Subbiah Reddiar v. Chinnamma — 1991 DIGILAW 308 (KER)

Judgment :- Paripoornan, J. The tenant in R.C.P No. 27 of 1985, Rent Controller, Ernakulam is the revision-petitioner herein. There are two respondents herein. They are the landlords of the building demised to the revision-petitioner/tenant. In this revision, we arc only concerned with the order of eviction in proceedings initiated under S.11(2), 11(3) and 11(4) (i) & (ii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The tenant had initiated proceedings for fixation of fair rent (R.C.P. No. 189 of 1982) and the landlords had initiated proceedings for eviction of the tenant under S. 11(2) of the Act in R.C.P. No.7 of 1983 the above two petitions and R.C P. No. 27 of 1985, from which the present revision arises, were disposed of by a common order by the Rent Controller, dated 10-7-1989. We are not concerned with the legality or regularity of the proceedings in R.C.P.189/82 or R.C.P.No. 7/83, in this revision. The Rent Controller dismissed R.C.P. No. 27 of 1985. He found that the landlords/ petitioners failed to exhibit any element of need objectively in support of their plea of vacant possession of the petition schedule building. In other words, the plea of the landlords, that the building is needed bona fide for own occupation, was rejected. Relief under S.11(3) of the Act was negatived. The Rent Controller also held that the landlords are not entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(4)(i) or S.11(4)(ii) of the Act. The matter was taken in appeal, by the landlords as also by the tenant. The appeal filed by the landlords is R.C.A No. 56 of 1989, preferred against the common order dated 10-7-1989 rendered in R.C.P. No. 27 of 1985. The appeal preferred by the tenant is R.C.A.No. 74 of 1989 against the common order passed in R.C.P.No.189 of 1982. We are concerned in this revision only with the order passed in R.C.A.No. 56 of 1989. The appellate Authority found that no case was made out by the landlords for an order of eviction under S.11(4)(i) and (ii) of the Act. But, the appellate Authority found that the landlords have succeeded in proving that the plaint building is required bona fide for own occupation and so they are entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. But, the appellate Authority found that the landlords have succeeded in proving that the plaint building is required bona fide for own occupation and so they are entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. Now, the only controversy between the parties is as to whether the landlords are entitled to an order of eviction under S.11 (3) of the Act on the ground that the building is required bona fide for own occupation. 2. There are two petitioners in R.C.P. No. 27 of 1985. They are the landlords. The second petitioner was, at the relevant time, in Government service. He was about to retire. The landlords' plea was that their son had studied upto S.S.L.C. He failed for S.S.L.C. in 1983. Even after several attempts, he could not succeed in the examination. The son wanted to start a business in provision. The brother of petitioner No.2 is a businessman. He is running a provision shop and a rice depot. He has promised to help the petitioners and their son for conducting the business. The petitioners need the building for their occupation and for the occupation of their son to start a business. They have no other building to meet the need. The respondent/ tenant is a rich man. He does not depend upon the income from the business in the rented building as the source of his livelihood. He could get a alternate building without any difficulty. The tenant, in his objections, referred to the other proceedings between the landlords and the tenant, and stated that the conduct of the petitioners/ landlords showed that they were bent upon harassing the tenant for evicting him from the building. The tenant also specifically pleaded that the petitioners' son is not capable of starling any business as alleged, the petitioners have no idea at all to start any business in the petition schedule building and the need stated in the petition is without any bona fides. Capacity and ability of the petitioners and their son to run the business were also questioned. It was further submitted that the respondent is not rich and that he depends upon the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule building for his livelihood and no suitable building is available in the locality to shift his business. Capacity and ability of the petitioners and their son to run the business were also questioned. It was further submitted that the respondent is not rich and that he depends upon the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule building for his livelihood and no suitable building is available in the locality to shift his business. The need of the landlords and the basis for an order of eviction arc stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the petition (R.C.P.No. 27/85) dated 18-2-1985. The objections of the tenant are stated in paragraph 5 of the objections dated 19-7-1985. 