Judgment :- The above appeal has been filed against the order dated 20-8-1980 made in A. S. No. 44 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Karur whereunder the lower appellate Court, while allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, remanded the matter for fresh disposal in respect of two points, namely, (a) whether the plaintiffs are the only next or the nearest reversioners to the estate of Sami Pandaram; and (b) whether Veerabadran is or is not the next or nearest heir or a person in the male line of succession to Angamuthu, Vathan, Kappa and Chinniah. 2. The relevant facts for the purpose it deciding the points raised before me are as follows : Respondents 1 and 2 have filed O. S. No. 69 of 1978 on the file of the District Munsif, Kulithalai praying (a) for a declaration that the plaintiffs, and 9th defendant, who is the 8th respondent before this Court, are entitled exclusively to the one-fourth right of the deceased paternal uncle Swami Pandaram in doing pooja services during that turn and in the income from the suit properties as his sole heirs at law and (b) for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 3 the appellants before this Court from in any manner interfering with or obstructing the enjoyment of that right and collection of rents from the suit properties by the plaintiffs. The case of the plaintiffs was that the temple known as Sri Angalamman temple at Thottiyam village was the private family temple for which the plaintiffs and their ancestors were the hereditary trustees and poojaries, that one Muthuveeran, the great grandfather of the plaintiffs, was originally the sole trustee and poojari, that he had four sons by name Angamuthu, Vathan, Kappa and Chinniah, that on the death of Muthuveeran, his four sons succeeded to that right and that all the four sons were doing pooja by turns and enjoying the income from the suit properties, that Sami Pandaram is entitled to 1/4th right, that he settled his 1/4th right in favour of his wife Angammal, that Sami Pandaram died in 1950, that subsequently in a litigation resulting in O.S. No. 581 of 1950 which ended ultimately in S.A. No. 833 of 1955 on the file of this Court, it has been held that Angammal, wife of late Sami Padaram, became entitled to the 1/4th share and rights of late Sami Pandaram by virtue of the settlement deed dated 11-2-1914, that Angammal had only a life interest in the property as per the said settlement deed executed by late Sami Pandaram, that she died issueless on 1-12-1977 and consequently the 1/4th right of Sami Pandaram reverted back to the family of the plaintiffs and they alone are entitled to succeed to that right and do the pooja service in that turn also as the sole and legal heirs to the deceased Sami Pandaram. 3. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 disputed the claim of the plaintiffs contending that they were entitled to the right and share of Sami Pandaram by succession as well as by alienation, that Angammal's life estate got enlarged as per the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (Central Act 30 of 1956), that thereafter she executed a settlement deed on 31-7-1964 conferring upon Veerabadra the absolute rights, that the first defendant, who is the wife of the said Veerabadra and the second defendant his only daughter were entitled to the same and that the third defendant is the son-in-law of the first defendant and also the sister's son of Angammal, wife of Sami Pandaram and consequently both by virtue of alienation as well as by succession traced by them to Sami Pandaram they are entitled to the 1/4th right indisputably belonging to Sami Pandaram and held in the earlier litigation to belong to Angammal under the settlement deed of the year 1914. The 9th defendant with whom the plaintiffs claimed a joint right, disowned any rights by filing a written statement contending that the properties of Sami Pandaram devolved on defendants 1 and 2 by virtue of the settlement deeds of the years 1914 and 1964 referred to supra and the 9th defendant virtually supported the defendants 1 to 3 in their claim. The other defendants are the lessees and tenants of the properties. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the rights of Angammal got enlarged by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and in view of the settlement deed executed by the said Angammal, the agnates of Sami Pandaram had no other right whatsoever as claimed by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court, disagreeing with the conclusions of the trial Court on the applicability of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, came to the conclusion that it was S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act that applied, that Angammal did not and could not get an absolute estate and, therefore, it became necessary to decide the question as to who are the next or nearest reversioners to the estate of Sami Pandaram and further whether the claim made through Veerabadra as the next or nearest heir could be sustained and for the limited purpose, remitted the matter to the trial Court. Aggrieved, defendants 1 to 3 filed the above appeal questioning the order of remand. 5. Mr. A. Ramanathan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf the appellants submitted that the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that Angammal had only a limited estate having regard to Section 14(2) of the Act and did not and could not become the absolute owner of the property she got under the settlement deed executed by Sami Pandaram in the year 1914 by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Act, is contrary to the law and cannot be sustained and that the findings of the trial Court in this regard ought not to have been interfered with by the lower appellate Court. Learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in 1977 AIR(SC) 1944, 1977 HLR 287, 1977 (3) SCC 99 , 1977 (3) SCR 261 , 1990 AIR(Mad) 379. In Ranganayakiammal v. R. Srinivasaraghava (supra) Bellie, J. held that a life estate given to the settlee for the purpose of her maintenance would fall within the scope of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act read with the Explanation and such limited right would get enlarged and ripened into a full or absolute right in the properties so settled. On this basis, the learned Counsel submitted that the conclusions of the lower appellate Court are opposed to the catena of decisions of this court as well as the Supreme Court and consequently cannot be sustained in so far as it related to the rights of Angammal and the applicability of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act so far as the estate got by her under the settlement deed of the year 1914 executed by her husband for her maintenance. 