1 brought her to the police station along with the appellant and his mother. 8. Allegedly the matter was compromised and the appellant gave in writing to maintain respondent no.1 comfortably and honourably in future and undertook to bring her back from her parent's place after four weeks. Allegedly, despite the expiry of the said period of four months, the appellant did not come to the house of respondent no. 2 to take respondent no.1 back to his house and despite several requests made in that regard. According to the respondents, the father of the appellant was instrumental in cooking up the story and, thus, he had been making correspondences in this connection. The respondents asserted that respondent no. 1 had all along been willing to go to her in-laws' place and respondent nos 2 and 3 also were willing to send respondent no.1 to her in-laws' place. The respondents asserted that respondent no. 1 had all along been willing to go to her in-laws' place and respondent nos 2 and 3 also were willing to send respondent no.1 to her in-laws' place. The respondents denied the story that the appellant, Bhagat Ram or Nand Kishore Ram had ever come to their house or they were ill-treated. It was further denied that the appellant came to the house of the respondent for performing Roksadi. It was further asserted that as respondent no. 1 had no source of any income, she joined at a private school at Rajhara on 1.8.1986. It was however disclosed that on 1.4.1984 unfortunately she was run over by a passenger train resulting in the amputation of her left leg but even on that occasion also the appellant did not care to come to see her in the hospital where she was admitted and remained unconscious for several days. 9. Allegedly, the well wishers of both the parties made effort to persuade the appellant to take back respondent no. 1 but failed. It is stated that respondent no. 1 is no longer in employment. The, other allegations made in the application for dissolution of marriage have also been controverted. 10. The learned trial court considered the issue which arose in the suit namely, as to whether the respondent no. 1 has deserted the appellant with effect from 28.2.1983 without any reasonable cause or not. Upon analysis of the evidence on record, the learned court below came to the conclusion that the appellant has failed to prove his case as made in his application 11. Mr. N. K. Prasad learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has raised a short question in support of this appeal. Learned, counsel submitted that from a perusal of paragraph 5 of the evidence of respondent no. 1, it would appear that respondents have failed to prove their case of demand of dowry and. motor cycle by the appellant and as the same was shown to be the cause for desertion", it must be held that respondent no. 1 had no reasonable cause to Jive at her parents' house. Learned counsel further submitted that so far as the plea of cruelty is concerned, it is not necessary to prove the case beyond any reasonable doubt without a preponderance of probability to serve the purpose. 1 had no reasonable cause to Jive at her parents' house. Learned counsel further submitted that so far as the plea of cruelty is concerned, it is not necessary to prove the case beyond any reasonable doubt without a preponderance of probability to serve the purpose. Learned counsel in this connection hat relied upon :- AIR 1985 Allahabad 253 (Smt. Kalpana Srivastava v. Surendra Nath Srivastava)" AIR 1988 SC 121 (Shobba Rani v Madhukar Reddy) AIR 1975 SC 1534 (Dr. N. G. Dastane. vs. Mrs. S. Dastane) 12. Learned counsel further submitted that respondents have also not brought on records the Sanha lodged by them on 25.2.1983 and, thus, it should be held that the appellant had a reasonable cause to be antagonised -by the respondents for lodging the false complaint against them. It was further submitted that in this. case, there is no dispute that respondent no.1 was living separately from her husband for a period of more than three Years. 13. Mr. A. N. Deo learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand submitted that on a perusal of application filed by the appellant purported to be under section 13(1) (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 itself it would appear that no case for divorce has been made out. Learned counsel further pointed out that both respondent nos. 1 and 2 in the evidences categorically stated that they had an along been wanting that the husband and wife should live together. 14, Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant and his father in their deposition categorically admitted that they do not want to keep the respondent no. 1 in their house in view of the fact that her leg has since been amputated. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the appellant on his own showing is not entitled to any decree for divorce. Learned counsel in this connection has reo lied upon a decision in Smt. Rohini Kumari v. Narendra Singh reported in AIR 1972 SC 459 . 15. The only question which, therefore, arises for consideration is :- "Whether the appellant had been able to prove that respondent no.1 has deserted him without any reasonable cause for a period of more than two years so as to entitle him to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage '" 16. 