JUDGMENT : Saldanha, J.—The appellants, Haffkine Biopharmaceutical Corporation Limited, have preferred the present appeal, which is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 17/18th September, 1987 in Writ Petition No. 612 of 1983. The present appellants, through that petition, had challenged an order of the Presiding Officer, 6th Labour Court, Bombay, passed on Application (IDA) No. 623 of 1982 dated 29.1.1983. By that order, the Presiding Officer had allowed the application filed before him u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The applicant, who had retired from the services of the appellants on 31.7.1981, had contended that he was entitled to claim the equivalent of gratuity amount payable to him for his tenure of service. It is essential to mention that the present appellants, as indicated above, took over the services of the employees of the erstwhile Haffkine Institute on and from 1.9.1975, on which date the appellants came into existence in their present form. The Respondent-employee was a supervisor with the Haffkine Institute. By a Government Resolution dated 30.4.1975, the employees of the erstwhile Haffkine Institute had been given the option to join the service of the appellants on being given continuity of service with all consequent benefits as set out in that resolution. Briefly stated, the resolution protected the service, conditions and tenure of the employees and by deeming provisions they were to be treated as though they had been in the service of the appellants right from the very beginning. It was, therefore, the contention of the respondent-employee, who had approached the Trial Court, that he was entitled to be paid gratuity as calculated under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act and the Rules framed thereunder for his entire tenure of service for approximately 35 years. It was his grievance that on his retirement, the appellant had calculated the equivalent of gratuity payable to him only for the period put in with the appellants and, furthermore, that the computation had been done bearing in mind the ceiling of Rs. 1,000/- which is the maximum qualifying salary under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was his grievance that on his retirement, the appellant had calculated the equivalent of gratuity payable to him only for the period put in with the appellants and, furthermore, that the computation had been done bearing in mind the ceiling of Rs. 1,000/- which is the maximum qualifying salary under the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent-employee had essentially contended that there was in existence an agreement that had been entered into with the employees and about which there is no dispute, dated 4.12.1981, by which agreement/settlement, according to the respondent-employee, he was eligible to be paid on the basis of his last salary drawn. The relevant clause which is Clause 15 of the settlement which, to our mind, is material for the decision of this appeal, reads as follows: - "It is agreed by and between the parties that the Supervisors shall be covered by the Payment of Gratuity Act and the Rules framed thereunder from lime to time by the appropriate authorities". 2. The application came to be resisted by the appellants principally on the ground that the computation done by them was correct. It was their contention before the Trial Court that the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act cannot be invoked by the applicant because that Act could not apply to him in so far as, admittedly, he was drawing a salary of more than Rs. 1,000/. Consequently, the appellants had also contended that the application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act would not be tenable insofar as the applicant ought to have preferred the claim, if any, before the authority constituted under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Trial Court dealt with the various contentions raised by the appellants and in a reasoned order upheld the position that the application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was maintainable and, furthermore, that the scale as demanded by the applicant before that Court was, in fact, the correct one. Accordingly, what the Trial Court did was that it computed the amount payable at the rate of 15 days' salary for each of the 35 years of service calculated on the basis of the last salary drawn, which was Rs. 2,413/ -and held that an aggregate amount of Rs. 48,720/- was payable to the applicant. Out of this, an amount of Rs. 2,413/ -and held that an aggregate amount of Rs. 48,720/- was payable to the applicant. Out of this, an amount of Rs. 23,649-70 Ps, which had been paid to him when he ceased to be an employee of the Haffkine Institute, was deducted and the balance amount of Rs. 25,070-30Ps. was awarded to him. It is against this order that the writ petition was filed. The learned single Judge after hearing the parties, upheld the order of the Trial Court and further observed that the application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act had rightly been entertained by that Court. The learned single Judge also upheld the manner in which the amount payable to the respondent-employee was computed and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. Against that order, the present appeal has been filed. 3. At the hearing of the appeal learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has, in the first instance, canvassed the proposition that the settlement in question was not applicable to the respondent-employee. In support of this argument, it is contended that the settlement dated 4.12.1981 could not apply to an employee who has retired on 31.7.1981. Dr. