JUDGMENT 1. - This revision has been directed against the order dated 23.7.1990, passed by M.J.M. Hindaun City by which the said court allowed the application of the non-petitioners dated 2.6.90 and held that as the plaintiff had not complied with the order dated 7.3.1986, passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Revision No. 21/86, and did not deposit Rs. 200/- of cost within one month from the said date and as such the Suit No. 218/74 stood dismissed. Against this order, the plaintiff has come in revision. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this case are that the plaintiff petitioner filed two suit Nos. 127/73 (218/74) and 135/72 (119/74). Both these suits were consolidated vide order dated 15.4.77, of this Court passed in Civil Revision No. 183/74, but the proceedings were drawn only in case No. 135/72(119/74) That during the pendency of the above suits, the defendant Surajbhan expired. The petitioner submitted an application in Suit No. 135/72(119/74), for impleading his legal heirs. That application was allowed and the legal heirs of Surajbhan were impleaded in that suit. No application was submitted for substitution of legal heirs in suit No. 218/74 in time. Later on, the plaintiffs submitted an application for substitution in this suit also which was beyond time. The trial court also allowed this application and the plaintiff petitioners were required to file amended cause title. As the plaintiff petitioners did not file amended cause title in suit No. 218/74, hence the trial court vide order dated 6.11.85, held that the suit stood abated. Against this order, the plaintiff petitioners filed a revision which was allowed by this Court on 7.3.86, on cost of Rs. 200/- which was to be paid by the plaintiff within one month from the said date. The order of the Court dated 7.3.86, reads as under: "In case the aforesaid amount of cost is not paid within one month from today, the suit No. 127/73 shall stand dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the order of the Court." Admittedly, this amount was not paid by 7.4.86 but was paid on 8.4.86. As the file of the lower court was gone to the Court of Hindaun City and returned back from that Court only on 17.3.90, nothing happened within this period. On 19.4.90, the Court asked regarding payment of cost in pursuance of the order of High Court. As the file of the lower court was gone to the Court of Hindaun City and returned back from that Court only on 17.3.90, nothing happened within this period. On 19.4.90, the Court asked regarding payment of cost in pursuance of the order of High Court. On 18.5.90, the plaintiff petitioners submitted receipt of payment of cost of Rs. 200/- dated 8.4.90. After seeing the receipt, the defendants moved the present application stating that as the plaintiffs did not make the payment of cost within one month from the date of the order of the High Court i.e. from 7.3.86, hence the suit stood automatically dismissed. The trial court vide its order dated 23.7.90, allowed the applications of the defendants and held that suit No. 127/73 stood dismissed in view of the order of the High Court dated 7.3.86, passed in Civil Revision Pet. No. 21/87. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record placed before me by the parties. It has been argued by Mr. Jain, counsel for the petitioner that the trial court accepted the application of the defendants only on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to extend time. The time can be extended only by the High Court. He placed before the trial court the file cover of Mr. P.D. Sharma, who argued S.B. Civil Revision No. 21/86. According to the file cover and the letter of the counsel, the plaintiff petitioners were under the impression that revision was allowed on 10th April and the amount was to be deposited by 9th April. He further argued that the petitioner should not be punished on account of mistake of counsel. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on a judgment of Hon. Supreme Court reported in Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and another, AIR 1981 S.C. 1400 . He further argued that if the trial court was not competent to extend time, time can be extended by this Court under Section 148 read with Section 151 C.P.C. Section 148 provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. He argued that the period expired on 7.4.86 and the amount of cost was deposited with the non-petitioners on the next date and as such this Court is competent to extend time. He further argued that the Court has inherent powers also to extend time. For that purpose, he placed reliance on a judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hirala, AIR 1962 S.C. 527 , wherein it was held as under: "Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court, it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it." He also placed reliance on a judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in Smt. Periyakkal and others v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 S.C. 428 . In this case also the time fixed by the order of the Court had expired and subsequently, an application was filed for extension of time. The Hon. Supreme Court held as under:- "The parties, however, entered into a compromise and invited the Court to make an order in terms of the compromise, which the Court did. The time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent mainfest justice." 4. Mr. Jain argued that the amount of cost could not be deposited in time in the circumstances mentioned above and there was delay of only one day. He further argued that this suit was consolidated with another suit and both the suits were to be tried together. He submits that the Courts exist not for the purpose of maintaining discipline but for deciding the rights of the parties and as there was delay of only one day and as such time should be extended by this Court under-Section 148 and 151 C.P.C. 5. He submits that the Courts exist not for the purpose of maintaining discipline but for deciding the rights of the parties and as there was delay of only one day and as such time should be extended by this Court under-Section 148 and 151 C.P.C. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Goyal argued that the order was peremptory in nature and the Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to extend the time granted by this Court while allowing S.B. Civil Revision Pet. Number 21/86. 6. After hearing counsel for both the parties, I am of the view that the lower court was justified in not extending time as it had no jurisdiction to extend time. But as the time was fixed by this Court, this Court has certainly jurisdiction to extend time. I am of the view that when the time has expired, it can be extended only in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. In the present case there was delay in payment of cost of one day only, the cost has also been accepted by the counsel for the opposite side. After accepting cost, the opposite party raised objection after a period of more than four years. In case the time is not extended, it would certainly cause injustice to the petitioners, who filed the suit in the year 1973, and seriously watching the progress of the same. Under these circumstances, I think it just and proper and in he interest of justice to extend time for payment of cost upto 8th April, 1986. This is subject to payment of cost of Rs. 500/- to the opposite side. 7. In the result, the revision is allowed with the above observations and the order of the lower court dated 23.7.90, allowing the application of the non- petitioners for dismissing the suit is set-aside. The application submitted by the defendants is dismissed and the Civil Suit No. 127/73, is ordered to be restored to its original number. 8. The lower court is directed to decide both the suits at an early date.Revision allowed. *******