15. The only question which, therefore, arises for consideration is :- "Whether the appellant had been able to prove that respondent no.1 has deserted him without any reasonable cause for a period of more than two years so as to entitle him to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage '" 16. Section 13(1) (ia) (b) and the explanation appended to it of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read as follows :- "Divorce (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party (i) has after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty of (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or x x x Explanation : In this sub-section, the expression 'desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shal1 be construed accordingly. " 17. In this case, although cruelty has already been made a ground for divorce, no specific case of cruelty as such has been made out. In the petition under section 13 of the Act, it has merely been contended that only because the appellant has been deprived of a conjugal life by respondent no. I, she is guilty of act of cruelty. As indicated hereinbefore, Mr. N. K. Prasad has further submitted that lodging of a false sanha as against the appellant and his parents, whereby allegations were made that respondent no. 1 was being ill-treated and there was apprehension of danger of her life itself is ground of cruelty. According to the learned counsel, the act, which amounts to mental cruelty is a sufficient ground for granting a decree for divorce. 18. 1 was being ill-treated and there was apprehension of danger of her life itself is ground of cruelty. According to the learned counsel, the act, which amounts to mental cruelty is a sufficient ground for granting a decree for divorce. 18. In Smt. Kalpana Srivastava v. Surendra Nath Srivastava reported in AIR 1985 Allahabad 253, a learned Single Judge distinguished the case of Dastane v. Dastane as reported in AIR 1975 SC 1534 and held that where the wife refused to prepare tea for the friends of the husband she not only hurts his ego but cause him humiliation before his friends. It was further held that where a wife lodges a false report of non-bailable offences, she causes husband deep anguish and brings disgrace and ignominy to the husband besides causing harassment. It was further held that where a wife gets rid of a pregnancy without the consent of the husband, she was guilty of cruelty. On the basis of the findings aforementioned the learned Judge held :- "Cruelty is not confined to physical cruelty but includes mental cruelty. The matrimonial alliance is irretrievably broken where one of the spouses persistently causes mental torture, disgrace and harassment. The entire evidence on record and the totality of circumstances have to be considered for judging cruelty." However, the situation obtaining in the present case is absolutely different. 19. As indicated hereinbefore, no case has been made out that by making false allegations in the Sanha lodged by respondent no. 2 on 25.2.1983, the respondent committed acts of cruelty. In the court below also such a case has not been made out. This court, therefore, cannot allow the appellant to raise the said issue at this stage in this appeal. Further, the appellant and/or his witnesses even; in their depositions before the court below have not made out a case that they felt humiliated which amounted to a cruelty because false allegations were made as against them. 20. Further the appellant on his own showing even after 25.2.1983 had allegedly been trying to pursue respondent no. 1 to return to her matrimonial home. If the statements made in the application are to be believed, then consistent efforts were made by the appellant and his father up to 1985 to bring back respondent no. 1 to their house. 20. Further the appellant on his own showing even after 25.2.1983 had allegedly been trying to pursue respondent no. 1 to return to her matrimonial home. If the statements made in the application are to be believed, then consistent efforts were made by the appellant and his father up to 1985 to bring back respondent no. 1 to their house. This, in my opinion, amounts to an act of condonation on the part of the appellant. 21. It is now well known that even if Condonation is not pleaded as a defence by the respondent, the court is under an obligation which is to be discharged even in an undefended case to find out whether the respondent's cruelty has been condoned by the petitioner inasmuch as in view of the provisions of section 13 read with section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act,. a relief for dissolution of marriage by divorce can be granted only if the court is satisfied 'but not otherwise' that the petitioner has, not in any manner condoned the cruelty. (See Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. Dastaoe reported in AIR 1975 SC 1534 ) upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. N.K. Prasad, J. 22. In J. L. Naoda v. Smt. Veeoa Nanda reported in 1988 PLJR 43 (SC), the Supreme Court held as follows :- "It is no doubt an unfortunate state of affairs but it could not be held that the respondent was behaving with the appellant in a manner which could be termed as cruelty which would entitle the appellant to a decree, of divorce. Some times the temperament of the parties may not be conducive to each other which may result in' petty quarrels and trouble; although it was contended by the appellant that he had to suffer various ailments on account of this kind of behaviour meted out to him by the wife, but it could not be held on the basis of any material that ailment of the appellant was the direct result of her (respondent's) conduct." 