JUDGMENT - Dr. DA SILVA E.S., J.:—This is an appeal directed against the Award of the learned District Judge, Panaji, dated 29-11-1986 in Reference Case No. 61/81, under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), whereby the learned Judge has partly allowed the appellant's prayer and enhanced the rate of the land acquired from Rs. 6/- to Rs. 20/- rejecting the remaining two prayers for a higher apportionment of the amount awarded between her and the Communidade and an increase in the valuation of the trees located in the acquired plot. 2. By Notification No. RD/LQN/311/78 dated 30-11-1979 which was published in the Government Gazette dated 13-12-1979 the Government acquired a vast tract of land admeasuring 75,347 sq. metres at Bampolim plateau belonging to the Comunidade of Cujira for the purpose of extension of the Goa Medical College Complex. An area of 44,400 sq.m. was tenanted to the appellant and the plot was containing cashew and other trees. Before the Land Acquisition Officer the appellant claimed compensation based on Rs. 40/- per sq. metre, but the Land Acquisition Officer by his Award dated 13-11-1980 fixed only Rs. 6/- per sq. metre and directed the said compensation be shared between the tenant and the Comunidade in the proportion 50:50. The case of the appellant is that her share should be 60% and that of the Comunidade should be only 40%. 3. Smt. Agni, learned Counsel for the appellant, first submission while challenging the impugned Award is that the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. metre allowed by the learned District Judge is highly inadequate and against the evidence on record. It was vehemently contended by Smt. Agni that the learned Judge totally overlooked the fact that the suit land was situated adjacent to the Panaji/Agacaim National Highway and just across the road in front of the Goa Medical College Complex. The learned Judge also grossly ignored the frontage of the land acquired towards the Highway and the circumstance of the same being almost a flat land with a hard soil and thus very much fit for construction purposes, availing also of all amenities like water, electricity and regular transport. The learned Judge also grossly ignored the frontage of the land acquired towards the Highway and the circumstance of the same being almost a flat land with a hard soil and thus very much fit for construction purposes, availing also of all amenities like water, electricity and regular transport. Besides, the 'said land' was also situated very close to the Post and Telegraph Office Staff Colony, quarters of Doctors and staff of Goa Medical College and Military Camp of the Signal Training Centre situated at a little distance away from the plot in question. Smt. Agni was very much aggrieved that the learned Judge had simply discarded the Sale Deed dated 21-9-1977 produced by the appellant whereby a plot of land in the vicinity of the suit plot was sold, two years prior to the acquisition, at the rate of Rs. 43/- per sq. metre. Smt. Agni urged that no cogent reasons were given by the learned Judge to refuse to consider its relevancy in this case on the sole ground that the sale plot was smaller in size in relation to the acquired land. The learned Judge could have at least given in this respect a sufficient deduction on account of the largeness of the plot acquired while trying to compare the market value of similar land in the neighbourhood about 4 years prior to the acquisition. Reliance was placed on the decision of (Smt. Kausalya Devi Bogra others v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad another)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 892, which has held that for determining, the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for any other property a deduction should be given, because when large tracts are acquired, the transactions in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline. According to Smt. Agni the sale plot was located far from the National Highway in the interior of the village Cujira and was therefore not enjoying the same facilities as availed of by the suit plot. Besides, the learned Judge did not give adequate weightage to the, fact that he himself had allowed an enhancement of rate in respect of similar land acquired in 1975, i.e., 4 years before the acquisition of the suit plot in the year 1979 and had awarded Rs. 20/- per sq. metre vide Award dated 29-3-1985 in Land Acquisition Case No. 98/79. 20/- per sq. metre vide Award dated 29-3-1985 in Land Acquisition Case No. 98/79. This by itself suggests, according to Smt. Agni, that the learned Judge did not give any consideration to the escalation of the prices of land in respect whereof he was supposed to take judicial notice so as to fix a reasonable higher rate to the land subsequently acquired in the same area, being of a similar nature and situated at a close distance from the acquired land. 4. We have perused the impugned Award and also gone through the evidence relied by the appellant in support of her claim for the rate awarded by the L.A.O. should be enhanced to Rs. 40/-. We are satisfied that the grievance of the appellant is fully untenable and that no fault can be assailed to the Award of the learned District Judge who has properly assessed, the evidence placed before him by the appellant and arrived at a correct finding with regard to the adequate rate of compensation to be fixed to the land acquired. 5. First of all there is absolutely no evidence to substantiate the appellant's contention that the suit plot, in the year 1979, should be valued at Rs. 40/ per sq. metre. Smt. Agni's reliance on the Sale Deed dated 21-9-1977 has been rightly rejected by the learned District Judge for good and valid reasons recorded in the Award and which we fully endorse. 