6. Mr. H. Sankaravadivel, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent made the following two submissions: - (a) The first plaintiff/first respondent before this court died on 21-8-1984 during the pendency of the appeal before this Court, that the belated and perfunctory steps taken to bring on record his legal representatives miserably failed and those applications were dismissed on 20-7-1985 and on that day the appeal, in so far as the first respondent, was also declared abated and dismissed. On account of this, according to the learned counsel, the whole of the appeal becomes liable to be dismissed and the appeal in respect of other respondents cannot be further proceeded with on merits. In support of the said submission, learned counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in 1961 1962 AIR(SC) 89, 1961 (2) SCJ 637, 1962 (2) SCR 636 , 1961 (2) MLJ 182, 1962 (1) AnLT 306, 1961 (2) KerLR 548, 1961 (2) MLJ(SC) 182, 1961 (2) MLJ 182 and (1972) 85 Mad LW 744: 1969 AIR(Mad) 428) (b) Learned counsel next contended that the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that it was only Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 that applies to the case of the estate derived by Angammal under the settlement deed of the year 1914 was correct and does not call for interference in this appeal. 7. So far as the first plea of the counsel for the second respondent is concerned, it requires to be decided first before considering the matter on merits. In Innasi Udayar v. Chinnasamy Raju, 1972 Mad LW 744 : 1969 AIR(Mad) 428), Ismail, J. considered the earlier Supreme Court decision on the point and came to the conclusion that where the decree is a joint and indivisible against all the defendants, and the decree does not provide that each one of the defendants will have to put the plaintiff in possession of the respective portions of the suit land in their possession or occupation, the decree appealed against having regard to it being a joint and indivisible decree against all the defendants, once the appeal has abated against one or more of the defendants who filed the appeal, the appeal by other appellants also cannot be proceeded with and has to be dismissed. The learned Judge also held that there cannot be any general classification regarding the applicability of the said principle and whether such principle will apply or not to a particular case will depend upon the cause of action, the nature of the relief claimed, and the nature of the decree granted and in the case of an appeal the applicability or otherwise of the principle will depend primarily upon the nature of the decree appealed against. In order to get over the said submission, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the rights of a reversioner are peculiar, in that, the reversioners sue in a representative capacity qua the estate of the last male-holder and not in their individual capacity and that in the case on hand, the death of one reversioner does not entitle his heirs to succeed along with other reversioners and on the other hand, it is only the remaining reversioners as the next and the nearest reversioners to the estate of the last male-holder that become entitled to the property and consequently the fact that in the appeal was dismissed as having abated against the first respondent does not affect the pursuit of the appeal as against the claims of the remaining reversioners as a whole. 8. For my part, I am totally unable to agree with the plea of the learned Counsel for the appellants regarding the manner in which he attempts to get over the objection of the respondents regarding the maintainability of the appeal, notwithstanding the order of this court dated 20-7-1985 dismissing the appeal in so far as the first respondent was concerned. The plea of the learned counsel for the appellants not only seems to be farfetched but proceeds upon a thorough misconception of the concept of reversioners and their rights as well as the course of remedies available to them during the lifetime of the holder of the limited estate and thereafter. It is only a suit or proceeding by a presumptive reversioner that can be said to be brought in a representative capacity for and on behalf of all the reversioners and only in such cases, it can be claimed that on the death of a presumptive owner, the next or remaining presumptive owner is entitled to continue the action instituted. But, this is not such a case and the suit itself came to be laid after the death on 1-12-1977 of the limited estate-holder Angammal, wife of Sami Pandaram. The suit O.S. No. 69 of 1978 instituted in the present case was by the two plaintiffs who claimed to be actual reversioners and not in their capacity as presumptive reversioners. 9. The suit O.S. No. 69 of 1978 instituted in the present case was by the two plaintiffs who claimed to be actual reversioners and not in their capacity as presumptive reversioners. 9. Be that as it may, the question is whether cause of action survives the death of the first respondent and if so to what extent and with what consequence in respect of the further course of action of the appeal. The vital aspect that has to be kept under consideration is that each of the reversioner is entitled to his own specific share and he could have sued for his own share and got a decree in respect of the same. The decree passed, therefore, could not be said to be joint and indivisible. 