23. 10 that case, therefore, the application for divorce on the ground of cruelty was dismissed. In that view of the matter in my opinion no case for granting a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty has been made out. 24. 10 that case, therefore, the application for divorce on the ground of cruelty was dismissed. In that view of the matter in my opinion no case for granting a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty has been made out. 24. As in terms of provisions .of section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, an act of desertion and an act of cruelty have been made separate and distinct grounds for obtaining a decree for dissolution of marriage by divorce. It is, therefore, clear that an act of desertion by itself would not amount to cruelty. 25. The appellant has made out only a case of desertion in his pleadings as also adduced evidence only to prove the said allegations' and merely made a submission that deprivation 'of leading a conjugal life would amount to cruelty and no other case has been made out. 26. I am, therefore, left with the case of desertion only. 27. The word 'desertion' has not been defined in the Act. However, in view of the phraseology used in section 13 (i) (ib) read with relevant explanation does not imply only a separate residence and a separate living. It also implies that there must be a determination to put an end to matrimonial relation and cohabitation. Without animus deserendi, there can be no desertion :- In Smt. Rohini Kumarl v. Narendra Singh reported in AIR 1912 SC 459, it was held :- "In Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena (1964) 4 SCR 331 ( AIR 1964 SC 40 ) this court had occasion to consider the true meaning and ambit of Section 10 (1) (a) of the Act read with the Explanation. Reference was made in the majority judgment to the earlier decision in Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shan v. Prabhavati 1956 SCR 838 : AIR 1957 SC 176 , in which all the English decisions as also the statement contained in authoritative text books were considered. Reference was made in the majority judgment to the earlier decision in Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shan v. Prabhavati 1956 SCR 838 : AIR 1957 SC 176 , in which all the English decisions as also the statement contained in authoritative text books were considered. After referring to the two essential conditions, namely, the factum of physical separation and the animus deserendi which meant the intention to bring the cohabitation permanently to an end as also the two elements so far as the deserted spouse was concerned i.e. (1) the absence of consent and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the intention aforesaid, it was observed while examining how desertion might come to an end: 'in the first place, there must be conduct on the part of the deserted spouse which affords just and reasonable cause for the deserting spouse not to seek reconciliation and which absoives her from her continuing obligation to return to the matrimonial home. In this one has to have regard to the conduct of the deserted spouse. But there is one other matter which is also of equal Importance, that is, that the conduct of the deserted spouse should have had such an impact on the mind of the deserting spouse that in fact it causes her to continue to live apart and thus continue the desertion. But where, however, on the ~ facts, it is clear that the conduct of the deserted spouse has had no such effect on the mind of the deserting spouse there is no rule of law that desertion terminates by reason of the conduct of the deserted spouse. " 27A. In Elokeshi Chakraborty v. Sunil Kumar Chakraborty reported in A.I.R. 1991 (Cal.) 176 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court following various Supreme Court decisions held :- "Desertion in such a case as the present is the intentional permanent fore-saking and abandoning of one's spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause; L.U. Kirpalani v. Smt. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 50. The law is well settled that for the offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is concerned two essential conditions must be there namely (1) the factum of separation and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end and similarly two elements are also essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned, namely (1) the absence of consent and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the intention aforesaid, Bipin Chandra v. Prabbabati AIR 1957 SC 176 . The burden of proving desertion for 2 years and further that such desertion was without any just cause is on the petitioner, L.U. Kirpalani (Supra). If a spouse is forced by the conduct of the other spouse to live separately or to stay away, in such case there is no legal desertion to constitute a ground for divorce: A Narayana v. K. Sri Devi AIR 1990 Ker 151 ; Toppo v. Toppo 1988 (1) CLJ 994. The law is equally well settled that the test of proof in a matrimonial suit is preponderance of probabilities as is available in every kind of civil litigation Dastane v. Dastane, 1975 SC 1534. In the background of the above propositions we now proceed to see how far the decision of the learned trial judge in this case may be considered as justifiable". 