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-employee, pointed out that there is a factual error in the submission insofar as the record very clearly and undisputedly indicates that the settlement arrived at was to be effective from 1.4.1981. Even though we do not find anything in support of this in the pleadings before us, we have noted the references in the written statement filed before the Trial Court by the present appellants wherein the fact that the settlement would apply to the present respondent-employee has not been disputed. This submission, therefore, to our mind, is wholly devoid of any merit insofar as the present appellants themselves had presented only a limited challenge to the application before the Trial Court on the ground indicated by us earlier. They had not raised this contention before the learned single Judge as is evident from the judgment and order under appeal and to our mind, even though they would normally be barred from raising this contention for the first time before this Court; even on merits there is no substance in this submission. 4. They had not raised this contention before the learned single Judge as is evident from the judgment and order under appeal and to our mind, even though they would normally be barred from raising this contention for the first time before this Court; even on merits there is no substance in this submission. 4. The second submission advanced on behalf of the appellants is that assuming that the terms of the settlement make provision for payment of gratuity that the ceiling of Rs. 1,000/-which is the upper limit for the applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act and the Rules thereunder would debar the applicant from making a claim for gratuity. We have pointed out to learned Counsel representing the appellants that, in the first instance, the present appellants had voluntarily agreed to the terms of the settlement dated 4.12.1981 of which Clause 15, which we have referred to earlier, is clear and unambiguous. Clause 15 proceeds on the basis of the guarantee contained in paragraph 4 of the Government Resolution dated 30.4.1975 which very clearly protected the conditions of service and further guaranteed to the employees who were to continue with the present appellants that they will be entitled to all benefits which they would have otherwise received if they continued as Government employees. One of the benefits admittedly was that the appellants would be entitled to gratuity at the prescribed scales. There is no dispute about the fact that the respondent-employee was entitled to this benefit because he had received such an amount calculated in relation to his earlier service at the time when he was taken over from the Haffkine Institute. 5. The Trial Court as also the leaned single Judge have both very rightly, to our mind, recorded the finding that Clause 15 of the terms of settlement guaranteed to the employees belonging to the supervisory cadre, to which admittedly the present respondent-employee belonged, the payment of an amount that would have been computed as though the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act applied to them. In the present case, what has been agreed to by contract between the appellants and the respondent-employees is that the principle embodied in the calculation of such gratuity amount, namely, the principle of 15 days' salary for each completed year of service calculated on the basis of the last-drawn salary, is the formula that had been agreed to by parties. If this was the agreement entered into between the appellants and the employees, they cannot be allowed to resile from this position and, consequently, the Trial Court as also the learned single Judge have rightly applied this standard and have, to our mind, very justifiably awarded the amount in question to the respondent-employer. 6. The third submission advanced on behalf of the appellants is that they can be held liable only for the period for which the respondent was an employee of the appellants and that the earlier period of 29 years in the present case ought not to have been taken into account. Even with regard to this submission, we are required to be guided by the provisions of the Government Resolution dated 30.4.1975, which in paragraph (4) very clearly states as follows:-"Their service rendered by them under Government will count for their pensionary and all other benefits as if it was a service rendered under the new body.'' Therefore, there can be little dispute about the fact that the entire period of service has rightly been computed in the present case. Even with regard to the calculations that have been made, we find from the order passed by the Trial Court at page 52 of the compilation that the Trial Court has given the appellant credit for the amount that has been paid at the time when the applicant, who is the present respondent-employee, ceased to be an employee of the erstwhile Haffkine Institute. To our mind, therefore, the procedure adopted cannot be faulted. 7. In this view of the matter, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge does not deserve to be interfered with. The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed with costs. We are informed that the respondent-employee was permitted to withdraw the amount due to him on furnishing a bank guarantee. The bank guarantee to stand discharged.