Judgement BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. :- The question that was raised in this appeal is whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit in respect of an order passed by the learned Magistrate sentencing the plaintiff to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 20 days. In case of continuing further trade without licence to pay a daily fine of Rs. 40/-. The facts are nut in dispute that the plaintiff was carrying on a business after obtaining a trade licence. Thereafter on 12th September 1984 the plaintiff appellant was served with a notice of summons under Section 537(2) and 437(1)(b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. By the said summons the plaintiff appellant was asked to appear before learned Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta to answer the charges and the complaint against him made under the aforesaid Sections. Pursuant to the said summons the plaintiff appellant appeared before the learned Municipal Magistrate and pleaded guilty. The plaintiff appellant was aggrieved by the second part of the sentence by which the plaintiff was required to pay a daily fine of Rs. 40/- as fine if he carries on business without licence. The plaintiff did not challenge the other punish­ment imposed by the learned Magistrate before this Court in criminal revisional jurisdiction nut filed a suit for declaration that the said notices Were bad, illegal and liable to be quashed. The main grievance of the appellant was that the appellant was carrying on manufacturing business and the municipal authorities have charged him for carrying on manufacturing business without obtaining health licence and on that ground lodged a complaint before the learned Magistrate whereupon this punishment was imposed. 2. Before the court below an injunction petition was filed but the same was rejected by the court below on the ground that the civil court has no jurisdiction to in interfere with the punishment imposed by the learned Magistrate. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 22nd May 1986 this appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff appellant. 3. Mr. Before the court below an injunction petition was filed but the same was rejected by the court below on the ground that the civil court has no jurisdiction to in interfere with the punishment imposed by the learned Magistrate. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 22nd May 1986 this appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff appellant. 3. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant contended that the civil court has jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain the suit and to grant relief inasmuch as the learned Magistrate has entertained a complaint and imposed a punishment without the authority of law inasmuch as, firstly, no health licence was required for the purpose of carrying on manufacturing business and secondly the learned Magistrate has imposed a fine of Rs. 500/- for the alleged offence which the appellant has committed. But the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to put restrictions on the appellants right to carry on trade by imposing a fine of Rs. 40/- per day in case the appellant carries on business without obtaining licence. The appellant is aggrieved by the second part of the fine. 4. Before us it was contended that the civil courts jurisdiction cannot be said to be barred in the facts and circumstances of the case and reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 , wherein the Supreme Court laid down the principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court. In that case the suit was for declaration that the provisions of law relating to assessment under the M. B. Sales Tax was ultra vires and for refund of tax illegally collected was not barred by Section 17 of the said Act by which the jurisdiction of the civil court was sought to be taken away. In that case the Supreme Court held that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Mr. Banerjee submitted that where the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure the civil courts jurisdiction cannot be said to be barred. Mr. Banerjee submitted that where the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure the civil courts jurisdiction cannot be said to be barred. Reference was also made to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 as also the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2238 : (1975 Lab IC 1651) in support of his contention that civil courts jurisdiction would not be taken away where the rights of the citizen are being affected by following a procedure not in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Reference was also made to the decision in the case of Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1988 SC 752 wherein the Supreme Court has recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil courts jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. On the basis of this judgment Mr. Banerjee submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case the plaintiff has a right to file a suit instead of preferring a revisional application against imposition of fine. 5. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that this suit could not be entertained and referred to the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure where it is provided that the civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature. It was submitted by Mr. Roy that the decision of the learned Magistrate was not a dispute of a civil nature. It was also submitted that the hierarchy civil courts and criminal courts are quite different and distinct in our present judicial system and accordingly the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a dispute which is not of civil nature. 6. Civil proceeding is one in which a persons seeks to enforce by appropriate relief the alleged implementation of civil rights against another person or State and which if the claim is proved, would result in the declaration, express or implied, of the rights claimed and the relief. 6. Civil proceeding is one in which a persons seeks to enforce by appropriate relief the alleged implementation of civil rights against another person or State and which if the claim is proved, would result in the declaration, express or implied, of the rights claimed and the relief. If the order of the Court is directed against a proceeding which is criminal in nature i.e., if the proceeding is carried on the a conclusion that it may end in imprisonment for an offence or imposition of fine then the proceeding must be taken to be a criminal proceeding. Section 9 confers the power upon the civil court jurisdiction to try a suit of civil nature, in other words, the civil courts power is restricted only to suits and/or disputes of civil nature. In the instant case the plaintiff appellant filed a suit for a declaration that the summons issued by a criminal court was illegal and void and consequently the imposition of fine in two counts, was without authority of law. In our view the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant such a relief for the simple reason that the proceeding before the learned Magistrate was not a civil proceeding but a proceeding of criminal nature. Even the jurisdiction of the High Courts is clearly distinct and separate in respect of civil and criminal matters. Article 133 of the Constitution provides the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeal from the High Court with regard to civil matters. On the contrary Article 134 of the Constitution provides appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeals from High Court in regard to criminal matters. We are of the view that when the order of the Court is directed against a proceeding which is criminal in character then it must be considered to be a criminal proceeding and as such Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a bar to entertain such a suit. In this case the relief under Code of Civil Procedure has not been barred by any stature. Civil Courts jurisdiction to try a suit flows from Section 9 of the Code and if the power of the civil court flows from Section 9 of the Code in that event the civil court has no jurisdiction to try suits save and except suits of civil nature. Civil Courts jurisdiction to try a suit flows from Section 9 of the Code and if the power of the civil court flows from Section 9 of the Code in that event the civil court has no jurisdiction to try suits save and except suits of civil nature. It is also well settled that the proceeding under the taxing statute or under the Industrial Disputes Act are civil proceeding. But in our view it could not be contended by any stretch of imagination that the proceeding before a Magistrate which is a proceeding of criminal nature in view of the fact that if a proceeding is carried which would end in imprisonment for an offence or imposition of fine then the proceeding must be taken to be a criminal proceeding. In the instant case we have no doubt that the proceeding before the learned Magistrate was criminal in nature and as such the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to grant any relief. 7. Accordingly we do not find any sub­stance in the submissions made by Mr. Banerjee and we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Court be law. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. It is made clear that the appellant would at liberty to pursue the remedy if it is otherwise available in any other law or in any other proceeding. Appeal dismissed.