28. In this case, in order to arrive at a finding as to whether the respondent no. 1 deserted the appellant or not, certain basic undisputed facts have to be noticed. On 25.2.1983, respondent no. 2 went to the house of the appellant, but he was not allowed to see his daughter. He went to Mukhiya and on the advice of the Mukhiya he made a Sanha. The said Sanha has been marked as Ext. A-1. Mr. Prasad, therefore, was not correct in his submission that Sanha has not been proved at all. 29. It is also admitted in view of the statements made in paragraph 8 of the application for divorce filed by the petitioner itself that the police upon receipt of the aforementioned Sanha came to their house and recovered and or took respondent no. 1 to the police station. It is on that date, respondent no. 2 took his daughter with him to his house. 1 to the police station. It is on that date, respondent no. 2 took his daughter with him to his house. It appears that even prior thereto, namely, on 20th August, 1982, a Sanha was lodged by respondent no. 2 wherein it was alleged by respondent no.2 that respondent no. 1 was not being treated properly by her in-laws and was being assaulted and upon being asked as to why his daughter had been assaulted, the appellant and his father told that respondent no. 2 was not fulfilling his promise after the marriage took place. 30. It appears that despite lodging of the Sanha, no further action in the matter was taken by either of the parties or the police and the defendant-respondent no. 1 accompanied her father to his place. It, therefore, cannot be said that Rekha Devi left his matrimonial house alone or on her own accord. 31. It is also admitted that roksadi was not performed and some notice had been given to the defendant no. 1's father by the father of the plaintiff-appellant. It is also admitted that the father of the defendants-respondent no. 1 in reply to the notice dated 11.6.1985 sent a reply to the Advocate of the plaintiff's father wherein it was alleged that the plaintiff-appellant even did not drop a single letter expressing his desire to keep defendant-respondent no. 1. It was also denied that defendant-respondent no. 1 had brought any ornament with her either before or at the time of coming back from the police station. It was further stated therein that according to the tradition prevailing in the society, husband goes to his in-law's place to bring back his wife in Roksadi. 32. In the said notice, it was stated :"My client is noble and holds reputation in the public and wants to save his daughter and son-in-law from being ruined and for leading a peaceful happy conjugal life. 32. In the said notice, it was stated :"My client is noble and holds reputation in the public and wants to save his daughter and son-in-law from being ruined and for leading a peaceful happy conjugal life. My client with all folded hands cordially invites your client and your client's son Omprakash to his house with clear and clean heart washing all malice and take his wife to his home and keep tied the relation of conjugal right." My client further requests your client to fix up a date of Roksadi and with all clean heart advise your client and his son Omprakash to take his wife and lead a life as a noble citizen of the place." Admittedly, the plaintiff/appellant (P.W. 6) did not accede to the request made in the said notice nor Roksadi was performed. In the meanwhile, defendant-respondent no. 1 met with a tragic accident on 1.4.1975; as a result whereof one of her legs had to be amputated. 33. Defendant no. 1 as also her father in their evidence categorically stated that during the period the defendant-respondent no. 1 was in the hospital nobody from her in-law's place including the plaintiff-appellant came to see her nor enquired about her condition. 34. The plaintiff-appellant did not challenge the statement in cross-examination nor any statements contrary to the statements of defendant-respondent no.1 and her father were given. 35. On the aforementioned backdrop of admitted facts, the question of desertion has to be considered. 36. It is now well known that a plea of desertion involves not only a physical act but also animus deserendi. It is for the plaintiff to prove that the respondent no.1 continued to desert throughout the whole course of two years immediately preceding the date of presentation of the petition. 37. As noticed hereinbefore, in Smt. Robini Knmari's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that absence" of consent and absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the intention to live separately, is a sine qua non for coming to the conclusion that one spouse has deserted the other" Reference in this connection may also be made to Bipin Chandra Sah v. Prabbabati reported in AIR 1957 SC 176 . 