3. A large volume of evidence (oral and documentary has been let in by the parties to substantiate their pleas. In particular, the tenant laid emphasis on Ext.B42 dated 11-4-1979, Ext.B9 dated 10-10-1979 and Ext.B1 dated 26-10-1979, the three documents by which he was let in possession. He also produced and relied on Ext.B26, proceedings of the Accommodation Controller, Kanayannur dated 11-2-1987 to show the strained relationship between the parties and how the tenant was permitted to carry out the repairs to the petition schedule building. The evidence of R W3, one Mr. Ananda Kammath, who was the mediator and figured as a witness in Ext.B42 and Ext.Bl, was also pressed into service by the tenant. In substance, the plea was this: In the place where the petition schedule building stands, originally there was a small tiled building. The landlords could not put up a big building there, due to lack of funds. The landlords approached the tenant through Rw 3. The tenant agreed to pay a sum of Rs.55,000/- on condition that the landlords will complete the building within 75 days and rent it out to the tenant. This is evidenced by Ext.B42 dated 11-4-1979. This was not done. The landlords wanted Rs.9000/- more. The tenant paid the said amount also, evidenced by Ext.B9 dated 10-10-1979. The landlords agreed to complete the building within 15 days and put the tenant in possession. They did not complete the building within the time stipulated in Ext.B9. Even so, the tenant took possession of the building on executing a lease deed (Ext.B1 ) dated 26-10-1979. It was for a period of five years, with liberty to extend the term, by mutual consent, for a further period of five years, The monthly rent was fixed at Rs.1000/-. Even so, the tenant took possession of the building on executing a lease deed (Ext.B1 ) dated 26-10-1979. It was for a period of five years, with liberty to extend the term, by mutual consent, for a further period of five years, The monthly rent was fixed at Rs.1000/-. The amounts borrowed by the landlords, in the sum of Rs.64,000/-, will be repaid by adjusting a sum of Rs.250/- every month out of the rent. These facts are spoken to by the mediator (Rw 3). The plea of the tenant was that the parties never intended to terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant atleast till the sum of Rs.64,000/- borrowed and acknowledged in Ext.B1 lease deed is paid by adjustment from the rent in monthly instalment of Rs.250/-. There was a specific clause for extending the period of lease for a further period of five years also. Ext.B1 is clear on those aspects. It is because of other certain extraneous considerations the landlords initiated proceedings for eviction prematurely and the plea, that the building is required for starting a business for their son was put forward as a pretext for eviction. 4. The Rent Controller adverted to the above aspects. The Rent Controller held that Ext.Bl, Ext.B42, Ext.B9 and the evidence of RW 3 and the background and circumstance in which the tenant advanced the amount, the petition schedule building was constructed and the agreement (Ext.B1) was entered into ,indicate that "there was no intention on the part of the landlords to narrow down the period of rental arrangement by five years" and the conduct discernible from Ext.B26 proceedings and other circumstances show that the landlords failed to substantiate the plea that there was any bona fide need of the building for starting a business. The appellate "Authority, holding that the Rent Controller did not appreciate the evidence in the right perspective, stated that the borrowal of Rs.64,000/- by the landlords from the tenant, the provision in Ext.B1 lease deed for repayment of the amount at the rate of ks.250/- per month and the option for renewal for a further period of five years etc., are all considerations which are foreign to the scope of enquiry to be made under S.11(3) of the Act. Proceeding further, the appellate Authority held that the enquiry should be confined to the question as to whether there is an element of need and after adverting to certain facts and on an appraisal of the facts and circumstances, held that the petitioners need the petition schedule building bona fide and so they are entitled to get an order of eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. 5. Counsel for the revision petitioner, at the threshold, assailed the approach of the appellate Authority in totally excluding Exts.B42, B9 and Bias also Ext.B26 and the evidence of RW 3 relating thereto. In particular, counsel for the revision-petitioner submitted that the jural relationship between the parties is evidenced by Ext B1 and the appellate Authority totally erred in not giving effect to the plain provisions in Ext.B1 and also the other evidence in the case which is in accord with the terms contained in Ext.Bl. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents/ landlords contended that the sole question that arises for consideration in eviction proceedings, is whether the landlords need the building bona fide for own occupation and the terms of Ext.B1 or Ext.B42 or Ext.B9 or Ext.B26 cannot in any manner adversely affect or neutralize the impact, if on facts landlords are able to substantiate the bona fide need of the building put forward by them. 6. The landlords (Petitioners in R.C P.No. 27/85) admit that they availed of a loan from the tenant in the sum of Rs.64,000/-. In paragraph 5 of the petition (RCP No. 27 of 1985), the landlords have stated thus, in accordance with Ext.Bl: "5. The petitioners have availed of a loan of Rs.64,000/- from the respondent. The mode of discharge of the said loan is also agreed to between the parties. In terms of the said agreement an amount of Rs.250/- from out of the loan will be adjusted against the rent payable per month. The rent payable per month being Rs.1000/-. The respondent will pay to the petitioners a sum of Rs.750/- every month for which a receipt for Rs.1000/- will be issued. A receipt for Rs.250/- evidencing the payment of the loan instalment will be issued in favour of the petitioners." In Ext.Bl, the demise is for a period of five years. The monthly rent was Rs.1000/-. The respondent will pay to the petitioners a sum of Rs.750/- every month for which a receipt for Rs.1000/- will be issued. A receipt for Rs.250/- evidencing the payment of the loan instalment will be issued in favour of the petitioners." In Ext.Bl, the demise is for a period of five years. The monthly rent was Rs.1000/-. Clause 7 of Ext.B1 provides for a further period of five years on mutual consent, after the expiry of the initial period of five years. The receipt of advance of Rs.64,000/- and the payment of Rs.250/- per month by way of return of the loan are also referred to in paragraph 8 of Ext.Bl. The jural relationship between the parties is governed by Ext.B1 dated 26-10-1979. The prior documents which resulted in Ext.B1 are Ext.B42 dated 11-4-1979 and Ext.B9 dated 10-10-1979. The circumstances under which a sum of Rs.64,000/- was obtained by the landlords from the tenant are very expressly stated in Ext.B42 and Ext.B9 prior documents. These aspects have been spoken to by RW 3, the mediator, who brought about the instant transaction between the parties. 7. Before we deal with the merits of the case, we shall dispose of a preliminary question mooted by counsel on both sides, that pertains to the jurisdiction of this Court in exercising the powers of revision under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. In revision, this Court can call for and examine the records relating to any order passed by the appellate Authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. Counsel for the respondent/ landlords submitted that the finding of the appellate Authority, that the landlords need the building bona fide for own occupation, is a finding of fact. This Court will not re-evaluate or re-appraise the facts and circumstances in exercising the power of revision under S.20 of the Act to examine as to whether the finding that the landlords require the building bona fide for own occupation is legal, justified or proper. The submission was that the finding that the landlords require the building bona fide for own occupation is a finding of fact, the correctness of which cannot be scrutinised in revision by this Court. Our attention was invited to a few decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court. The submission was that the finding that the landlords require the building bona fide for own occupation is a finding of fact, the correctness of which cannot be scrutinised in revision by this Court. Our attention was invited to a few decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court. We are of the view that the finding entered by the appellate Authority, that the landlords require the building bona fide for own occupation, is a finding of fact. Even so, the jurisdiction of this Court under S.20 of the Act can be exercised, if it is shown that the said finding of fact was arrived at due to an error of law or that the said finding was based on no evidence at all or was arbitrary, unreasonable or perverse. Mafatlal v. Radhe Lai (AIR 1974 S.C.15%, at p.1601 para 10). S.20 of the Act enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order under revision. It is a jurisdiction wider than S.115 C.P.C. That jurisdiction enables this Court in appropriate cases to examine the correctness of the findings of fact also. In an appropriate case, this Court can re-appraise the evidence, if the finding of the appellate Authority is found to be infirm in law. --See E.V. Mathai v. Sub-Judge, Kottayam (AIR 1970 S.C. 337, at p. 340 - para 4 =1969 K.L.T. 348); Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander (AIR 1988 S.C.1422, para. 7). The findings entered on conjectures and surmises and on the basis of non-existent materials and baseless assumptions can be interfered with, in exercise of the revisional powers under S.20 of the Act. (See- Vinod Kumar v. Surjit Kaur-AIR 1987 S.C. 2179, paragraphs 9 and 12). The last two decisions of the Supreme Court aforesaid have been cited with approval in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rai ChandJain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla (AIR 1991 S.C. 744, paragraph 10). The decision in Mathai's case (AIR 1970 S.C. 337) was one under S.20 of the Rent Control Act. In Ram Das's case (AIR 1988 S.C.1422) and Rai Chand Jain's Case (AIR 1991 S.C. 744) the revisional jurisdiction was substantially similar to S.20 of the Rent Control Act. The decision in Mathai's case (AIR 1970 S.C. 337) was one under S.20 of the