6. Admittedly the sale plot is about 940 sq. metres. in area while compared with the suit plot which is more than 44,000 sq. metres large. Indeed the sale plot appears to have been purchased for building purpose while the suit plot was just an agricultural land leased to the appellant by the Comunidade and consisting mainly of cashew plantation for which she was hardly paying to its owner a meagre yearly rent of Rs. 400/- only. Besides while the sale plot is situated at Cujira village which is within the urbanised area of St. Cruz Panchayat, being also closer to Panaji city, the suit plot is admittedly located at the Bambolim Plateau along the National Highway, far from any urban centre and lacking the basic amenities and facilities which the sale plot could easily avail. Besides while the sale plot is situated at Cujira village which is within the urbanised area of St. Cruz Panchayat, being also closer to Panaji city, the suit plot is admittedly located at the Bambolim Plateau along the National Highway, far from any urban centre and lacking the basic amenities and facilities which the sale plot could easily avail. This by itself shows that it is difficult to compare both the plots for the sake of relying on the purchase price of the land situated at Cujira while fixing the land acquired at Bambolim. Similarly the learned Judge was justified when he took into account the rate fixed in the Award dated 29th March, 1985 as having a direct bearing in the valuation of the suit land to fix the same rate to the acquired plot in spite of its having been acquired about four years later. The learned Judge has borne in mind with this regard the fact that the area of the plot first acquired was only 2495 sq. metres while confronted with the larger area of the suit plot admeasuring about more than 44,400 sq. metres and was also on a sound basis when he observed that the appellant did not adduce any evidence to show that there has been any increase of the rates between the intervening period. Smt. Agni's submission that the learned Judge should have taken judicial notice of the escalation of prices of land is thus not well founded and the reliance put by her in the case of (Ram Narain Gope others v. Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh)2, A.I.R. 1990 Patna 118, appears to be totally misplaced. We say so because apart from the circumstance that nothing had been brought on record by the appellant to enable the Reference Court to come to any conclusion with regard to the probable rate of the escalation of prices, the fact remains that it was not permissible for the Court to just presume that the rates of land had been increased everywhere and in all times irrespective of its nature and utility. It was therefore incumbent upon the appellant to adduce at least expert evidence, if not documentary one, in this respect and for her complete negligence in doing so she alone has to be blamed. It was therefore incumbent upon the appellant to adduce at least expert evidence, if not documentary one, in this respect and for her complete negligence in doing so she alone has to be blamed. Further the Patna ruling referred to above which no doubt has emphasised the desirability of the Reference Court taking judicial notice of the fact of continuous inflation and rising in immovable property, particularly in a town, which was a district headquarter, has been clearly given on facts which are in no manner applicable or attracted in this case. Hence the first submission of Smt. Agni cannot be accepted as devoid of any substance. 7. It was further contended by Smt. Agni that admittedly the possession of the land was taken by the Department on 2-2-1981 while the deposit of the amount awarded was done only on 7-2-1987. Therefore the learned Judge should have granted to the appellant interest on the amount due under section 28 of the Act on the excess of compensation awarded which he failed to do although she was allowed the additional compensation of 12% as prescribed in section 23(1-A) of the Act. 8. However, this submission of the appellant does not also seem to be entirely correct. Section 28 of the Act, as amended in 1984, in fact provides that if the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine percentum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court. In addition the proviso to that section prescribes that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen percentum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of 'such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry. It follows therefore that the question of granting interest lies in the exclusive discretion of the Reference Court as the very word “may” clearly suggests, which discretion is always expected to be judiciously exercised by the Reference Court. In the instant case it is seen that the learned District Judge has actually exercised his discretion by allowing interest on the amount found to be due at the rate of 9% for the first year after the award till the final payment. It is not known as to why the learned Judge declined to exercise also the same discretion under the proviso to section 28 so as to grant to the appellant further interest at the rate of 15% also, after the expiry of the period of one year. We are therefore of the view that there seems to be no justification to deprive the appellant from the benefit of the enhanced rate of interest permitted by the law once the learned Judge, in his wisdom, was satisfied that interest for the delayed payment should be available to the appellant. Hence the appellant's claim to the extent of payment of interest at the rate of 15% after the expiry of the period of one year in terms of the proviso to section 28 of the Act, deserves acceptance. 9. Smt. Agni has next submitted that the learned Judge was also wrong in declining to give any increase in the value of the trees situated in the land acquired. It is her case that the learned Judge should have held that, in view of the number and nature of the trees located in the suit land and to which a mention was made in the report of the Deputy Director of Agriculture, that valuation of the trees done by him was grossly low and inadequate. 10. We are, however, unable to subscribe the view taken by Smt. Agni. 10. We are, however, unable to subscribe the view taken by Smt. Agni. The record shows that the appellant did not care to adduce any evidence to substantiate the plea that the trees had been undervalued by the L.A.O. The learned Judge also took note of this fact when he observed that no evidence was produced by the appellant to show that the trees standing on the suit land were worth more than the valuation done by the agricultural experts and therefore he would maintain the same valuation of the L.A.O. Being so there is hardly any scope for the appellant to make a grievance of this finding of the learned Judge and therefore we reject also this appellant's suggestion as entirely misconceived. 