38. P. W. 1 in his evidence clearly stated that he is not willing to keep the defendant-respondent no. 38. P. W. 1 in his evidence clearly stated that he is not willing to keep the defendant-respondent no. 1 in view of the fact that her leg was amputated. Similarly, P. W. 4, the father of the plaintiff-appellant also stated that after the amputation of Rekha's leg, he is not ready to keep her as his putoh. P. W. 4 further admitted that he had never been to the defendant's house. 39. It is, therefore, clear that since the time of amputation of the leg of defendant respondent no. 1, namely, neither the plaintiff nor his father was willing to accept the defendant-respondent no. 1 as a Babu in the house. 40. It is, therefore, clear that from the evidence of P. W. 4 and P. W.2 it appears that both the plaintiff and his father were not willing to take back the defendant-respondent no. 1 to their house and, thus, ex facie, the question of desertion of plaintiff by defendant no. 1 for a continuous period of two years does not arise. 41. Plaintiff examined various witnesses to prove desertion. P.W.1 is Bhagat Ram. He deposed on 15.6.1988. Allegedly he accompanied the plaintiff twice to the house of defendant no. 2 once 4-5 years prior to the date of his deposition and on another occasion after about 2 years thereafter, that is, three years prior to the date of deposition. On the first occasion allegedly the plaintiff was abused. But except the allegation that defendant no. 2 did not perform Roksadi on the second occasion, no such allegation of abuse or insult of the plaintiff-appellant by the defendant-respondent no. 2 has been made out. This witness allegedly is not related to the plaintiff. He does not appear to be a truthful witness as he could not say a bout the names of the relatives of the plaintiff. According to him, the marriage took. place-4-5 years prior to his deposition which evidently is not correct. This witness admitted that he never had any talk with the defendant no.1. He stated that he went for the first time to the defendant no. 2's house one month after the marriage. If this statement is correct, his statement in the examination in-chief to the effect that even at that point of time, the defendant no. 2 did not send the defendant no. He stated that he went for the first time to the defendant no. 2's house one month after the marriage. If this statement is correct, his statement in the examination in-chief to the effect that even at that point of time, the defendant no. 2 did not send the defendant no. 1 with her husband, does not appear to be correct inasmuch as no such case has been made out. 42. It is, therefore, clear that he is not a trustworthy witness and further in any event he is not a witness on the point of desertion of the appellant by the respondent no. 1. 43. P. W. 2 is one Ram Sundar Tiwary. He is an employee in Bajrang- Oil Mills, Daltonganj. Allegedly he met respondent no. 2 on 13.1.1989 and had a talk with him with regard to Bidai of defendant no. 1. At that time allegedly respondent no. 2 told him that he would not send his daughter to the house of Om Prakash. In his cross-examination he stated that be has no proof that he works in the aforementioned Bajrang Oil Mill. Surprisingly he stated that he met respondent on 13.1.86 itself. It cannot be believed that on his first meeting with respondent no. 2 he will have talked regarding the Bidai of respondent no. 1 to the house of the appellant. His evidence cannot further be believed in view of the fact that admittedly he did not tell this fact to anybody. Evidently, P.W.2 has been produced by way of an afterthought. This witness further admitted that he has not received any summons. He was asked to depose by the father of the plaintiff on 13.1.1986 itself and prior to that according to this witness, the suit had already been filed. 44, P.W. 3 is Malik Chand Ram. This witness also alleged that the ladies of his house used to visit the house of the appellant. He further alleged that respondent no. 2 about two years back met him and told him that his daughter would never go to the appellant's house. This witness has never met Rekha Debi. He is a hear-say witness and his evidence did not inspire confidence. The appellant did not examine any lady of his house who might have informed P. W. 3 about the unwillingness on the part of the defendant-respondent no. 1 to live in the appellant's house. This witness has never met Rekha Debi. He is a hear-say witness and his evidence did not inspire confidence. The appellant did not examine any lady of his house who might have informed P. W. 3 about the unwillingness on the part of the defendant-respondent no. 1 to live in the appellant's house. His evidence on the point is, therefore, not trustworthy. 