Rent Control Act. In Ram Das's case (AIR 1988 S.C.1422) and Rai Chand Jain's Case (AIR 1991 S.C. 744) the revisional jurisdiction was substantially similar to S.20 of the Rent Control Act. In cases, where the conclusions arrived at by the appellate Authority can be characterised as "so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no Tribunal could arrive at such a conclusion on the evidence on record", the revisional jurisdiction is attracted, as held by this Court in Mandal Gopalan v. Rohini (1977 K.L.T.386). In S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India [(1979) 2 S.C.C.491 ], the Court held that there will be an error of fact when a public body is prompted by a mistaken belief in the existence of a non-existing fact or circumstance, and an order based on reasons of fact which do not exist must be held to be infected with an abuse of power. 8. In this context, we would refer to a few decisions which arose under the Income-tax Act or other proceedings, wherein the question came up for consideration as to the circumstances in which a finding of fact is open to interference by this Court on the ground that it raises a question of law. Placing reliance on a few decisions of the Supreme Court and the English Court, a Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party, in Padinjarekara Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [(1988) 173 -I.T.R.637, at pp. 645 & 646], stated thus: "Even a pure finding of fact entered by the appellate Tribunal may be set aside by this court, if it is established that the appellate Tribunal acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained or is otherwise perverse. The court may also set aside the finding of the appellate Tribunal if it appears that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law would have come to the determination under appeal. The court may also set aside the finding of the appellate Tribunal if it appears that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law would have come to the determination under appeal. A finding of fact, based upon a misconstruction of a statute or misunderstanding of a material document or if the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in arriving at the finding or if the Tribunal has overlooked or ignored a crucial fact or document, the finding will be vitiated' So also, if any inference from facts made by the appellate Tribunal does not logically accord with and follow from them, then, one must say that there is no evidence to support it. To come to a conclusion for which there is no evidence to support, is to make an error in law. (See Bean (J.H.) v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1944) 2 All. E.R.279 - Du Paroq L.J., Affirmed - (1946) 1 All E.R.642 HL)". We may also refer to a few English decisions, which are relevant in this context. In Secretary of State ASLEF (No. 2) -[(1972) 2 All E.R.949] at p. 967, Lord Denning MR stated thus: "if the Minister does not act in good faith, or if he acts on extraneous considerations which ought not to influence him, or if he plainly misdirects himself in fact or in law, it may well be that a court would interfere; ". In Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Metropolitan Borough of Tameside [(1976) 3 All E.R.665], at p. 675 Scarman L.J. stated thus: "I do not accept that the scope of judicial review is limited quite to the extent suggested by counsel for Secretary of State. I would add a further situation to those specified by him; misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact". I would add a further situation to those specified by him; misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact". When the said case reached the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce, at pages 681 and 682 of the Reports, stated the law thus: "If a judgment requires, before it can be made, the existence of some facts, then, although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court must enquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken in to account, whether the judgment has been made on a proper self direction as to those facts, whether the judgment has not been made on other facts which ought not to have been taken in to account. If these requirements are not met. Then the exercise of judgment, however bona fide it may be, becomes capable of challenge: See Secretary of State (or Employment v. Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers' and Firemen (No. 2), per Lord Denning MR In many statutes a Minister or other authority is given a discretionary power and in these cases the court's power to review any exercise of the discretion, though still real, is limited. In these cases it is said that the courts cannot substitute their opinion for that of the Minister; they can interfere on such grounds as that the Minister has acted right outside his powers or outside the purpose of the Act, or unfairly, or on an incorrect basis of fact." 9. The above said decisions clearly state that even a finding of fact is open to challenge in certain specified circumstances. So, we should examine whether the finding of fact entered by the appellate Authority that the landlords need the building bona fide for own occupation is vitiated by any one of the infirmities adverted to in the above decisions. It is not as if under no circumstance a finding of fact entered by the appellate Authority can be scrutinised or evaluated by the revisional court exercising powers under S.20 of the Act. We repel the plea to the contrary. 