10. Though the suit has been filed by two persons joining together and one decree has passed in the said suit, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and also the nature of the rights of parties claimed therein, I am of the view that in substance and reality, the suit involved consideration of the distinct rights and independant claims of the plaintiffs and therefore, it could not be legitimately contended that the appeal abated even in respect of the claims of the other plaintiff who is presently the second respondent before this court. In Harihar Prasad v. Balmiki Prasad, 1975 AIR(SC) 733, 1975 (1) SCC 212 , 1975 (2) SCR 932 , the apex Court held that where each one of the plaintiffs could have filed a suit for his share, the mere fact that all of them joined together as plaintiffs and filed one suit does not mean that if for one reason or the other the claim of one of them fails or abates the suit in respect of the others also fall or abates. In the opinion of the Apex Court, the decree is in substance a combination of several decrees in favour of several plaintiffs. The significance of one of such plaintiffs cited as a respondent in the appeal becoming dead and the appeal abating as against him for the failure to bring on record his legal representatives is that the decree, in so far as he is concerned, cannot be set aside. The significance of one of such plaintiffs cited as a respondent in the appeal becoming dead and the appeal abating as against him for the failure to bring on record his legal representatives is that the decree, in so far as he is concerned, cannot be set aside. Consequently, in my opinion, there would be no question of any conflict of decrees resulting in a case where the decree passed is in effect and substance a combination of many decrees. The objection of the counsel for the respondents does not merit my acceptance and the same shall stand rejected. 11. So far as the plea recording the provision of which applies to the case on hand, i.e., whether it is Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is concerned, I am of the view that the lower appellate Court was in error in applying the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act to the case on hand. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows : "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property : (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation :- In this sub-section, 'property', includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise; or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any Other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." * The conclusion of the lower appellate court that what was settled upon by late Sami Pandaram under the settlement deed dated 11-2-1914 was a new right conferred upon Angammal and was not made in recognition of any pre-existing right in favour of Angammal, though appears to be attractive, really misses the vital point that indisputably the properties were given for purpose of maintenance of Angammal, his wife. The ratio of the decisions reported in V. Tulasamma v. Seha Reddi (supra) and Ranganayakiammal v. R. Srinivasaraghavan (supra) squarely apply to the case on hand and that merely because she was given the properties under a document, the case is not taken out of Section 14(1) of the Act. The recitals in Ex. A.2 settlement deed do not in any way militate against the applicability of Section 14(1) of the Act nor do they render the same as one falling within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider once again this question in a decision reported in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh, 1987 AIR(SC) 2251, 1987 (2) CCC 561, 1987 (2) DMC 254, 1987 (2) HLR 416, 1987 (3) JT 121 , 1987 (2) Scale 82 , 1987 (3) SCC 674 , 1987 (3) SCR 576 , 1987 (2) UJ 399 whereunder it was opined as follows at page 2254: "(3). It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right to a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership under Section 14(1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of Court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right." The right of a wife for maintenance from her husband or from out of the joint family properties is a right which (inheres) in her by the very fact of she being the wife of a Hindu male and when such right is secured by means of a document, it could not be said on that fact alone that she had no pre-existing rights but for the document executed by her husband. Consequently, I am of the view that the judgment of the lower appellate court reversing the finding of the trial Court on this aspect is liable to be set aside and therefore, is hereby set aside. The rights of parties have to be determined only in the light of Section 14(1) of the Act. Even that apart, it is very much doubtful whether the claim of reversioners could be sustained as reversioners in a case like this, when the original holder Sami Pandaram is said to have died only in 1950, having regard to the provisions contained in the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and the amendments introduced to the same by the State of Tamil Nadu. 12. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal, in so far as it relates to the other respondents than the deceased first respondent, shall stand allowed. 12. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal, in so far as it relates to the other respondents than the deceased first respondent, shall stand allowed. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I consider it necessary, in order to render substantial and effective justice, to set aside the order of remand made by the lower appellate Court directing the trial Court to answer the other points 1 and 3 to 5 formulated by the lower appellate court further direct the lower appellate Court to dispose of the matter itself, if necessary, after affording such opportunity as it deems fit and necessary instead of the trial Court, and in the light of the conclusions and findings rendered by me supra. But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.