45. P.W. 4 is the father of the appellant. This witness admitted that Rekha was not happy in his house. He, of course, supported the case of the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint. In his cross-examination, he categorically stated, as noticed hereinbefore, that he is not ready to keep her as her daughter-in-law. Although this witness stated that he came to learn about the amputation of the leg of respondent no.1, after the institution of the suit, but such a statement cannot be believed. It is pertinent to note that he never had been to the house of respondent no. 2. Admittedly, from the very beginning, he had been making out a case for filing a suit for divorce, as otherwise there does not appear to be any reason giving notice and lodging Sanha from the very beginning. Further, the very fact that he admitted that Rekha was not happy in his house goes to show that she was not being treated well. 46. P.W. 5 is Govind Ram. Allegedly, he met Rekha Debi on 20.2.1986 in Barwadih Passenger Train when he had been going to Japla. It is alleged that she told to her that she was going to Rajhara for teaching purpose and on being asked by P. W. 5 whether she had taken permission she told her that she was not required to take permission from anybody. She further told that she did not want to go to the house of Om Prakash. Although this witness claimed to be a cousin of the appellant (phuphera bhai) but he could not ten the names of the relatives of the appellant. 47. There does not appear to be any plausible reason as to why questions would be put to defendant no. 1 as to whether she had sought for permission from her husband or whether in the year 1986, particularly, when she had met with an accident, she had been working in any school or not. 47. There does not appear to be any plausible reason as to why questions would be put to defendant no. 1 as to whether she had sought for permission from her husband or whether in the year 1986, particularly, when she had met with an accident, she had been working in any school or not. In paragraph 10 of his deposition he admitted that he asked the aforementioned question about taking permission by way of joke and she had also replied in the same spirit. This witness further admitted that as and when necessary, he came to learn that Rekha used to remain unhappy at her in-law's place from some ladies. He never had any talk about bringing Rekha to her in-law's place. The evidence of this witness also does not inspire any confidence, nor can it be said that by reason of his evidence, plaintiff can prove desertion on the part of respondent no. 1. 48. P.W. 5 is the plaintiff himself. According to him, he and his parents used to be have well with respondent no. 1. But he could not explain as to why respondent no. 1 used to remain unhappy in his house. He also admitted that Rekha Debi used to remain unhappy in his house. He made out a new case that respondent no. 1 had not been behaving well with him though she had been in his house for about 10 days. 49. With regard to the story of his visiting the house of respondent no. 2, he alleged that even respondent no. 1 told him to cohabit as otherwise he would be killed and his dead body would be thrown in the river. Evidently this witness has sought to make out a new case. This statement on the part of P.W.6 has been contradicted by P.Ws. 1 and 2, who, as noticed hereinbefore. categorically stated that appellant was not allowed to meet respondent no. 1. In the Sanha dated 8.9.1985 (Ext. 2/B) he stated that only respondent nos. 2 and 3 made certain overt acts. In paragraph 16 of his deposition, he further stated that after 25.2.1983. he never met respondent no. 1 alone. This witness further stated that he even did not consult the pandit for finding out a date for performance of Roksadi. In the Sanha dated 8.9.1985 (Ext. 2/B) he stated that only respondent nos. 2 and 3 made certain overt acts. In paragraph 16 of his deposition, he further stated that after 25.2.1983. he never met respondent no. 1 alone. This witness further stated that he even did not consult the pandit for finding out a date for performance of Roksadi. It does not appear to be a normal conduct of a person that he would go to his in-law's place for performance of Roksadi without consulting d priest. This witness admitted that he never wrote any letter to his wife. He admitted that on 25.2.1983, he was called to the police station by the police. He further admitted that he promised there that he would bring back respondent no. 1 after performing Bidai. He frankly stated that his wife is ready to live with him but as her leg has been cut, he is not ready to keep his wife. 50. The statements are clearly suggestive of the fact that P. W. 6 is not a truthful witness. 51. On the other hand apart from other witnesses. respondent no. 1 (D.W. 5) in her deposition clearly stated that she had all along been ready and willing to go to her in-law's place. She even stated that even on the date of her deposition, she was ready to go to her-in-laws' place. She further stated that in August, 1982, she was turned out of the house by her in-laws, and she sent information to her father and, thereafter, she had met with her father at the college-gate when she narrated the incident of ill-treatment made to her by her in-laws. She further stated that respondent no. 2 took her to her in-laws place and requested them to keep her but her father in law refused to do so. He further stated that the appellant and his parents had been demanding a motor cycle and dowry. 