10. One other aspect stressed by counsel for the respondents and mentioned by the appellate Authority is .that the pleadings of the tenant denying the bona fide need of the landlords is vague. We have adverted to clause 5 of the objections filed by the tenant. We repel the plea to the contrary. 10. One other aspect stressed by counsel for the respondents and mentioned by the appellate Authority is .that the pleadings of the tenant denying the bona fide need of the landlords is vague. We have adverted to clause 5 of the objections filed by the tenant. He had denied the allegations in paragraph 8 of the petition and has further stated that the petition for eviction is filed without any bona fides. The tenant has also highlighted the fact that the petitioners or their son are not capable of starting a business. We perused through the petition filed for eviction (R.C.P. No. 27 of 1985) and also the objections filed by the tenant. We are of the view that there are sufficient pleadings in the case. Moreover, looking at the entire proceedings, we are satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the landlords due to lack of precision or details in the pleadings. This Court has held, on more than one occasion, that the pleadings should be liberally construed and meticulous analysis of the pleadings should not be adopted, which will lead to failure of justice. - (See - Narayani v. District Judge (1991 (1) K.L.T. 646); Madhavan v. Leelamma (1991 (2) K.L.T. 32). On a perusal of the orders of the authorities below and the nature of the examination of the parties and the evidence tendered in the case, we are of the view that no surprise has been caused to the landlords due to any vagueness in the pleadings. The argument to the contrary is devoid of force. 11. As stated, the jural relationship between the parties is governed by Ext. B1. The said deed was entered into as a result of the earlier or antecedent agreements, evidenced by Ext. B42 dated 11-4-1979 and Ext. B9 dated 10-10-1979. We should understand the terms of Ext. B1 bearing in mind Exts. B42 and B9, to the extent the terms of Ext. B1 are not very clear Or otherwise vague or ambiguous. The mediator (Rw 3) who brought about the deed has given elaborate evidence as to how these documents came into force and the circumstances under which the parties entered into the deal. B1 bearing in mind Exts. B42 and B9, to the extent the terms of Ext. B1 are not very clear Or otherwise vague or ambiguous. The mediator (Rw 3) who brought about the deed has given elaborate evidence as to how these documents came into force and the circumstances under which the parties entered into the deal. It is by adverting to these vital documents as also the evidence of P W 1 and Rw 3, the Rent Controller stated that till the loan of Rs. 64,000/- is wiped out in the manner contemplated in Ext. B1, the parties never intended to discontinue the rental arrangement by limiting the duration by short span of time (Para 15 of the order). Adverting to the loan of Rs. 64,000/- obtained by the landlords, the lack of any explanation as to why the amount was received and the evidence of Rw 3, the mediator, the Rent Controller stated, in paragraph 16 of the order, that the circumstances in which the petitioners (landlords) received the said amount of Rs. 64,000/- also indicate that there was no intention on the part of the petitioners to narrow down the period of rental arrangement by five years. After referring to the above documents and also Ext. B26, the Rent Controller held that the petitioners have failed to establish that they really intended to start a business in the petition schedule building for their son and they have failed to exhibit any element of need objectively in support of their plea of vacant possession of the petition schedule building. But, the above three vital documents (Exts.B42, B9 and B1) and also the evidence of Rw 3 were totally excluded as irrelevant by the appellate Authority to find whether the plea of bona fide need of the building for own occupation is tenable and valid. In his opinion, the only factor to be looked into is whether the landlord has made out the case pleaded under S.11(3) of the Act. We are of the view, that this approach is over-stating the legal position. Since Ext. B1 is the very demise which brought about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the terms of the said document should ordinarily govern the relationship of the parties. We are of the view, that this approach is over-stating the legal position. Since Ext. B1 is the very demise which brought about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the terms of the said document should ordinarily govern the relationship of the parties. In addition thereto, the landlord should prove one or the other grounds specified in S.11 of the Act to get an order of eviction. Proof of one of the grounds for eviction specified in S.11 of the Act is in addition to the contract