11. The last contention raised by the appellant is with regard to the rate of 50% apportionment in the appellant's favour done by the learned Judge in respect of the whole amount of compensation awarded by the L.A.O. which, according to him, should be even lesser than that but for the fact of the Comunidade having not challenged a similar apportionment made by the L.A.O. The learned Judge gave very sound and valid reasons to justify this apportionment. The learned Judge observed that the suit land being a mere cashew grove, however, the plantation of the cashew trees appeared to be very scarce and weak, which fact could be made out from the circumstance that being the area of the land substantially vast and admeasuring more than 44.000 sq. metres the appellant was paying to the Comunidade per year just a paltry sum of Rs. 400/- only. 12. The appellant at a certain stage gave up this point and instead raised a fresh plea by way of an amendment which she was allowed to make in the memo of appeal, consequent upon the fact that there was no objection on the part of the Comunidade which, in spite of having been duly notified of the proposed amendment remained absent at the time of the hearing. By the said amendment the appellant claimed that, by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu another v. Lakshmibai Narayan Patil)3, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1771, upholding the validity of the Fifth Amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter called the Tenancy Act) which has been struck down by the learned Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu, all the tenants of leased lands became its deemed owners on the tiller's day. As such she being also a deemed owner of the cashew land admittedly leased by the Comunidade, as its acknowledged tenant, the appellant had vested right to the whole amount of compensation awarded by the L.A.O. 13. There is indeed a lot of substance in this submission of Smt. Agni which no doubt merits consideration. Section 18-A of the Tenancy Act, as amended in 1976, which refers to the tenant being deemed to have purchased land on the tiller's day (14-10-1976), prescribes that every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant and such land shall vest in him free from all encumbrances subsisting on the said day. Section 18-C refers to the notices to be issued by the Mamlatdar for the determination of the price of land to be paid by the tenants. Section 18-D speaks of the purchase price payable to the landlord and section 18-E prescribes the mode of payment of the purchase price by the tenant. Section 18-G is with regard to the recovery of purchase price as arrears of land revenue. Section 18-H makes purchase ineffective in case the tenant-purchaser fails to pay the purchase price. Section 181 provides that the right of the tenant whose tenancy has been created after tiller's day while section 18-J confers on the Mamlatdar the power to resume and dispose of land not purchased by the tenant. 14. It follows therefore that in view of the scheme of the Amended Act the tenant is deemingly entitled to hold the leased land, as on 14-10-1976, as its actual owner provided he pays the price determined by the Mamlatdar and against the payment of such price. 14. It follows therefore that in view of the scheme of the Amended Act the tenant is deemingly entitled to hold the leased land, as on 14-10-1976, as its actual owner provided he pays the price determined by the Mamlatdar and against the payment of such price. Thus the object of the Amending Act is clearly to vest the land in the tiller and the right of any person to receive merely rent is just taken away for a price. 15. This being the position it is obvious that until and unless the appellant pays to the Comunidade the price ascertained by the Mamlatdar it is not open for her to plead any ownership rights on the leased land and/or claim that she is actually entitled to forthwith collect the full amount of compensation awarded by the L.A.O. to the acquired land. In the instant case it appears that the Comunidade has already withdrawn half of the compensation deposited by the L.A.O. and therefore irrespective of whatever rights the appellant may eventually seek to enforce against the Comunidade and for this amount, it is however, compelling to acknowledge that, as the things now stand, she is only the deemed owner of the acquired land and as such required under the prevailing law, to fulfil certain obligations towards the landlord so as to be vested with the proprietary rights in respect of the suit land. To be noted also that the aforesaid sections 18-H and 18-J provide for the purchase becoming ineffective on the tenant's failure to pay the lawfully determined price to the landlord and also for the power of the Mamlatdar to resume and dispose of land not purchased by the tenant. It remains to be seem however, that from the very circumstance of the tenant being for all purposes to be deemed as owner of the tenanted land the legal protection conferred on the appellant by the statutory provisions of the Fifth Amendment justifies, in some measure, her claimed entitlement to the amount of compensation awarded by the L.A.O. also in respect of the share already paid and actually collected by the Comunidade subject to the appellant's compliance of the requirements of sections 18-D and 18-E of the Tenancy Act. Thus the prayer of the appellant is to be allowed but only to the extent and in the manner as shaped above. 16. Thus the prayer of the appellant is to be allowed but only to the extent and in the manner as shaped above. 16. In the result the appeal partly succeeds and the award of the learned District Judge dated 29-11-1986 is hereby affirmed with the already mentioned modifications regarding accrual of interest at the rate of 15% in the appellant's favour in respect of the sum due on the expiry of the period of one year after the passing of the award till its actual payment and the apportionment of the entire amount of compensation awarded for the acquired land to the appellant subject to her compliance of the provisions of sections 18-D and 18-E of the Tenancy Act. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Order accordingly. Appeal partly allowed. -----