52. It is true as pointed out by Mr. N.K. Prasad, that she stated that immediately after her marriage, the said demand was not met, but, evidently the demand was made later on. The statement of the witness has to be read as a whole and the evidence of this witness cannot be disbelieved only because she admitted that dowry was not demanded immediately after the marriage. N.K. Prasad, that she stated that immediately after her marriage, the said demand was not met, but, evidently the demand was made later on. The statement of the witness has to be read as a whole and the evidence of this witness cannot be disbelieved only because she admitted that dowry was not demanded immediately after the marriage. She further stated that when she went to her in-laws place about 1 1/2 month, the behaviour of her father in-law initially was good, but thereafter, he started misbehaving and beating her. She also stated that on 25-2-83 she was locked up in a room and she was rescued from there by police. She further stated that after she was brought back by her father, her husband never came to her house to take her back. She further stated that when her leg was amputed no person from her Sasural came to console her. 53. O.P.W. No. 1 is one Narain Ram. This witness stated that when she went to the appellant's house for obtaining payment of a bill in relation to supply to bricks, respondent no. 1 asked him to call her father to see her. This witness further stated that after the leg of respondent no. 1 was cut he informed about the same to the appellant and also told him that she was in Tumba-garha hospital, when the appellant replied that he had no concern with her and he would not go there. 54. O.P.W. 2 is Kesho Prasad Verma. He also stated in his deposition that in the evening of one Saturday 1982, he met with Rakha Debi when she was weeping and when he asked about the reasons therefor, she informed him that she had been beaten and turned out of the house by her in-laws. She refused to go to her parent place. He then met respondent no. 2 and informed him about the same. 55. For the purpose of this case, the evidence of O.P.W. No.4 is not relevant. 56. O.P.W. No.3 is respondent no. 2. He also denied that at any point of time the appellant came to his house along with his friends to take the defendant-respondent no. 1 back to his house. 57. 2 and informed him about the same. 55. For the purpose of this case, the evidence of O.P.W. No.4 is not relevant. 56. O.P.W. No.3 is respondent no. 2. He also denied that at any point of time the appellant came to his house along with his friends to take the defendant-respondent no. 1 back to his house. 57. From the conspectus of facts as noticed hereinbefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that initially the appellant intended to take back his wife, but he never had such an intention after the leg of respondent no.1 had to be amputed because of the accident she had met with. Evidently the said accident took place on 1-4-1984. It is only in May, 1983 if at all, the defendant respondent no.1 left her in-laws place and went to her father's place. It cannot be believed at all that the appellant and/or his father were not aware of the factum of the amputation of the leg of respondent no.1. Evidently, therefore, the appellant and/or his father had been preparing documents to make out a case for divorce. 58. In my opinion therefore, the learned court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant bad not been able to make out a case of desertion as against respondent no. 1. 59. Before parting with this case, however, it may be mentioned that after the argument was over and the judgment was reserved, a notes of additional argument on behalf of the appellant was filed on 18-7-91 wherein it was mentioned that a decree for divorce should be passed inter alia on the ground that the parties had been living separately for about 8 years and averments have further been made that in the event of a decree for divorce being passed, the appellant would be willing to pay alimony to respondent no. I in terms of section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act at the rate of Rs. 250/- per month as directed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daltonganj, in Misc. case no. 62/86. It was further averred that in the event of a decree for divorce being passed, the revision application filed as against the order dated 16-12-1988 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daltonganj, in Misc. case no 62/ 86 would be withdrawn. 60. 250/- per month as directed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daltonganj, in Misc. case no. 62/86. It was further averred that in the event of a decree for divorce being passed, the revision application filed as against the order dated 16-12-1988 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daltonganj, in Misc. case no 62/ 86 would be withdrawn. 60. In view of my findings aforementioned, I am of the view that no case for dissolution of marriage by granting a decree for divorce has been made out. The aforementioned submissions made on behalf of the appellant cannot be taken into consideration. 61. However, it is expected that the appellant and his father will show magnanimity on their part by accepting respondent no. 1 in their house as his wife/daughter in-law respectively, despite the fact that in an unfortunate accident, she had lost one of her legs. 62. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there be no order as to costs.