between the landlord and the tenant and not in derogation of it. The fetter imposed under S.11 of the Act is on the landlord. That is an important aspect to be borne in mind. It is by reference to Ext B1, the tenant has pleaded that the demise in the instant case cannot be put an end to till the entire advance of Rs. 64,000/-is wiped out in the manner indicated in the said document. In other words, the manner in which the debt of Rs. 64,000/- has to be repaid by adjustment of a sum of Rs. 250/- per month from the rent is a strong pointer indicating that till such period the amount due is wiped out in the said manner, the relationship between the parties will continue as landlord and tenant. A reference to Ext. B1 along with Ext. B42 and Ext. B9 was called for in adjudicating the issue, since the very plea of the tenant is that the claim for eviction is nothing but a pretext and there is no bona fide need. We are of the view that the appellate Authority was in error in holding that the aforesaid documents are foreign to I he scope of enquiry to be made under S.11(3) of the Act. In our opinion, the said documents are relevant and Ext. B1 demise and Ext. B42 and Ext. B9 and the inference flowing from the said documents and other circumstances should be given effect to. That us what was done by the Rent Controller. The appellate Authority erred in discarding them. What is more, the appellate Authority was wrong in stating that the Rent Controller was swayed by certain extraneous considerations in referring and relying on those documents. The approach to the vital question in issue by the appellate Authority was from a wrong perspective. That us what was done by the Rent Controller. The appellate Authority erred in discarding them. What is more, the appellate Authority was wrong in stating that the Rent Controller was swayed by certain extraneous considerations in referring and relying on those documents. The approach to the vital question in issue by the appellate Authority was from a wrong perspective. The appellate Authority declined to refer to the basic documents in the case, the documents which brought about the jural relationship between the parties. Relevant and material aspects were thus over-looked. What is more, the pleadings were wrongly characterised as vague and irrelevant consideration was imported. That apart, in scanning the evidence, in paragraph 23 of the judgment, the appellate Authority, after referring to the various aspects spoken to by the witnesses, has indulged in conjectures and surmises, when it stated thus: "The only answer to that defence is that nobody is born with experience, nobody in the business filed (has) born as Tata or Birla. Experience is something to be gained by gradual stages. A person who is very poor in studies will shine in the business field. So the desire of the parents of 1'W2 to provide employment to PW2 by starting a business in the scheduled building can never be characterised as an irrational desire or a whimsical wish. There is an element of need so long as it is brought out that PW2 is very poor in his academic studies". It passes one's comprehension as to how the appellate Authority surmised that "a person who is very poor in studies will shine in the business field" or that "there is an element of need so long as it is brought out that PW2 is very poor in his academic studies". Thus, it is by a glaring wrong approach to the basic question involved, and by ignoring vital documents and by indulging in conjectures and surmises, the appellate Authority, in para 24 of the judgment, concluded that the need put forward by the petitioners is bonafide and therefore they are entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. The said finding is illegal and irrational. It resulted due to a misdirection in law; crucial documents were ignored and relevant facts were totally misunderstood. 12. The said finding is illegal and irrational. It resulted due to a misdirection in law; crucial documents were ignored and relevant facts were totally misunderstood. 12. On a perusal of paragraph 22 of the judgment of the appellate Authority, we are left with the impression that the appellate Authority declined to bestow its attention on essential aspects, stressed on irrelevant or non-essential aspects and indulged in conjectures and surmises. Even the basic document which governed the jural relationship between the parties (Ext. B1) was ignored by stating that it is foreign to the scope of the enquiry. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the finding of the appellate Authority that the petitioners need bona fide the petition schedule building for own occupation, is tainted and is irrational and was arrived at by ignoring relevant and vital factors germane to the issue. The said finding is illegal and improper. We set aside the finding. It is based on the said finding alone, the appellate Authority has reversed the order passed by the Rent Controller in R.C.P. No. 27 of 1985. 13. We set aside the order passed by the appellate Authority and order a remit of the matter on the above aspect to the said authority for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. The revision petition is allowed. Dated this the 24th of July, 1991.